Basically, you're banking on the idea of reasoning about this stuff--so that you need to proceed as if moral utterances have truth values, and you're also trying to do that from the perspective of moral utterances needing to be maximally generalized rather than being very particularly qualified or alternately rather vague.

"suffering more than they would without modifications" then — khaled

They could just say, "I have no opinion on that; all I have an opinion on is that creating suffering people is morally neutral"

"Is genetically modifying a child to suffer as much as possible ok by you?" — khaled

For one, they didn't say anything about "suffering as much as possible" did they? So why would you change it to that?

Okay, but you'd realize that someone could just as well think "Creating suffering people is morally neutral" right?

You're not going to say, "Hey subjectivism or emotivism is right re ethics . . . especially because ethics makes no sense under subjectivism or emotivism"

Obviously one is not going to adopt a philosophical view about something that results in that thing making no sense, right?

So the answer is no? I'm just saying that not making sense from a subjectivist/emotivist standpoint isn't really a problem with antinatalism only — khaled

So obviously you're not a subjectivist or emotivist. Why pretend to be one?

Is there a way to make sense of any ethical stance from a subjectivist/emotivist standpoint? — khaled

You wouldn't ask this if you really thought it was subjective.

Which is not realizing that it's a category error.

No no no, I'd say I am. — khaled

Sure. I know that. But you're not really, because I don't think you really understand it. You wouldn't be arguing about moral utterances having truth values if you did.

I don't think there's really any way to make sense of antinatalism from a subjectivist/emotivist standpoint.

It depends on the individual in question and how they're thinking about them.

Look, basically, you're not really a subjectivist on this stuff. Which is something I pointed out a long time ago.

"P2" is the case for someone who feels the way described in P2
"P3" is the case for someone who feels the way described in P3

Which bears absolutely zero resemblance to "would be the case for an individual who agrees with P1"

And you said P2 and C would be the case for an individual who agrees with P1 — khaled

Someone isn't reading very well.

P1: Creating happy people is morally neutral — khaled

No. That has no truth value. (That's what I told you at first by the way.)

Because if the first statement has non truth value then what exactly did I just say here? — khaled

What you're saying is how you feel about murder. The way that you feel about murder has no truth value.

The other two would only be the case for an individual if they feel that way.

So all thieves think theft is morally ok? — khaled

You have an ask an individual to see what their moral views are. It's not as if everyone has the same moral views just because they fit under a classification such as "thief."

Does that mean they wouldn't mind if someone robbed them? — khaled

Surely some have views such as "Theft is okay in circumstance x" etc.

Just saying "emotivism is the case" doesn't make it the case. — khaled

Of course. The way the world happens to be makes it the case. You say it because you want to get correct what the world is like.

A moral statement is not necessarily a statement of how one feels. — khaled

Yeah, it is. That's what they are ontologically.

Why not? — khaled

Because there's nothing to get correct or incorrect. It's simply an utterance re how an individual feels towards the behavior in question. You can't get that correct or incorrect. However one feels is how one feels.

No. — khaled

Then the analogy doesn't work. Moral statements can not be true or false.

In math how do you know that if A = B and B= C that A = C. That's a premise. And it's taken to be true because it's not provable. Same thing in reasoning with moral statements. — khaled

You're arguing that mathematical statements can't be true or false? That truth value is a category error for them?

If we were emplying the "doesn't benefit at all" limit then this would be a bad example — khaled

You just said to forget about that. If you're not forgetting about it then we're back to trying to make sense of the initial comment.

But also asking the vast majority of children if they want to go to school or not will have them answer postively in the long term. So i don't think it's much of a forced decision anyway. — khaled

So something is consensual just in case most people would say they had a positive opinion of it in the long term.

But you're suggesting that most people don't have a positive opinion of life in the long term?

You can assume a moral statement is true and reason from there. — khaled

It doesn't make any sense to assume it's true, because that's a category error.

Premises have a truth value. Logic doesn't make much sense outside of the notion of truth value.

No. Not any reaction. That's the point. I don't just have any reaction to you saying "imagine a blue elephant". I might stubbornly refuse to imagine a blue elephant. I might get confused and imagine a pink elephant... But I am vastly more likely to think of a blue elephant than I would have been had you not spoken the words. Your words have had an effect on me. They have made it vastly more likely that I will think of a blue elephant than it was before you spoke.

If you don't believe me, walk into a pub, say "imagine a blue elephant" and bet £100 that the number of people who then think of a blue elephant will be exactly the same as the pub next door where no one spoke those words. — Isaac

What would this have to do with the notion of causing people to be violent because you're saying "nigga" or teaching a dog to raise its paw when it hears "Sieg Heil" (which are two cases that were looked at under the UK hate speech laws)?

And the answer is that you could apply the same reasoning, but in the case of hate speech there's a sensible basis for banning it, — S

. . . What does that have to do with Shamshir's post?

the two main premises of antinatalism the first being "making happy people is morally neutral" and the second being "making suffering people is morally bad" — khaled

Neither of which are true or false (since no moral stance is). Thus calling them "premises" doesn't even really work.

Why are you continuing to pursue this when we both know that it's a stupid idea, not at all comparable to hate speech? — S

Just following shamshir's reasoning.

I'm not sure why we're still talking about this when I already said "You can forget about the “and they don’t benefit from it whatsoever” bit. — khaled

Sorry, I missed you saying that.

What about an example of taking someone from a less risky to a more risky position without their consent that is considered ok."

Okay, so one very standard example of that is sending a child to school.

There is benefit if the expected value of a situation goes up — khaled

You stipulated that we're talking about "where they do not benefit whatsoever from the shift," right?

Okay, just swap "being angry" with "being spurned romantically". It's not like that makes it any less impractical, impossible, and ridiculous. — S

Why wouldn't it simply take a claim that you asked someone to hook up with you and they turned you down? All we need for rape is a claim that it happened.

You're not understanding the context of my comments to you at the moment.

I'm trying to understand how it makes sense to talk about any chance of pleasure if we're limited to talking about "where they do not benefit whatsoever."

You brought up the idea of a zero-sum game in the context of expectations. I'm trying to figure out how that makes sense of positing both a chance high risk of pleasure and being limited to talking about having no benefit whatsoever.

It would be practically impossible to ban anger, so that's not even worth bringing up as an attempt at producing a counterexample. — S

?? "Being spurned romantically" refers to someone turning you down when you're romantically interested in them.

So we're always expecting a zero sum game?

Anything that causes violence is an advocate of violence. — Shamshir

Sure. And do you want to allow those things or?

No it doesn’t. When I say don’t benefit whatsoever, I mean the expected value of pleasure/pain doesn’t change but the standard deviation does. — khaled

Huh? You'd need to explain that.

That's its purpose, dear. First the spark, then the inferno. — Shamshir

So if something else caused violence, genocide, etc. that's no problem?

Advocation of violence is itself violence. — Shamshir

Why are you bringing up the idea of it sparking violence, then genocide, etc.?

It's not romantic spurning to be prohibited, but the advocation of violence as a fair mean to settle an issue.

The problem is not with the speech or the spurning, but the violence they advocate. — Shamshir

Wait, so you don't have a problem with the violence/genocide/etc. itself, but just the advocating of violence?