Let me try this: is gold a yellow metal? Is gold any other color? Assuming the answer to these are yes and no respectively, then it seems right to say that if there is gold, then it is a metal and it is yellow, and, if it is either not metal or not yellow, then it is not gold. — tim wood

So, when we're talking about this from the a priori context, the answer is "It depends on how you've formulated your concepts."

No, the structure was all F that E can be predicated of are E all F that G can be predicated of G, — MindForged

Try that one mo 'gin in Engrish.

You like the word really - what is really going on; what the statement really tells us. I'm not so keen. I still do not see how your post explains anything. — Banno

Well, we'd need to check if you even understood my post, I suppose. How would you say what I said in your own words?

But deductive validity requires that the form must guarantee deriving only true conclusions from true premises. — aletheist

Right. I wasn't arguing that it was valid, and I explained why it's not. What I argued is that people gave examples where the conclusion did follow. They didn't give examples where the conclusion doesn't follow.

Right not necessarily, but the conclusion does follow in your example. Your example is actually a bit different structurally, because you're saying that all F that G can also be predicated of are F, and all F that G can also be predicated of are G . . .

It explains what's really going on with those statements contra Kant's misconceptions, and it explains the only sense in which we could say that they're "necessary."

"Gold is a yellow metal" or "a bachelor is an unmarried man" — tim wood

All those types of statements really tell us is how an individual has formulated their concepts. It's telling us either what they require to call some x (some particular) an F (some type term), or alternately it's announcing terms they use as synonyms.

The only necessity invoked there is the stringent stipulation of the individual in question.

What? The problem with that is the argument is just the form, not the truth value of the two premises. All bouncy orange balls are bouncy, all bouncy orange balls are bouncy, but that does not imply "some orange are bouncy", it doesn't follow. Of course the sentence doesn't make sense but the relevant logical issue is just the use of an invalid argument form. — MindForged

Right, the problem is the form in that the form doesn't guarantee that the conclusion is true.

That doesn't mean that the conclusion can't be true. If All guitars are Gibsons and All guitars are Les Pauls, then some Gibsons are Les Pauls. So the conclusion is true in that case. But it's not impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false, because we can formulate a version of the argument where the conclusion is that some orange is bouncy.

I don't see the conceptual issue here, these seem like perfectly comprehensible properties some object might have even if they do not in fact have them — MindForged

I was explaining this to aletheist, and I can explain it to you, but it will take a few steps. First, what is the domain you're dealing with in the example you have in mind?

It's like asking "Does the moon prefer to listen to Michael Jackson or Mozart?" And then noting that the moon doesn't prefer either, and concluding that there are no preferences, period.

That's clearly absurd though. Why? Because it's individual people who have preferences, not things like the moon. We need to ask the question in the right context.

Meaning, significance, preferences are things that we do. And it's definitely the case that we do those things.

I'm not dismissing quantum entanglement per se. What I'm dismissing is that we can empirically observe something like "x can be anything until it is observed" or "x doesn't exist prior to being observed" or "x is both F and not-F prior to being observed."

That sort of stuff is at best about the mathematical formalisations used, where unfortunately, people have a tendency to reify something that's just an instrumental convention.

So with the Darapti argument (All As are Bs; All As are Cs; Therefore some Bs are Cs) we go from true premises to a false conclusion. — MindForged

The reason that that argument wouldn't be valid would be that Bs and Cs can both be properties (or in other words, things "predicated of A") where it doesn't make sense to say that some of property B is (or has) property C. For example, if B is "orange" and C is "bouncy" (and As are bouncy orange balls) it doesn't make sense to say that some orange is bouncy.

That's not the case with your winged horse example. In the winged horse example, we're not positing properties where it doesn't make conceptual sense to say that one property somehow is or has the other property.

It would not be fallacious for me to argue that I should buy pizza because that’s what the guests want. — TheHedoMinimalist

That's not a fallacious sentiment--sentiments can't be fallacious, arguments are; but it's also not true or false, correct or incorrect, or objective in any manner (aside from the objective fact that when polled, most of your guests said they wanted pizza).

Similarly, it would not be fallacious to argue that if most people prefer existence over non-existence then we should consider this fact when thinking about the morality of reproduction — TheHedoMinimalist

That makes a lot less sense to me. You should consider that fact when thinking about the morality of reproduction in what context? Deciding your own moral stance?

Valid argument: Most guests at your party want to have pizza for dinner. This fact is one objective fact about the overall preferences of your guests that should be taken into consideration — TheHedoMinimalist

You can't have a valid should. Shoulds are preferences that individuals have, too. They're not valid or invalid.

If nothing is what it is, or can be anything until it is observed. — Rank Amateur

There's a huge problem with scientists saying stuff like this. That sort of nonsense has absolutely nothing to do with any experiment we can do.

A conclusion is true or false because of the structure of the argument. You don't determine if the conclusion is true or false by doing an empirical examination re whether there are any winged horses (in whatever domain).

You can't show via an experiment that either something doesn't have a spatiotemporal location or that it doesn't exist prior to being seen.

I am looking outside the logic — MindForged

Which isn't itself logic. Hence the wording.

Unlimited tolerance would presumably include tolerance of hate speech, Pro-Nazi views, pedophilia advocates--etc. Views considered more outrageous.

The philosophic implication of such a world is all problems then become metaphysical - since all physical constants are only valid in the space time plane we are aware of. — Rank Amateur

You also don't seem to be using the term "metaphysical" in the standard (at least modern) philosophical sense there.

Quantum entanglement as I understand it has been experimentally proven — Rank Amateur

Ermpirical claims are not provable (in any stricter sense of that term) and we're not doing science if ANY claim isn't revisable.



And apparently no one knows what instrumentalism is, by the way.

The fact that there is one sort of reality we know about (the material world) does not exclude the possibility of alternative forms of reality. We are missing information in the real world and it must be somewhere. If we can't find it in the real world, it must be elsewhere. So a non-material world makes sense. — Devans99

An alternate-to-the-material-world world doesn't make sense just because we are "missing information"--whatever that amounts to, exactly. And whatever it amounts to, "Just in case there's only the material world, then we'd not be missing any information" obviously doesn't follow.

You'd have to try to make some sense of what a non-material world would even be. Otherwise it's just an empty term. You could just forward any nonsense word as the alternative--"There must be a pleebaflak that's different than the material world because we're missing information." It would just be a sound referring to nothing.

There is masses of experimental evidence for the speed of light and for quantum entanglement; — Devans99

If there is empirical evidence that the speed of light can be exceeded, then obviously we went wrong somewhere in our theorizing. Empirical evidence trumps theory.

FTL travel is not possible because of spacetime — Devans99

"Spacetime" is one place that I KNOW we've gone wrong. There is no such "thing" as spacetime. Space is the same as the extension of matter and the extensional relations of matter. That's it. it's not anything else. It's not any sort of "container" to put things into. It has no properties in itself. And time is simply change or motion--so that it again supervenes on matter/the dynamic relations of matter. Thinking of space, time or spacetime as something that kind of functions like a container, or that has its "own" properties, etc., is a very fundamental mistake, and any theorizing based on that is going to have problems.

Re the theory worship problem, in a nutshell, if you get to a point where theory suggests something that is absurd or that contradicts empirical evidence, you should figure that we went wrong somewhere in our theorizing, or we at least missed something.

It's the "therefore I have no head" problem. If the theory leads to a conclusion like that. you don't continue to endorse the theory as if it's necessarily the trump card (and add stuff like, "It must be magic that makes it appear as if I have a head . . ."). You go, "Oops! I must have royally f-ed up somewhere." And then you retrace your steps, apply (creative) critical thinking to each step, and try to figure out where you could have gone wrong.

In my opinion especially physics spends a lot of time on and posits a lot of gobbledygooky, unfalsifiable nonsense, and interprets a lot of things in a completely untenable way philosophically, in a way that has increased in the past 150 years or so . . . but I'm a physicalist and a nominalist with a very parsimonious ontology--I'm not even a realist on mathematics, or any abstracts for that matter--who favors and instrumental interpretation of science and who has a bit of a logical positivist disposition. So obviously I'm going to think that "multiverse" talk and all of that sort of stuff is so much balderdash.

The initial post says nothing about physical violence, initiating physical attacks, committing murders, etc.

Conventional talk of tolerance has nothing to do with that. It has to do with attitudes, beliefs customs, biases, biogtry, etc. It's an ideological issue, not a violence issue.

Either you're ignoring what I just explained re what it is for there to be any As at all in a domain, or you didn't understand what I wrote . . . which could be my fault, because maybe I wasn't very clear, but it doesn't help to just proceed so that I'd have to basically write the same thing again.

First, you're ignoring that the idea of a nonmaterial anything doesn't even make any sense.

Secondly, you're doing what I talked about earlier re assuming that our theories are correct. In other words, if our theories suggest that FTL communication is impossible, then it's impossible. Our theories could be wrong. We could have gotten things wrong at a very fundamental level that would require a major paradigm change in physics (and/or the mathematics that underlies it).

Third, you're comfortable jumping to "well FTL communication is impossible in the material world, but it would be possible in the nonmaterial world" (even though the idea of a nonmaterial world doesn't even make any sense and we haven't the faintest idea whatsoever how FTL communication would be possible in a nonmaterial world . . . we haven't the faintest idea whatsoever how anything would work in a nonmaterial world, or what any properties of it would be).

You might as well just "explain" every mystery with, "It must be magic."

oh I’m so sorry for thinking the words you say mean the words you say. — khaled

That's just the issue though. You have to deal with what people actually have in mind, not something they don't have in mind but that you think the words "literally" say. The latter is the mistake that Aspies make. That's one of the primary characteristics of Aspergers.

I already told you at least twice above that no one is using "tolerance" to refer to just letting people murder others, say.

The non-material substrate could be arranged differently so the entangled particles remain co-located in the substrate. Or FTL communication is possible in the substrate. — Devans99

But you could just make the same moves re the material world without having to posit something incoherent.

Believability can't be bootstrapped by testimony alone, it requires something additional.

Exactly why tolerent people as defined can't defend themselves from Intolerant people — khaled

It's not an argument against something if you don't even know what people are talking about. You have to address what someone is saying. Not what they're not saying but how you can creatively or "literally" interpret a term.

Aspies tend to interpret things "literally."

It is inherently illogical for a deity to exist. — NKBJ

Then testimony alone isn't sufficient for you.

So what if there's two eye witnesses? Or three? Or one hundred? — NKBJ

Testimony isn't sufficient no matter how many people testify. You don't believe every major religion, do you? There's no shortage of people testifying there.

Argumentum ad populums are fallacies.

Tolerance is never about letting people initiate physical attacks, murdering others, etc.

I don't know if you're an Aspie or not, but you can't approach topics like an Aspie (without it just amounting to inanity).

Here's a conventional definition of "tolerant":

"showing willingness to allow the existence of opinions or behavior that one does not necessarily agree with."

Are you saying that you're using mere testimony as sufficient evidence that a crime occurred?

The whole point of my comments (in this regard) is that epistemically, testimony isn't sufficient support of empirical claims.

It's not even possible to "force a belief" (and I just said that). The whole idea of that is nonsensical.

ok cool so since you can't force your beliefs on others that is identical to not being able to defend yourself is it not? — khaled

No, of course not. I just said that defending something doesn't at all amount to forcing anything on anyone. Think of a defense lawyer. They defend their clients. They don't--and can't --force beliefs on anyone.

Re a physical attack, you'd be conflating beliefs and actions. They're not the same thing.

expressing your opinion is fine but trying to force it on someone else is not. Because that would mean you don't tolerate their beliefs and want to change them — khaled

Defending tolerance doesn't at all amount to forcing anything on anyone.

That sounds like apathy, not tolerance. Tolerance doesn't conventionally amount to not having and expressing your own opinion.

not it wouldn't make sense to defend tolerance if you're pro tolerance because that would mean you're not tolerant towards the intolerant which makes YOU intolerant. — khaled

I don't agree with that. Maybe if you tell me the definition of tolerance that you're using.

How about this one:

lol, islamic scripture says there would be a heavenly wine that you can drink that makes you feel awesome without all the negative aspects of drunkenness. — Mr Phil O'Sophy

I was just thinking of the old polka standard: