I think the fact a word like "pessimism" means something in ordinary discourse makes its use to describe a philosophical position inadvisable, as confusing, but say no more than that regarding philosophical pessimism at this time. In other words, I think "pessimism" as it's apparently used in philosophy is something of a misnomer. That I'm not a philosophical pessimist should be obvious, and I think I've said why that's the case already. — Ciceronianus

Should we ditch Stoicism or the descriptor of "Stoic" or Epicureanism and the descriptor of "Epicurean" for similar reasons?

How do you propose it be done? Is it a moral argument, as in, the greater good comes from being negative in perspective? That would be odd, considering happiness is often posited as the goal of the good.



Is it an epistemological goal, as in truth is found by being negative?

Present your thesis. Pessimism is a correct perspective because it does what better than optimism?

I also don't think we debate political ideology here. We argue current events, choosing our facts and conclusions to fit our narrative. Political debate would argue the nuances of a political theory without the personal commentary. It's rare to see capitalism or Marxism argued from a emotionally neutral perspective. It's why the Trump and Israel threads are dumpster fires. — Hanover

@Tom Storm

So what I mean by the fact that Philosophical Pessimism is debatable not just something someone has based on the whims of temperament is that it is a worldview based on "what is the case".

Let me give you an analogy. In certain political or ethical formulations, "human rights" are considered to exist in some way. It is somehow considered "what is the case". However, someone who might be a skeptic of human rights, might debate this and claim that at best, its a pragmatic fiction designed for desired societal results.

Okay so, the content of the human rights debate doesn't matter for this discourse, but you notice that there is a dialectic that can be had here. That is to say, it would be bad faith arguing to say to the human rights person, "Well of course you believe in human rights, that is just your temperament to believe so! My temperament says otherwise!". Well, philosophy as a field or debate on anything, would simply collapse as we now somehow assert "temperament!" as the reason for anything and thus no debate is to be had. There are no real claims then, no real positions, nothing to debate, it's just "You have your X, and I have my X". But then, of course, we don't assume this for almost every argument in philosophical discourse. And I am saying, that is the same for Philosophical Pessimistic stance.

I think rather, what is going on is that people are confusing the common use of the term "pessimism" with its historical rootedness in philosophical ideas (like Schopenhauer's pessimism, for example). That is to say, there is a point of view to be made yay or nay for the stance. Surely, one's temperament my affect one's view of what is the case, but it doesn't dictate what is the case, nor one's belief in what is the case. That is to say, a person with "slight depression", may very well be more inclined to be a Philosophical Pessimist, but that isn't necessarily the case. Just as you may have "happy-go-lucky" adherents of Buddha's Four Noble Truths (including that Life is Suffering), you can have "happy-go-lucky" people that hold Philosophical Pessimist ideas.

That being said, "What" is Philosophical Pessimism? Well, there's actually whole books written on this, including these somewhat recent ones in philosophical academic literature:

https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691141121/pessimism

https://global.oup.com/academic/product/weltschmerz-9780198822653?cc=us&lang=en&

From the Pessimism site it says:

Pessimism claims an impressive following — from Rousseau, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, to Freud, Camus, and Foucault. Yet “pessimist” remains a term of abuse — an accusation of a bad attitude — or the diagnosis of an unhappy psychological state. Pessimism is thought of as an exclusively negative stance that inevitably leads to resignation or despair. Even when pessimism looks like utter truth, we are told that it makes the worst of a bad situation. Bad for the individual, worse for the species — who would actually counsel pessimism? — Pessimism- Joshua Foa Dienstag

On the Wiki site it even says of Phil. Pessimism:

Philosophical pessimism is a family of philosophical views that assign a negative value to life or existence. Philosophical pessimists commonly argue that the world contains an empirical prevalence of pains over pleasures, that existence is ontologically or metaphysically adverse to living beings, and that life is fundamentally meaningless or without purpose. Philosophical pessimism is not a single coherent movement, but rather a loosely associated group of thinkers with similar ideas and a resemblance to each other.[1]: 7  Their responses to the condition of life are widely varied. Philosophical pessimists usually do not advocate for suicide as a solution to the human predicament; many favour the adoption of antinatalism, that is, non-procreation. — Wiki on Pessimism

And here are some common positions in defense of Phil. Pessimism:

Pleasure doesn't add anything positive to our experience
A number of philosophers have put forward criticisms of pleasure, essentially denying that it adds anything positive to our well-being above the neutral state.

Pleasure as the mere removal of pain
A particular strand of criticism of pleasure goes as far back as to Plato, who said that most of the pleasures we experience are forms of relief from pain, and that the unwise confuse the neutral painless state with happiness.[28]: 286–287  Epicurus pushed this idea to its limit and claimed that, "[t]he limit of the greatness of the pleasures is the removal of everything which can give pain".[21]: 474  As such, according to Epicureans, one can not be better off than being free from pain, anxiety, distress, fear, irritation, regret, worry, etc. — in the state of tranquillity.[29][30]: 117–121 

According to Knutsson, there are a couple of reasons why we might think that. Firstly, we can say that one experience is better than another by recognizing that the first one lacks a particular discomfort. And we can do that with any number of experiences, thus explaining what it means to feel better, all that just with relying on taking away disturbances. Secondly, it's difficult to find a particular quality of experience that would make it better than a completely undisturbed state.[29]

Thirdly, we can explain behavior without invoking positive pleasures. Fourthly, it's easy to understand what it means for an experience to have certain imperfections (aversive qualities), while it's not clear what it would mean for an experience to be genuinely better than neutral. And lastly, a model with only negative and neutral states is theoretically simpler than one containing an additional class of positive experiences.[29]

No genuine positive states
A stronger version of this view is that there may be no states that are undisturbed or neutral. It's at least plausible that in every state we could notice some dissatisfactory quality such as tiredness, irritation, boredom, worry, feeling uncomfortable, etc. Instead of neutral states, there may simply be "default" states — states with recurrent but minor frustrations and discomforts that, over time, we got used to and learned not to do anything about.[29][31]: 255 [9]: 71–73 

Pleasure as the mere relief from striving
Schopenhauer maintained that only pain is positive. That is, only pain is actually felt, it's being experienced as something added to our consciousness. On the other hand, pleasure is only ever negative, which means it only takes away something already present in our experience. He put forward his negativity thesis — that pleasure is only ever a relief from pain.[5]: 50 [26][32][4] Later German pessimists — Julius Bahnsen, Eduard von Hartmann, and Philipp Mainländer — held very similar views.[5]: 154, 208, 268 

Pain can be removed in one of two ways. One way is to satisfy a desire. Since to strive is to suffer, once desire is satisfied, suffering stops. The second way is through distraction. When we're not paying attention to what we lack — and hence, desire — we are temporarily at peace. This happens in cases of intellectual and aesthetic experiences.[32]

A craving may arise when we direct our attention towards some external object, or when we notice something unwanted about our current situation. It's being experienced as a visceral need to change something about the current state. When we do not feel any such cravings, we are content or tranquil — we feel no urgency or need to change anything about our experience.[33][31]: 254–255 

No genuine counterpart to suffering
Alternatively, it can be argued that, for any purported pleasant state, we never find — under closer inspection — anything that would make it a positive or genuine counterpart to suffering. For an experience to be genuinely positive it would have to be an experiential opposite to suffering. However, it's difficult to understand what it would take for an experience to be an opposite of another experience — there just seem to be separate axes of experiences (hot and cold, loud and silent), which are noticed as contrasting. And even if we granted that the idea of an experiential opposite makes sense, it's difficult — if not impossible — to actually find a clear example of such an experience that would survive scrutiny.[34] There is some neuroscientific evidence that positive and negative experiences are not laid on the same axis, but rather comprise two distinct — albeit interacting — systems.[10][35]

Life contains uncompensated evils
One argument for the negative view on life is the recognition that evils are unconditionally unacceptable. A good life is not possible with evils in it. This line of thinking is based on Schopenhauer's statement that "the ill and evil in the world... even if they stood in the most just relation to each other, indeed even if they were far outweighed by the good, are nevertheless things that should absolutely never exist in any way, shape or form" in The World as Will and Representation.[36]: 181  The idea here is that no good can ever erase the experienced evils, because they are of a different quality or kind of importance.

Schopenhauer elaborates on the vital difference between the good and the bad, saying that, "it is fundamentally beside the point to argue whether there is more good or evil in the world: for the very existence of evil already decides the matter since it can never be cancelled out by any good that might exist alongside or after it, and cannot therefore be counterbalanced", and adding that, "even if thousands had lived in happiness and delight, this would never annul the anxiety and tortured death of a single person; and my present wellbeing does just as little to undo my earlier suffering."[36]: 591 

One way of interpreting the argument is by focusing on how one thing could compensate another. The goods can only compensate the evils, when they a) happen to the same subject, and b) happen at the same time. The reason why the good has to happen to the same subject is because the miserable cannot feel the happiness of the joyful, and hence it has no effect on him. The reason why the good has to happen at the same time is because the future joy does not act backwards in time, and so it has no effect on the present state of the suffering individual. But these conditions are not being met, and hence life is not worth living. Here, it doesn't matter whether there are any genuine positive pleasures, because since pleasures and pains are experientially separated, the evils are left unrepaid.[4][26]

Another interpretation of the negativity thesis — that goods are merely negative in character — uses metaphors of debt and repayment, and crime and punishment. Here, merely ceasing an evil does not count as paying it off, just like stopping committing a crime does not amount to making amends for it. The bad can only be compensated by something positively good, just like a crime has to be answered for by some punishment, or a debt has to be paid off by something valuable. If the good is merely taking away an evil, then it cannot compensate for the bad since it's not of the appropriate kind — it's not a positive thing that could "repay the debt" of the bad.[37]

Suffering is essential to life because of perpetual striving
Arthur Schopenhauer introduces an a priori argument for pessimism. The basis of the argument is the recognition that sentient organisms—animals—are embodied and inhabit specific niches in the environment. They struggle for their self-preservation. Striving to satisfy wants is the essence of all organic life.

Schopenhauer posits that striving is the essence of life. All striving, he argues, involves suffering. Thus, he concludes that suffering is unavoidable and inherent to existence. Given this, he says that the balance of good and bad is on the whole negative.

There are a couple of reasons why suffering is a fundamental aspect of life:

Satisfaction is elusive: organisms strive towards various things all the time. Whenever they satisfy one desire, they want something else and the striving begins anew.
Happiness is negative: while needs come to us seemingly out of themselves, we have to exert ourselves in order to experience some degree of joy. Moreover, pleasure is only ever a satisfaction—or elimination—of a particular desire. Therefore, it is only a negative experience as it temporarily takes away a striving or need.
Striving is suffering: as long as striving is not satisfied, it's being experienced as suffering.
Boredom is suffering: the lack of an object of desire is experienced as a discomforting state.[12][26]
The terminality of human life
According to Julio Cabrera's ontology, human life has a structurally negative value. Under this view, human life does not provoke discomfort in humans due to the particular events that happen in the lives of each individual, but due to the very being or nature of human existence as such. The following characteristics constitute what Cabrera calls the "terminality of being" — in other words, its structurally negative value:[38]: 23–24 

The being acquired by a human at birth is decreasing (or "decaying"), in the sense of a being that begins to end since its very emergence, following a single and irreversible direction of deterioration and decline, of which complete consummation can occur at any moment between some minutes and around one hundred years.
From the moment they come into being, humans are affected by three kinds of frictions: physical pain (in the form of illnesses, accidents, and natural catastrophes to which they are always exposed); discouragement (in the form of "lacking the will", or the "mood" or the "spirit", to continue to act, from mild taedium vitae to serious forms of depression), and finally, exposure to the aggressions of other humans (from gossip and slander to various forms of discrimination, persecution, and injustice); aggressions that we too can inflict on others (who are also submitted, like us, to the three kinds of friction).
To defend themselves against (a) and (b), human beings are equipped with mechanisms of creation of positive values (ethical, aesthetic, religious, entertaining, recreational, as well as values contained in human realizations of all kinds), which humans must keep constantly active. All positive values that appear within human life are reactive and palliative; they do not arise from the structure of life itself, but are introduced by the permanent and anxious struggle against the decaying life and its three kinds of friction, with such struggle however doomed to be defeated, at any moment, by any of the mentioned frictions or by the progressive decline of one's being.
For Cabrera, this situation is further worsened by a phenomenon he calls "moral impediment", that is, the structural impossibility of acting in the world without harming or manipulating someone at some given moment.[38]: 52  According to him, moral impediment happens not necessarily because of a moral fault in us, but due to the structural situation in which we have been placed. The positive values that are created in human life come into being within a narrow and anxious environment.[38]: 54 

Human beings are cornered by the presence of their decaying bodies as well as pain and discouragement, in a complicated and holistic web of actions, in which we are forced to quickly understand diversified social situations and take relevant decisions. It is difficult for our urgent need to build our own positive values, not to end up harming the projects of other humans who are also anxiously trying to do the same, that is, build their own positive values.[38]: 54 

Duḥkha as the mark of existence
Constant dissatisfaction — duḥkha — is an intrinsic mark of all sentient existence. All living creatures have to undergo the sufferings of birth, aging, sickness and death; want what they do not have, avoid what they do not like, and feel loss for the positive things they have lost. All of these types of striving (taṇhā) are sources of suffering, and they are not external but are rather inherent vices (such as greed, lust, envy, self-indulgence) of all living creatures.[39][14][16]: 130 

Since in Buddhism one of the central concepts is that of liberation or nirvana, this highlights the miserable character of existence, as there would be no need to make such a great effort to free oneself from a mere "less than ideal state". Since enlightenment is the goal of Buddhist practices through the Noble Eightfold Path, the value of life itself, under this perspective, appears as doubtful.[40][14][16]: 130 

The asymmetry between harms and benefits
Main article: Benatar's asymmetry argument
David Benatar argues that there is a significant difference between lack/presence of harms and benefits when comparing a situation when a person exists with a situation when said person never exists. The starting point of the argument is the following noncontroversial observation:
1. The presence of pain is bad.
2. The presence of pleasure is good.
However, the symmetry breaks when we consider the absence of pain and pleasure:
3. The absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone.
4. The absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.

Based on the above, Benatar infers the following:

the absence of pain is better in the case where a person never exists than the presence of pain where a person does exist,
the absence of pleasure is not worse in the case where a person never exists than the presence of pleasure where a person does exists.
In short, the absence of pain is good, while the absence of pleasure is not bad. From this it follows that not coming into existence has advantages over coming into existence for the one who would be affected by coming into the world. This is the cornerstone of his argument for antinatalism — the view that coming into existence is bad.[11]: 28–59 [15]: 100–103 

Empirical differences between the pleasures and pains in life
To support his case for pessimism, Benatar mentions a series of empirical differences between the pleasures and pains in life. In a strictly temporal aspect, the most intense pleasures that can be experienced are short-lived (e.g. orgasms), whereas the most severe pains can be much more enduring, lasting for days, months, and even years.[9]: 77  The worst pains that can be experienced are also worse in quality or magnitude than the best pleasures are good, offering as an example the thought experiment of whether one would accept "an hour of the most delightful pleasures in exchange for an hour of the worst tortures".[9]: 77 

In addition to citing Schopenhauer, who made a similar argument, when asking his readers to "compare the feelings of an animal that is devouring another with those of that other";[41] the amount of time it may take for one's desires to be fulfilled, with some of our desires never being satisfied;[9]: 79  the quickness with which one's body can be injured, damaged, or fall ill, and the comparative slowness of recovery, with full recovery sometimes never being attained;[9]: 77–78  the existence of chronic pain, but the comparative non-existence of chronic pleasure;[9]: 77  the gradual and inevitable physical and mental decline to which every life is subjected through the process of ageing;[9]: 78–79  the effortless way in which the bad things in life naturally come to us, and the efforts one needs to muster in order to ward them off and obtain the good things;[9]: 80  the lack of a cosmic or transcendent meaning to human life as a whole, borrowing a term from Spinoza, according to Benatar our lives lack meaning from the perspective of the universe, that is, sub specie aeternitatis.[9]: 35–36 

Benatar concludes that, even if one argues that the bad things in life are in some sense necessary for human beings to appreciate the good things in life, or at least to appreciate them fully, he asserts that it is not clear that this appreciation requires as much bad as there is, and that our lives are worse than they would be if the bad things were not in such sense necessary.[9]: 85 

Human life would be vastly better if pain were fleeting and pleasure protracted; if the pleasures were much better than the pains were bad; if it were really difficult to be injured or get sick; if recovery were swift when injury or illness did befall us; and if our desires were fulfilled instantly and if they did not give way to new desires. Human life would also be immensely better if we lived for many thousands of years in good health and if we were much wiser, cleverer, and morally better than we are.[9]: 82–83 

*****

Defence mechanisms
Peter Wessel Zapffe viewed humans as animals with an overly developed consciousness who yearn for justice and meaning in a fundamentally meaningless and unjust universe — constantly struggling against feelings of existential dread as well as the knowledge of their own mortality. He identified four defence mechanisms that allow people to cope with disturbing thoughts about the nature of human existence:

Isolation: the troublesome facts of existence are simply repressed — they are not spoken about in public, and are not even thought about in private.

Anchoring: one fixates (anchors) oneself on cultural projects, religious beliefs, ideologies, etc.; and pursue goals appropriate to the objects of one's fixation. By dedicating oneself to a cause, one focuses one's attention on a specific value or ideal, thus achieving a communal or cultural sense of stability and safety from unsettling existential musings.

Distraction: through entertainment, career, status, etc., one distracts oneself from existentially disturbing thoughts. By constantly chasing for new pleasures, new goals, and new things to do, one is able to evade a direct confrontation against mankind's vulnerable and ill-fated situation in the cosmos.

Sublimation: artistic expression may act as a temporary means of respite from feelings of existential angst by transforming them into works of art that can be aesthetically appreciated from a distance.[44][15]: 91–94 

Non-procreation and extinction
See also: Antinatalism
Concern for those who will be coming into this world has been present throughout the history of pessimism. Notably, Arthur Schopenhauer asked:[45]: 318–319 

One should try to imagine that the act of procreation were neither a need, nor accompanied by sexual pleasure, but instead a matter of pure, rational reflection; could the human race even continue to exist? Would not everyone, on the contrary, have so much compassion for the coming generation that he would rather spare it the burden of existence, or at least refuse to take it upon himself to cold-bloodedly impose it on them?

Schopenhauer also compares life to a debt that's being collected through urgent needs and torturing wants. We live by paying off the interests on this debt by constantly satisfying the desires of life; and the entirety of such debt is contracted in procreation: when we come into the world.[36]: 595  — Wiki- Philosophical Pessimism

All that being said, these are stances, or positions, one can create a dialectic around, and not just dismiss as one's temperament.

Pessimism is a choice, and I think, for you, the right one. You are exactly as you should be, right where you're needed.

That is what optimism sounds like.

I don't think it's all about disposition. You can be a pessimist or an optimist. That's just how great the world is. Freedom. — Hanover

But why is political ideology something to be debated, but Philosophical Pessimism is something you just choose, like a favorite band or some such? Why is Realism or Idealism a debate bit not Philosophical Pessimism?

On the other hand, a claim that I should see the world, with the same emotional shadings as someone I am not, would sound like crazy talk to me. — wonderer1

Is it about emotional shadings or things like suffering, and what is to be our response to it? As I see it, Philosophical Pessimism is less to do about emotional disposition and what one does in response to various negative aspects of life and specifically the human condition of self-knowledge amidst known forms if suffering. Yes it’s about value (just like political arguments say) but not so much about temperaments. One can be quite happy Philosophical Pessimist.

Cool, so you offer nothing but repeat. Perhaps eternal recurrence.

I think it really is a matter of disposition, and that globally pessimistic and optimistic dispositions may even simply be driven by different brain chemistries. It is common enough for humans to rationalize their own experiences and mind-sets after the fact. — Janus

Again, why can Philosophical Pessimism be dismissed as temperament based, but any other axiological debates like ethics and politics are fair game?

To add, I don’t agree with ideas around Ubermesch, eternal recurrence, will to power, or master and slave morality. You can use those as jumping points.

I don’t believe it until you tell me how misinformed I am. Also you took one post which was extremely cursory but I’ll let you proceed with that sample.

I suppose one significant factor is that the dispositions of others are fairly invisible to us on superficial observation. I'd think most of us tend to assume that others share our dispositions until shown evidence to to the contrary. — wonderer1

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/876676

Same answer.

There is no human problem which could not be solved if people would simply do as I advise. — Tom Storm

True enough

I have come to consider that the matter of 'gods or not gods' is one of personal preference, a bit like sexual orientation. We are attracted to certain ideas aesthetically and because they fit in with our general sense making of the world. If stuff doesn't fit it is discarded and sometimes feared or resented. A lot of the more formal arguments seem to come post hoc. Which does not mean that they aren't important, just that they aren't primary. — Tom Storm

I think aesthetic fit is huge, sometimes upbringing, social groups or reaction against those social influences. However, my point was rather why it is we give people the benefit of the doubt that they are at least trying to make a logically valid/sound case when making a political or moral argument but not so if it is a pessimistic claim? In other words I think the question of pessimism should not be bad faith dismissed as simply disposition, unless your view is that every claim should be dismissed for such reasons.

Just curious, political and moral arguments for various sides are constantly defended and presented- why do you suppose there are still arguments made for various sides rather than people leaving it to “simply dispositions”?
@Tom Storm

To what extent, if any, have you been informed of Biden's ineptitude and lies? His stumbling and bumbling? Do the website search on each website. See what you come up with. I'd post the links, however, I am too new to this forum for such credentials. Oh, and look for O'bama's speech where he referred to the Marines as Corpsman several times while pronouncing it phonetically. How'd he get into Harvard? Go ahead, Google it. See which news agencies covered it, and which ones didn't. Then go check out Vice President Dan Quayle Under President Bush misspelling the word "potato." He added an "e." Not incidentally, potato was historically spelled with an "e" until the mid twentieth century. All of the networks made much hay of it. Now let me guess, I'll get a bunch of responses that will minimize the above points. Or, maybe make their best defense an erroneous offense. — Steven P Clum

You build a mighty straw man here. Since when did misspeaking or misspelling a word or sentence make someone inept or deceitful?

Rather, if you are interested in debating the character of someone who doesn't mind tearing apart a 247 year old democracy and building a cult of personality and someone who doesn't, I'd be happy to debate that, but that is moving away from your OP, which is that one must ensure to balance ones news sources to get multiple views.

Most people can't read Nietzsche. Reading Nietzsche without having first read Kant, Hume, Plato and the pre-Socratics is like watching 2001 A Space Odyssey without having learned how to count. — Lionino

Sounds similar to Schopenhauer actually.. and many philosophers.

One can anticipate negative outcomes, or think that "the worst" will more likely happen than not, without making a general judgment regarding life or the world. I don't question whether there's such a thing as "philosophical pessimism." — Ciceronianus

Right, but I guess I am perplexed because no one (Ligotti or I at least) is saying that you can't make a "the worst" anticipation of a negative outcome without "making a general judgement regarding life or the world"... So I am not sure what it is this straw man you are arguing against, as no one as I see it, is claiming thus.

I'm not here to "convince" you of anything, schop, just challenge (analyze) claims – expose nonsense, poor reasoning, falsity – and explore (untangle) complex ideas from which we both might learn something insightful. Don't be lazy, man, know what you're talking about; there is no shame in "I don't know" or being attentively silent. :chin: — 180 Proof

Look, I know he is a philosophical hero of yours, so me maligning might hit a nerve with you. I welcome critique.. Hell, recruit someone else to critique what I am saying.. as with another poster who is a huge N advocate, when I "analyze" the critique further it would be a re-wording of my claims of his ideas, and thus the whole "You just don't 'get' him" deflates into simply being unhappy with one's favorite philosopher criticized. You glom onto anything I say negative about him extremely fast, so clearly, this is close to your heart.. Go ahead and explain away.. Take passages, analyze them to your content in regard to how they are NOT what I am characterizing them. We will see and as you say

and explore (untangle) complex ideas from which we both might learn something insightful. — 180 Proof

I found this fascinating and immediately understood. — Tom Storm

:up:

You can claim I misunderstand him all you want, but you don't break down WHY.. only very generally allude to past posts and such which aren't helpful or convincing. So go on being the ninja of sidestepping YOUR responsibility to show why. If you don't show, then don't tell.

Perhaps @BC has more to say on the Fairness Doctrine and its applications?

I have found that Fox shows the inconvenient and or irrefutable halves of truths that the left leaning networks wont. Anyone out there afraid to try and objectively view Fox News? — Steven P Clum

How do you know they are irrefutable?

But with your bigger point about balance, every show should have all sides represented when presenting a case. Trump has made this immensely harder, however, as he himself cannot debate a point to save his life- he can only stoke ire. It should be an unspoken rule for news outlets to present the sides, and have the audience judge for themselves. I know for the US, there used to be something in broadcasting (not newspapers) called "The Fairness Doctrine" which mandated that for any political issue, both sides had to have at least some representation on any news programming. That was lifted as being against First Amendment rights in the late 80s and paved the way for various conservative talk shows (think Rush Limbaugh), which paved the way for various conservative-only news, which then spawned various (very) left-leaning news (rather than moderately left leaning which used to be the case with general broadcast news on the major stations).

I have no interest in setting challenges and consider the vulgar Nietzschean-esquee pretentions to be the opposite of my own inclinations. — Tom Storm

Good word here...

I am quite happy to loiter around the foothills of Maslow and avoid the peaks. — Tom Storm

That sounds very Ligotti-esque itself, which is a good thing :smile:.

I think hobbies and sport and travel are all distractions from meaninglessness. We used to have religion for this and now it's Instagram and TikTok. I don't think it makes much difference. — Tom Storm

I don't have much to add because I wholeheartedly agree here. Modern man has made it about as you said "sucking the marrow out of life" by accumulating (and projecting) being at the peak of something (well, when everyone isn't as you say "distracting themselves with social media"). That is to say, if you notice, everyone wants to project the same intense experiences... TRAVEL (the more exotic the better, so better have some obscure African/Asian/South American destination there too), OUTDOORS (better show pictures at X landmark and showed you really struggled to get there in an arduous hike), EVENTS (concerts, political rallies, whatever), EXTREME stuff (fast X.. cars, trains, planes, rides, adventure stuff), or simply playing games (electronic or analog) markers like this. I can try to tie this in to the commodification of human experience, but I am not really trying to do that. Rather, I am just showcasing the struggle for humans to come up with modern ways to inject meaning. Thus, sporting, games, hobbies, travel, and various experiences become the default for modern man to hang their hat on. But, as you said, it doesn't make a difference. As I stated this represents:

and then at the top is supposedly "self-actualization", which I gather to be "peak experiences". One is being true to one's values (Nietzschean-esque).. I imagine the world-travelling, hobbyist, sports-enthusiast, mountain-climbing, civic duty participating, citizen, supposedly reveling in the balance between skill, challenge, preference, and aptitude.. The perfect balancer of personal interests and social interests.. Flow states are had readily and easily. One is able to express one's talents, etc. — schopenhauer1

They are all doing what Zapffe explained (ignoring, isolating, anchoring, and sublimating).

As adumbrated above, Zapffe arrived at two central determinations
regarding humanity’s “biological predicament.” The first was that
consciousness had overreached the point of being a sufferable property
of our species, and to minimize this problem we must minimize our
consciousness. From the many and various ways this may be done [schop1 note: acknowledgement this is simply a model, not exhaustive],
Zapffe chose to hone in on four principal strategies.
31
(1) ISOLATION. So that we may live without going into a free-fall of
trepidation, we isolate the dire facts of being alive by relegating them to a
remote compartment of our minds. They are the lunatic family members in the
attic whose existence we deny in a conspiracy of silence.
(2) ANCHORING. To stabilize our lives in the tempestuous waters of chaos,
we conspire to anchor them in metaphysical and institutional “verities”—God,
Morality, Natural Law, Country, Family—that inebriate us with a sense of
being official, authentic, and safe in our beds.
(3) DISTRACTION. To keep our minds unreflective of a world of horrors,
we distract them with a world of trifling or momentous trash. The most operant
method for furthering the conspiracy, it is in continuous employ and demands
only that people keep their eyes on the ball—or their television sets,
their government’s foreign policy, their science projects, their careers, their
place in society or the universe, etc.
(4) SUBLIMATION. That we might annul a paralyzing stage fright at what
may happen to even the soundest bodies and minds, we sublimate our fears by
making an open display of them. In the Zapffean sense, sublimation is the
rarest technique utilized for conspiring against the human race. Putting into
play both deviousness and skill, this is what thinkers and artistic types do when
they recycle the most demoralizing and unnerving aspects of life as works in
which the worst fortunes of humanity are presented in a stylized and removed
manner as entertainment. In so many words, these thinkers and artistic types
confect products that provide an escape from our suffering by a bogus
simulation of it—a tragic drama or philosophical woolgathering, for instance.
Zapffe uses “The Last Messiah” to showcase how a literary-philosophical
composition cannot perturb its creator or anyone else with the severity of trueto-life horrors but only provide a pale representation of these horrors, just as a
King Lear’s weep-
32
ing for his dead daughter Cordelia cannot rend its audience with the throes of
the real thing.
By watchful practice of the above connivances, we may keep ourselves
from scrutinizing too assiduously the startling and dreadful mishaps that
may befall us. — Ligotti- CATHR

Can't find much to disagree with. I think a lot of folk are afraid of pessimism and work hard to deny their own tendencies in this area just in case it makes things even worse. Whistling in the dark is a popular human reaction. — Tom Storm

Good analysis! I think this whole book (being a "non-fiction" work of "horror) is grappling with EXACTLY this fear of pessimism you are bringing up.. He will continue to hammer this point home in various angles. It is cool that you picked up on precisely this tendency. It is more a critique of the optimist by way of the optimist's critique of the pessimist, which I find delightfully interesting in its nuance. That's my take at least. Whatever you think of pessimism, his searing criticisms are hard to completely critique, as he already incorporates the critique and spits it back out.

This raises another question for me. Is life worth living even if suffering is almost eliminated? Let's say there are no wars and there is economic and political equality and medicine can cure most diseases. What then? I think one still has to face the question is living worth all the work and effort? All the psychological exertion. I've had a fortunate life (so far) with minimal suffering, but if I had the choice would I want to do it all again or not be born at all? I suspect I would choose the latter. I think this may well be dispositional as Ligotti suggests. I have always been reluctant to universalise my own tendencies and acknowledge how many people who have suffered intensely still 'love life' and cherish their time. — Tom Storm

Yep all good questions. This is precisely the kind of thing that I think is most important to ask. It may well be dispositional, but is there a case that overrides simple disposition? Schopenhauer's case is that you can't eradicate Suffering as it is part-and-parcel of the human condition- in fact more acutely so found in the human condition more than any other animals, because of self-understanding. This is generally the Philosophical Pessimist's case. The mere fact we are asking this question belies and underbelly of doubt about if all is well and ends well.

I'll provide some more quotes to this effect, but I think Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs is the closest to a "model" for the modern man's (supposed) antidote to such generalized ideas on "EXISTENCE". That is to say, whatever your beliefs this way or that, it is about peak experiences that make it worth it.. One must provide safety, security, social bonds, physical needs, and then at the top is supposedly "self-actualization", which I gather to be "peak experiences". One is being true to one's values (Nietzschean-esque).. I imagine the world-travelling, hobbyist, sports-enthusiast, mountain-climbing, civic duty participating, citizen, supposedly reveling in the balance between skill, challenge, preference, and aptitude.. The perfect balancer of personal interests and social interests.. Flow states are had readily and easily. One is able to express one's talents, etc.

I haven't figured out if Trump is fully "self-serving" in foreign policy or "Russia-serving". If it is Russia-serving, indeed he may have to tone down against Russia's interests in the Mid East. If he is self-serving, then any strong man (including Netanyahu) is fair game to admire and support.

blocking Security Council resolutions and continuing to funnel weapons and ammunition to Israel, even circumventing Congress if it has to. — Tzeentch

Why do you assume the US cares what the Security Council says? Or why do you think it is by default supposed to?

The "pressure" the administration puts is not actual pressure at all. It's simply what Biden has to do to avoid looking like a complete stooge, and Israel understands this is how it works. — Tzeentch

The fact is that the US has interests in the region, and support their ally in the region. You don't have to look for old-school conspiracy theories of AIPAC for this. It's a worldview of balances of power. Iran represents something against US interests, especially with their use of proxies. Netanyahu is certainly an asshole, I grant that, but Biden simply doesn't want to make that kind of decision in the midst of this. I will say too that Israel has to get its shit together by finding a new strategy. Biden can only work with who he has got. Other than getting the hostages back, I see no way Israel will want to keep Hamas as a neighbor with their threat, and the US gets this threat.

Trump seems to me very much against this type of 'final solution' business in the Middle-East, so I personally find it very hard to believe he would try to profile himself as an even greater Middle-East hawk. — Tzeentch

I would bet Trump would do anything he can to win Evangelical support.. So if Biden looks weak, he will just say that he can do better, whatever the case may be. Also, he is besties with Netanyahu. Don't count him out either for using war for his gain. He hasn't done it yet, but I wouldn't count it out. Saying that he is strictly an "isolationist" is believing he is principled or ideological to a fault. He is self-serving to a fault- there is a difference. Nixon went to China when it suited him. Nixon was virulently anti-communist when it served him. Etc. In fact, Nixon was able to stop the North Vietnamese delegation from taking the offer at the Paris Accords in '68 because Nixon wanted to look like the person who stopped the war. Trump isn't Nixon. No, he's worse.

Also, you didn't address any of this:

So this is a canard of the Left. Why is it that Leftists support Islamist causes? It's a rhetorical strategy to malign any policy against hostile actors in the region as Israel's bidding. Why wouldn't America want to support an ally, while at the same time support their own interests (shipping/cargo/trade/resources) in the region? It would be foolish to let Iran make mischief unabated. Iran is trying to show people like yourself how powerful they are, and Leftists go weak in the knees rooting for it, but in a "Because Israel is bad" sort of rhetorical ploy. If Israel is bad, then Iran's actions must go unattended, is pretty odd argument as whole, but fits right in with a certain worldview for sure. I call it Lefitst. Call it whatever you want. It's certainly not "Idealist", unless you mean the corrupt UN (which lets countries with human rights violations unironically cry foul). — schopenhauer1

Perhaps I misunderstand something, but Nietzsche seems at odds with himself. He seems to believe in the "overcoming" of oneself, and the embracing of Suffering in some aesthetic appeal to the Ubermensch who thrives on pain in the idea of manifesting one's own values (power) into the world.

In this type of manic idea, I immediately think of Shakespeare's response:

The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle.
Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
And then is heard no more. It is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.

Like I said, I might not be very helpful :rofl: . The whole scale thing is just something I've seen thrown out in favor of pessimism quite often. I used to think it had a great deal of merit and use it myself. And then one day it struck me that it is actually one of the sillier philosophical arguments out there. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I can see that. Those seem like quite irrelevant arguments for Pessimism. Pessimism to me, is always about the "internal".. the "human condition" component. Contending with suffering and knowing one suffers. Deliberation itself- authenticity means we are always tacitly saying "yes" if we still choose to move forward and live. The "yes" doesn't mean "no rebellion" against this condition. The rebellious stance is where the Pessimist lives, but not by way of Camus or Nietzsche (say YES to the situation that one is thrown into), but by way of Schopenhauer, "Screw the whole project! Let it end by way of acknowledgement of what is going on."

Sure, I place positive or negative values on things routinely, but I also recognize that the way I do so is idiosyncratic aspect of the way I am and not some fact about about human existence. I don't see how you think it can be justified to generalize about the subject as you seem to. — wonderer1

Oh, I would just say to re-read what Ligotti says at exactly this kind of critique.. and I'll add this addition. So re-read and then add this part too:

But as to a direct answer from myself, life's goodness, whether to keep living, whether to reproduce gets to the heart of the human project itself... One can still be alive, but see it as negative in value.. whatever the current psychological state of the moment is. There are several ways that "generally" this is so, and it's not just the individual's temperament. It is the structural way that we face suffering, both Eastern and common views of suffering, as well as the de facto impositions of human life. And indeed, human life is something qualitatively different, in how our consciousness is self-reflective and our understanding of suffering, our dialogue with it and ourselves, our self-understanding, not just that we straight up "suffer". All these make for a value judgement leading to the Pessimist's stance towards life.

People often bring up the scale of the universe when they say life "obviously lacks meaning," but why exactly should fudging around the length of our lives or our size relative to everything else that exists have anything to do with meaning? It's a weird idea when you think about it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yeah, that's not Ligotti though.

That said, I love the fiction, not all of the broader philosophy. It seems to me like it all hinges on the claim that the world is indeed meaningless, and even more the claim that freedom is illusory. I don't think there are good reasons to believe these claims. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think that is the end of his argument though. His ideas are circular and spiral-like. Read the passage above to understand what I am saying. He will criticize pessimism, but in doing so, make scathing critiques of pessimism's interlocutor.. as he is doing in that passage (and ones I quoted before it). I'd actually like to see what you think of his style there, what he is doing with his prose, and how it intersects with the lesser critique (of pessimism by way of interlocutor), and greater critique (searing cynicism of optimism, hacking at its arguments from the backdoor).

Without these claims the rest of the pessimismtic claims collapse. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think so at all. A worldview on consciousness would have nothing one way or another to say about the value of living/existence.

If we lived for 10,000 years? If we were the ruler of a galactic empire for five million years? If the entire universe only contained our solar system? If the entire universe consisted of one small town and we were one of its 80 residents? If our body grew to the size of a billion galaxies?

People often bring up the scale of the universe when they say life "obviously lacks meaning," but why exactly should fudging around the length of our lives or our size relative to everything else that exists have anything to do with meaning? It's a weird idea when you think about it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think you'll be pleasantly surprised at how in depth Ligotti goes in answering and addressing these philosophers.. I would have to look if he has Nagel in there, but he addresses similar ideas/philosophies nonetheless. He is delightfully/playfully anti-optimism but with acknowledgements of the canards thrown at the Pessimist.

I don't see any more reason to think that there is an objective fact of the matter as to the desireability of existence, than there is an objective fact of the matter as to the desireability of anchovy pizza. — wonderer1

Why that itself is a value judgement. Humans are indeed strewn with value judgements- I would argue that is how we even go about our normal daily routines. You place value in something (goals/reasons), and then you set about with narratives and routines and habits and efforts and actions to make them happen.

Surely if you can make a judgement on anchovy pizza, you can make a judgement about life. Surely, if you can make a judgement that it was worth answering this post on an online philosophy forum, you can make judgements on life. Those judgements will be made, it's how you will make them. So I think the idea of "objective fact" is irrelevant, it is a human concern, and that is all that matters.

FWIW, I took a look at my Kindle copy of CATHR and saw that I got 26% of the way before losing interest. — wonderer1

Ok.

It's not something which constitutes a view of the greater world. I'm not "pessimistic" regarding the world; I don't think it will act in its own self-interest, or is lazy, or malicious, or inclined to act badly--those are human attributes. — Ciceronianus

So you bring up a good point, but by way of misinterpreting Pessimism. I have made this point often, Pessimism "proper" IS indeed a philosophical stance. It's right on my profile if you care to look. It is the idea that there is indeed negative values in the world (like suffering), and that it is not worth it. Even making the value judgement, "There is no value" is a judgement of value. What someone declares, and how one lives is often different.. "I don't suffer" and then feeling immense pain and anguish are two often contradicting things that a suffering-denialist would have to square. But I am getting too far afield...

Philosophical Pessimism is the view that the world suffering is immensely inherent to life, and would therefore be something not preferable. It is not simply a temperament that "things will go badly in the future". That would be the bastardized "common" pessimism.

I'm pretty sure you are interested in Stoicism. What if someone says "I am a Stoic because I hide my emotions". You would say, "That is a misunderstanding of Stoicism. Stoicism is a whole philosophy and worldview, not the bastardized common version of "Not showing emotion". The same goes for Romantic.. "I am a Romantic".. could mean the aesthetic movement of the 19th century for artistic escapism, nature, and emotion, or it could mean someone really likes watching romantic comedies. To mix the two up would be intentional for rhetorical purposes in a debate to deny Pessimism its proper place in philosophy, or it is simply ignorance of the difference. Which is it for you? Or am I missing what you have done here in your mixing the two?

and thus not serve Trump's isolationist views. — Tzeentch

How do you know his views aren't more aligned with Russia's? There may not be outright "collusion", but it damn sure looks like it on paper.

Israel/the lobby know that full well. They might use Trump, but the chance that they'll actually support him over Biden is very slim. But they will use Trump to pressure Biden for sure. — Tzeentch

So this is a canard of the Left. Why is it that Leftists support Islamist causes? It's a rhetorical strategy to malign any policy against hostile actors in the region as Israel's bidding. Why wouldn't America want to support an ally, while at the same time support their own interests (shipping/cargo/trade/resources) in the region? It would be foolish to let Iran make mischief unabated. Iran is trying to show people like yourself how powerful they are, and Leftists go weak in the knees rooting for it, but in a "Because Israel is bad" sort of rhetorical ploy. If Israel is bad, then Iran's actions must go unattended, is pretty odd argument as whole, but fits right in with a certain worldview for sure. I call it Lefitst. Call it whatever you want. It's certainly not "Idealist", unless you mean the corrupt UN (which lets countries with human rights violations unironically cry foul).

In fact, the Trump phenomenon may give the Biden administration room to get away with a lot, including another war in the Middle-East against Iran and/or its proxies. — Tzeentch

I mean, this could go the other way. If Biden doesn't do anything in the Middle East, Trump will use it as a case that he is the backchannel savior (ala Nixon during Vietnam).

@Wayfarer might be interested.

Perhaps @Count Timothy von Icarus would like to join the discussion.. There's always an open invitation to @BC and

@Tom Storm @Ciceronianus @Echarmion

What do you think of Ligotti's analysis of the pessimist? I actually think this is more a critique of the optimist, but indirectly. He acknowledges and dispatches the well known canards and epithets of the optimistic response.

Pessimism I
Along with every other tendentious mindset, pessimism may be
construed as a fluke of temperament, a shifty word that will just have to
do until a better one comes along. Without the temperament that was
given to them in large portion, pessimists would not see existence as
basically undesirable. Optimists may have fugitive doubts about the
basic desirability of existence, but pessimists never doubt that existence
is basically undesirable. If you interrupted them in the middle of an
ecstatic moment, which pessimists do have, and asked if existence is
basically undesirable, they would reply “Of course” before returning to
their ecstasy. Why they should answer in this way is a closed book. The
conclusions to which temperament lead an individual, whether or not
they are conclusions refractory to those of world society, are simply not
subject to analysis.
Composed of the same dross as all mortals, the pessimist cleaves to
whatever seems to validate his thoughts and emotions. Scarce among us
are those who not only want to think they are right, but also expect
others to affirm their least notion as unassailable. Pessimists are no
exception. But they are few and do not show up on the radar of our race.
Immune to the blandishments of religions, countries, families, and
everything else that puts both average and above-average citizens in the
limelight, pessimists are sideliners in both history and the media.
Without belief in gods or ghosts, unmotivated by a comprehensive
delusion, they could never plant a bomb, plan a revolution, or shed blood
for a cause.
Identical with religions that ask of their believers more than they can
possibly make good on, pessimism is a set of ideals that none can follow
to the letter. Those who indict a pessimist of either pathology or
intellectual recalcitrance are only faking their competence to explain
what cannot be explained: the mystery of
44
why individuals are the way they are. To some extent, however, why
some individuals are the way they are is not a full-fledged mystery.
There are traits that run in families—legacies lurking in the genes of one
generation that may profit or impair those of another. Philosophical
pessimism has been called a maladaptation by those who are concerned
with such things. This call seems indisputably correct. The possibility
must be considered, then, that there is a genetic marker for philosophical
pessimism that nature has all but deselected from our race so that we
may keep on living as we have all these years. Allowing for the theory
that pessimism is weakly hereditary, and is getting weaker all the time
because it is maladaptive, the genes that make up the fiber of ordinary
folk may someday celebrate an everlasting triumph over those of the
congenitally pessimistic, ridding nature of all worry that its protocol of
survival and reproduction for its most conscious species will be
challenged—unless Zapffe is right and consciousness itself is
maladaptive, making philosophical pessimism the correct call despite its
unpopularity among those who think, or say they think, that being alive
is all right. But psycho-biographers do not often take what is adaptive or
maladaptive for our species into account when writing of a chosen
member of the questionably dying breed of pessimists. To them, their
subject’s temperament has a twofold inception: (1) life stories of
tribulation, even though the pessimistic caste has no sorrows exclusive to
it; (2) intractable wrongheadedness, a charge that pessimists could turn
against optimists if the argumentum ad populum were not the world’s
favorite fallacy.
The major part of our species seems able to undergo any trauma without
significantly re-examining its household mantras, including “everything
happens for a reason,” “the show must go on,” “accept the things you
cannot change,” and any other adage that gets people to keep their chins
up. But pess-
45
imists cannot give themselves over to this program, and its catchwords
stick in their throats. To them, the Creation is objectionable and useless
on principle—the worst possible dispatch of bad news.It seems so bad,
so wrong, that, should such authority be unwisely placed into their
hands, they would make it a prosecutable malfeasance to produce a
being who might turn out to be a pessimist.
Disenfranchised by nature, pessimists feel that they have been
impressed into this world by the reproductive liberty of positive thinkers
who are ever-thoughtful of the future. At whatever point in time one is
situated, the future always looks better than the present, just as the
present looks better than the past. No one today would write, as did the
British essayist Thomas De Quincey in the early nineteenth century: “A
quarter of man’s misery is toothache.” Knowing what we know of the
progress toward the alleviation of human misery throughout history, who
would damn their children to have a piteous toothache in the early
nineteenth century, or in times before it, back to the days when Homo
sapiens with toothaches scrounged to feed themselves and shivered in
the cold? To the regret of pessimists, our primitive ancestors could not
see that theirs was not a time in which to produce children.
So at what time was it that people knew enough to say, “This is the
time in which to produce children”? When did we think that enough
progress had been made toward the alleviation of human misery that
children could be produced without our being torn by a crisis of
conscience? The easy years of the Pharaohs and Western antiquity? The
lazy days of the Dark Ages? The palmy decades of the Industrial
Revolution as well as the other industry-driven periods that followed?
The breakthrough era in which advancements in dentistry allayed
humanity of one-quarter of its misery?
But few or none have ever had a crisis of conscience about
46
producing children, because all children have been born at the
best possible time in human history, or at least the one in which the most
progress toward the alleviation of human misery has been made, which
is always the time in which we live and have lived. While we have
always looked back on previous times and thought that their progress
toward the alleviation of human misery was not enough for us to want to
live then, we do not know any better than the earliest Homo
sapiens about what progress toward the alleviation of human misery will
be made in the future, reasonably presuming that such progress will be
made. And even though we may speculate about that progress, we feel
no resentment about not being able to take advantage of it, or not many
of us do. Nor will those of the future resent not living in the world of
their future because even greater progress toward the alleviation of
human misery will by then have been made in medicine, social
conditions, political arrangements, and other areas that are almost
universally regarded as domains in which human life could be better.
Will there ever be an end of the line in our progress toward the
alleviation of human misery when people can honestly say, “This is
without doubt the time produce children”? And will that really be the
time? No one would say, or even want to think that theirs is a time in
which people will look back on them from the future and thank their
stars that they did not live in such a barbaric age that had made so little
progress toward the alleviation of human misery and still produced
children. As if anyone ever cared or will ever care, this is what the
pessimist would say: “There has never been and never will be a time in
which to produce children. Now will forever be a bad time for doing
that.” Moreover, the pessimist would advise each of us not to look too
far into the future or we will see the reproachful faces of the unborn
looking back at us from the radiant mist of their nonexistence. — Ligotti- CATHR

I'm not sure where you got that.. Though, I did just mention

o I guess, let the Middle East implode in its genocidal project to only be safe for extremist versions of various Muslim sects. It's already failed at trying Western versions of shitty forms of government (Bathists/ Nasserism etc.). — schopenhauer1

But no, I don't actually think the Middle East should implode.. If you mean my reference to the "Thunderdome" type morality of Hamas and other extremist sects, sure. And Israel has been co-opted by such logic in its need to destroy Hamas at all costs and not having a clear plan for the day after. However, I don't blame Israel for wanting to get rid of Hamas. Hamas said what they wanted, they did what they said, and they have shown that in the past, like the suicide campaigns of the 90s-2000s. Also, when given freedom to actually "govern" some territory, they acted like the belligerents they were and put all the extra money into armaments and not growing a thriving region, or other avenues of peaceful existence, which may have led to different outcomes. I honestly couldn't fathom them doing so, so yeah, Israel is to blame in the sense of cynically thinking they might be better than Fatah. However, I think it was mostly because they didn't want to interfere. Kicking the can down the road has made it that much harder to get rid of them. Of course, if Israel tried to interfere more strongly back twenty years ago, they would have also been criticized for interfering, so Israel just can't win, and which is why they largely just ignore the gaslighting of Leftists, which I get. It works with those who already agree on a philosophy forum though.

I will agree that Israel should never have kept the West Bank and Gaza, but I also get that having strategic land which they could negotiate for peace (since at the time of 1967, no Arab state (including the newly formed PLO), wanted Israel to even exist).. I think the failed negotiations of 25 years+ ago and Hamas' stepped up attacks at that time, had unfortunately killed the Israeli will to vote in more dovish governments, and despite my hardline against the LEFTISTS on THIS FORUM, I actually am on the side of the (diminished) Doves in this whole conflict, DESPITE the hateful/one-sided rhetoric of the Leftists.

What I see here is a process of the US slowly but determinedly sucked into the quagmire of a Middle Eastern conflict, which isn't beneficial for itself — ssu

A ton of cargo goes through the Red Sea and Gulf, so it is strategic, as with everything in that region. Also, it's good to back up allies, period. The US would indeed look weak if they don't back up allies in a region that also has strategic interests- as they have done in the past, like WW2, But I don't blame certain European attitudes for this I guess. It's nice to sit pretty with small homogeneous populations (except for "immigrants" from which causes their own "populist/nativist" divisions, even within Europe) with budgets for welfare states after WW2 and centuries of the bloodiest of conflicts and massive colonization and imperialistic World Domination projects by the biggest of the states... So I guess, let the Middle East implode in its genocidal project to only be safe for extremist versions of various Muslim sects. It's already failed at trying Western versions of shitty forms of government (Bathists/ Nasserism etc.).

If the US made strange unwise bedfellows with strategic anti-Soviet interests, European Leftists should watch for the same unwise bedfellows with extremist Islamist interests. It is a shame the Mid East is not as non-strategic as most parts of sub-Saharan Africa or Micronesia or something.

Ice car

Thought this was appropriate:

In regards to my last comment, a while ago I found this video from, out of all places, an Azerbaijanian-based news agency, that gave one of the better military overviews of the situation. One must keep in mind this was from months ago, so could be a bit dated with all the developments. However, it pretty much lays out why it is so difficult in terms of the lay of the land, if you will, and what it must face:

It goes without saying that neither side deserves any prizes in that regard. — Tzeentch

Which is where I basically agree with Friedman's analysis as I see how the Israeli government has carried out the campaign. That's why I'm advocating looking at it as a system.. And I think we are but we are both saying that the other side should turn the key.

I get Israel's priority to NOT have Hamas anymore, but I of course get the Palestinian (non Hamas) who don't want to be in the midst of this current round of conflict.

What isn't discussed very much is why Israel chooses one strategy over another, and what it's advantage is, even if they don't care about world opinion. I have yet to have any real military analysis. I've been waiting for that, sans people's bias and moralizing.