He’s talking to a hypothetical depressed suicidal for sure, if they are going to kill themselves. Your observation doesn’t matter to the point he’s making though as explained in the OP about the problem already existing and death not being its opposite, so can’t “fix” it. No relief is had once started.

Not if there aren't any negatives that don't have a detrimental impact one's well-being. And the roblems can be solved to a degree that allows one to appreciate the potent joys of life. — DA671

You can't predict that. Also, who are you to determine what other people view as what is impactful or not? Also, things change all the time. One well-being may be a tragedy later. I know your idea. I get it you think that people need to be born so they can experience positives. Got it. I just think I have answered you in every way that this is wrong.

who are capable — DA671

But not by default. So a problem to be resolved.

Do you think that terms such as mokṣa or Nirvāṇa mean anything? How would you interpret what is meant by them? — Wayfarer

What does this have to do with my question? If it does, "enlighten me" (get it!).

Moksha means something like "release". Because Hinduism is so diverse, it can be used in different ways, but usually associated with being released from the rebirth cycle and samsara. It's generally a peaceful state of non-attachment. Nirvana, means something similar but emphasis on release from the causes of suffering. I do know both have an aspect of illusion created by karmic events. But one is questioning the illusion which causes attachments, etc. etc. The ego is not real sort of thing.

So again, how does labeling this nihilism fit into this? Is it because it denies the ideas regarding moksha, release, nirvana, etc? If that is the case, sure, I can agree with that.

I'd like to double down on Schopenhauer's approach of pessimism then. Rather, ideas of nirvana and moksha are not isolated, but are carried out in a broader Hindu framework of Dharma and other notions. They believe in stages of life, and hierarchies of birth (the whole caste system), and things such as this. But if we take that seriously, and not even from a human rights perspective, this means that the very problem (suffering/karmic build-up) is something humans must participate in by having more humans. What would happen if no humans put more people into the whole mix? There is no "problem" to have to solve (by way of moksha or nirvana).

The only answer you can provide is that it is just bound to happen cause the universe "wills" it. But then I refer back to my idea that this is just a self-fulfilling justification (post-facto and circular reasoning). That is to say it is faulty in that it says, "Because the universe is bound to produce suffering, it doesn't matter anyways, so we mine as well produce more people that will suffer" and if taking Hindu/Buddhist ideas seriously, they will suffer so they can realize they don't need to suffer. Again, why initiate the problem (have people) in the first place to then have to overcome the very problem?

So Schopenhauer's pessimistic emphasis is called for if it is seen in juxtoposition to the life-affirming aspects of the other parts of the Hindu/Buddhist philosophies that encourage the traditional having of families, life stages (young, middle-age with family, old study Hindu philosophy and moksha).

Rather I'd present a different view of catharsis. That is, communal catharsis is recognition of the state of affairs. A world is less harsh if we all agree it sucks. It's the persistent idea not only is it good for you but that your notion of the world means other people must also live it, even though they are people with their own notions that are not yours. This then dovetails into Western ethical concerns of deontology and identity.

Deontological problem: Causing other people suffering because you have a notion that you are doing positive things on behalf of them (even though you know it brings suffering too).

Identity problem: When someone is born and has negative experiences and/or has a negative evaluation of life, that person is affected. If in a counterfactual situation, a person is not born (was not actualized even though the potential was there), that person is not affected. They are not regretful, forlorn, or deprived of the positives of life. The affect only goes in one direction, and only matters in one direction.

So yeah, all that.

Yeah that response that you okayed there is exactly an example of my point here:
Yes. The ascetics have it. They veer away from it when they do summersault justifications like, "Humans are needed so they can break samsara, thus making more humans to suffer to escape suffering..." I just see it as a post-facto and circular justification.

Nihilism - nothing is real, nothing matters, nothing truly exists. That poem you quote is dripping with it. — Wayfarer

Ok, so if it is, so what? What is the implication? It sounds like you're trying to say something with that label.

So there’s the purported origin of pessimism and nihilism which seems to characterise your philosophy also. — Wayfarer

Nihilism is multi-faceted. It's like "realism". Art realism? Metaphysical realism? Epistemic realism? Etc.

I just find the term unhelpful really. What are you trying to say by it? What is the purpose of labeling it as such? In other words, what are you trying to indicate or imply with it?

In the quote it looks like nihilism is basically the "suffering" part of Buddhism but with no escape. Is that it?

E.M. Cioran, who is quoted in the OP, can be considered a sort of resignationist. That is to say, there is nothing to do and nowhere to go, so sit back. There is a sort of an inertia in his writings. That any move is pointless. See here:

-To get up in the morning, wash and then wait for some unforeseen variety of dread or depression. I would give the whole universe and all of Shakespeare for a grain of ataraxy.

-My faculty for disappointment surpasses understanding. It is what lets me comprehend Buddha, but also what keeps me from following him.

-I am enraptured by Hindu philosophy, whose essential endeavor is to surmount the self; and everything I do, everything I think is only myself and the selfs humiliations.

-In the fact of being born there is such an absence of necessity that when you think about it a little more than usual, you are left—ignorant how to react—with a foolish grin

-The same feeling of not belonging, of futility, wherever I go: I pretend interest in what matters nothing to me, I bestir myself mechanically or out of charity, without ever being caught up, without ever being somewhere. What attracts me is elsewhere, and I don't know where that elsewhere is.

-Better to be an animal than a man, an insect than an animal, a plant than an insect, and so on. Salvation? Whatever diminishes the kingdom of consciousness and compromises its supremacy.

-There was a time when time did not yet exist. ... The rejection of birth is nothing but the nostalgia for this time before time. — E.M. Cioran, The Trouble With Being Born

I still can’t draw a line between what you say and nihilism. — Wayfarer

Nihilism doesn't have any ethics. Pessimism is more fitting.

Yes. The ascetics have it. They veer away from it when they do summersault justifications like, "Humans are needed so they can break samsara, thus making more humans to suffer to escape suffering..." I just see it as a post-facto and circular justification.

And how can one avoid participation? — Wayfarer

Don’t throw more people into it. Nature will make people suffer. Therefore, I will make more people that will suffer does not compute. Not saying you’re saying that, but I can see the idea that suffering is going to happen no matter what so therefore I can do X thing that makes people eventually suffer being some sort of justification.

One suffers much more from one's attitude towards suffering than from the mere fact that one can / does suffer.' That what I meant – paraphrasing the insights of thinkers I listed in my previous post. And IME I've found that this is more often than not the case. — 180 Proof

I’m more interested in the inextricable nature of being caught in this inescapable situation than how people are just “overblowing suffering” and should just “get over it”. But the fact that one has to get over it is the whole point. The problem(s) have already been put into motion. There is no escaping one has to overcome in the first place.

it is indeed a different ethic to believe one should force others to suffer because there is also good accompanied by that initial force. But indeed, as the quote says, the force was done, and the problem has already been presented. The stoppage of the problem brings no relief post-facto. It is a "gordian knot" indeed. Once in the mess, there is really no "out of it". That's because death is not the opposite of being born. They are incommensurable.

. So for that reason, seeking the cessation of 'continued becoming' by ending one's own individual life does not actually achieve its end, as the 'drive to become' will always find a way to make itself manifest again.

Speaking of quotes, I have one from Schopenhauer0, to wit:

In order to always have a secure compass in hand so as to find one's way in life, and to see life always in the correct light without going astray, nothing is more suitable than getting used to seeing the world as something like a penal colony. This view finds its...justification not only in my philosophy, but also in the wisdom of all times, namely, in Brahmanism, Buddhism, Empedocles, Pythagoras [...] Even in genuine and correctly understood Christianity, our existence is regarded as the result of a liability or a misstep. ... We will thus always keep our position in mind and regard every human, first and foremost, as a being that exists only on account of sinfulness, and who is life is an expiation of the offence committed through birth. Exactly this constitutes what Christianity calls the sinful nature of man. — Wayfarer

I agree with Schopenhauer here, however, let's not make it a self-fulfilling prophecy either and participate in it. Evolution might bring about suffering beings, but we don't have to.

Not sure what you mean here.

But it is the Problem that is created and perpetuated.

Is there no symbolic catharsis? The conclusion doesn't default to thus condoning and embracing the Problem. When things are written as poetry (like Thus Spoke Zarathustra) then manic embracing of the Problem seems charming. But that's not life. That is a simulacrum of life used as a cudgel against the Pessimist (his dear teacher Schopenhauer).

Also, combining Cioran with Schopenhauer's quote:

Suicide may also be regarded as an experiment — a question which man puts to Nature, trying to force her to answer. The question is this: What change will death produce in a man’s existence and in his insight into the nature of things? It is a clumsy experiment to make; for it involves the destruction of the very consciousness which puts the question and awaits the answer. — Schopenhauer

Once dead, the relief is not had. No relief is had.

Which is not an option open to anyone who's already-born. Preventing new births likewise accomplishes nothing because the already-born continue to suffer; perhaps only reducing net suffering of the already-born is possible, or worth striving for. I rephrase Cioran's insight as
It's not worth the bother of killing yourself or refusing to procreate, since you always kill yourself and go extinct as a species too late. — 180 Proof

The problem is that this means the only way out is through. As I was saying to noAxioms, this itself is the Problem (big P). Creating the need for need. The damage is done and it is inescapable.

The implication seems to be that the only purpose of suicide is to somehow be a solution to past suffering. The conclusion follows only from this assumption, but it can be falsified by taking into account future suffering.

Two obvious cases: You're taken prisoner as a spy and have secrets that will be tortured out of you before you are put to death. Or you have a painful form of cancer making what time you have left a hell (and a financial burden) for yourself and your caretakers. You voluntarily choose to eliminate that suffering by taking an early exit.

Second case is dementia. You still have your marbles but know you have say Alzheimer's. In a short time you will no longer be of sufficiently sound mind and body and will doom yourself and your caretakers to the same burdens as above. The time to make the decision is now, not later when the marbles are lost.

Both cases above falsify the assertion made by Cioran. The latter one is more interesting since the time to make the decision is well before the action is to take place. It might be as little as some kind of DNR, but it might be a more proactive action to be taken by what will at that point be an unwilling state. — noAxioms

So I get what you're saying if we took Cioran too literally. However, I think there are layers to this quote. We have to follow the implication to the end.

"You always kill yourself too late" Why?
Because you were given a problem(s) to overcome.

The problem was being given the problem to overcome. There is no escape from being in a position of having to deal with in the first place. Even suicide being perceived as the only option is itself problematic.

The fact is being born is a hot potato and you can let your hands burn or pass it, but potatoes keep being tossed in your lap.

I don't understand. I just gave an example of a human that is about to be born. Give me an example of what you're thinking and your opinion on it. Don't worry about what others think. — Philosophim

X amount of indefinite harm will occur for a future person who is not born yet. Some have argued that one is not "preventing harm" for anyone, as they don't exist yet. Is this just rhetorical hedging in order to hold a certain ethical belief, or do they have some ontological validity in the idea that the potential person is not actual and therefore nothing is being prevented to any actual thing.

I think we're still a little abstract. I like to give a concrete example of any abstract I use so its clear to others.

Lets say I'm pregnant and I want to get drunk. There's a high probability or certainty it will cause fetal alcohol syndrome, impairing my child's brain in the future. I can choose to drink and enjoy myself, or emotionally suffer until the desire blows over so that my child doesn't receive brain damage.

I think its pretty clear that this is an ethical consideration. Schopoenhauer1, it sounds like you're trying to say something without saying something. Give your idea fully. What are you looking for here? Its a lot easier to get to the point instead of holding out on it until some abstracts have been established. — Philosophim

At what point does a future person come into ethical consideration? Some have argued that because a person does not exist yet, that "that person" is an invalid category because it is en potential and not actual.

If something does not exist in the future, but could exist in the future on certain known conditions, does that future state of affairs have any ethical worth to consider? Let us say a human exists in future point Y, but does not exist now in actual point X. Does future point Y have any ethical consideration since they don't exist unless conditionally at future point Y?

Are you asking what the probability of each conditional happening is? Are you asking if its possible for X and X2 to happen? — Philosophim

So some might say that a future event is in some sense not "real" until it actually takes place. Some might argue that these possibilities somehow, ontologically exist. Even if they don't ontologically exist, are they in some sense real in a different way, or simply how we use language?

I think a lot of confusion arises because we don't use distinct vocabulary between conditionals, probabilities, possibilities, and plausabilities. Could you clarify what you mean by X is X but it could also be X2? Its a little too abstract for me to understand why X could be X or X2. — Philosophim

The tree is in X position now, but could be in X1 position or X2 position in the future, depending on conditions (conditional state of affairs I guess). What is X1 or X2 without defining it tautologically (that they are conditionals, or just explaining that in a longer definition).

Sometimes conditionals are also confused for possibilities. In the case of T Clark's example, we say its possible that the coin could have landed at either heads or tails. But the reality is it landed on tails, so that was always going to be the outcome of that flip. If we say, "If I flipped it in X way, then it would land on heads", we have a conditional.

Conditionals rely on known laws and outcomes. When the law happens, the outcome happens everytime. Possibilities rely on known outcomes, but do not know which outcome could come out based on the information we have in front of us. We could flip a coin, but since we don't know all of the forces involved, its possible it lands on either heads or tails. — Philosophim

Nice definitions. But are these possible worlds in some way real? X is X. X could be X1 or X2. Is X1 or X2 a thing? What are these possibilities? Also, X could be X1 or X2, or even X3, but then they have likelihoods of being one or the other. But also there is a sense of necessity involved here. It is necessarily true perhaps, that X could not be Y in any possibility.

Either you are not really taking this seriously or you hve some kind of strange mental block.

Anyway, bye bye. You just did away with any future interaction from myself and, I strongly suspect, many MANY others. — I like sushi

You’ve been arguing nothing these last posts and this last one now proves it. I’ve been waiting for you to stop responding since you started with your nonsense.

A case where this might be justified would be what I referred to in the OP as necessary burdens. These are ones where a person cannot survive without them. Education might be one of these. Also there seems to be an element of "already existing" to the burden. That is to say, circumstances made the burden "already exist" for the person, and you are offering a lesser burden for them so they can overcome the greater burden placed on them. — schopenhauer1

As an extreme example one might ask someone to kill for food and in this circumstance some people are more able to carry this burden than others whilst if the tsk was different those more able to handle the burden of killing would be less able to deal with other tasks. — I like sushi

It depends. As for examples of circumstances I just laid out the frame work for endless examples of this. It was not difficult. — I like sushi

:rofl: oh really? How does this not fall under

b) when there is no dire situation you are mitigating? — schopenhauer1

You’re just casually burdening someone to hunt food for you? How are you not arguing out of bad faith? You’re so interested in trying to prove me wrong you can’t argue anything of substance. Keep trying though.

So, YES an ‘unecessary burden’ is ‘unnecessary’ … what is or is not considered as necessary or unnecessary is a matter of opinion. Specific examples can be expanded upon and explored via hypothetical scenarios. The abstracted the scenario is from reality the lower the resolution.

From a purely ‘natalist’ perspective there are undoubtedly situations where one ca argue that it is not particularly viable to have children and others where it is. ‘Necessity’ used in this realm is a slippery term. — I like sushi

It's about necessity in whether or not to burden someone. When is it ever okay to burden someone
a) without their consent
b) when there is no dire situation you are mitigating?

Would you be okay if someone went around causing unasked for burdens upon people and with no reason tied to mitigating a dire circumstance for that person? I doubt you can think of a circumstance like this.

Also, we are not talking about trivial or weak burdens either. We are talking major burdens. In fact, it is the burden of "Set of all sets of burdens".

You are not really saying anything. I know the point stems from some extreme antinatalist stance so I am safe to guard against it and prod you to provide some actual reasoning that is not merely an empty opinion. — I like sushi

WTF doesn’t count as an empty opinion to you? I just gave you the reasoning again and you didn’t address my response. That is bad faith argumentation.

X Provides reasons..
Y claims no reasons provided
Repeat

The statement that is it flat out wrong to burden anyone with anything is ridiculous. — I like sushi

But I did qualify it and explained it. Now, it seems you are just putting up some defense by incredulity as if I didn’t explain it in detail. Again, I point you here:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/805941

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/804589

Either you’re unwilling to address the argument because you can’t be bothered or because it actually makes sense. Either way, that’s a problem on your part if you want to be a good faith interlocutor, and not my argument.

This is an unnecessary burden, and wrong. It creates the burden in the first place to see someone overcome the burden. It was a burden that didn't need to be created at all. — schopenhauer1

So burdens that are permanent, inescapable, the other person had no choice, the burdens didn’t have to be started in the first place are unjustified as they are unnecessary. That was my contingency. Also, starting any of the above for reasons like bringing about good states of affairs or to see someone overcome struggles, are not justified as it is violating non-harm and autonomy principles of the person being affected. That person was not in a bad situation that the burden would make better. Rather, without having the ability to consent, the burden-giver took upon themselves to create someone who will thus be burdened that didn’t have to be for various unnecessary reasons, overlooking the person being burdened (e.g. wanting to mentor, wanting to see someone overcome adversity, intending good bit knowing inescapable bad). Again, it is unjustified as it revolves around unnecessarily creating burdens that did not need to be created in the first place.

I explained why character building and wanting to see good states of affairs don’t get a pass.

Your opinion. You have to accept you are expressing an opinion here rather than offering an iron cast argument that backs up your opinion.

It is ‘wrong’ in your opinion. It is not justified in your opinion.

I cannot really take your opinion that seriously. Yet if you are expressing this as if it is a solid position to hold and holds logical weight, alongside being justifiable, I will just keep saying ‘no’ until you give something other than raw subjective opinions. — I like sushi

No dude, that's not how ethics works. If you want to debate meta-ethics, cool, but not what this particular argument is about. It is arguing for a specific normative standard (not burdening others unnecessarily), and explaining why and how and when it is justified to give someone else burdens.

You may say that this is not an ethical point or doesn't matter, but if I forced upon you burdens you could not get rid of, you did not want, and said that I'm doing it for character building reasons, or because I want someone to mentor, or because I didn't intend to burden you but I knew it would come with burdens- in many circumstances this seems to be prima facie wrong. If you say no still, then you wouldn't mind if I burdened you with stuff without your say. But see, you would indeed take umbrage at that, I am sure.

'Prior to' - ontologically prior. Not 'outside' as in 'located somewhere else'. — Wayfarer

Yeah. It is ontologically not mediated by time and space.

Suppose "representation" is the "thing in itself" (just as the tip of an iceberg is also an iceberg) ... — 180 Proof

Again, I was reiterating Schopenhauer and Kastrup's theory. But yeah, the idea of representation itself has to be accounted for, so in a way it "is" the tip of an iceberg. However, if what you mean is that physical reality just extends into some non-empirical depth, sure. I know you are a Spinoza fan, and that makes sense with his often characterized "neutral monism" of modes etc.

I would say that the physical world is represented. It is not the thing itself, but both what is represented and experience are of something.

Is the assumption that there is something that is experienced and something that is represented mistaken? — Fooloso4

So the problem with Kastrup is the problem I have with Schopenhauer's metaphysics. Why is there so much involved in this "illusion" of the representation (physical) from the monistic Mind? I don't know. Why should it be so complex if it is some sort of unity? Even if it is unity individuated into an "alter" of disassociated parts, why should these parts be the complexity that it is?

This to me, leads to not just disassociation of a unity, but an assemblage of separate contingencies. That is to say, it seems too convenient for a monistic "mind-substance" to just so happen to be also this astonishingly complex physical illusion. Why would it take on this complexity rather than simply being a simple physical aspect? You can ask, "Why not?" but then we must ask, why even have the monism then? The monism simplifies one problem, the combination problem, but then creates a new one of why division in such complicated physical ways. The complicated physical ways is the known. The idea of a monistic mind is the theory. Let's take the known seriously at least, and take that where it leads us, to perhaps a plurality.

I guess I can try to counter-argue this point and say, time is the main factor of why we think of plurality. If everything started as a unity (singularity), then time makes it seem as if things are not a singularity. So the multiplicity is not a multiplicity in at least one point in time (the singularity). But then why is that point in time the only one we are focusing on? Not sure, maybe someone like @Bob Ross wants to chime in.

Would you consider yourself an idealist? — Tom Storm

I'm agnostic. However, I am weary of the hidden dualisms, Cartesian theaters, and homunculus fallacies found in most reductionist materialism / physicalism models.

I used to read neuroscience thinking I was reading metaphysics on things like mind. That is not the case. I was reading results from a methodology for other physical happenings. One of my themes is the notion of "minutia-mongering". Many people think if they just mine the world for more minutia they will find the hidden secrets. As if adding more physical understanding is peeling back to a core that is to be revealed, with just that much more technical information from scientific investigation.

Believe me, I would rather the "Hard Problem" be solved in some mundane technical fashion. But it might be one of those things that actually cannot. I don't want there to be fantastic "Mind is everything", or panpsychism, or proto-panpsychism, or any cluster of that which puts experiential / mind prior to material, but I am willing to entertain it because it answers the question better than the other. However, that doesn't mean it is accurately accounting for reality either.

Being that the only verification for justification we know of is empirical methods, this wouldn't be amenable to getting to the metaphysical heart of the matter (no pun intended). Rather, we may have to be content with theories that have a semblance of a ring of truth to it, based on parsimony. So, that being said, I am willing to entertain ideas like "experiential-first", "mathematics-first", "process-first" models, that turn the traditional, "Mind from matter" on its head as it is looking for novel ways to approach the problem that bypass the aforementioned hidden dualism/Cartesian theater/ homunculus fallacy problems. However, bypassing doesn't necessarily entail solving anything. It is just a clever, and interesting alternative that is worth consideration.

Are you sympathetic to the Kantian notion that space and time are part of the human cognitive apparatus and allow us to make sense of our experience, but not an aspect of the noumenal world? — Tom Storm

I'm sympathetic, but not necessarily in agreement :wink:.

The problem I see with Schop with this is the architecture doesn't line up...

Will ||
Forms || Outside Time/Space

What is thus "mental states" then? This "unknown knower" Subject? Ok... Why is that in there? Where is this time/space/causality (PSR) coming from? It's an illusion? Whence this illusion?

It just seems oddly shoehorned in.

The Noumena is supposed to be Will, the Phenomena is I guess the Representation which encompasses ... The Subject (mental states?), The Forms (the content of mental states?), and Time/Space/Causality (and the fourfold root of the PSR that stems from this. It's just too many things comprising the Representation, seemingly arbitrarily.

And why is this the way Will chooses to individuate itself?

Why this kind of architecture and not another kind? Why would a unitary thing be so complicated? — schopenhauer1

Yes, that's kind of my reaction too. — Tom Storm

Schopenhauer had a quasi-Platonic idea of Forms that Will emanated and animated, but this just begs the question of whence these Forms, and why? It was a bit circular. Yes we know the world is individuated by time/space, and the Forms (which can be glimpsed through art?), are but templates the Will uses.. But then why is there an internal time/space, why is there a Platonic Form, and why how are these interacting with Will? Is Will the internal time/space, is Will outside this? Both, and then how do Forms fit in as some sort of objective thing outside mental states? The only diagram that sort of lays it out is the diagram on this old website, but still doesn't really answer my questions.

I think that's a good point. Kastrup seems to be influenced by Schopenhauer and it seems that he has taken the notion or will and the world as representation of will, changed some terms and added some speculative insights from QM and psychology. Notably, the idea that people are dissociated alters of Mind at Large (will) with metacognitive capacities which Mind at Large does not have. Mind at large being a blind and striving instinctive consciousness - sounds familiar... — Tom Storm

:up: Yep agreed. Both theories kind of lack the "why" to it though. Why this kind of architecture and not another kind? Why would a unitary thing be so complicated? This points to a sort of contingency to things that points away from monism or unitary being.

Whatever we do in the morality space will be flawed and inadequate, just like human beings — Tom Storm

Agreed. Living de facto relies on moral violation by the mere fact that we have different ideas of morality that will thus be violated by others we encounter with different ethical standards or approaches to things.

I can make an argument that this fact itself makes living itself morally disqualifying... but I digress. In fact, I devised a political theory based on just that. Social democratic programs are justified for a minimal standard of living as retribution for people being forced into a social contract that they could never agree to, and may have wanted differently once they reach an age of reasoning.

social enterprise and about cooperation and flourishing, then the idea that there is something in it for us all to be moral is possibly inescapable. — Tom Storm

There's your first problem. What of negative ethics which focus on not violating other's autonomy, and dignity, or refraining from what is harmful to others rather than "what is good for them or the species en totale"? Shit in, shit out. Not shit in, not shit out.

The assumption with positive ethics is one of burdening others for the sake of one's self interest of the individual or the species. That is just hidden naturalistic fallacies at work to justify force or seeing one's vision carried out, or for one's vision being that which one envisions as being natural thus becoming very convoluted and circular.

"I presume it is natural to see X (the species flourish), therefore I will force a situation Y on others, presuming that they need to do A, B, C to flourish, because that is my presumption of what is natural". Of course, many assumptions here, including the presumption that the species flourish rather than just a preference one has because it seems like it would be natural (but is really cultural programming, personal preference, mix, etc.).

Can you explain how that works? — Fooloso4

We have, however, made considerable progress in explaining things physically. The claim that things are experience (esse est percipi?) does not explain anything. Where do we go from there? How do we distinguish between experiences? Is the dream of getting hit by a train as real as getting hit by a train? Will the dream train get me where I need to go? — Fooloso4

Kastrup would say that our perception is simply representing the world as if it was a certain way. The physical world is representation, not the thing itself.

He doesn't think we are compound beings, but rather unified entity that is disassociated over different interacting timelines in parallel, or something like that.

I'm not saying I agree with this necessarily. I just said in my initial response that it was a way around the hard problem without having the problem that every object is individually conscious but rather everything is unitary and instances are a manifestation of this. Then I recognized the Schopenhauerian aspect of this.