I would be interested to learn about other schools of ‘pessimism’ if you can give an account of some of them rather than sticking to the one in the OP.
I feel showing the distinctions between different views in this area would help in the understanding of a particular ‘pessimism’. — I like sushi
I think it is so loosely defined, that there aren't really "schools" of pessimists, but just individual pessimists with similar themes. However, I can sum up some basic differences:
Metaphysical Pessimists (Schopenhauer, Hartmann, Mainlander, etc):
These thinkers thought there was an inherent source of suffering. For Schopenhauer it was Will. Will represents a striving-for-nothing. Will's playground is the illusion of individuation. This individuation creates the appearance of separate objects. These objects are objectifications and individuations of the Will, but are not primary ("less real") than the unified Will. Animals, and especially humans, suffer due to a profound sense of metaphysical "lack". Satisfaction is temporary because we are go from pursuits of survival and entertainment to boredom and back. Satisfaction can only truly happen by transcending one's nature of willing. According to him, this requires denying the Will and becoming an ascetic along the lines of a Jainist or something of that nature. The ultimate fate would be to starve oneself to death peacefully. He didn't expect anyone except a few to live up to that kind of lifestyle. He did think there were other things that can invoke will-lessness. He thought compassion and art brought us temporarily into a state of will-lessness. It goes on obviously. He has four really large books on the matter in The World as Will and Representation.
I'll just paste from the Wikipedia article on Mainlander:
Working in the metaphysical framework of Schopenhauer, Mainländer sees the "will" as the innermost core of being, the ontological arche. However, he deviates from Schopenhauer in important respects. With Schopenhauer the will is singular, unified and beyond time and space. Schopenhauer's transcendental idealism leads him to conclude that we only have access to a certain aspect of the thing-in-itself by introspective observation of our own bodies. What we observe as will is all there is to observe, nothing more. There are no hidden aspects. Furthermore, via introspection we can only observe our individual will. This also leads Mainländer to the philosophical position of pluralism.[2]: 202 The goals he set for himself and for his system are reminiscent of ancient Greek philosophy: what is the relation between the undivided existence of the "One" and the everchanging world of becoming that we experience.
Additionally, Mainländer accentuates on the idea of salvation for all of creation. This is yet another respect in which he differentiates his philosophy from that of Schopenhauer. With Schopenhauer, the silencing of the will is a rare event. The artistic genius can achieve this state temporarily, while only a few saints have achieved total cessation throughout history. For Mainländer, the entirety of the cosmos is slowly but surely moving towards the silencing of the will to live and to (as he calls it) "redemption".
Mainländer theorized that an initial singularity dispersed and expanded into the known universe. This dispersion from a singular unity to a multitude of things offered a smooth transition between monism and pluralism. Mainländer thought that with the regression of time, all kinds of pluralism and multiplicity would revert to monism and he believed that, with his philosophy, he had managed to explain this transition from oneness to multiplicity and becoming.[16]
Death of God
Main article: God is dead
Despite his scientific means of explanation, Mainländer was not afraid to philosophize in allegorical terms. Formulating his own "myth of creation", Mainländer equated this initial singularity with God.
Mainländer reinterprets Schopenhauer's metaphysics in two important aspects. Primarily, in Mainländer's system there is no "singular will". The basic unity has broken apart into individual wills and each subject in existence possesses an individual will of his own. Because of this, Mainländer can claim that once an "individual will" is silenced and dies, it achieves absolute nothingness and not the relative nothingness we find in Schopenhauer. By recognizing death as salvation and by giving nothingness an absolute quality, Mainländer's system manages to offer "wider" means for redemption. Secondarily, Mainländer reinterprets the Schopenhauerian will-to-live as an underlying will-to-die, i.e. the will-to-live is the means towards the will-to-die.[17]
From the Wiki article on Hartmann:
The essential feature of the morality built upon the basis of Von Hartmann's philosophy is the realization that all is one and that, while every attempt to gain happiness is illusory, yet before deliverance is possible, all forms of the illusion must appear and be tried to the utmost. Even he who recognizes the vanity of life best serves the highest aims by giving himself up to the illusion, and living as eagerly as if he thought life good. It is only through the constant attempt to gain happiness that people can learn the desirability of nothingness; and when this knowledge has become universal, or at least general, deliverance will come and the world will cease. No better proof of the rational nature of the universe is needed than that afforded by the different ways in which men have hoped to find happiness and so have been led unconsciously to work for the final goal. The first of these is the hope of good in the present, the confidence in the pleasures of this world, such as was felt by the Greeks. This is followed by the Christian transference of happiness to another and better life, to which in turn succeeds the illusion that looks for happiness in progress, and dreams of a future made worth while by the achievements of science. All alike are empty promises, and known as such in the final stage, which sees all human desires as equally vain and the only good in the peace of Nirvana.[9]
Existential Pessimists (E.M. Cioran, Nietzsche, Camus, etc.)
These people tend to not focus on metaphysics but purely the phenomenological human.
E.M Cioran for example, wrote in essays and aphorisms. One of his main themes was the idea of inertia (that is my take anyway). It's the idea that there is our situation is grim, but there is nowhere to go and nothing to do. Here are some quotes:
My mission is to kill time, and time's to kill me in its turn. How comfortable one is among murderers.
Man starts over again everyday, in spite of all he knows, against all he knows.
To Live signifies to believe and hope - to lie and to lie to oneself.
Ennui is the echo in us of time tearing itself apart.
Life inspires more dread than death - it is life which is the great unknown.
When people come to me saying they want to kill themselves, I tell them, "What's your rush? You can kill yourself any time you like. So calm down. Suicide is a positive act." And they do calm down.
Better to be an animal than a man, an insect than an animal, a plant than an insect, and so on. Salvation? Whatever diminishes the kingdom of consciousness and compromises its supremacy.
There was a time when time did not yet exist. ... The rejection of birth is nothing but the nostalgia for this time before time.
Not one moment when I have not been conscious of being outside Paradise.
Just read any of his quotes here:
https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Emil_Cioran
Again, there is not so much a coherent movement as much as similarity in themes. 19th century Germany might be the most prominent time/place of this philosophy. Schopenhauer was the progenitor for much of the ideas that came after. Even if not directly, movements like existentialism were influenced from him.
For more reading go here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_pessimism
or read these books:
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1677700.Pessimism
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/28192377-weltschmerz?ac=1&from_search=true&qid=CASfH7rSIL&rank=1
From Goodreads on Weltschmerz:
Weltschmerz is a study of the pessimism that dominated German philosophy in the second half of the nineteenth century. Pessimism was essentially the theory that life is not worth living. This theory was introduced into German philosophy by Schopenhauer, whose philosophy became very fashionable in the 1860s. Frederick C. Beiser examines the intense and long controversy that arose from Schopenhauer's pessimism, which changed the agenda of philosophy in Germany away from the logic of the sciences and toward an examination of the value of life. He examines the major defenders of pessimism (Philipp Mainlander, Eduard von Hartmann and Julius Bahnsen) and its chief critics, especially Eugen Duhring and the neo-Kantians. The pessimism dispute of the second half of the century has been largely ignored in secondary literature and this book is a first attempt since the 1880s to re-examine it and to analyze the important philosophical issues raised by it. The dispute concerned the most
fundamental philosophical issue of them all: whether life is worth living.