I do wish there was a middle ground whereby the AN topic can be cogently discussed in separate threads without "cluttering" the main forum. The only other way would be to banish it to The Lounge, but then that doesn't show up on the main feed, so I'm opposed to that too. I also think, as loathsome as it might be to some sensibilities, it is squarely philosophical (generally in the realm of ethics), and should be discussed robustly and openly in the main forum.

I don't vociferously disagree with it actually. Depending on how "it" is presented. E.g. If someone said to me, "I don't want to have children because the world is a dangerous and corrupted place and I don't want them to suffer", I'd say "makes sense". But as we discussed before, you were creating literally dozens of threads on the same theme, and it is a niche topic, hence this is the solution. — Baden

I get that, but how does one differentiate between all the threads of argument dealing with the subject?

ristotle text is just drawing out what we already know about the virtuous man — Leontiskos

This has a lot of unjustified assumptions.. such as, why should virtuous men matter? If you say that because the know how to live a "good life", AN always knows that starting a life for someone else means you have a project for them to follow. But here belies an actual UNVIRTUOUS thing- the forcing of someone else into the burdens of life to live out the project of X (the virtuous man!.. cue marble statue staring into the horizon clutching robe!!). It reeks of an aggressive paternalism and assumption (for someone else), that their negative rights should be violated (and that is indeed part of the debate, is it a violation), because you think "someone living out a virtuous life" is okay to go head and be aggressively paternalistic to allow for a deontological violation to take place.

The Lord of the Rings, obviously, an author and work who would be against my philosophy or antinatalism, however, does have themes that I am getting at. The Ring itself can represent the controlling nature of humans- the ability to want to control people, destiny, the world. Wanting to see X thing from another person, even if it means burdening them is perhaps one of these unconscious factors that we hold. The Ring seems to be a good idea.. it seems to have the answers, but in fact, it is simply the human desire to control things, to see their projects carried out by way of using other people, even their sufferings to make this happen. '

You will claim "NO! LOTR was talking about unrestrained control- like Sauron wanting to enslave everyone!". But there is indeed where the debate lies. "Does procreation represent an aggressive paternalism.. does this too go too far in how we want to control people, even violate ethical principles, to see our project carried out?". And I get the impulse to defend it.. It's the very basis for which our whole society has operated. But perhaps it isn't as unassailable as you might think. And for millennium, as long as there has been societies that had the abilities to reason beyond the tribal unit, there have been lifestyles of ascetics who eschewed the worldly projects. I am not necessarily advocating that, however, but just showing that this difference in notions of established familial traditions exist.

In fact I was recently at my cousin's wedding, and the food at our table was extremely late, arriving about 90 minutes after dinner was supposed to begin. At about 30 minutes into the dinner my nephew received his kid's meal: chicken strips, mac and cheese, and cauliflower. Everyone was gratified to see that at least someone had received their meal, and it looked to be the ideal meal for a hungry toddler. But to everyone's surprise he lost his shit and had a complete meltdown. This caused the whole table to erupt in laughter and festivity. We later learned that his mother had been misinforming him for weeks that the wedding would be wonderful and he would have a delicious meal of chicken strips and French fries - oops! I don't know that he even prefers French fries to mac and cheese, but the expectation threw him. It was a teaching moment for him where he learned that life is bigger than his misplaced French fries, and in time he will learn that life is bigger than many other disappointments, too. As Eichendorff said, "Thou art He who gently breaks about our heads what we build, so that we can see the sky—therefore I have no complaint." (The irony here is that children solve the problem of antinatalism, for it is hard to believe that anyone with the task of parenting a child could subscribe to antinatalism.)

It seems that all the opposed are agreed that antinatalism will not be cured by more of the overly serious, self-centered gravity of analytical argument. Such is not its cause and such is not its cure. What the antinatalist lacks is the subtle virtuous demeanor that Aristotle attempts to paint, and such a thing cannot be bought and sold with mere arguments. The cure for the ridiculousness of antinatalism is laughter, for like the child on the parent's lap we cannot help but laugh at the prognosis. You need only join in and we will be laughing with you and not at you. :wink: — Leontiskos

Far be it from me to begrudge anyone laughter. But as I indicated with the Lord of the Rings analogy above, there is a bit of a weird aggressive paternalism in the notion that you need to teach someone, and see your project carried out... I have wants and desires, but do I have the right to unnecessarily and non-consentingly burden you with them? Well, no I don't have that right. But somehow a blind eye is seen in the case of procreation because of the romantic notions of learning and virtue of the philosophies you describe here. Don't get me wrong, go have fun.. don't be a dour asshole to your children, but my point is perhaps we may even question the impetus for control and wanting to see projects carried out from others, rather than assume that this is what is right. The doting grandfather laughing at his grandchildren in merriment as they work through the small problems of life gradually being raised to become productive members of society, etc. But what of this? I question this project, its motives, and what we are wanting from other people.

The other problem here is that most 2a's presuppose the falsity of 1a, whereas 2 does not presuppose the falsity of 1. Or in other words, Benatar's argument contains no implicit logical clause, "...Unless the world is situated such that happiness far outweighs suffering for all." That's the very problem with his argument that is being highlighted. — Leontiskos

So this is why we shouldn't debate Benatar's full position here without actually having Benatar's full positions available to us. I am not going to defend Benatar with my vague memories of some ideas he had or piecing together from secondary sources. If you want, let's agree to actually obtain a copy of Better Never to Have Been, and we can start looking for how he defends it and critique from there. We would be foolish to make half truths about positions he may not even hold or already addressed and we are ignoring.

Contrariwise, prohibitions against stabbing are premised on pain, injury, and mortality, and therefore the sort of world you suggest logically invalidates the prohibitions (and hence 3a). This is completely different from Benatar's argument, for the case I gave clearly does not invalidate his prohibition. That's why, in a fit of honesty, you told me that the question may need to be reconsidered in light of such new circumstances. So if you want to pull your head out of the sand you will answer the question: What would you say to Benatar in that scenario? Why trust an argument in our world that you would not trust in that world? The argument by its very nature cannot be invalidated by the minimization of suffering, and yet this is what you are committed to. — Leontiskos

Same as above. Let's see what Benatar says himself! I think his book actually goes over this and if I remember, he said that the asymmetry didn't necessarily hold on its own, but rather was bolstered by various other asymmetries that needed to also be true to support it, such as psychological phenomenon, etc.

If you want, there seems to be a preview of the audio version here.. I guess this is a good start, but still isn't enough:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DuLJMhbzZM

1) My first question is (especially for those who do not beleive in some 'objective ethics'): what is the foundation of ethics for an antinatalist? It seems that in AN there is a very strong ethical component but if 'ethics' is reduced to some kind of social contract or something 'natural', it seems that AN doens't have a strong justification to be 'better' than others. — boundless

You'd have to qualify "foundation" but there are MANY foundational ethical frameworks for which AN conclusions have been drawn or at least "fit into", such as deontological ones (which I hold). Many fall under a negative utilitarian variety. Others are vaguely consequential (environmental ones, probably ones least like the ones I hold). One can even argue for a virtue theory version, that can correspond with Schopenhauer's notion of compassion being THE only real moral sentiment (because it sees everyone as what they truly are.. fellow-sufferers). In this theory, anti-procreation would be a natural course of a virtuous (i.e. compassionate) person. They see what befalls man, and wants to prevent it. In this sense, AN can also be philosophical pessimistic in its foundation. That is to say, there is something INHERENTLY negative about existence that makes it fundamentally never redeemable through social, personal, or political actions. This goes to a vaguely existential understanding of the situation.

2) Also, if one accepts that we also have a 'deontological duty' for others, for the whole human community and if one agrees that 'extinction' of humanity is bad for the whole community then it seems that what the 'deontological' argument for AN leads to is not AN itself but an 'ethical dilemma', i.e. we arrive at a situation where we have two contradictory duties, i.e. we shouldn't decide to 'give life' due to the ignorance/lack of certainty of what that will entail (if we assume that life might be bad in some cases) and the impossibility of consent and at the same time we should, among other things, continue to sustain the whole human community. If all of this is true, why antinatalists think that AN is the best choice? — boundless

So deontology generally puts the locus of ethics at the individual level (not all the time, but most.. things like rights/duties). To me, the outcome doesn't matter. That is to say, we don't have a duty towards the outcome of "preserving humanity". Humanity isn't a subject for ethical concern. Rather, we have ethical considerations of individuals and their suffering, or right thereof not to be unnecessarily and non-consentingly caused the situations/conditions wherewith (ALL!) suffering takes place. That is not your right to confer for someone else. And there is no symmetrical duties/obligations for creating happiness, especially with understanding that there is no one who exists to be deprived of happiness you would not be thus conferring.

It wouldn't be wrong in the same way as it is now. But your theoretical does not function as a reductio to any argument that I have offered, and that is the primary difference. — Leontiskos

Now what you did not quote nor did you actually address was this:

But I just want you to know, every single ethical consideration can be reconfigured if you change the conditions for which ethics plays out... So for example.. What if when you stab someone, they reanimate every time you do it instantly.. would that be wrong? I don't know, but that's not the world we generally live in.. — schopenhauer1

1. Suppose every living human being is guaranteed a pinprick of pain followed by 80 years of pure happiness.
2. [Insert Benatar's antinatalist argument here]
3. Therefore, we should never procreate — Leontiskos

Yet I said here:

This is rhetorical blather. First off, I DON"T EVEN USE Benatar wholesale. His asymmetry, if I do mention it, is a way to jump off but I have my own variations of it, which I have taken painstaking time to outline over the course of MANY threads over MANY years.. To have you pin me to one line of reasoning, like that is a subtle but malicious form of uncharitable reading.. But keep mistaking me for Benatar. — schopenhauer1

SO you are still arguing against your own arguments.. ones cleverly concocted to make you win an argument against yourself.. as they are YOUR contrived arguments (uninformed version of Benatar and my own individual philosophy), not mine.

1a. Suppose one is reanimated whenever they are stabbed.
2a. [Insert anti-stabbing argument here].
3a. Therefore, we should not stab.
4a. (Any 2a that can get you from 1a to 3a is faulty argumentation.)

This fails because we have no reason to believe either 3a or 4a. There is no parity between these two approaches. It's an ad hoc dodge. — Leontiskos

Not at all.. If one is reanimated when stabbed, that changes the very conditions of the world itself. Death is not really death. It's something else. Just as a pinprick world might not be the kind of suffering we are used to. This is the most uninteresting argument I've seen in a while. You haven't even incorporated Schopenhaueran suffering/pessimism in there, something that would come into play in my understanding of suffering (look at my profile if you need to understand that), but you reduced to some kind of hedonoistic/common version all in one swoop because you think you can win some rhetorical points -> NEXT!

You are drawing up more escape hatches because you see your argument failing. You are the one who brought up Benatar, not me. — Leontiskos

You mean where I said THIS???

However, I don't want to get caught in the weeds of that particular version of the argument. I think it is best reformulated clearly as this:

Preventing happiness is less a moral obligation than preventing suffering. All things being equal, in the case of non-consent, and ignorance (like this Veil of Ignorance argument is saying), it is always best to prevent suffering, even on the behest of preventing happiness.

The fact is, this is from the perspective of the decision-maker. That SOMEONE exists who can understand what will result is all that matters, not that the subject of the action exists. — schopenhauer1

Oh so where I even said right in your quote "reformulated as" and went into MY OWN version?

Problem solved. :wink: — Leontiskos

Nah, we can just do that for any topic right? The instant you make your 30th post on Kant, you should have its own thread to wade through in the Search. Let's do that with every topic:
Meaning of life
Plato
Kant
Aristotle
Systems Theory/Semiosis
Theoretical Physics etc. etc.

Let's ghettoize all the topics equally then and make it similarly as many unnecessary steps to search for it.

By burying your head in the sand in this way you prove yourself unserious. — Leontiskos

So AGAIN, you ignore the answer I gave you? That is twice you ignored my answer. Why didn't you quote what I quoted you??

Would you "shh!" him and sweep him under the rug!? "Don't give that argument in this world! I like birth in this world! Arguments aren't about what's true, they are about what I want, and we don't talk about the arguments that don't suit what I want!" — Leontiskos

What are you talking about? I would listen and see if he had a point that indeed, in that world even a pinprick is not worth it. In fact, if you ACTUALLY read his book (don't have it in front me, but if you want to do a chapter by chapter reading, I suppose we could), he DOES cover this. So, let's get at it then.

You're doing the same basic thing when you bury your head in the sand. You recognize that the argument proves too much but you want to believe its conclusion so you refuse to address the objection. This is precisely the sort of irrational motive I spoke about in the other thread. It's like playing soccer with a guy who uses his hands whenever he starts losing. My solution is to find someone else, who is actually interested in playing soccer. Or find a game in which the person is not irrationally devoted to a predetermined outcome. For whatever reason you show yourself unable to play by the rules of rational argument when it comes to anti-natalism. — Leontiskos

This is rhetorical blather. First off, I DON"T EVEN USE Benatar wholesale. His asymmetry, if I do mention it, is a way to jump off but I have my own variations of it, which I have taken painstaking time to outline over the course of MANY threads over MANY years.. To have you pin me to one line of reasoning, like that is a subtle but malicious form of uncharitable reading.. But keep mistaking me for Benatar.

But the funny thing is, EVEN if I defend Benatar qua Benatar (not my variation of him), I STILL defended him sufficiently, and you IGNORED my actual response to make rhetorical blather.

Put up with people who clearly misunderstand hte position, can't put together coherent objections and consistently insult us on the basis of a view we're not forcing on them.

I would hazard a guess neither is actually worth the time. That said, 180 is a never-ending fountain of bad replies which certainly help to elucidate the wrongness of some objections, so maybe there's that. — AmadeusD

It seems to be the case that general decorum for debate in this forum has long ago been deemed as unnecessary.. people like to pull out the roots rather than prune the branches. Robust debate is replaced with "getting one's goat". It's obnoxious and un-philosophical. It is certainly sophistic, but I thought philosophy was trying to veer away from such tactics and stick to substantial issues. This I guess is why philosophers snipe at each other's beliefs, not in real time, but over the course of many years in journal articles. We are playing speed chess, academic philosophy is playing a much longer game, so they can afford to "stick to the topics" more-or-less, in their paid positions to do so in ivory towers. But, this forum doesn't have to resort to gutter tactics. I simply do so when it's necessary to meet in kind, when I sense that people are dodging, uncharitable, rude, or strawmanning my position with sweeping generalizations that don't address the issues.

My two cents - I think the decision that was made was the right one. It's not ideal, but I don't see a better option given the current constraints of PlushForums. — Leontiskos

@Baden

Funny you defend this ghettoizing of the topic of antinatalism (something you vociferously disagree with), and yet you bring up a topic we discussed way back.. Something which I can't easily look up BECAUSE of this ghettoization whereby EVERYTHING related to antinatalism, no matter what thread/topic is squished into one long thread. So perhaps it is the limitations of PlushForums, but I am proposing a way to give people the ability to create new threads on the topic, so that conversations can be logically viewed.

The fact that you admitted to reconsideration shows that you do see the force of the reductio, but you failed to follow through and actually do the hard work of reconsidering Benatar's argument and your position. — Leontiskos

Oh fuck no, because I don't see this world as ever being just a pinprick. Did you find my response? It came right after:

My point was that empirically-speaking, in the real world, there are no such charmed lives, so it is de facto out of the question other than a thought experiment. Supposing only a pin-prick was the suffering, I guess the scenario could be reconsidered. But I just want you to know, every single ethical consideration can be reconfigured if you change the conditions for which ethics plays out... So for example.. What if when you stab someone, they reanimate every time you do it instantly.. would that be wrong? I don't know, but that's not the world we generally live in..

But ok, let me take your bait for taking the strongest position just for the sake of argument..

Benatar thinks indeed, being that no one being deprived of this "almost charmed life", there is no foul. No person harmed, no foul. Rather, the violation still takes place in this scenario. It's not like the child is being "saved" from non-existence, so this isn't a palliative situation either. — schopenhauer1

My sense is similar, namely that anti-natalism is a kind of second-order malady rather than a first-order thesis. It seems to stand on the circumstantial situation of the proponent rather than on its own intellectual legs, and my guess is that anyone who holds it on purely intellectual grounds could be dissuaded in time. It's hard to understand it any other way when the arguments are not sufficient to justify the conclusion, nor the tenacity with which the conclusion is held. — Leontiskos

I think this would be one man's assertion without intellectual "legs" to refute it. You say that AN isn't intellectual but a symptom of a diseased mind or whatnot, but then anyone can believe anything they want. I provide my justification. Where's yours?

actually living, present persons, n o t possible, future persons (which is AN's category mistake). — 180 Proof

Dude, your point is not valid. Buck up buttercup. Future people can be considered. It’s just how things work. If a future person could exist, they could suffer.

which your trolling is too lazy to pick-up on or too disingenuous to acknowledge my references elsewhere in this thread (as well as o — 180 Proof

:lol: clearly triggered. If you see trolling, look in the mirror. All your posts are drive by troll posts. I’ve never seen you make an attempt at civil dialogue. Toxic AF :mask: :death:!

keep avoiding my arguments for a straw man argument no one made.

It’s here if you need it:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/928608

Anti natalism is such a broad subject. Why squash all the conversations that can be had on the subject in to one thread? It's messy and isn't really conducive to a nice flow of different conversations that would be better suited apart from one another, not mingled altogether. — ShadowRajul

Your observations are correct. I used to have posts that dealt with various aspects that are disparate enough to warrant their own topic.



I wonder, would it be possible to have a subforum within Ethics just for antinatalism topics? If not that, is there some middle ground whereby topics can be clearly delineated within the same thread? I think this category has enough demand to not confine it to the ghetto of a monolithic Antinatalism thread whereby individual topics are hard to discern on a broad and multifaceted issue.

Edit: I added a substantial amount to explain more and keep on track above.

Oh yes, THAT natural philosophy :roll:. This is a non-sequitur. Besides the fact that you would then have to justify Aristotle's philosophy in regards to causation as somehow "THE" metaphysical view (less interested in that debate so don't worry), this just shows your disregard for the is/ought gap if you're somehow trying to justify these ideas in some overreaching way as it applies to ethics. I'm not going to try to fill in what I think you're implying, that's your job. Even so, after your whole explanation, my guess is that is/ought gap will be violated yet again as is your wont.

The rest is just too dull to address. — apokrisis

Ah yes, just dismiss. This is one way not to engage (dodge?) the issues I raise. You haven't even explained why it's "dull", so your comment falls flat and dull. My guess is because I do not mention your entropic yadayada philosophy and shoehorning of the notion of "balance" and "two complimentary sides" to create a basis for ethics. But I already addressed that in the last post. And I think what I brought up suffices as an objection to this non-foundation that you propose. You will call it "black-and-white" thinking, but that is misconstruing what normative ethics is. Ideals can be separated out from pragmatics. You don't ditch the ideals though. And that is the crux of the debate. Are ideals the basis for normative ethics? And from there, you are most likely going to go into a relativistic aspect to it. At the least, you can go with some Hegelian "revealing" of ideals which I would entertain. But to simply be a Sophistic relativist to the extent that you seem to be will reveal our main disagreements.

Even the Hegelian ideals would be "real", even if revealed in stages, to the extent that it reveals itself over time. Slavery was seen as tragic but perhaps, a part of life in the not-to-distant past. But various beliefs and events coalesced around the idea that freedom to not be enslaved is not just pragmatic, but the ideal. The same with many ideals we cherish. So, you can justify perhaps a systems approach, but it would odd to then ditch the ideals that come about from it, and either willfully or unintentionally replace the negotiation process (as revealed over historical time) itself with the ideals that come from them.

However, at the bottom of this might not even be Hegelian idealism, but simply idealism simpliciter. Equality and fairness and non-harm and autonomy can be said to be very ancient notions competing with other things. Negative ethics battles positive ethics in various ways. Your positive ethical impulse for X might violate someone else's negative impulse to be prevented from Y. But there are times when this conflict itself doesn't simply "balance out" in an equation.

And with all this being said, we are indeed sidetracked, as AN represents a uniquely different scenario than almost any other one that happens, as everything else that happens happens AFTER someone is already born. Thus they are in "mitigation ethics". Now, indeed the ideals have to be engaged in a sort of trading of greater for lesser harms. But uniquely, prior to birth, in consideration of future people, the ideal becomes much more stark as a "Yes" or "No". Do you cause unnecessary harm? There is no one alive already for that consideration to matter for. This changes the pragmatic aspect of the ethical consideration, and indeed does move it to a more digital ideal than the usual negotiations one must play between people's positive and negative ethics. Now, indeed we are in "preventative ethics". You can uniquely prevent ALL harm, with no collateral damage to an individual.. the one in question being so harmed. And here there will be more disagreement, as you will somehow consider positive projects more important than negative harm in these considerations. Thus the ideal rears its head again, "Do you use people to the extent that you can harm them when you don't have to because you want to see X positive project play out?". And of course your answer will be in the affirmative. But then, you this is where you play 'fast and loose' with ethics to allow for such things by ditching the ideal of non-harm for some positive project, which is not justified other than circular logic whereby the whole system justifies what is done to an individual by using the very system itself as a basis, which again, is circular logic.

So my approach is rooted in natural philosophy. That is its metaphysical basis. — apokrisis

This might be a fatal mistake in your reasoning as it is literally the naturalistic fallacy, but not even hidden, but embraced. You'd have to seriously qualify this for me to show which version of the fallacy this would be violating..

Yours seems to be some kind of Platonic notion of perfection. A one-note "good". A leap to an extreme that ends all debate. — apokrisis

Deontology generally seems to work this way, yes.

The slippery slope fallacy, as I say. All answers must arrive in the one place, whereas for me they have many possible balancing points between two complementary notions of "the good". — apokrisis

So then, can you balance murder being wrong? You would not want murder, whether 1st or 2nd degree, surely. There is something that makes the core principle behind it a bad act, and it isn't because of a negotiation or balance. If you jump to manslaughter, that isn't murder. And surely, if someone was very negligent to cause manslaughter, you wouldn't want that either, even though that is perhaps less "blameworthy" or would be in need of a "lesser punishment". That is to say, with all these principles, whatever feels "just" in a pragmatic sense, there is a core with which you at some point say, "This should or should not happen".

Pain is good as pain tells you what to avoid. Life is good because after that you will have plenty of oblivion in which to rest. — apokrisis

But at this point, we are then arguing about the core principle of "Do not cause unnecessary suffering", or "Do not use people if it can be avoided". Or perhaps, "Don't allow your version of what is good violate someone else's negative ethic to not be harmed unnecessarily".

Nature has set us up genetically to think in this natural way. To understand life as a spectrum of possibilities that we must then navigate in a reasonable fashion. — apokrisis

No, humans are deliberative creatures. You make it seem like what we choose is a foregone conclusion.

The primary dichotomy of human social organisation is the balancing of competition and cooperation. Individual striving and collective identity. Both of these imperatives are good to the degree they are in a fruitful balance. — apokrisis

It just seems you are taking appeals to traditional values as THE values one should follow. Tradition is not "nature" per se, but contingent upon a bunch of choices made, which even if helped with survival, is not anything like "nature" in the sense of pure instinct. It would simply be "what takes place" making nature a rather impotent idea then.

But what is murder? What acts fall into that category without involving shades of grey?

Perhaps you have a conviction in black and white thinking to a degree I cannot even fathom? I sort of suspect that deep down you must be kidding. That a little reasonableness will soon penetrate the pose. I'm still kind of giving credit to the possibility that you aren't completely in the grip of your own rhetoric. — apokrisis

The point is that you would not WANT murder because it's wrong, even if, for practical purposes, such as law, we can differentiate punishment and blame based on various pragmatics surrounding the normative principle.

One doesn't WANT to cause another unnecessary suffering is the normative principle. That there are various scenarios of degrees for which negligence towards this can be hashed out, doesn't take away from that core principle.

What you are trying to do is deny that there is a core principle, but that is exactly what I am pushing back on. Negligence and pragmatics are de facto how things play out in the world, but that doesn't change the principles.

For fun, let's test the pragmatic limits to your antinatalism. — apokrisis

You've already started off the argument then in bad faith argumentation as its about the normative. 1st degree murder isn't 2nd degree murder isn't manslaughter isn't a random accident. None of your scenario matters to the normative claim of the deontological basis being presented.

Well that becomes the point where we can start winding back towards the practical notion of risks being balanced against rewards. We can get back to my commonsense position is that if we are going to treat reproduction ethically, then what matters in the prospective parents is not that the baby signed off on the whole experiment in advance but that the parents were wholeheartedly in a position to strive to make it a positive outcome. That they weren't just going to spray and walk away.

One can have a productive ethical debate where there are two complementary imperatives in play – like risks and rewards – and so the way we ought to behave is in the way that aims to arrive at its optimised win-win balance. You know. Thinking like an adult.

But if you set up your ethics on the side of a slippery slope fallacy, then why would you expect that to be useful or persuasive? — apokrisis

No, this isn't a slippery slope fallacy because the debate is at the normative level. Murder isn't somewhat wrong, it's wrong. That different scenarios can occur surrounding murder doesn't make murder itself NOT wrong.

My error was only in re-entering a long stale discussion. — apokrisis

Fair enough, as the other poster said. I'll just leave you with the idea that some things are just principles, not everything in human actions have to be about some "greater good" outcome. A lot of injustice happens in the name of that mentality. Deontological basis may be seen as inflexible, but it's not when considering the procreational decision against post-birth considerations. Once born, you have a child that has rights to not die in your care, for example. I call this "mitigation ethics", as the harm is done, but now it's trying to trade the greater for lesser harms (all the "raising" part). But to create the harm, to thus mitigate it is indeed unnecessary, and thus misguided. And, as I was saying, it is aggressively paternalistic ("fascist" if you will). For some reason YOU want to see something and SOMEONE has to dance to the tune you want to see happen. With birth control, there is no real "it's just what people do" aspect (not that they had no choice or couldn't take actions prior either). It now makes it purely a political choice, even if out of negligence. One knows the possibilities.

You assume some holistic system, but these are decisions made by people within the system. Life is a choice one makes on another's behalf, it is not an inevitability to choose that someone else needs to be born into this life. Using people in order to serve some "systemic view of things", makes no sense in light of ethics that considers individuals, and their pain. People aren't pieces to be moved around such that some grand narrative plays out. That is circular logic, whereby the descriptive aspect (entropic gobblygook, etc.) becomes a sort of naturalistic fallacy and a violation of the is/ought gap.

It might be relatively wrong but then also relatively right. You of course will do your usual mad thing of talking in exceptionless absolutes. — apokrisis

This is more than a bit of bad faith argumentation being that you didn't address any of my points, and only left a sweeping general claim, don't you think?

It is not the “gift of life” that is our unconsented burden. It is the attitudes we were surrounded by that could be the reason for a life of burden and suffering. That which we could not help internalising as it was how we were treated, the circumstances of our early rearing. But that which we can grow out if we have a clearer idea about how the human mind is shaped. — apokrisis

So it is THIS mindset you speak which I think to be an exemplar of the root of the ethical dilemma AN brings up, at least in the deontological sense.

For deontologists, it would be wrong to use people. Birth uses the person who will be born to fulfill a need of the parent. The person did not exist in the first place to need anything. Rather, the person being born is purely for reasons outside the person themselves.

And thus, thus boundless was right here to say:

If I am 'justifying' his or her life (which he or she might not see as a 'good' for him or her) as a mean to a possible 'higher good', it seems that I accept to treat him or her as a mean to an end (let's say also that his or her actions benefit for many people, but they do not percieve any good from that).
I am wrong? — boundless

And thus the house of cards that the pro-natalists puts up crumbles from there. Causing unnecessary harm to someone else, didn't need to occur. Breaking non-autonomy principles to cause unnecessary harm, all the worse.

And then these arguments below end up being hollow strawmen because the AN is not making these claims:

Again, do you accept that people are allowed make their own informed risk-reward choices or not? Are they allowed to express the potentials of their own bodies or do their preferences require your consent as the fertility police. The fertility police who will anyway only ever say no. — apokrisis

But antinatalism is claiming this transcendent principle that no chances should be taken at all. I don’t get to choose what is right for me in my circumstances. The antinatalist has assumed the ethical high ground that trumps any choice I might make. Which seems a little fascist. — apokrisis

The antinatalist is providing a suggested ethic, and giving you reasons such as not causing unnecessary suffering, not using people, not breaking non-autonomy principles. They are not forcing the situation. Pro-natalists actually advocate for forcing life unto others, and how is that not a little fascist? Antinatalists simply provide a strongly suggested ethic that you can take or leave. However, the pro-natalist action LITERALLY lasts a lifetime, and NOT on one's own behalf but for another person. You mentioned "fascism", how is THIS not controlling, dictatorial, and forceful- all markers of fascist regimes? Fascists have a vision of a "way of life", and want others to be forced to follow that vision. Pro-natalists also want to see a "way of life, and want others to be forced to follow that vision. And indeed, the issue becomes political as one stance does not force one's vision on another, and another's outcome surely does.

Then you suggest various forms of therapeutic balancing to ones that are already born. You say things like:

This is the shift in mindset behind the positive psychology movement. A new style of therapy for helping people realise they have internalised certain scripts and, if they want, they can rewrite them to better suit their own lives. — apokrisis

But the burden was already laid upon the person born. These now are mitigating what was already started (not prevented from happening). It is odd to provide the problem to someone only so that later they can mitigate it. Again, this strikes me as using people to follow a sort of game (life itself!) and thus wanting to see others maneuver in this game that YOU want to see FOR THEM. Again, how is this notion itself not dictatorial, forceful, and commanding- fascist? And if you don't like it the regime wants you dead or stricken from the record. How dare one question the regime, right? All hallmarks of fascist thinking.

They are not because "natalism" is not an ideology or doctrine or dogma –"unlike antinatalism. Natality is a biological function that animals can prevent or terminate. Having been born does not in any way entail procreating. Thus, "antinatalism". (i.e. natality : antinatalism :: mortality : denialism¹) — 180 Proof

Natality isn't. I said to use whatever term you want for it.

So you positively want to stop me having babies and I don't feel particularly strongly about whether you do or not. I only feel strongly about you being suitably thoughtful about this important choice. I'm perfectly fine if you decide the proposition is a lose-lose in your circumstances.

And yet for some reason your feelings about my procreation are what must be the case here? You have decided that all births are only a losing story? And that is what must be forced on me? And now on my own children too? You will be chasing after my descendants til the end of time with your philosophy? — apokrisis

The operative word is "forced" here. That is exactly my point. Antinatalism's main gripes revolve around causing others unnecessary suffering and the fact that something as important a decision can never be consented. Procreationists/natalists want to see a FORCED outcome for other people. Antinatalism has no outcome as such. And we can go in circles about consent (and I would make arguments why this is different than getting shots or educating children or government taxes or whatever other strawmen that I've seen about that thousands of times before.. at that point, I'll just pull up the old comments). The point for THIS conversation (again trying to avoid previous debates surrounding consent or "forced"), is that precisely the claim you are making about antinatalism, is what anti-antinatalists are doing- that is to say, "FORCING" others. I claim that procreation is a political move. It is VOTING on ANOTHER'S BEHALF that one must carry out X.

So quite literally, antinatalists cause no FORCE, simply propose arguments while pro-procreation people quite literally FORCE situations upon others. So it is the natalists that cause the force, not the other way around.

Ok. But you're talking about an established population ethics concept. It would be more reasonable for me to say "pick a different term". THe one you've chosen is taken. — AmadeusD

Cool. Again, I don’t care what term is used here. I’m aware of natalism as a population ethic term.

He's wrong in his recent reply too, because that particular attitude is not capturing Natalism. — AmadeusD

I already said you can use what term you’d like.

What does that mean? You were birthed. Does that force you to be a natalist? — apokrisis

I mean that at the end of the day antinatalists don’t force a way of life unto others. Natalists (or whatever term you’d like to use for it), de facto lead to forced outcomes for others. They want to see someone else live out X and they make it happen. They force the hand.

Use whatever word you want for wanting others to live out X way of life. Pro-birth, procreationists, etc.

Source? — apokrisis

Anyone birthed.

So at what point does anti-natalism become just another social interest group telling me what I should think?

As an evangelist, do you believe you have “the truth” on your side? Yours is the view I simply must follow, and not some more generally held view in society? — apokrisis

You would have a point if natalism and antinatalism were symmetrical- but they’re not. Antinatalism at the end of the day is an ethic/philosophy that you can take or leave. Natalism advocates for forced conversion.

So, they justify their dismal worldview by labeling the "goodys" as Idiots, blind to the obvious Truth that is clear to all "right-thinking" people. Does that self-righteous attitude remind you of religious fundamentalists? — Gnomon

It depends. For example, procreation imposes life onto someone else, making it an act of force. In this sense, it can be viewed as a self-righteous attitude, where the belief in one's justification resembles that of religious fundamentalists. The newly born are like the forcibly converted, not (can never be) consulted, in someone else's vision of what life should be. What could be more controlling and fundamentalist and "me-centric" than deciding for others what you deem to be the necessary way of life, that others simply must follow? :smirk:

Just my thoughts on the above video language discussion on the word "better". The question was basically, "Who is it "better" for not to exist, if "they" don't exist to be better?". My response to that would be that it is simply from the perspective of someone already existing. I've had that conversation on here many times before. If there are no humans in the world, or ethical agents at the least, there is no need for ethics. As long as there is at least one person who has a "perspective" for lack of better terms, they can still fathom what better means from their actions. As long as an ethical perspective is around at all, then "better" exists, and thus ethics come into play such as, "This state of affairs will be better". That's how I would have answered that part of the debate.

I thought this was a thoughtful, respectful, conversation with two more-or-less differing views on antinatalism. It's weird to listen to a debate without the vitriol you generally see on forums like this.

I think "Procrustean" would fit as well as "Peircean" a lot of the time. — wonderer1

:smirk:

Yes indeed, @apokrisis' philosophy is indeed a totalizing one, perhaps to a fault. But I do value his attempt to order the world in such a way, even if it is ultimately missing something or wrong. By seeing his logic of synthesis of various fields, it might provide some insights into other things along the way, even if simply thinking of contrary perspectives to its totalizing tendency. One should be charitable first, and then see the breakdown. It looks good from a certain angle for a second, and then vanishes when looked at again. His command of some technical fields does make it more impressive though. I have fought with him on areas which his totalizing view doesn't seem to penetrate, but I still think it interesting, even if he is wrong on issues, and frustrating to debate with in this setting at least.

Indeed, I think in any of these conversations, we have to think of a god that is not "having a hand in creation" so much as "the ground of being" for which the universe exists. Think metaphorically of Vishnu here.. Some modern scientists might argue this is akin to recognizing the Multiverse (if that theory is even correct.. of course there are many scientists that assign this as too speculative, though it does have an answer for quantum physics questions like superpostions). The Multiverse would be all that was is and would be perhaps, and that could be an infinite array of universes. It seems like @Gnomon is going to say that, without the animal/human observer, this Multiverse is simply information. But in my last post, I questioned what that really means. Just like the Multiverse, "Information" seems to be a "catchall" for the "ground of being". @apokrisis for example, will have a grand Peircean version of this consisting of a triadic grouping that must always be in the equation, and explains how existence exists without animal observers (as signs, signifiers, object aka information). Of course, this all begs the question too much if carefully examined, at least to me.

Ok, it looks like you are indeed discussing the "God of the philosophers" rather than the theological/Abrahamic variety and the baggage therewith.

So that being said, I can only add at the moment regarding this philosophical deity, is that if I was purely speculating, I can propose that this universe is indeed one of an infinite variety, each with a tiny variation of a variation of a variation perhaps, which indeed, would be infinite beyond anyone's wildest notion and unfathomable for human comprehension. I don't know what that means for determinism, for the block universe, versus partial block, etc.

Certainly, there are "laws" that we have harnessed and used for tools in our pursuit of survival and entertainment. All the mathematical formulations which you alluded to mean there is something for which this universe is "about", and not just constructed, and thus a "realness" to it. Surely, a Schopenhauer would balk at this, and for good reason, being the Kantian he was. That is to say, the universe sans mind is an interesting prospect to ponder. What is that? Pure potential? Pure information? What does that even mean? Of course, people like Berkeley and Descartes thought it was all derived from God's mind, Logos, as you might put it, so there is a "pat" solution, it seems, but doesn't seem satisfying either.

You're parroting a watered-down, feel-good version of stoicism and absurdism, dressing it up as "reasonable indifference," when it's nothing more than a coping mechanism for those too prideful to face the malignant uselessness of existence head-on.

The real question isn’t about abstract notions of courage or indifference. It’s a simple "Yes" or "No" to the continuation of this "way of life" of existence foisted upon people. It’s inherently political because it’s a choice made on behalf of others- those yet to be born. You can throw around pseudo-intellectual insults and castigate those who don’t buy into your hollow philosophies all you want, but the truth remains: your mindset dictates the rules of the game, and right now, those rules are designed to continue a cycle of unnecessary suffering.

So, spare me the self-congratulatory nonsense about "grokking" absurdism. The real courage lies in confronting the malignant absurdity head-on, recognizing it for what it is, and choosing not to perpetuate it- something your "reasonable indifference" can never achieve. That is to say, what I am proposing recognizes and deals with the structural problems as they are, and its political nature as a perpetuation of a "way of life" (voting "Yes").

@wonderer1 @180 Proof
If the perpetuation of an unjust system is seen as problematic, then a collective understanding of the situation, would make sense. This thread is about utopia. It is precisely that this isn't a utopia, that it is unjust to perpetuate and force it. Absurdism is a response, similar to existentialism, but it doesn't see the problem for what it is. Only PP does that, and hence the correct modern approach to the existential situation. It need not be "defeatist". Rather it is acknowledging the situation and acting in a way that works within this knowledge communally through catharsis and empathy. It isn't distracting or ignoring or waving away the problem, but directly confronting it collectively and knowingly to better understand the plan of action in the face of it.

And yet consistent with your (Ligotti's) defeatist premises that's still a MALIGNANTLY USELESS "notion", no? :smirk: — 180 Proof

I'm not sure why it isn't consistent. As I answered here:

THAT it is malignantly useless, doesn't mean we are thus malignantly indifferent to it. — schopenhauer1

Long ago I was fortunate to be part of a community along such lines, although these days I get such needs met through talking with individual friends. Anyway, I'll PM you, because a public forum isn't a very good place for discussing such things. — wonderer1

Ok :up:

Yeah, of course, because misery does love company. :mask: — 180 Proof

You should know!

So what if participation in such a community results in someone no longer feeling isolated, lonely, and as being the only one suffering? Would that person still be able to contribute to the community or would they need to persist in seeing themselves as the only one suffering to be recognzed as a member of such a community? — wonderer1

The suffering wouldn’t be from being isolated, but rather it would be discussed communally without being gaslit, distracted from it, or ignoring it, facing it and recognizing it communally. If procreation stands as a political action for suffering in the name of X projects, this is political action against it.