Explaining is something we do. — Banno

Yes, but how is that not a truism? Who doesn't agree with that? But is being done, is something different than "getting something done". We are playing with semantics here. Getting something done would be more like a command, or trying to have an outcome come about. There is no outcome in an explanation other than the explanation itself. If you are saying, "We are trying to get done understanding what is the case about the world", ok.. but this is a superficial argument that wouldn't really be controversial.

Some language games have very little utility... and yet are still played on forums around the world. Sue is not just utility. Language as use is not utilitarianism. — Banno

No, but some might call it a kind pragmatism, which is about uses for people.

I'm not sure what they would be... We do make claims as to what is the case, just sans metaphysics. — Banno

Why sans metaphysics? State of affairs X is Y. This is not a metaphysical statement? Perhaps not a true one, but it is trying to get there, I guess. How we know it is, is something different.

If the meaning of a game is given in what one does in that game, metaphysics may be little more than a parlour game. — Banno

I don't know. Can't there be degrees of metaphysical truths? Surely Newton's is pretty close to something? Surely Einsteins might be closer?

That's not what is being claimed here. — Banno

Ok good. Sometimes I think these debates go down to "language as use" thing, which then leaves no room for "language as explanation". We use language to explain things about the world. Its use in explaining things is different than its use in "getting something done". One is trying to provide metaphysical claims. One is about something's utility. My guess, is you would reject making metaphysical claims about what is the case. Others might argue that the metaphysical claim is its own thing apart from how it is useful to getting something done.

But at the same time, they're only perceivable by a mind that is capable of counting, namely, a rational intellect. So they are described as 'intelligible objects' - real, but not material. So in that sense, not 'products of the imagination' at all. (Mathematical platonism is controversial and not universally accepted, but it's still maintained amongst at least some current mathematicians - Godel and Penrose often named in this respect.) — Wayfarer

I see. Certainly this goes to the idea that humans have pattern recognition. Quantification is one of these.

So the philosophical question is, what kind of reality or being do numbers have? Are they simply in individual minds, and therefore ultimately explicable in terms of 'what that the brain does'? (which would be the materialist view.) Because if they're both real, and not material, then this is obviously a defeater for materialism, which holds that everything is reducible to, or supervenes on, matter. So there's no room in that view for real numbers. — Wayfarer

I guess the question to you is whether abstractions have to be "Platonic"? What does that mean to be Platonic? What would an abstraction be that is not "Platonic"?

And they're not 'made up', evidence for which is the uncanny degree to which mathematical logic has advanced physics and science generally in the last several centuries. In other words, it enables real and testable predictions about the real world, which could not be known by other means.

There's quite a good SEP article on mathematical platonism, particularly the paragraph on it's philosophical significance. — Wayfarer

Yes, I had a thread going about mathematical realism. The idea that we are sort of patterns seeing the patterns. The patterns cannot help but create pattern-recognizers, sort of thing. This is a sort of neo-Pythagoreanism.

Nuh. Explanation is one use. — Banno

Well, what is the difference of the two in your conception? How are we not making everything just "use", and conflating words into each other, thus misconstruing them?

Or make that Beijing, continued Sally coquettishly. I'm being earnest! Bob said earnestly.

Ok, so let's say conceptual or language games take place within a shared terrain. You can divide it up however you like, but all games still succeed or founder insofar as they're in some way adequate to the terrain. Mere internal coherence is not enough. There's still the question of whether there is the possibility of a unified theory or whether what we always have is a patchwork of loosely connected conceptual games that we shift between depending on what we're doing. If there's a metaphysical question lurking here,it's whether the world itself is any less patchwork than our games. (but importantly, if it isn't, that isn't full relativism. games still work or don't.) — csalisbury

@Banno

You are all playing a language game by equivocating explanation and use.

Umm, there's this thing called 'science'..... :yikes: — Wayfarer

Not sure your non-sequitor there. The point is why would imaginary objects be equated with Platonic realm?

life as a problem isn't something to be solved, but simply to be endured — Maw

I think that is key with Cioran. We didn't ask for this, but here we are stuck.

For Frege, the term "leprechaun" is an empty name (or, rather, an empty noun). It does not refer to an object.

The term "three", on the other hand, refers to an object. — Kornelius

What is the object referencing? Presumably reference is a "real" thing, but how does he explain this without being self-referential? If he says it is somewhere in the world, then where is this "three"? But if he says it is in the realm of the imagination, then he once again has no way of differentiating it from the leprechaun.

Searle just says we know in the case of humans we know that we're conscious, so it must be tied to our biology, since we don't have any other explanation. — Marchesk

But then how about my criticism?

What I thought was a funny conclusion from much of these philosophies, is that neurons themselves seem to have a sort of magical quality.. If one does not bite the bullet on PANpscyhism, one bites the bullet on NEUROpsychism. In other words, the "Cartesian theater", the "hidden dualism", and the "ghost in the machine" (or whatever nifty term you want to use) gets put into the equation at SOME point. It just depends on exactly what point you want to put it in the equation. — schopenhauer1

I agree that ideas are not physical, but I rather prefer a dualist interpretation, whereby humans are able to interface between the Platonic realm of abstractions, and actual objects, to produce neat things like: — Wayfarer

If imagination is simply the mind combining prior sensory data or rearranging it to make up imaginary objects that are not correlated to the real world, then this sort of Platonic realm of abstractions is deflated to simply imagination which is a sort of mechanized reflection of our sensory world by our mind. There would be no Platonic realm more than this. Certainly, the Hard Problem of Consciousness remains, but this in no way proves that the internal/imaginary state is in some way linked to an ethereal realm of Platonic forms and what not.

Searle's biological position — Marchesk

Can you reiterate this for me? What makes neurons special as a carrier of chemical messengers, sodium/potassium gates, and so on? Further, what is it about billions of these chemical messenger carriers packed together in a skull with peripheral sensory organs like the eye with its auditory nerve, and somatic nerves in the skin, and so on?

What I thought was a funny conclusion from much of these philosophies, is that neurons themselves seem to have a sort of magical quality.. If one does not bite the bullet on PANpscyhism, one bites the bullet on NEUROpsychism. In other words, the "Cartesian theater", the "hidden dualism", and the "ghost in the machine" (or whatever nifty term you want to use) gets put into the equation at SOME point. It just depends on exactly what point you want to put it in the equation.

Added more to the post above.

Something being useful is a good start.

I think that pragmatism would a good philosophical school. I wonder why Americans aren't so much into it, even if it is genuinely of American origin (Pierce and Dewey). — ssu

I think many Americans don't engage in much philosophy at all if you are to characterize it as a whole. I'm guessing that is most societies though, except perhaps France who may put more stock in philosophy as more a political-cultural statement? If you are talking about academics and professors, I honestly don't know what is most popular. My sense is that Pragmatism as well as analytic philosophy in the tradition of Russell, Wittgenstein, Kripke, Quine, Austin, etc. rates pretty high in academic citations.

The populace as a whole I would say values use over other considerations. Technological innovation is a huge part of American industry. However, I suspect use-value is prized in almost all countries. Philosophical abstractions would not rank high as a value for most people anywhere.

Also, being such a pluralistic society, by de facto, Americans assent to a sort of pragmatism whereby if it is useful to you, and it does not interfere with what someone else finds useful, then they all should be considered legally equal. There is a pragmatism with dealing with people from so many backgrounds that have to "get stuff done" in civil society- the everyday aspect of work, consumption, public utilities, etc. I realize however, this is not Pragmatism proper- the philosophy that Peirce described as ""Consider the practical effects of the objects of your conception. Then, your conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object."

Overall doing is more important than reflecting I would propose in American values. Reflecting is for idlers and idlets are bad. It's always go go go. If you are doing something, what is its use towards improving your survival, comfort, or entertainment levels would be the implicit assumption. Where are you going? What are you doing? Not what are you thinking, not what is the meaning of. But again, this is probably most societies. Most people dont want to reflect why they should do anything at all or what motivates all this doing in the first place. It assumed an action with some outcome shod just happen.

I think that's probably not a realistic expectation, given the atomized nature of science and the idiosyncrasies of individual scientists. — T Clark

So these fields are essentially inert just so theories then and will remain so?

Due to our wills, our need "to do", we are always put in a stance of overcoming something. The existentialist understanding is that this overcoming is always deliberate and we have choices, even of suicide. The psychological-structural understanding would know that the deliberation tends towards certain types of goals (e.g. survival, comfort, entertainment related). The societal-structural understanding would understand that these survival, comfort, and entertainment related goals would always take place in a society with a historical development of ideas, economy, technology, culture, and institutions. These institutions would in turn have need to perpetuate itself through enculturation and habituation. Thus the hope is the individual takes on the values of the culture, to comply more easily with the dictates of survival within that culture's context. This in turn, keeps the individual working in the society, and helps society to perpetuate in perpetuity by each individual complying with its dictates for its own perpetuation.

No, I don't think he says that at all, but must confess to not having read his 'concepts and objects' paper. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure. @Kornelius what would be the difference between numbers and leprechauns in Frege's conception of objects? I realize that question is funny as I write it :).

Why laughing? I am just saying, Frege seems to think anything is an object as long as it is not a predicate statement. Thus, any old imaginary thing can be an object. That does not seem to be a great definition of an object. In a way, I agree with your interpretation of an object as material.

Snarkily : there are ways of looking at one's life that aren't centered, like room service, around how comfortable you are. Use it the wrong way and Baden gills (which I am in favor of) can simply become a demand for air-conditioning plus an awareness of inevitable outages, and the Final Outage. — csalisbury

C'mon you know that structural suffering is more than that. You move it to the contingent there. I don't know what "Baden gills" is.

Can you speak more about 'compliance' ? — csalisbury

In it to win it. Go with the flow. Work hard, play hard. The meaning is in the struggle. No pain, no gain. Insert self-help coping mechanism here. It's the attitude towards the foisted challenges and harms. It is like Stockholm syndrome. It's easier to embrace the thing that is foisted upon you.

The rainbow metaphor is Schop. I'm saying he had recourse to the fluctuating emotional states of his readers when he deployed it. It works, its a good image, but it works because he knew how to use words to modulate affective states. — csalisbury

One thing about Schop is he would move from the structural to the contingent and sometimes conflate the two. That is why I try to make the distinction more apparent.

Then they would just say it's the physical output of an electrical circuit opening and closing other circuits. This would be a physical act.

But then why should terms that refer to abstract objects be taken to be "reification" of what are in fact concepts? Why not take it as evidence that we may have been doing the reverse, i.e., referring to abstract objects as mere concepts, when in fact they were not? — Kornelius

Someone would just say that numbers are objects like leprechauns are objects- made up ones. What would it matter if objects are objects if objects can be imaginary? Numbers can be useful, made up objects. So being an object in Frege's own conception would not make something real. It can be useful though.

Right but this transcendental root of suffering, if you like, says that there are guaranteed to be minus strokes. What makes these minus strokes minus strokes minus strokes? The same view, the same grid, that the mere seer of contingent harm, uses to evaluate a stroke's bad/good valence. Structural suffering still retains the view where any given moment can be treated in isolation as bad or good. It just goes a step further and explains why there will always be bad moments and how they'll far outweigh the good. — csalisbury

Let's suppose I grant you this argument. I don't necessarily, but just for the sake of argument- what does this prove or not prove? I can always say the grid is simply the background that is always there once born and thus itself is part of the structure.

If you're implying that the aesthetic is above flux, that strikes me as clearly false. If you have a certain rainbow over a waterfall metaphor for the aesthetic, that could *sound* true, but the pull of that metaphor is itself is due to a flux in emotional state. — csalisbury

Not sure what you mean. Rather, there is always deprivation and challenges to overcome, no matter what your emotional stance is towards them. These are negative as they are defined by what is not already had, and are forced onto a person. There is no choice in the matter. Of course people will take on the only attitude that is easy to go along with this scenario- happy compliance.

For that reason, a lot of these theories will never be practically verifiable. So I question whether they are really theories in any useful sense, so much as thought-experiments or speculative inventions. Or whether they will ever be usefully in scope for science at all. After all, to explain speech and reason is in some sense to explain what it is that does the explaining. There's a certain circularity in that. — Wayfarer

Yes, I guess what I find annoying is that I invest a bit of stock in these theories, and they give a good "just so" understanding of the phenomena, but you know that there is no way that this is verifiable to the point where it would be accepted to say, "Deacon's empirically verified theory of language evolution". All of these ideas are like thought-experiments. They are abductive reasonings, giving us best explanations from the evidence. But if these theories do not start working together, they are not going to lead to anything other than thought-experiments. It is jarring how epistemologically different the takes are on phenomena like language evolution. I do get that this touches on so many fields with very different approaches and methodologies, but then how can the answer to this phenomenon be taken seriously when everyone isn't even in the same ballpark of epistemological explanations. The goal then would be to move the theories from abduction to a more inductive approach.

I'm sorry, but having trouble interpreting this. This is almost stream-of-consciousness.

It's not unusual for scientists studying different aspects of the same phenomena to use different tools, terminology, and concepts. I think that's partly because of the way scientific evaluations tend to pull out little chunks of the universe in isolation from the rest. You end up with a lot of little snapshots until someone finally gets around to unifying the views into a comprehensive approach. It's probably also caused by historical coincidence and scientists not reading each other. — T Clark

It would be very bizarre for something like Corbalis' theory of gestural speech/mirror neurons to conflate with Terrence Deacon's semiosis theory of the "symbolic species". They are just two very different takes on language formation. One is starting from anthropology/neurobiology and the other is starting from physics/anthropology/neurobiology/semiosis/entropy and more integrated approach. I can see how it may be combined, but do these approaches talk to each other and inform each other and recognize each other more than a passing reference perhaps in a paper or in conferences? Unlike philosophy proper, which is always handled theoretically more-or-less, these fields would purportedly want to actually provide THE explanation for a phenomena (knowing that it can be changed later of course through verification/falsification methods).

But, with the structural perspective, you still have minus-strokes. Only now you have a conceptual apparatus that allows you to see them as contingent instances of a general harm. Both perspectives (contingent harm/necessary-structural) bring with them a certain way of looking at things - as though you had a cartesian grid with an 'origin' of neutrality from which you could determine the positivity or negativity of a state by seeing where it is in relation to that origin — csalisbury

But I would still say this isn't quite right in regards to structural suffering. Structural suffering means that the there are no countable minus-strokes, as the phenomena is just always in the background. Examples would include deprivation, and challenges to overcome. These are always in play once born, by definition.

Ok, but two points. The first I've made before.

(1) It may be cathartic the first time around, but then its diminishing returns. Catharsis becomes addiction very quickly. Catharsis is freeing. Addiction looks like a compulsion to repeat.

(2) I don't mean to say that philosophy should be the thing itself, rather than a delayed reflection. I'm trying to suggest that this particular philosophy is trying to 'freeze' the thing itself in a certain way, to have control over it. Good philosophy ought to change in accordance with life. Pessimism isn't like that. It installs itself, sets down roots, and then translates everything that passes by into revalidations of itself. — csalisbury

That is the thing though, Philosophical Pessimism, understanding the structural suffering, sees it as a sort of root. The fluxes of various emotional states do not have as much to do with this aesthetic understanding of life. Simply being in a state of deprivation and challenges to overcome would itself be enough to qualify as negative, as there is a deficit that is foisted on the human, once born.

Do you mean that friday night/saturday morning is gritty and real and sunday night/monday morning is fluffy and false? If so, I'm trying to say that Cohle's pessimism is wayyy less gritty than the thing he's avoiding. — csalisbury

No, the exact opposite. In most countries, Friday night/Saturday morning is the start of the weekend, so seemingly hopeful. Sunday nigh/Monday morning is the dread again of more work. That would be more gritty and gloomy. The show wanted to provide the opiate of hope. Audiences do not like complete despair. They can handle it up until a point. Also, it is simply a writing trope to sublimate an existential problem with the character's deep psychological issue from some trauma. Nick Pizzolatto was the screenwriter. His inspiration was Thomas Ligotti's Conspiracy Against the Human Race. That book is a non-fiction book on Pessimism that is unrelenting in its gloom, but he knew that this would be too much to maintain it to the very end on a mini-series.

Sorry I should change the wording of this whole thread.. It isn't that language and consciousness theories at odds, but WITHIN the context of their respective fields of EITHER studying language evolution OR consciousness, the theories WITHIN their OWN respective frameworks are talking past each other.. Thus consciousness theory 1 and consciousness theory 2 are talking past each other. Similarly, language evolution theory 1 and language theory 2 are talking past each other. The only reason I put the two in the same topic is that they are both examples of the same thing..theories within their respective fields that are not commensurable to other theories in the same field. It does not have to do with linguistics in relation to consciousness. They are meant to be taken as separate fields that have various theories that are not agreeing how to explain the phenomena (whether that be consciousness or language, respectively).

Just to clarify, in my OP, I meant language AND consciousness theories. They do not have to relate with each other, but they are examples of theories that are not amenable to verify or falsify.. there are hundreds of theories of how both a) language evolved AND b) how consciousness evolved. These theories for each of these phenomena are what are in question.

But any finite set of observations can be explained in many totally different ways. Our current mainstream theories are not the only possible explanation, they are simply the commonly accepted explanation. — leo

Sure but predictable models like relativity, quantum mechanics, the clotting process, protein formation, etc. can actually be verified in outcomes. Not so with consciousness and language theories. No doubt theories can change, but that is not the problem here, rather if any theory can actually be applied to the case in the world, how would that be verified, and would all these incommensurate theories be combined, some dropped, reinterpreted, whole fields disappear? It seems like these theories and avenues of reflection are more art in some ways and philosophy rather than having any mappable explanatory power (like the examples I mentioned).

I thought it too obscure. — Banno

A bit ironic from you :wink: . But "doing things with words" would be kind of arbitrary use of words. Doing things with forks and knives is not necessarily accomplishing anything with them. Once you use it for an actual task and it achieves an outcome of some sort (hopefully intended), then it is "getting things done". So doing something with words is just literally saying stuff. There is no outcome attached. Getting things done with words, is trying to get something to happen with words- some sort of outcome.

So doing stuff with words can be considered a sort of critique that language is not really accomplishing anything. It's a bunch of idle chatter. There is something else that has the efficacy to get something done outside of the language. Getting stuff done with words, would be saying that language can bring about outcomes, hopefully intended and has real efficacy in bringing about outcomes. So there is a major difference in the interpretations of your argument.

So I am a loser if I am not as big as a whale, or cannot fly faster than a speeding bullet? Where is the line between capacities that I don't have the opportunity to fulfil, and capacities I just don't have? There seems to be a difference between complaining that I have been born without wings, and complaining that I have been born without arms, but the difference seems to depend on comparing myself with other humans and not other birds. Expound a little, and put me right. — unenlightened

Yes, it's in comparison to other humans. So human achieves their capacity for X, Y, Z (e.g. jobs, love life, achievements and capacities in general as outlined by Nussbaum). Human A fulfills his capacities and Human B does not. In this case, human A is the "winner" in this. He has lived up to the capacities that he had the opportunity to achieve, but human B did not. A moral system should account for actualities not potentialities. If we just say, only potential to achieve capacities for a "good" human life (as outlined by Nussbaums list of values), then we are essentially ignoring the rest in this system. There will be winners and losers in fulfilling capacities then. If we say, "Screw em, at least SOME people will fulfill their capacities (like human A)", then there is something missing.

What is what? I'm really struggling to make any sense of this at all. There are winners and losers when there is competition and comparison, and otherwise not. Is that much agreed, or do you can something else? — unenlightened

It is something else. Winners and losers here are not necessarily against other people, but against the fulfilling their own capacities. So some people will actualize their capacities if given opportunities and others will not. It is not enough to just take into account the idea of "potential" to reach capacities as some people will not actualize their capacities (for doing X, Y, Z). To just say, "Fuck em, at least SOME people will actualize their capacities if given the opportunities", would seem a bit strange for a moral theory.

In terms of the first, Occam's Razor would seem to mitigate against placing 'language' in a behavioral category of its own, and in terms of the second, both 'systems theory' and the anchoring of language in 'context' ( both physiological and social) have been fruitful. — fresco

That's great, so all these incomensurable ideas that don't seem to fit together to explain this phenomena? If you can explain a theory in one way, and then in a totally different way, they are just thought experiments and "just so" theories and don't really tell us much other than the answer can be thought of in various different explanatory models. But we already knew that much.

Doing things with words, or getting things done with words? Those are two different things. — schopenhauer1

@Banno, I don't think you answered that one.

but an examination instead of the inner logic of the framework, how it functions as a psychological support etc. — Baden

What I think Cioran does well, is he already anticipates the "average position" or "optimist" response and then completely demolishes it. Thus, an optimist might argue that a suicide is simply an optimist who has lost hope. He then sees this move and says, correct, the pessimist would not commit suicide as he never had hope. Or perhaps one might say, suicide is the optimism of relief. He would jump over this and say, suicide provides no relief for anyone (literally), and besides the fact, the damage has been done to cause this anyways. There's a few interpretations here.

So in a way, Cioran is dissolving the problem before it becomes an argument perhaps?

The world is not kind or fair, therefore kindness and fairness have no value. — unenlightened

No, that is not what I said. Rather, what is a response in a world where there are losers and winners when it comes to actualizing capacities? The losers will be pay the cost for winners, as you cannot know beforehand who will actualize and will not. There is collateral damage. This doesn't seem to be good if a moral system is based on this collateral damage. Just saying that people have an opportunity to live up to their capacities would not be enough here for the damage to those who do not actualize their capacities.

Also, a capacity that is invariably actualised is not a capacity. Whales do not have the capacity to be big, they just are big. A pint glass has a capacity of one pint whether it is full or empty. — unenlightened

Not all capacities are actualized, sorry. You gave examples of ones that can be, but certain whales will not actualize the capacity to find proper food and will die, for example. A pint glass has a capacity to be used for various amounts of time, but some will be dropped right away and break.

Surely, on the basis that 'language' is a necessary aspect of 'consciousness', the central problem is that 'language' is trying to 'explain itself'.
If (as at least one writer has suggested) that 'languaging' is merely a form of complex behaviour which serves to organise other behaviours, and to coordinate joint actions, then 'the problem' is deflated.
But of course, this pov would also tend to deflate 'philosophy' to the level of social dancing ! — fresco

Yes I agree, but the main question is, are all these theories commensurate? What would it take to prove who is right? Are they all right? Can they be combined into some grand theory that incorporates all of them or are they not amenable to each other?

Both views take as given a static reference point where anything can be considered a plus-stroke or a minus-stroke situated along [bad] and [good] axes. — csalisbury

I see this plus-stroke or minus-stroke more characteristic of contingent harms. Structural harm would be a constant in the equation.

Echoing fdrake, I have a sense that transformation happens when you don't judge things as good or bad, you take them as they are, and figure out how to work through them/with them.* The only way to work through anything is to is let go of the grid of concepts that lets you organize everything from without. Which puts the 'something' in danger of no longer being preserved - but really that shouldn't matter, because whatever is preserved is preserved too late. — csalisbury

Well, that is a default. We are always working through them. In that sense, philosophy is always preserved too late- or anything that is descriptive of the situation rather than the primary situation discussed. Philosophy is mainly looking at things through analysis and description, so in that way, all that can be done is to describe the world through words, and then to analyze what is the case from that secondary response. Otherwise, there is just silence. However, if philosophy is any form of therapy for the pessimist, this secondary world would suffice, if not just for catharsis and to understand better what is going on.

If you shut yourself in, it goes without saying everything will seem to repeat futilely. Ecclesiastes ,so the legend goes, was written by a King - those guys are famous for being trapped in a world of artifice. Movie pitch : King Midas only everything he touches turns to an illustration of structurally necessary suffering. — csalisbury

Perhaps the king sees better what is the case? Same with Buddha, who was a prince, right? The assumption then is something along the lines of, "Cultivate your flowers". We are certainly put in abusive situations and then have the need to justify them. But if you "step up" and "get er done" perhaps it will all work out, right? Comply, comply, do not deny. Life is a struggle, but the struggle brings meaning, right? Everything is what it is, right?

*canonical TV-pessimist Rust Cohle is misread as truth-speaking hero when the show telegraphs, frequently, that his Pessimism is a defense against working through his guilt over his daughter's death. 'Our planet's a gutter in the abbatoir of the slums of the ghetto of the universe' is way less meaningful than 'I was responsible for my daughter's death. But it's easier to deal with. — csalisbury

No, the screenwriter didn't want to leave the viewer with a Sunday night/Monday morning feeling (metaphorically speaking), but rather a Friday night/Saturday morning feeling.

I'm not sure how one might compete over sleep. Trying to Imagine 'America's got Shuteye' or 'The Great British Sleepover'. I suppose we could cooperate a little - I could read you a bedtime story and kiss you goodnight and tuck you in. But in the end, sleep is a solitary affair to the extent that neither competition nor cooperation can be a feature beyond not waking someone up.

Architects, though, never get anything much done without cooperating with builders, town-planners and financiers.

I think I'm missing your point. Or you mine. — unenlightened

So Nussbaum's theory seems to say that morality is based on values that are defined by the opportunities for people to use their capacities. I am saying that there is a flaw in the theory- that it does not account for outcomes. You can have opportunities, but if there are people who don't achieve the outcomes, what then? The word "opportunity" does not have some magical power. Potential means not much if it is not actualized. We fetishize the idea of opportunity and overlook actual outcomes- real time. So if a moral theory is based on opportunities for capacity, and people fail to achieve certain capacity, what then for that moral theory? Screw the people that fail, because at least some will win out? That seems amoral.

Matter? why would it matter? What's the value of a value? You keep asking, and asking again of every answer. It's a silly play of words. Let's bite the bullet - nothing matters at all. Nothing has any value at all in actual actualisation of actuality. Not suffering not joy. Your problem is you give value to the negative. so here is a valueless argument that will not convince you that your arguments are valueless and unconvincing. Enjoy. — unenlightened

Not sure what you are trying to argue here. I am arguing that if this specific morality of opportunities of capacities is never actually achieved by a certain percentage, then what does that say of that moral system? Further, by just shrugging your shoulder at it and saying, "Well, at least there are at least SOME winners who will achieve their capacities if given an opportunity, oh well about the rest" then this seems out of whack too.

Well, that brings up the question of whether information exists independent of minds, and minds are just acting on the information already there in the environment, because that's why minds/bodies could successfully evolve.

Alternatively, minds generate the information when interacting with the environment based on what is useful to those minds. If information is a subset of language games, which themselves are made up, then information doesn't exist without language users? — Marchesk

This is exactly the debate I had earlier in the Wittgenstein thread. Neo-Pythagorean types might argue that our epistemological capacities MUST find patterns, as the patterns themselves allowed for survival and evolution proceed successfully.