But its the implicative consistency that makes it work. It not only doesnt need invariance, but belief in this concept holds back what our technologies can do, becasue they aren't designed to pick up on and take advantage of this natural drift in sense. instilling greater creative innovation in our machines will require that we explicitly tap into what we now only implicitly understand in our technological languages.

Invariance only works as well as its limitations allow it to, just as Cartesian philosophy 'works' only as well as its limitations allow. This is like saying that those who believe that truth is 'objective' can cite how wonderfully a non-relativistic approach to science solves problems. They cite the wonders of the hypo-deductive method and the linear progress of the sciences. But Kuhnian approaches to science(there is no objective truth), which believe that science is not a linear progression, and that scientific ideas change via revolutions rather than accumulation can argue that their way of understanding also 'works', but differently, and in a way that provides more options for creative advance of thought. This is because "truth is not objective" doesnt mean objectivity is false, it means the idea of objectivity is an island floating on a moving sea, but its adherents cant see past the edge of the island and so see only invaniance. Technologies used to build computing machines work wonderfully, but in a limited fashion.. In order to exceed these limits and accomplish what even the simplest one celled organisms are capable of in terms of intelligence , they will have to modify their vocabulary and methods.

Quantum mechanics and relativity dont question the fundamental basis of an objective causal logic, although they play around with applications of it in terms of specific mathematical models

Conway's game of life was small step in the direction i have in mind. — Joshs

I think we are actually getting at similar conclusions. Look at my previous post about this here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/292703.

I too think that the kind of logic that the Greeks crafted, and that was then taken up and further elaborated by people like Frege, logicists, and analytics, were refined and "invariant" versions of the more general inferencing power of the human animal in general. It isn't the only version of inferencing, but a very formal version of it. Tribesman's inferencing works in their environment.

Here is where we disagree, perhaps. The more refined version of logic, which stems from the more general inferencing power, has more efficacy in prediction and technological efficacy. Thus, there is perhaps a realism going on that this more refined version is intuiting. Perhaps there are more refined and elaborated logics that are less "invariant" but that doesn't negate the fact that there is some patterns that are being intuited, be them by old-school invariant styles or new-school variant styles.

So for example you ask why it might be important to tie maths to logic. To do so requires that you treat maths and logic as if they are distinct. But if maths and logic are much the same thing, it would not make sense to seek to tie them together. — Banno

Sure that's another way to look at it. I think we have to try to understand why Frege wanted to tie math to logic. I made a "jump" perhaps on why Frege wanted to tie math to a manageable set of axioms and symbolic framework by saying it was due to the idea that logic is more amenable to human reasoning itself.

First let's define logic. Is it purely the forms that were started by the Greeks (notably Aristotle and the Stoics) and later refined by people like Leibniz, Boole, Frege, Russell, Whitehead, Peirce, Tarski, et al? Or is this more "formal logic" of symbols, and relations of the symbols through various methods of inference a specific form of the mere act of inferencing itself?

I think logic as its own genre of inquiry may have culturally started with the Greeks (and other cultural contributors that synthesized with the Greek method etc. etc.), but inferencing itself is simply part of the human animal's capabilities. Our ancestors and tribesman today can inference about a lot of natural phenomena (what causes sickness, what plants have healing properties, etc. etc.) and this inference ability is indeed an informal form of logic. Inferencing from a specific set of circumstances to a broader class (or vice versa), and deducing conclusions from broader notions, are done even at this pre-agricultural level of existence.

Further, being that logic is much to do about observational patterns (a posteriori) and internal patterns (a priori), both forms of knowledge are innately tapped into, by all humans and cultures in some form (though not formalized and distilled into its own genre and then applied afterwards). Rather a rudimentary form was the basis for the distilled/applied form later on crafted and refined by the Greeks through accumulated cultural learning. These, in turn, cannot be helped to be substantiated in the human as it is necessitated by the laws of evolution/survival that animals either follow patterns of instruction (instinct/most other animals), or recognize patterns of instructions (humans).

@fdrake@StreetlightX you may be interested too.

@StreetlightX@Banno
Frege tried to prove that math is reducible to logic and invented "formal" logic as a result. Russell and AN Whitehead tried early on to do a similar project. Many would say Russell himself with his initial paradox and later with Godel and his incompleteness theorem blew this project up- that a manageable set of of axioms can explain all of arithmetic. Neo-logicists try to pick up where Frege left off, but with Russell and Godel's contradictions and inconsistencies in mind.

Why might it be important to tie math to logic? Because while mathematics is not a kind of empirical knowledge we get through the senses, scientific knowledge does work this way. But math is not empirical, it can be done without any knowledge of experience of the world "outside" (gathered from the senses). However, math even if doesn't originate in experiential knowledge, is uniquely useful for experience. You need it to understand the theories of empirical sciences.

By reducing math to logic, it grounds math in a very practical way that humans parse the world (logic). Logic seem much more empirically-based even though it may not be purely empirical. It is closer to human experience than pure math is. Thus, we can see the importance of the project Frege was working on in terms of how math works so unreasonably well in the empirical world (it is based on a more empirically usable system of logic).

However my question goes a bit deeper than that. It is asking why logic itself is so useful. Why does logic work so well? I provided an evolutionary approach for logic's efficacy. This approach tried to demonstrate that patterns in nature (metaphysical statement), by way of some emergentism, have created a being that has pattern-recognizing abilities (epistemological statement). My critique of my own argument is explanation of how emergence works. I've always had a problem with emergence, especially in ideas of theory of mind. However, taking away that tricky problem, it is kind of a basic theory. That is to say, patterns by necessity create more patterns and beings that recognize those patterns. First, it was primitive problem-solving and pattern-recognition, but as accumulated knowledge grew over time (by way of the very basic adaptation that humans developed of accumulating cultural knowledge), logic itself becomes more refined and applied to other sets of problems. All the minutia we monger comes from this.

Edit: An interesting addendum would be that creatures have to follow a "logic" of instinctual norms that more-or-less fit ecological setting (or extinction), or be plastic enough in its ability to recognize patterns (not instinct but cultural and other times of more plastic learning) in order to survive. Due to the necessity of patterns, humans couldn't survive any other way since we evolved such a high degree of plasticity. It would be almost a contradiction for there to be an animal with this much plasticity to not have pattern-recognition and problem-solving skills and eventually logical inferences.

And physics can ignore them not because the aspect of the world it studies functions differently than subjectivity, but for its own convenience and due to its theoretical limitations it uses a vocabulary that masks these facts. — Joshs

The problem is, this invariance "works" for predictive models and technological problems. The usefulness of the logic is then what matters. Also, there are fields I am sure, that take into account the variance you describe, and put back the subjectivity in the equation, such as quantum mechanics and relativity, etc.

On a more basic level, tribesman probably see patterns in their everyday living and make note of it in their technology across generations. Agriculture became a pattern that started the idea of living with more coordinated effort to draw water for the crops and animals. This kicked off engineering, and the problem-solving that it needed. Then from engineering we can go to pure logic and math by the time of the Greeks. Other civilizations had their own mathematical systems based on astronomical pattern seeking. So it's the seeing of patterns and problem solving, and having a language to index it all that gave logic its natural force perhaps. All of these patterns are from the evolutionary patterns that helped shape our species, which themselves are from other patterns, down to patterns of laws of nature. Its patterns all the way down man. Our species are just pattern recognizers because of our brain's plastic nature of learning and ability to accumulate cultural knowledge.

Ugh, this is starting to look too similar to @apokrisis :meh:

The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics? My friends, it is only unreasonable that one forgets reason evolved with it. — fdrake

I think my last post here, is getting to your point as well: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/292353

Both of you seem to be hitting at my last post.

@Joshs

Thermodynamics, Maxwell's equations, all sorts of electrical, chemical, and physical laws, these are the basis for much of the technology we use. These patterns of nature (i.e. laws of nature) are in-built into the system. They are not things we invented (pace a realism of some kind).

Of course, the way these patterns lead to more complex patterns (pace an emergentism of some kind), it not fully known. How combinations of patterns create systems that are more than its parts, are perhaps the most vague part of the process. We know the less complex patterns. We know perhaps, how these patterns can combine, and we know the output of more complex patterns, but how this emerging process really works in terms of less complex to more complex is harder to nail down.

But lets say one of the complexities out the less complex patterns is the pattern of evolutionary change in animal species. There is a pattern, perhaps, to how species respond to environmental stimuli and external pressures. These patterns in evolution produce patterns of behavior. Patterns for various species are conserved in what we colloquially call instinctual behaviors- ones that can produce outputs favorable for survival in a certain morphological/biological/ecological niche for that species.

Human evolutionary pressures resulted in a more plasticity. The plasticity allows for accumulated cultural learning. In this learning process, abilities to see the very patterns that compose the human, nature itself, and the very reason they can learn, are employed to recognize patterns, use linguistic encoding to symbolically represent those patterns, and then use those patterns to help in survival, find more comfort, and entertain ourselves. The superstructures of culture, institutions, and the like help glue together the accumulated cultural knowledge and learning and reinforce it in a kind of feedback loop.

Thus logic that is metaphysically composed of "natural laws" becomes logic that is creatures composed of the patterns, recognizing the very patterns they are composed of. This might be where @Banno was coming from in his idea that logic fits too well- like questioning why a glove fits so well. This also leans towards the idea that logic and math is in fact discovered.

Now, a counter of this is @StreetlightX objection that humans don't just discover natural laws, and laws that lead to technology, but other laws that are not useful in any way outside their own contained system. These are non-thermodynamic, non-Maxwell's equations, non-quantum theory, non-Boolean algebra, etc. These are mathematical systems that are fiat, made up, but are wholly functional systems in and of themselves, without mapping to any real world phenomena. In this regard, it is the pattern-finding that is primary. The output need not be useful or map to anything real. If I was to use an analogy with other animal traits, I might use the example of certain birds that reach out and move their beaks and neck to catch an egg before it rolls away. It might do this in circumstances that mimic an egg rolling. It didn't do anything "real" towards the eggs, but it kept doing its instinctual response anyways. Well, if humans are naturally problem-solving pattern-finders, this can be simply taken out of its original context for survival purposes as an exaptation of sorts. It is an ability that is there as byproduct of having the enormous amount of plasticity needed for original environmental pattern-seeking and problem-solving.

What a logician calls logic are just those forms or patterns that are deemed useful for certain purposes in the space of all possible forms and patterns. Understood this way, it's not mysterious that we distinguish patterns that help us achieve our purposes from those that don't. — Andrew M

This is sort of going in the direction I trying to go. idea here is also leaning in that direction to. are looking in that direction.

I notice most of the answers here have to do with logic's place as already useful. I find it interesting that an inquiry on the nature or origin of logic is almost considered impossible. What is the implication of that then? Well, you can just say, "It's foundatioanal", and "it is what it is", but how unphilosophical is that? Here we have a set of tools that we use in the world to create other tools, but we don't and refuse to look at it closely?

Is logic something that the universe provides? Are we divining/discovering logic? If so, is logic just how the universe operates? If so, is this different than the idea that we are divining/discovering math? Is that the same thing being that math is also an ordering/pattern principle? Is it more foundational or less foundational then math then as it might underride math (pace early Bertrand Russell).

If math is simply something that is nominal- we make it up to help make sense of the world, why can it be used so effectively in things like generating outputs from inputs? If put to use in a technological context, it is the basis for modern engineering, science, and technology.

How do I get outside of logic to ask about it?
Aren't I using logic to talk about it?
My brain hurts. — Valentinus

What is the implication then?

But logic and the world are not so distinct.

It's like being astonished that a glove just happens to have five fingers. — Banno

But what are you implying here?

But not as Levinas seems to accuse him of, as making hunger and enjoyment matter only becasue there is some overarching utility in mind. — Joshs

I'd have to agree with them both here, but in different contexts. Heidegger gets right the overarching picture- we are a striving animal (pace Schopenhauer). We are mainly deprived in the departments relating to survival, comfort, and entertain-related needs at almost all waking hours (at least for most socially-normalized humans).

However, Levinas has a point too, in that amidst our deprivation, we have the capacity for what I call, absolute "goods" (they are good in and of themselves). I can think of 7 categories at least of experiences that are absolutely good in and of themselves that being: relationships, physical pleasure, aesthetic pleasure, accomplishment, esteem, learning, and flow states.

Of course, overall are these goods worth the costs? I don't think so. We are always deprived in some way, and that is universal/structural (pace Heidegger?/Schopenhauer). We also have many varying contingent negatives that affect our individual lives (in various different contingent ways depending on the individual). To be born, is to give someone debt- even in the most material wealthy, well-adjusted, contingently-low suffering individual. To force challenges of the individual, to give them the need for need, and to provide them opportunities to be prey of contingent harms, and then have to avoid/overcome/navigate them is not good. Hence, in the final outcome, the best ethic is to realize the situation (see the pessimistic aesthetic) and rebel against the existence (antinatalist).

Can you explain the practical implications of the difference between Heidegger's "mattering" and Levinas' "end in itself"?

themselves from enslavement to logic — Joshs

The problem is, logic has as its backing, things like technology. For example, boolean logic is the basis for how electrical signals get turned into logical gates that allow information to calculate and be stored. This is the basis of a computer. Computers use millions of instances of logic. Logic is also behind many of the physical events that can be predicted and harnessed for technological use. Looks like certain forms of logic start to point to a kind of realism, or at least a usefulness that can't be ignored. Then we get the typical debates of realism and social constructivism, yadayada.

I guess I have the same response to you as ghost:
But where would philosophy be without the extreme minutia mongering of all forms of logic? The logicians and philosophers of math (and maybe some types of science) would scoff at the notion of being thrown in with the creative writing folks.

I think Rorty is right. But where would philosophy be without the extreme minutia mongering of all forms of logic? The logicians and philosophers of math (and maybe some types of science) would scoff at the notion of being thrown in with the creative writing folks.

Would you seriously compare yourself to any one of the greats? — Janus

Slow your roll there. I'm just suggesting that certain types of philosophy are extremely detailed pictures of that person's interpretation of what is the case, sometimes requiring its own self-contained jargon/neologisms to get the point across. They have some really useful and interesting insights, and in a poetic/aesthetic sense can be very powerful. But it is still someone's interpretation of the world and other people's reaction to that interpretation. What makes it philosophy proper is how it relates itself to previous known philosophers, and how subsequent philosophers reference it for their own work. Similar to how Google works with its heuristics, the more other philosophers reference a previous philosopher, the more weight that philosopher has. However, I don't necessarily think something is of great insight just because a philosopher is referenced more. And what makes a philosopher itself can be quite hard to define, other than, you know, be credentialed from a higher institution with a degree, but c'mon... does that make a PHILOSOPHER? Ha

Thus Spoke Janus just doesn't sound as good.

Thanks Inyenzi. Hmm :chin:

That's how that works.

They are more original? — Janus

By popularity, this is the consensus, or Janus thinks so only, or is it up to the individual?

Like I said, go back and it's not obscure. I mention the text that I keep opening up again, and that means going from Bacon to Heidegger without becoming dizzy. — ghost

That's fine but I'm also trying to make the point that, with a philosophy like Heidegger, what makes his insights any greater than mine? Is it credentials? Degree? The voluminous amount of writing? Essentially, his philosophy is akin to theology, or one's own insights into the nature of what is the case. Because he thought of some of his own jargon and had some nifty ideas of human relations to the world and language, does he deserve more attention? Other philosophers have their own jargon, and have different conceptions. So it is just hermeneutics.. picking one that agrees more with your sensibilities at that point. What makes one's insights into the human psyche more insightful? It jives well? Those in certain circles just thinks it makes sense? It's usefulness? Many philosophies can be useful if people took them as seriously, but certain philosophers gain traction and others do not.

Often these philosophers are used because of the weight the name carries. Sometimes I'll refer to Schopenhauer, even though I have my own similar idea, simply because people respond to the dead philosopher more than schopenahuer1 idea. So be it, if it is taken more seriously, even though it shouldn't have to be necessary. I also do it as it shows I'm not alone in my thinking- there is some historical precedent. But again, doesn't mean more insightful just means that a species with 5,000 years of writing is likely not to have too much new under the sun into thoughts of the human psyche.

@Janus,@ghostHere is some jargon I made up that I find useful:

1) Minutia mongering- our focus on the particular, especially as it pertains to technological mastery. Some type of people think that by "mining" existence- that is to say, by knowing/mastering all the minutia of life (minutia mongering), that we are somehow fulfilling a higher goal of some sort. Even if they say there is no higher goal to work towards, de facto by being wrapped up in the minutia, by trying to master it, they are regarding the fact that we are able to mine some understanding that can be useful for prediction/functionality from the materials/universe as being something of value. The value comes in the output of more mining. For example, if I show you a really complex and extremely detailed math formula or proof, and then go about solving it, and then applying it to some world event that it maps to, I must be doing something of meaning because of its very complexity and its use in a functional application. I have mined the information and presented it and solved it and used it in a complex tool. That in itself must mean something. The very fact of my understanding and solving the complexity or that I advanced a functionality.

To sum it up, all the information needed to maintain a complex technology, is minutia mongering. Our culture relies on people to be experts in minutia- to monger it, in order for our mode of survival to continue. Because of its use-value in our culture, the minutia and its mongering, are seen as valuable and to have meaning because of its useful functionality. The minutia mongerer is the modern man extraordinaire to those with a scientific bent. The minutia mongerer is an expert about how a piece of technology works- right down to the bits and bytes, or the quarks, and electrons.

2) Survival/comfort-seeking/entertainment Motivations- these are the three main categories for which humans strive. We keep ourselves alive through socio-cultural, historically-developed institutions, avoid discomfort/maintain our environments (e.g. clean our environs because it feels more comfortable/society expects it maybe), and flee boredom (entertain ourselves).

3) Circularity Argument for Non-procreation- Any X reason for a parent thinking a future child should be born becomes a circularity when compared to the fact that no one had to be born to carry out that X reason in the first place. For example, no one needs to overcome challenges, if they weren't born to experience those challenges in the first place.

Addendum: it is wrong to foist unescapable set of challenges for another person when there did not need to be those challenges in the first place.

Etc. Etc. insert more schopenhauer1 jargon here.

I find Heidegger's thrownness, idea sort of useful- the facticity of what is already-there, and what has been shaped historically. Also, the idea that Dasein is sort of a mix of the past, present, and future. Okay, so he brings in the time aspect. But I think my own conception of what essentially comprises and shapes the individual human being is more accurate and to the point. It lacks that obscurantism that so entices people to Heidegger though. My conception is thus:

Each action we take, is a decision we have to make and choose within the motivational constraints of survival, comfort-seeking, and entertainment mediated by genetically and environmentally created personality filters, that are themselves carried out and partially informed from a broader linguistically-based, socio-cultural context with a historically-developed set of institutions.

Yes I know, it is frustrating. Basically what I'm saying is that Dasein describes the subjectivity of the everyman in a general situation; it's set up that way. Heidegger's analysis is aimed at revealing deeper and deeper 'grounding' structures of the everyman in every day situations. — fdrake

So it describes my annoyance at the maddening creaking and stomping sounds I hear everyday from my inconsiderate upstairs neighbor?

We get the essence of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer in Hobbes, in clean, lean lines of real talk. — ghost

Indeed Hobbes had a bit of the pessimist about him.

The emaciated skeletal structure of the subject Dasein is is not a full account of human being; it falls silent on the specifics by design. — fdrake

Can you explain that? I think that is the crux of your critique, but a lot of Heideggerese is lost on me- mainly because more specialized jargon is used to explain his specialized jargon.

However he doesn't actually say what the sins are we are supposed to have committed. — Andrew4Handel

I don't know much about the hell and brimstone guy you are quoting, so I can't say specifically if he had a set of sins in mind. However, this seems to prove the point that committing "sins" (multiple) makes little sense out of its original context of being specifically transgressing Mosaic Law. Sin was the opposite of following the commandments, in other words. It was "missing the mark". It was atoned for by way of asking forgiveness if to another person, and sacrifices at the Temple in Jerusalem. This is partly why the High Priest and the priestly class in general were so important in the Second Temple Period especially.

Being that Pauline Christianity broke away from Jewish law, and was essentially targeted to gentile communities who had no connection with an ancestral Mosaic Law to begin with, sin becomes nebulous. It either becomes more metaphysical, as in the concept of Original Sin (we are all impossibly imbued with sin due to the first man), or there are simply Church-constructed "sins" that become ones that are to be transgressed. Usually these are arbitrarily taken from Mosaic Law. This is even more tenuous because, if Mosaic Law is supposed to be no longer binding, then why only certain parts of Mosaic Law are cherry picked as "sins" while the rest aren't? This would be post-facto justification. The Church in this case, needs a reason for people to need it.

However, 'law' here is not simply a civil code, but divine command; the Mosaic law. So, perhaps less elaborated in the OT than the NT, but nevertheless, of the same order. (Although I do understand that 'sin' is the most politically incorrect concept in the English language :-) ) — Wayfarer

Yes, but I said that. Again, did you read my first post you responded to? I said:

Paul on the other hand, conceived of the idea of Original Sin, so humans can have some unescapable tainted metaphysical aspect, that only his conception of a savior/dying/resurrecting god can redeem through this act. This conception was meant to overthrow the original conception of sin as transgressing the Laws of Moses/Torah/commandments/Jewish law, etc. — schopenhauer1

I just take it as a metaphor that we should embrace life fully and our fate. I'm more of the opposite variety- that is to say the Schopenhaurean perspective. Life is an imposition, imposed on the individual. It is to be endured. Nietzsche's implication is that we can't do anything about it, so fully embrace it. I take the stance of rebellion against it. That is to say, recognize it for what it is (pessimism), and turn against its tyranny (antinatalism). Meanwhile we will minutia monger our way through our survival, comfort-seeking, and entertainment motivations. As I've said before:

Each action we take, is a decision we have to make and choose within the motivational constraints of survival, comfort-seeking, and entertainment mediated by genetically and environmentally created personality filters, that is itself carried out and partially informed from a broader socio-cultural context with a historically-developed set of institutions.

That’s exactly the Augustinian doctrine of original sin - that all mankind is tainted by the original sin, transmitted by the act of procreation, and only absolved by faith in Christ. Sin as missing the mark is one etymology, but the idea of 'abrogating the law' is more consistent with the Jewish emphasis on keeping the law. This idea was later generalised to account for mans' overall condition of 'fallen-ness' which is the meaning of the 'original sin'.

Anyway my comment was more a modern, or revisionist, attempt at interpreting the myth in realist terms, because I accept that 'the myth of the fall' says something real about the human condition. It's not simply 'myth' in the sense of being a fallacious account now displaced by scientific knowledge. But on the other hand, if you accept, as I do, the scientific accounts of the development of the species then any interpretation has to be reconcilable with that, so it has to speak symbolically but realistically about the human condition - which I believe it does. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure you fully read or comprehended my last post. I acknowledged that the idea of Original Sin, as far as I see, started with Paul and later Church Fathers like Augustine. However, the original conception of sin, was not the one painted by Paul/Augustine but was more practical- which is to say, whether one is transgressing the Law or not. Sin was equated with simply not keeping the Law properly or violating it. The atonement for this depended on the kind of transgression. If it was against another person, that wrong had to be forgiven by the person. If it was against a ritual law, one was to provide a sacrifice at the Temple.

Paul's conception made it such that humanity was tainted from "Sin" at the beginning of time, thus setting up the idea that Jesus' death/resurrection was thereby the sacrifice that was needed for participants to be "saved" from this original sin.

I also provided a deconstruction of the myth, mentioning E.M.Cioran's idea from his book, "The Fall into Time" that it may be a metaphor for human's basic dissatisfaction, even in paradise.

Having children is biology. If you're not going to have kids due to nihilism, it's a short step to suicide. Not that I care if anybody wants to off themselves. — yupamiralda

Having children is a choice one makes on behalf of another. Someone else doesn't have to endure life because of another's decision. Not having children, literally doesn't hurt anyone.

The present to hand is not equated with reflection by Heidegger, it is equated with subject-object predicative statements(the basis of formal concepts as well as objective determinations of physical things). There is nothing particularly problematic for Heidegger about reflective thinking unless it cuts itself off from relevant contexts of involvement by narrowing itself down to theoretical or logical analysis. He would not want us to simply reject such forms of discourse, but to understand its derivation. so that we can use such forms in a more knowing and ethically effective manner. — Joshs

That's the thing, I never quite understand Heidegger. Ok, so present-at-hand is not reflective thought, it is "theoretical or logical analysis". Well, isn't that something often used in troubleshooting and heuristics for fixing technology and improving it? What is an example of this "not as good" way of thinking he labels "present-at-hand"? Is it literally just Descartes sitting in his room, ruminating about metaphysical matters a priori? Does it have to touch a "real world application" for it to be considered the "good" ready-at-hand?

Yeah, you also find the same hollowness and conformity in this sort of drivel:

"I leave Sisyphus at the foot of the mountain! One always finds one's burden again. But Sisyphus teaches the higher fidelity that negates the gods and raises rocks. He too concludes that all is well. This universe henceforth without a master seems to him neither sterile nor futile. Each atom of that stone, each mineral flake of that night-filled mountain, in itself forms a world. The struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy."
— Albert Camus — Inyenzi

Yep, very Nietzschean to me.

But perhaps here you are giving only two choices. Either there is an embracing of the conditions of this life and world (and therefore a continuance of it), or there is a total rebellion against and rejection of it (and therefore, it's cessation). But is there not a third, in-between option - that of changing the conditions of our existence (or future existences)? Where one does not embrace the conditions of this life, and yet doesn't totally rebel against all possible conditions. The antinatalist is saying, "the conditions of my existence, and the existence of all beings are such that no lives are worth starting. Life is not good enough for my standards, and therefore shouldn't exist at all." But instead of dissolving the entire human project into quietude because of this, why not instead bring the world (and the lives that begin in it) up to your standards? Is the task really so utterly hopeless?

I think there are worthwhile, meaningful, and positively good experiences in this life - I'm sure you've had them. Perhaps humour, romantic partnership, music, just the sheer awe (or is that, horror?) over existing at all. Although rare, and containing downsides, is there not a sense in which the antinatalist is throwing these babies (among others) out with the bathwater (or rather, out with the ocean of suffering they drown in)? I don't ask these questions rhetorically by the way. It could very well be that the Buddhists are right in that, — Inyenzi

Yes, we've discussed this idea that there are absolute good experiences in the world. I mentioned there being six or seven categories I can think of that these goods can fall within. So, I recognize these exist. There are a couple points here though.

1) Bringing more people into the world to "bring the world up to my/your standards" is using them as a means to this end. This I do not believe to be good to enact on someone as their burden to bear for some idea of progress or future betterment. Using individual lives, who must endure X suffering/adversity/challenges for some abstract notion of betterment, or even for personal betterment, makes no sense and is circular reasoning, in the light of not existing in the first place.

2) Similarly, bringing new people into the world is presenting them with known and unknown sets of challenges. Foisting challenges on someone's behalf, whether that new person identifies with the challenges or not, in an inescapable game, is wrong to do, period. The more so if there is undue suffering for that individual as collateral damage above and beyond the "known" adversities a person might face and have to endure or overcome.

3) There is the negative nature of existence itself. In another thread there was the idea of Adam and Eve eating the apple in the Garden of Eden. Why did they eat the apple when they already had paradise? Because there is a kernel within the human species that is dissatisfied no matter what. This dissatisfaction cannot be taken out of the equation. Bear in mind, I am using this myth as metaphor.

If we are discussing contingent/relative amounts of suffering (not ones intractable but probable),the Nietzschean crowd will simply say that the unknown amounts of adversity, that we call "the real", is what makes it interesting. If we put this into an ethical stance towards procreation, it is saying that people should experience the unknown amounts of suffering, adversity, tribulations that existence offers. Something about the "game" or the "challenges" of existence itself, is worth it. Again, I don't see in the light of non-existence how making someone go through the challenges of "the real" is worth it, in the light of no one needed anything before being born into it in the first place. What about foisting the challenges of the real matters? There is a self-perpetuating scheme going on here. The scheme is that goods are good, but only worth it, at the cost of the negative. This is "real life" and it is somehow "good" for someone to endure. Again, this is just the status quo. Rather, no one needs to endure anything. Nothingness is not deprived of anything, nor has it ever hurt anyone.

To sum this up, to make new people overcome challenges, and experience undue suffering for the sake of the "goods" of life, is again using people. The hope is the goods are enough to entice them that the endeavor is worth it or that the challenges are necessary. There is a reason why the "real" is the "real". Some things cannot be taken away. This is it. This is reality. Technology might change, but the basic conditions of how we relate to the world, each other, and obtaining the absolute goods that we instinctively seek, are not going to change much, nor would it be good to force people into existence to figure out a solution to this at some future point.

At least the antinatalist has only the suffering of this earth to uproot, rather than the endless lifetimes through hell, ghost, animal, deva, etc, realms. — Inyenzi

Good point, which is why I claimed that it is actually Nietzsche who is the most pessmistic philosopher (contra almost everyone else's interpretation). The Eternal Recurrence/Return idea of life simply repeating over and over, similar to the Buddhist/Hindu reincarnation story, seems pretty hellish. The problem is that Nietzsche tries to "abundance the hell" out of life.. by embracing the tragedy and having unbridled enthusiasm for life, we can somehow overcome it, and become some sort of ubermensch. This all rings hollow- I likened it to someone who is on a cocaine bender of some sort.

I liken most philosophies about life/existence as either rebellious or conforming. Nietzsche, pretended to be rebellious with his uber life-affirming message, but ends up being simply the most conforming of all. The quietude of antinatalism, the rebellion against furthering the objectives of foisting more challenges on yet more people, is the rebellious stance against existence itself.

That it is a reflection of the predicament of the human condition, of which self-awareness and willfulness are essential ingredients. — Wayfarer

This is an interesting metaphor, but do not think it is exactly what Paul's (and later Augustine's) definition of Original Sin was. It is the idea that humanity is somehow imbued with sin based on the actions of the first humans. My point was that the original Hebrew/Israelite/Jewish interpretation of these events did not characterize the world in such a way. This was mainly an idea developed by Paul and later Church Fathers like Augustine. Sin was not thought as something that tainted humanity, but rather was seen as each individual "missing the mark" or not following commandments. Basically, the Torah was seen as divine law. Humans transgressing the Law were seen as something approximating what would later be deemed as "sin".

Paul on the other hand, conceived of the idea of Original Sin, so humans can have some unescapable tainted metaphysical aspect, that only his conception of a savior/dying/resurrecting god can redeem through this act. This conception was meant to overthrow the original conception of sin as transgressing the Laws of Moses/Torah/commandments/Jewish law, etc.

Now, as far as simply deconstructing the myth- I am fine with that, as long as we are seeing that that is a separate topic. For example, if we want to deconstruct the myth with the idea that eating the apple was akin to "falling into time" (pace E.M. Cioran), that has some interesting implications. Man, even in the Garden of Eden, was not contented. There was a kernel of dissatisfaction, even then. Dissatisfaction is simply a part of our condition, and we beget it continually for ourselves and to others through procreation.

Think about finding what is broken in a car by indicative sounds, or using a voltmeter to assess if an appliance is working correctly, or writing a line of code in a familiar programming language, or pausing to think how to articulate a concept. When you are reflecting, it usually pauses the autopilot until an opportunity to resolve it presents itself. — fdrake

Yes, like troubleshooting a technical problem. You may know some of what to do, but it's not a flow state by any means, but grueling attempts to match known heuristics with the new problem or find a possible other cause and solution.

But he does not, at least not to my knowledge, provide a detailed phenomenology of cognitive labour, or make comments that allow us to infer what it would be, at all. — fdrake

Agreed.

So I'm quite tempted to Mearlu-Ponty-ise Heidegger's present-at-hand/ready to hand distinction here, while the distinction was noticed through creative synthesis of descriptions of transcendental structure (existentialia) out of the experiences suggestive of it (existentielle), construing the 'present at hand' as merely an obstacle or aberration from all usual functioning in the world is precisely a framing error. In phenomenological/Heidegger terms the error is in taking how something is thematised within a particular reflection as constitutive of its essence rather than formally indicative of it! The present-at-hand gets downplayed because Heidegger needed it to for his account, in other phenomenological contexts it's incredibly important to attend to. — fdrake

Well that's just it. Why does the present-at-hand get downplayed at all? It seems a false and unnecessary dichotomy. Any troubleshooting with a problem of the world is reflective. Any easy-use of an intended tool is more of a flow state. Both are necessary and entailed to live in the world as human beings. In fact, if present-at-hand is equated with reflective capabilities, it is indeed the primary way we humans engage and survive in the world (contra Heidegger). One of my themes in another thread is the decoupling of instinctive programming with cultural learning. To troubleshoot is to take intuitive guesses based on past learning and applying it to new situations, running scenarios of similar use-cases or intuiting new approaches that might fit. These approaches are based on abduction/induction, intuition, inference, iterative thinking, and generally discursive, haltingly painstaking thought-processes. This to me, is all present-at-hand. A new tool gets created or an existing tool gets fixed through these aforementioned painstaking, non-flow-like mental states and attitudes. Sure, we are at ease in the use of a tool, but we also have the capability to be not at ease troubleshooting or creating new tools, deemed appropriate or necessary for human living.

You might like Ray Brassier's 'Concepts and Objects' for an interesting corrective about how to think about conceptual, specifically philosophical, labour. — fdrake

Thanks for the suggestion. I'll look into that.

Nonexistence never hurt nobody. Why should someone have to experience the ups and downs in the first place? It's a set of challenges (or "adventures" or "a big game" or "mission") foisted on a new person. One of my main themes is that people are not unknowingly living through life like zombies or pre-programmed automatons. Each action we take, is a decision we have to make and choose within the motivational constraints of survival, comfort-seeking, and entertainment mediated by genetically and environmentally created personality filters, that is itself carried out and partially informed from a broader socio-cultural context with a historically-developed set of institutions. With all these contingent factors, it is still an individual, and his self-awareness of the situation, the very human condition he is in. We are not here of our choosing, we go about maintaining our institutions, using social cues, ideologies, and role-constraints to keep a person in-check from rebelling against the whole damn seemingly self-perpetuating enterprise. It is wrong to foist a set of challenges to be overcome unto new individuals whether they consider themselves or by others as "well-adjusted" or not. All versions of well-adjusted are equally invalid for me, whether the surburban 2.5 kids lifestyle, enlightened sage, the wanderlust world-traveler, the party-goer, the mountain-climber, the tribesman, the inventor, the scientifically-inclined, the mathematical whiz, and all the rest.

:rofl: Apt analogy

I don't think the positive nature of the world is as you make it seem. There is a negative quality to existence itself having to do with its circular nature. One simple change that would help is not bringing more people into the world to endure it for 80+ years. More minutia to monger, more "stuff" that needs to get done that doesn't really need to get done by anyone, literally.

So, it's not so much a political change, as you may see on your average news network or other media. Rather, it is an existential acknowledgement that you are not doing anyone a service by bringing them into the world. By having children, you are making a political statement- other people should be born, deal with the challenges, deal with life in general, and that is okay to do for them. But is it?

Christian animosity toward and propaganda against the Jews in the New Testament are the direct result of this schism. I suspect that Jesus would have been appalled by Paul's teachings, and even more so if he knew he would be made a God by Paul's followers. — Fooloso4

Agreed

In my opinion, Arius' arguments had a far more convincing Biblical grounding than Athanasius'. — Fooloso4

It lasted for a while but eventually was squashed. By that time though, it was all variations on Pauline anyways. Once past the layer of James and the brothers of Jesus who took over the early community after him, it's like apples and oranges, so all the divisions are of the variations of oranges, when the whole time, the original was apples.

This is an interesting question. Cain's sin was not a violation of Mosaic Law since this was prior to the Law. Adam and Eve's disobedience was not called a sin. Perhaps the reason is that prior to knowledge of good and bad they were innocents and could not be held responsible for what they did not know. On the other hand, Eve saw that the fruit of the tree was desirable for gaining wisdom (3:6). How could she see that if without having knowledge of good and bad? — Fooloso4

I'd like to preface this with the fact that I don't believe any of this happened, and that this far back in Genesis is basically pure mythology drawn from internal and external inspiration of the Hebrew scribes and storytellers before that.

However, prior to Noah, the idea was probably that God was probably more involved in the whole thing. Some Rabbis later retroactively said the Torah was in full force and known.. Of course, that was a bit of poetic license there on their part to answer that sort of question. There is something called Noahide laws- these were the seven laws that all humankind is supposed to follow (as opposed to the more stringent 613 commandments only Israelites/Jews were to follow). I am not sure the apologetics of how someone "sinned" before Noah though. Presumably by the time of the Roman period, "sinning" for gentiles was breaking the seven Noahide laws.

I have wondered about Paul's influences - was it the influence of Hellenism or some strand of Judaism or some combination? According to Acts, Saul was a student of Gamaliel, but we do not find in the lineage of that teaching, beginning with his grandfather Hillel, what Paul came to preach. Contrary to that teaching, Saul did not display the kind of tolerance they advocated. Was Paul's conversion responsible for his teachings about sin? Was his aversion to the body idiosyncratic? To what extent might it have been rhetorical, geared to an audience that was familiar with Hellenistic teachings about the corruption of this world? A way of persuading them to seek salvation in Christ before it was too late? A story of cosmic forces beyond their control? — Fooloso4

I think Paul was a well-educated guy, educated enough to essentially start a new religion and sell the shit out of it. Though most of this can only be speculation, Hyam Maccoby's ideas about Paul rings true based on the evidence. Paul came from Tarsus in Asia Minor- raised a Hellenistic Jew. Presumably he encountered Hellenistic ideas in the main Greco-Roman stronghold of Asia Minor. That area, especially Tarsus was known for mystery cults where initiates would become more initiated into the rites of the god Mithras who would symbolically be slaughtered in the form of a bull, and rites of drinking blood as communion occurred every year. He was a dying and resurrecting god that saved the world every year. Maccoby proposes that Paul was so Romanized that he had Roman citizenship, something denied most Jews of his time period in the Roman Empire. Thus he and his family must have been very friendly with the higher ups. He was probably familiar with Gnostic teachings in the Hellenistic areas that he traveled from and to, being that he could write in Greek himself, and was exposed to these ideas of the "corrupt" physical world, and the "refined" spiritual one, his attitude towards the Torah and sin and salvation were crystalizing before he even got to Jerusalem.

He came to Jerusalem as a seeker, and got disillusioned by the various Jewish sects- probably not even staying any notable time in the Pharisees. Most likely he found himself as a lackey for the High Priest. Perhaps he truly thought he had some epiphany on the road to Damascus. Whatever it was, he pretty much hijacked the Jesus Movement sect, and started synthesizing ideas of "dying for sins" (Mithras), with the idea of Torah not being necessary (Gnostic/Platonic ideas).

Whereas the original group was probably some sort of Enochic/Essenic Judaism that had very characteristically Galilean Jewish interpretations of the law (less emphasis on non-Priestly purity laws as opposed to the more stringent Jerusalemite/Judean interpretations) and was headed by his brother James, Paul made a sort of counter-cultural coup inside the inner circles, and especially when out of the site of James who was stationed in Jerusalem. Eventually Paul's counter-revolution won out, and that became what eventually was to be Pauline/Gentile Christianity- which had many competing factions of its before the Council of Nicea. The original Jamesian sect died out over time as they had no home in the newly formed Rabbinical Judaism nor in the alien gentile Churches that were taking over the Roman Empire.