His table, for example, could only have been made from that certain piece of wood, and if it had been made from some other piece of wood, it would be a different table. — Banno

That seems pretty good evidence to me of some sort of substance based metaphysics. We can call it whatever you want or feel comfortable with if you like. If you have a term for it, please let me know.

While his account for him is metaphysical, I'm reading him as providing rules for modal discourse - a grammar, in the broader sense.

So I guess you might read him as saying that the substance an individual is made of is essential to that individual. — Banno

I'm just trying to follow you when you are talking about his more controversial parts- the necessary a posteriori. This is where I thought you were going with it, some more "substantive" metaphysical claims (that to me are more interesting than simply his use of grammar). Maybe that's my "non-analytical" bent as you might claim. As far as the modal discourse, I think it is cool that he uses possible worlds to evaluate an individual/kinds reference, but I think it was more aimed at theories of description that came from other analytic philosophers of his time and earlier, and is more interesting if one was involved in those debates.

I would think of that as too broad, though. For example a waterfall is an individual that does not always consist of the same substance. — Banno

Someone might say that a waterfall would simply be an abstraction. The water and the cliff it is flowing over are the "substance", their pairing would then be a secondary pairing of the two in a location in order to play more precise language games for ease of communication. In all possible worlds, only water being H20 and the cliff being (X,Y, Z substance) would matter. This is pretty radical in terms of how we identify things in everyday speech, but I guess if we are talking metaphysics, things can be different than how we are used in our ordinary understanding. That might be an interesting implication from Kripke though. Hidden how we name individuals and kinds is an underlying metaphysics that is not as ordinary as we think. However, none of this might matter to his theory, if his theory of naming only applies to proper names, and not necessarily generic, non-living individual objects in nature. I am not sure if that is the case though. He does talk about H20 so I am guessing non-living generic objects of nature can be considered, not just kinds. Again, I don't know. That specific water versus another specific body of water is an interesting concept to throw in all of this.

That's exactly the opposite conclusion than the one he wants to draw. He presents a couple of arguments against the idea that the semantic value of names must be definite descriptions, which were covered in the previous thread and lectures. — fdrake

How is that exactly the opposite? I said he was AGAINST the idea that rigid designators are definite descriptions.

Kripke is against trying to equate a rigid designator as a definite description. Why? In all possible worlds, descriptions can be mutable- able to be changed, and the reference still stands. Thus, what would count as a rigid designator? Well, mere properties wouldn't work as that is a definite description. What is left? Well, he gave the example of H20 being necessary to water. In all possible worlds, any property or description glides off as necessary to water, but H20 will always remain. But what is H20? Its a substance. Thus, there is some residue, some "thing", some substance that is, that is necessary to individuate kinds and individuals in all possible worlds.

A bit dismissive being it’s a pretty substantive point but so be it.

Hello? Not sure if you saw last reply.

Well, it’s not descriptive based, and I saw Banno connecting with idea of substance so I assumed that Kripke was making some sort of case that rigid designators are substance based rather than description based. If you think that’s not the case, can you show me what he is trying to say?

Then is it substance based? And what does that even mean?

I think the main point of Kripke is that there are essential necessities. But is this the same as essential properties or is there a difference between properties and how he is using the word necessity? Is his use of the word substance somehow connected? Is substance “real” and properties simply nominal if we consider modal logic? If substance is real, and it is essential to a thing, this means that there is ground for essentialism versus everything being mutable in our language or cognition.

Honestly it is what I've seen on these forums. This type of response inspired me:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/241534

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/241539

Basically it is not questioning what is the given. Even the idea that "society must flourish and continue" is not a given. You must question every perspective. Perhaps society is always a harm to the individual. The consequence of course is to not use an individual for society's benefit, even if there is a symbiotic relationship. That leads to other conclusions, etc. But that would be radically challenging what is thought to be dear, that is to say, the status quo.

I don't agree that it is a big difference. That the human race will cease to exist is a big deal, the manner in which their extinction comes about is minor in comparison. — Isaac

That is the consequence yes. Your assumption is that there is somehow value to the perpetuity at the species level. Unlike other animals which we are making extinct through no fault of their own, we are self-aware. We can understand what harm is for a future person. We can choose to not expose future people to harm by procreating them. It is as simple as that. The universe itself doesn't cry over our absence. Either would any actual person, if it actually came down to no one having children. But remember, antinatalists don't force their views, so de facto, other views being at least neutral to mildly pro-natalist, it doesn't seem like the end consequence of antinatalism is going to happen any time soon, just like everyone accepting veganism won't happen any time soon.

I think several thousand years of ethical debate rather contradicts this notion. Have you read Moore, for example, who seems to me to be pretty resoundingly questioning this notion, he just doesn't come up with the same answer Benetar has. — Isaac

I never said that people weren't pessimists. Indeed pessimists can be seen through literature going back millennia. But would you say this would be MOST people? A small sub-set are pessimist, an even smaller sub-set are antinatalists. Also, most people don't really question procreation, and would rarely think of the specific idea of preventing harm without causing any deprivation of good to an actual person. It is non-intuitive because life is almost always assumed to just be good in and of itself, and must be carried out no matter what. The agenda of the procreative agent is always one that is assumed to override harm to the future person.

I'm saying that different meta-ethical positions have different normative implications, and whilst meta-ethical positions are not derived consequentially, some humility is warranted about the fallibility of our rational capabilities when they lead us to conclusions which carry an enormous and irreversible normative consequence. — Isaac

I think again you mean, normative positions that have enormous applicable consequences. But I don't want to parse terms. Again, this delves into the idea I said before- just because there are a multitude of positions, doesn't mean one shouldn't hold a position. Lucky for you then, the marketplace has other ideas that counter the antinatalist. The humility is baked into the fact that no one is forcing this position on anyone else nor is it incumbent to condemn those who do hold different views.

It is a matter of what the status quo is defined, but we can say broadly defending the current social, political, ethical, and even metaphysical ideas without much change. The OP explains what I meant. Thus, for example, pick any philosopher that says hard work is good or meaningful in itself, and then analyze whether this is somehow done as a means to keep institutions of society perpetuated. Businesses need productive workers, ideologies that promote people to value hard work would clearly be favorable to manager/owner interests. In a broader way, it is good to maintain the current social institutions, in these philosophies.

Edit: Usually there is little reflection as to whether society itself is harmful for the individual. This would be considered too radical. Rather, what already exists is assumed to be correct. There is no thinking outside what is about keeping society going with minor tweaks. Where it may be rightly assumed major catastrophic actions taken by social institutions would harm an individual, the daily grind of what is current (and perceived to be the "real") is harmful as well, albeit more diffusely and less obvious. The very fact of the individual being used by society, being a part of just what is "real" is telling, for example.

You are aware, I presume, that there are different meta-ethical positions, yes?

You are aware that the anti-natalist stance relies on a particular meta-ethical position, yes?

You are aware, presumably, that David Benetar is not God, he's just a man of the same epistemic status as any of the other philosophers who've arrived at different meta-ethical theories, yes?

Considering that these meta-ethical theories cannot all be true/right, it follows that all but one of them must be wrong.

Given that the philosophers who derived them are of the same epistemic level as David Benetar, it follows that it must be possible, no matter how clear it seems, for someone of David Benetar's epistemic level to be wrong, yes?

If Phillipa Foot is wrong, then decisions made by virtue may mislead us, where they should have been made by consequence. Likewise if Peter Singer is wrong, then we will have given to charity more than we need have and the economy may suffer.

If David Benetar is wrong we will have exterminated the entire human race needlessly.

Do you see why people are lumping you in with extremists? — Isaac

Exterminated is not the correct word though. Preventing people from coming into existence is passive. No one is forcefully doing anything to actual people. That is a big difference, though the outcome might be the same, that no people will exist if taken to its logical conclusion. I can see why at first, it seems unintuitive to most folks. They are used to the idea that life is good in and of itself, and people need to be born to experience this. They never question this notion. As I've said before, the idea of nothingness scares people. This also goes into the idea that people think that they are messianic-deliverers, bringing more X (put whatever you want, experience, good, technology, civilization) into the world by bringing more people into it. As if the individual who will be harmed, is being used for the cause of advancing some other agenda. Harms can be prevented, and goods will not be missed by any actual person in the case of birth. Again, these are non-intuitive ideas for most people, but just because something has never been questioned before, or thought about in a certain way, doesn't mean it is not correct.

I would also say these are at the level of normative theories and normative-as-they-are-applied scenarios. Meta-ethics goes one stop beyond normative ethics to understand how ethics obtains at all (is it subjective, objective, "in the world", in our species, intuition-based, logic-based, etc. etc.). So just wanted to clarify that you are discussing at the level of normative ethics (i.e. virtue theory, deontological, utilitarian, etc.), not meta-ethics.

So in the market place of ideas, you can decide which ideas make sense based on the arguments. As long as no one is forcing their ethical views on you, I see no problem following or not following Benatar. The individual may hold a view, but they shouldn't force the view. So I'm not sure where the problem is. Just because there are so many points of views, doesn't mean one shouldn't hold any view.

This is your favourite subject, isn't it? You're the antinatalism guy, much like the nuclear weapons guy and the animal rights guy. :grin: — S

Absolutely it is. I just don't like being taunted and provoked. Also when it gets to a level where I have to look four strings back to get to he heart of the argument, it loses its focus. I will keep making posts as well, all from different angles on this subject. However, the one thing this forum lacks is a formality to the debate. Thus it would be better if at some point both parties would just decide to make a closing argument as happens in certain debate formats. Otherwise, it is about who gets the last word and it endlessly provokes and taunts rather than elucidates and allows for reflection or for onlookers to have time to consider the two sides. This is especially so if the debate is contentious rather than a dialogue.

It's not spurious at all. I could keep going with what the two have in common, but I don't mind letting it go. I'm impartial enough to accept that there are similarities with your position and both that of the incels and that of the vegans. But you don't like the former, hence you've put forward an alternative. — S

You can find similarities with any two positions, but by purposely pairing it with this insidious philosophy you want antinatalism to have the same guilt by association. It is a good rhetorical trick. As far as I know incels are essentially a hate group and are violent, and they have little philosophical reflection behind their arguments. None of this applies to antinatalism. Antinatalism doesn't hate a certain group of people. There is no condemnation or calls for crazy actions. Now, if some individuals do have hatred, this is just like individuals in the animal rights or vegan communities who spew hatred etc. That is not representative of the philosophy, just the actions or character of those individuals.

Whereas my justification isn't even deontological, it's consequentialist. — S

Well, I did say it is a difference in value. Agreeing by using "where as" and then naming some of the differences doesn't make sense except to be contentious for its own sake. However, I would say Benatar is mostly negative utilitarianism due to his focus on preventing harm in the unique case of birth. In my own formulation, there is a deontological aspect of not using someone for another cause, or in other words, not creating someone on their behalf who will experience harm for X agenda reason. This of course tying into the idea that no one needs to be given an obstacle course in the first place, in order to find solace through "strength-through-adversity" or finding the good despite the obstacles, or even the fact that good experiences exist so ergo it is a parents job to be messiah-figures delivering people who are expected to find the good life. This isn't even to mention that some people don't think they live worthwhile lives. What is your threshold for collateral damage of those people? That isn't even the main argument though, though it can be bolstered using the empirical evidence, that even a small amount of collateral damage or unintended consequences is not a good outcome. I don't see people as small bits to be used in a big "good life" aggregator machine. That makes no sense to me.

Compassion for the individual who will experience harm is countered by empathy for the individual who will have worthwhile experiences, and the alleged injustice of forcing someone into adversity is countered by the unjustified opposition to the opportunity of someone having inevitable worthwhile experiences and most likely a good enough life, the latter of which most people attest to.

Your objections to my counters typically involve a double standard, so they don't count and your problem lingers unresolved. — S

No, my objections typically involve a nuance that you don't seem to compute. That is to say, while it may be worthwhile continuing a life once born, there is an asymmetry when we are dealing with the unique situation of whether to procreate a new person into the world. Since there is no loss to an actual person of "the good life", it is not bad that it was never incurred. However, all harm was prevented, which is good. Combine this further, with the notion that no one needs to be given an obstacle course on their behalf, that is no one needs to be given adversity and harmful experiences in the first place, if they didn't need it. This is a messianic complex, to think that one is delivering another person into the world as arbiters of "good life" for others when the collateral damage to is harm. No one needs to experience the good life, unless they were already created in the first place. No person, no need for it.

Yes, that's a big difference. I think that it can. And I also think that you're like most people in that you wouldn't even hesitate to apply this reasoning in many other contexts. You reject it here because it doesn't lead to your desired conclusion. In other words, you put the cart before the horse. — S

Again, different contexts may require different thinking. The context of birth is different than the context of already being born, thus a different standard can be applied.

It should indeed be avoided, but not unconditionally, not at any cost. It should be avoided, setting aside the exceptions, and this is one of them. Your principles here are far too simplistic, and they lead to your adoption of ridiculously disproportionate "solutions" (using a sledgehammer to crack a nut). — S

But that's the point. There is always another nut to crack. There are always more problems to solve. There is always more adversity to overcome. Putting post-facto reasons that are often culturally necessary for people to have the strength to get through, no one needs to have more nuts to crack in the first place. No one needs to be given the "chance" to solve these problems for X teoleological purpose, or because one is an recognized Nietzschean who likes the idea of "strength through perseverance", and beyond good and evil. Why create these situations for someone else? Oh right, because there is an agenda that they have to carry out "the good life", that people have to deliver themselves from the adversity and harms to find the good from the adversity, or good despite the adversity. But why did they need to go through this in the first place? Oh right, it's just good for them to go through it.

Yeah, that's another difference. I think it can, and I think that your arguments just don't work. Sure, you can piece something together for yourself and the relatively tiny number of people who share your views, but they have very little wider appeal. They're largely unconvincing. You're not too bad at this debate thing, but you don't stand a chance against someone of equal or superior skill (and I obviously fall under the latter category :strong: ) because your position suffers from a much weaker foundation. You're bringing a knife to a gun fight, mate. :wink: — S

Oh yes, if I declare myself King of the Universe, that must mean it is so. You can declare your argument to be stronger, but doesn't make it so. As for not having wide appeal, this doesn't hurt the argument. Being the right position and being the popular one are not necessarily/ nor should necessarily be the same thing. The knife to a gunfight is a nice little rhetorical gimmick though.

Yeah, I think I'm done with these analogies. It's a weak tactic in my assessment, because I can just as easily come up with analogies of my own to counter yours effectively, as I've demonstrated at least a couple of times already. — S

Analogies are just another tool in these arguments and can help illustrate a point.

Although actually, this one's not anywhere near as bad your Buddhist analogy, which formed the basis of your argument in the opening post. I can work with this set up at least, and I already have. I've said my piece about the "obstacle course", the people who go through it, and why I disagree with your take on it. — S

Yes, and we differ on whether it is good to create someone on their behalf, that has to go through an obstacle course to find the good, or find the good despite it. See above paragraphs for more detail.

Look, I am not going to do this back and forth anymore for a fourth round. I can answer every individual point, but this would never end, and the debate would quickly lose its main focus and my interest. I'm not going to change your mind. You are not going to change mine. We can get some value from this perhaps by strengthening our arguments, but I have no pretensions that either you or I will magically realize the other one has the "true" insight into this matter. Rather, I see this going in a dismal ad hominem way, which I already see with your accusations that my antinatalist arguments are equivalent to the "incels". [That analogy is quite spurious. I liken most antinatalist arguments to vegan arguments. That is to say, antinatalists present their case non-forcefully and it is up to the individual to decide. There is no malicious intent, there is no condemnation. The philosophy does not advocate violence towards anyone, but ironically, the opposite- it is trying to prevent all harm and in a passive way.]

I'd like to sum up what I see to be the main differences in our core values, as that is the heart of the matter. What this comes down to is a difference in values. My main value is that the moral obligation lies in not creating/exposing someone else to harm. There is no moral obligation, however, to not prevent good. Compassion for the individual who will experience harm, the injustice of forcing someone into adversity are part of the reasoning.

Connected to the above is the idea that exposing the individual to harm cannot be justified by some net calculus that this person might bring into the world (for himself or society). Exposing another individual to harm should be avoided, and preventing birth prevents exposing another person to all of life's harms. Any harm that's been done cannot be rectified (post-facto) by the hope/fruition of a future benefit either by reports of an individual (as you think the outcome will be), or by somehow adding to society's net benefit (if that kind of measurement is even commensurable or reliable).

To further explain the above, I will provide the analogy that this is like forcing someone to run an obstacle course because they can get some benefit from it, or be strengthened by it. However, this does not take back the fact that that person was created and exposed to adverse/harmful conditions in the first place. It's almost like some people have a quasi-messianic notion that they need to bring other people into a world with adversity/harm so that then they can be delivered or transformed into some "better" person (i.e. the good life). Or they are expected to experience the good despite being exposed to adversity/harm. Rather than this exposing people to harm to overcome something they didn't need to in the first place, I am saying it is always good/best not to force someone, on their behalf, into the adversity/harm of life in the first place. The obligation is on the prevention of harm, not on the promotion of pleasure/good. Whether good obtains for an individual in the future, does not take back the fact that a person is exposed to harm in the first place. It was not bad to be prevented from good experiences, if no actual person is deprived, but it was certainly good that someone was not forced into adverse/harmful experiences.

No, that's not possible. You can't be on the side of the future person because a consequence of what you're advocating is that there would be no such person to benefit from our actions. — S

Doesn't bother me. Oh, and it doesn't bother "him" either ¯\_(ツ)_/¯.

And what we know about present people makes it more likely that you would be acting against the wishes of the future person, which is another reason why you can't be on their side. — S

Doesn't bother me. Oh, and it doesn't bother "him" either ¯\_(ツ)_/¯.

So, with that in mind, and thinking about this rationally, I ask again: whose side do you think you're on? — S

The future person.

They cannot possibly benefit from that. They cannot benefit from anything at all if they don't exist, and your position makes it impossible for them to exist. — S

But admitted as such. That is the asymmetry. Preventing harm is always good and that is person independent. It is just always good to prevent harm, but it is not bad if you prevent pleasure (unless there is someone who already exists to be deprived).

No, either both count or neither count. Take your pick. Or, perhaps you already have in effect. If the prevention of joy means nothing to no one because no one is around to lose out, then the prevention of harm means nothing to no one because no one is around to benefit. You can't have your cake and eat it. And if you think otherwise, then you've abandoned reason. — S

Again, I believe it is always good to prevent harm (even if there is no one to benefit from being prevented from harm), but it is not always bad to prevent pleasure unless there is someone there to be deprived of the pleasure. That is the terminus of this ethical axiom. I've always stated that beyond that, what one values is really up to the emotional resonance of the ethical agent. If you think that bringing a good life into the world trumps preventing suffering, in a situation that would uniquely not deprive any actual individual of said good life, then you value that agenda (of the possibility of a person living a good life) over the complete prevention of harm. That is where we cannot go much further. I can give you my reasoning, and I have. You can decide you are not convinced. There is no air tight slam dunk in ethics, just a back and forth of the arguments and rebuttals. You can go on and do some ad hocs, or try to entice me with some insults to how bad the arguments are, but that is how these go. Some people will just not find them convincing. I'm not going to jump off a cliff because S is unsatisfied with schopenhauer1's argument on antinatalism.

That argument is nonsense on stilts. It is not rational to maintain, on the one hand, that a future person would benefit from the prevention of adversity, yet, on the other hand, that they would not lose out from the prevention of joy. — S

No get the argument right first. Rather, I don't think a person has to exist for preventing adversity to be good. I DO think a person has to exist for prevention of pleasure/good to be bad. Otherwise, it is not bad (or good).

There doesn't need to be for my argument to work. And I'm guessing that you think the same about your argument. So why even bring that up? — S

Because you have to create the person (with all the negative effects on that person) in order to create happiness. Meanwhile, no one needed nothing, and no negative effects were incurred in my formulation. That goes with the Buddhist analogy.

That's a red herring. You don't need a "divine command" to do anything that I'm arguing in favour of. You don't need to do anything at all, really, because hundreds of babies are born every minute. — S

Not on their own. And you are right, I can't do anything about it. It's not a red herring. Other than harm, anything else does not need to take place, it i the desire or result of the parent for a child to be born to fulfill X reason.

No, if preventing pleasure isn't bad because there is no one there to be deprived, then preventing harm isn't good because there is no one there to gain. — S

Already explained the asymmetry that I think is the case.

You've kind of skimmed over the point without really addressing it. I know that, once born, we can act so as to either increase or reduce the chances of encountering all sorts of adversity, such as that which would inevitably be encountered in the activities that I listed. The question is, given that this adversity can be avoided or minimised to the extreme, why aren't you endorsing this? It's because you don't really believe that adversity is as big a problem as you make it out to be when the context is your pet topic. That's a double standard.

You're just using adversity as an excuse for extinction. Extinction is what you really care about, and extinction is against the wishes of most people, and the wishes of most people are a likely reflection of what the wishes of a future person would be, which means that in all likelihood you're not going to be on the side of a future person, which is a good reason for rejecting your claim that you're on their side. — S

Adversity can be used as a form of entertainment or trying to test resolve. It can also be something that is undesirable- and this would be perhaps considered not just adverse, but harmful. The point though is not about whether I would take on self-imposed adversity, but whether it is right for someone else to force someone to be exposed to all adversities that will befall that person. Now once born, we do have psychological survival instincts and attachments, but that is a difference scenario with never coming into existence in the first place. I think they are separate scenarios, which is what I've said all along in this argument. Continuing to exist and starting existence for someone else are two different scenarios. One is more or less symmetrical with good and bad (prevention of good is bad, prevention of bad is good), where the other is not (prevention of good is not bad in respect to no actual person experiencing it, prevention of bad is good, even if there is no actual person around).

It's a matter of likelihood, not projection. If, for arguments sake, three out of every four people feel that life is worth living, then that makes it very likely that a future person would feel the same way.

And I already know what your stance is in terms of being against creating new humans because of the adversity that they would face. I wasn't questioning what you're against. You've purposefully answered in a way which reveals nothing new and evades what I was trying to get out of you. So I ask again, whose side are you on? Or is it that you are in fact on nobodies side, but you're either in denial about that or you're reluctant to come out and say that that is so because you know that it would make you look bad (and rightly so!). — S

I've already explained the unique scenario of starting a life, vs. the scenario of already being born.

You see, there was no person who existed prior to birth who was just sitting around undisturbed in peaceful bliss like a Buddhist. — S

That is simply an analogy.

The creation happens, then there's someone, and this someone is privileged with the opportunities that only life can bring. There is no need to want anything prior to birth, and there is no need to face adversity, but that is neither here nor there. In that scenario, no one can benefit, whereas in the real world, people can. Standing a good chance is better than standing no chance. So the real world is better than your hypothetical world devoid of life (which doesn't even compete). — S

Why is it good to create someone who can "benefit"? What right do you have to expose someone to adversity just because you want to give an opportunity to "benefit"? That is the point of the whole thing.

A double standard. — S

A different standard.

But we frequently don't. You frequently don't. You put yourself in situations which count as examples of easily preventable adversity all the time! You're doing that every time you decide to engage in debate on here. You do that whenever you go to the gym, or play a game of chess, or read an intellectually challenging book, or whatever it is that you do in your spare time - there's bound to be something else that counts for you beyond this forum. Why the hypocrisy? You must really take after your namesake. — S

Harmful adversity. Also, creating situations of adversity for OTHER people, is perhaps a necessity, but a double bind. To CREATE someone for the SAKE OF making them go through adversity FOR THEIR BENEFIT is still a contradiction to me. I don't believe in making obstacle courses for others because we think it is best for them at the end of the day. This may be a corollary of the initial asymmetry, if you will.

We can't avoid it completely whilst we're alive, but that wasn't what I was challenging. I was challenging why you presumably don't do more to at least avoid it where possible or minimise it to the extreme, as one would reasonably expect if adversity is a problem so severe that it warrants nothing less than the extinction of humanity! — S

I did say we can try to minimize harms and maximize benefits, etc. once alive.

Yeah, well, I am opposed to using a sledge hammer to crack a nut. That's not a sensible way to approach the problem either way. — S

The problem only exists for the already born obviously. No reason to create scenarios of adversity for someone else, pace the corallary to the asymmetry, that is to say " creating situations of adversity for OTHER people, is perhaps a necessity, but a double bind. To CREATE someone for the SAKE OF making them go through adversity FOR THEIR BENEFIT is still a contradiction to me. I don't believe in making obstacle courses for others because we think it is best for them at the end of the day."

Adversity is a consequence of life, and life for most people is worth living. If you're not like most people, and you don't see it that way, then that's too bad, but you shouldn't take it out on humanity. I worry about people who think like you. You're not so different from an incel. — S

That is an extreme accusation I gather for rhetorical point-making. I don't know much about "incels" but what I've heard in the media is they are extremely misogynistic and want to harm specific groups of people. I would obviously say that both those things are bad and unethical.

Q1. Whose side do you think you are on? As in, whose interests do you think you're defending? — S

The future person. Preventing harm and adversity for them. Guess what though? No one needs be deprived of the flipside of the benefits :D. In the scenario of uniquely preventing all adversity for a future person, without any deprivation to that individual, then one should prevent adversity. That is the argument. There is not even a person that I have to promote their "welfare" or "happiness". What counts in the scenario of birth is prevention of harm only, as the downside is nothing to no one. I have no divine command to promote someone's future "good life" in the scenario or any other agenda I might have for the future person, simply to prevent unneeded adversity or harm.

Q2. Do you accept that a variation of your argument can be used against you? — S

I'm not sure which one you mean other than something along the lines of, "If you are thinking of potential children, why not think of their net benefits rather than just preventing adversity? Why should that be the only thing to worry about?". Again the response is that preventing pleasure/good is not bad when there is no one there to be deprived. It is always good to prevent harm however.

Q3. Are you against any kind of activities where you might - or are likely to - face adversity, which would include countless activities like reading a book, playing a game, going to school, playing an instrument, participating in a sport, engaging in debate, and so on and so forth? — S

Not in an absolute "this is a definite" way. Once born, we can choose all sorts of adversity that we would like to challenge ourselves with. That is not the scenario of birth where there is uniquely no one there to be deprived of pleasures in the first place, and no one that needs to overcome challenges to get to a "better" place (whatever that might mean metaphysically speaking).

I ask the first question because the answer isn't clear to me, and the possible answers seem peculiar to me. You can't be on the side of most people, because you're against the wishes of most people. Are you on the side of a minority of people? If so, why should the wishes of a minority supersede the wishes of a majority? Or are you on the side of no one? In other words, people themselves are the problem, and only a world devoid of people is what matters. — S

I'm on the side against creating adversity for people for whatever reasons are projected onto the new humans.

I ask the second question because it seems clear to me that the tables can easily be turned on you by imagining a hypothetical person who wants to live a good life and is willing to face adversity in the hope of achieving that. Like your scenario with the monk, one can imagine an innocent prisoner who wants to be freed in order to live a better life, and you have the key. Would you keep him locked up? Would that be ethical? — S

This is silly. No person existed prior to birth who wants anything. You would literally be creating the desire for the good life out of nothing by creating the person. The creation happens first. However, there is no need to want to overcome diversity prior to birth. Adversity also includes non-desired adversity too, don't forget.

And I ask the third question because if adversity is such a problem - apparently so much of a problem that it's not even worth the possibility of starting a life and living through it to reap the rewards - then, for sake of consistency or in other words so as to avoid a double standard, shouldn't you be endorsing the avoidance and minimisation of adversity in life? And if so, that would seem to rule out a lot of activities. — S

I explained earlier I think there is a different decision for starting a life and continuing a life. Once we are alive we do whatever utilitarian things we must to prevent adversity. But we cannot avoid most adversity, I'm aware of that. The real world demands it. I am opposed to making people go through it, even if people are enculturated that some of the adversity is good for them. We can get into the psychology of what people say, but I'd rather not. But if you think that is needed beyond the simple axiology of preventing all adversity, I will be glad to provide it for you.

But I do think in general, giving others adversity unduly is not good. However, sometimes it "has" to be done. So that is another ethical dilemma. Now we must put people in adverse situations and that is the "best" scenario for them. Sure, that is the real world, but someone was brought into the real world.

Is it wrong? Yes I think its wrong to *rationally* create human embodiment, but the more I actually see the way in which children are so mindlessly and irrationally created, the less I think reproduction is really even in the realm of moral judgment at all. Sometimes it seems like sex, pregnancy and reproduction can be treated entirely as biological functions, much like eating or sleeping. Does it make sense to question the moral value of your stomach digesting its food? Perhaps questioning the morality of reproduction is along the same nonsensical lines. — Inyenzi

You have some very well-stated points. I often think the same thing. There is a mindlessness to procreation, which is so at odds with the immense philosophical stakes of creating a whole new being. People rarely stop to rationally reflect on it being that the process itself is so embedded in the messiness of sexual relations, and the ever-intertwined socio-biological lens through which it is viewed. Thus, people who would otherwise gladly debate some abstract ethical logic in regards to the Trolley Problem or Prisoner's Dilemma, or wax on about the Categorical Imperative and lying and murder, will look with contempt at questioning procreation as a whole. Perhaps it is seen as so natural that it cannot be questioned in its entirety.

Case in point, I am myself solidly antinatalist. I think it is wrong to create human embodiment and the suffering it necessarily entails, and it ought not be done. But at the start of this year me and my girlfriend had a pregnancy scare. Thankfully she ended up miscarrying but still, it just really brought home how mindless and crudely biological it all is. We were drunk and (to put it crudely) wanted to fuck, didn't bother with protection and she became pregnant. At the time of sex, the moral weight of what we were risking couldn't have been further from my mind. If she didn't miscarry, human suffering would have mindlessly proliferated itself. And perhaps when the child was old enough to question its predicament I'd tell him or her that life is gift, and overcoming and learning from its struggles and miseries makes it all worth it. Maybe the child will question and argue against these reasons for its creation, but these were not actually why it was created, it was all so much more mindless and biological than that. — Inyenzi

Great case in point. Most people are procreated through mindless actions related to pleasure and emotions related to affection. Lofty reasons like "overcoming and learning from struggles" are just post-facto answers for a much more basic reason. So what do we conclude from this?

it doesn't make much sense to assign a majority of Christian authorial credit to Paul or any other singular entity. — VagabondSpectre

Why not ALL the Church Fathers (those who wrote doctrine a generations later than Paul), attest to his influence, and there are at least 7 epistles that are almost definitely attributed to him or someone very close to his time. It is probably true that Timothy and some others were not his writings.

Generations of Jewish oral tradition seems to have shaped Abraham (almost certainly an archetypal myth) and the old testament, and radical re-adaptation under novel social pressures (not just in the time of Paul) slowly turned it into something new. — VagabondSpectre

This is a false analogy. Almost all scholars would agree that the further back you go in the Biblical narrative, the more mythological the story becomes. Thus Abraham, may or may not have been a real person, but the stories surrounding him were meant to summarize the migrations of the ancient Hebrews embedded in wisdom stories and mythological-narratives that provided ideas on how traditions started.

commoditized salvation/afterlife/blessings just wasn't competitive/accessible enough for the masses of the Roman empire, where the message of Jesus was cheap, easy, and generous. In a world where social inequality would have been eminently visible (leading to discontent) at least as a peasant you could now believe that you would get the best possible afterlife instead of whatever meager afterlife prior tradition/culture dictates you can afford. — VagabondSpectre

I agree with you here, but by the time we get to gentile (non-Jewish) Romans being converted by the masses, the Kingdom of Heaven had become something different from its original meaning in the context of an Essene/Pharisaic/am-haaretz Jew in the Galilee region.

The original intended meaning of Jesus' (or Paul's) message could be any number of things, but unless it got interpreted as it did (a set of practical instructions which cut out the expense of prevalent and competing superstitions, and offered psychological salvation/happiness at a massively competitive discount) it would never have spread among the masses and never have become Rome's state religion. — VagabondSpectre

I agree that the message changed to fit the pagan masses of the 100s-400s in the Mediterranean world.

This is why I kind of scoff at the presumed value of authorial meaning; ideas become popular and are therefore presumed valuable because of how they are interpreted, not because of how they were intended. Why are the original beliefs of Jesus or Paul really any more interesting or relevant than the original beliefs of Pontius Pilate or historical or contemporary Jews? — VagabondSpectre

Why is it important? The OP asked what Jesus meant by the Kingdom of God. You have to understand who the historical Jesus was in his cultural/political context rather than the layers of theological layerings that were put on it by people who had their own agendas (Paul, Church Fathers, and the sort who mainly turned it from a Jewish movement in the Galilea/Judean region to a one that with more appeal to the pagan masses).

don't see where we necessarily disagree; we both view the evolution of religion as continuous change emerging from complex and dynamic social and environmental forces (notably Judiasm and economic/social conditions widespread in the empire re: Christianity). I don't think you would object to my description to Paul as opportunist, nor to my description of Jesus as not directly accessible. — VagabondSpectre

I would agree that Paul was an opportunist, I would agree to an extent Jesus is not completely accessible but that we can get an idea/ a rough picture of what his movement would be like based of the Judaism of his time period/region.

Where we might differ, I think, regards how well we can reconstruct the timeline and series of causes/developments (specific to individuals) to actually pin down the likely authorial meanings associated with original Christian founders. — VagabondSpectre

Yes this seems to be true. Well, it seems you don't even think it can be reconstructed meaningfully where I think we can at least get a rough picture based on his culture and region.

I will check them out. — VagabondSpectre

Cool.

that the ideas being addressed in this thread are hopelessly entangled in a very broad set of meta-ethical concerns that are only being addressed by referring to 'you should read this book/thread'. I'm assuming that's why you asked at the outset whether the thread's thought experiment was intended to be persuasive to folks with a different meta-ethical stance or whether OP's already taking certain moral axioms for granted (of course there's nothing wrong with that if he wanted to have an ethical conversation that did not get bogged down in meta-ethics). — John Doe

It's meant for both. Ideally the axiom would be taken at face value as true, but of course, it is always me defending the asymmetry that while it is person-independent that no person was harmed (whether there is actually someone there to benefit), it is person-dependent whether it is bad for pleasure/benefit to have been deprived (to someone).

So just saying "he's written a book about it" is not an argument. Summarise his reasoning and submit it for criticism or else there's little point in raising the matter. — Isaac

Perhaps you should read a little of it. I presented his main point. If you don't like it, then explain why other than that you want me to put more explanation on it than I already have for three pages of this thread.

.
I don't have time to find them.. but there are plenty of copy pasting from the book in that thread. Maybe later I'll try to find them for you.

I've answered that loaded question without playing into your hand. — S

Really?

If it's a choice between a neutral option and a better option, then obviously the better option wins. And the better option is obviously the one with a net benefit. — S

In the scenario of whether it is good to start life vs. good to continue it once born, I believe these to be separate situations. Once born, it makes sense to perhaps try to gain net benefits. In the situation where NO ACTUAL PERSON EXISTS YET, the ALWAYS good outcome is to not allow harm to occur. The neutral (not bad) outcome is whether someone might experience good. So the "obvious" option to you, is not that obvious to me, considering the asymmetry of the scenario of whether to reproduce.

That argument doesn't work, in spite of my agreement with you that a nonexistent person cannot be deprived of anything. It doesn't work because as moral agents we are capable of making decisions for better or worse, and if we consciously refrain from making a better decision, then we bear the responsibility for that. So, if we consciously decide to refrain from procreation, knowing that the chances are that procreation will lead to a life worth living, then, without good reason not to, that's the least moral option of the two. — S

Capable on behalf of someone else, to create a whole life for them, where they will experience adversity because they might experience the "good life" according to the parents' version of such a concept? Rather, adversity is always a bad when it is not necessary to foist on a new person. I've explained to Terrapin Station that it is a matter of what we value. Do you value bringing forward people so that they can experience the goods of life at the cost of bringing about situations of adversity? What matters in this scenario is always prevention of adversity/harm without any cost to an actual person. It would be wrong to create situations of adversity on the behest of someone else, PERIOD. It is quite arrogant to think that it is your job to create this for someone else and then tell them to post-facto "deal with it" because it provides for a chance of the good life, and brings a net benefit to the universe somehow.

Look at the Global Antinatalism thread.

The reason I say it's a whole book is that all I'm going to end up doing is copy pasting long passages which I've already done enough of.

Not much of an argument. Does he say any more about how he arrives at this conclusion? — Isaac

Yes he wrote a whole book on it. Ironically your argument for it not being much of an argument is not much of an argument.

Yes, I understand that you are making these three assertions. What I was asking is whether you are interested in discussing the assertions themselves (for which I would need an argument as to how you arrived at them), or the consequences of accepting these assertions as axioms. Two pages in and it is still not clear which. — Isaac

The best source is David Benatar's "The Harm of Coming into Existence" and his idea of an asymmetry between benefit and harm when it comes to the question of birth. See here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antinatalism

From the article:

David Benatar argues that there is a crucial asymmetry between pleasure and pain:

the presence of pain is bad;
the presence of pleasure is good;
the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone;
the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.[38][39]
Scenario A (X exists) Scenario B (X never exists)
(1) Presence of pain (Bad) (3) Absence of pain (Good)
(2) Presence of pleasure (Good) (4) Absence of pleasure (Not bad)
Regarding procreation, the argument follows that coming into existence generates both good and bad experiences, pain and pleasure, whereas not coming into existence entails neither pain nor pleasure. The absence of pain is good, the absence of pleasure is not bad. Therefore, the ethical choice is weighed in favor of non-procreation.

Benatar explains the above asymmetry using four other asymmetries that he considers quite plausible:

We have a moral obligation not to create unhappy people, and we have no moral obligation to create happy people. The reason why there is a moral obligation not to create unhappy people is that we believe the presence of pain is bad for those who are hurt, and the absence of pain is good also when there is no someone who is experiencing this good. By contrast, the reason for which there is no moral obligation to create happy people is that although the feeling of pleasure would be good for them, the absence of pleasure when they do not come into existence will not be bad, because there will be no one who will be deprived of this good.
It is strange to mention the interests of a potential child as a reason why we decide to create it, and it is not strange to mention the interests of a potential child as a reason why we decide not to create it. That the child may be happy is not a morally important reason to create it. By contrast, that the child may be unhappy is an important moral reason to not create it. If the absence of pleasure is bad even if someone does not exist to experience its absence, we would have a significant moral reason to create a child, and to create as many children as possible. If, however, the absence of pain wouldn't be good even if someone would not experience this good, we would not have a significant moral reason not to create a child.
Someday we can regret for the sake of the good of a man whose existence was conditional on our decision, that we created him – a man can be unhappy and the presence of his pain would be a bad thing. But we will never feel regret for the sake of the good of a man whose existence was conditional on our decision, that we did not create him – a man will not be deprived of happiness, because he will never exist, and the absence of happiness will not be bad, because there will be no one who will be deprived of this good.
We feel sadness by the fact that somewhere people come into existence and suffer, and we feel no sadness by the fact that somewhere people did not come into existence and in this place there are happy people. When we know that somewhere people came into existence and suffer, we feel compassion. The fact that on some deserted island or planet people did not come into existence and suffer is good. This is because the absence of pain is good even when there is not someone who is experiencing this good. On the other hand, we do not feel sadness by the fact that on some deserted island or planet people did not come into existence and are not happy. This is because the absence of pleasure is bad only when someone exists to be deprived of this good.[40] — Antinatalism article in Wikipedia

Not wrong as such. But actual people living good lives is a net benefit. So a possible world full of people living good lives is better than a possible world devoid of people living good lives. — S

But what is the negative outcome of no one living a good life? You haven't really answered that except with an elusive "it's a net benefit". Non-existent people don't cry over spilt milk. But it is true actual people will experience adversity if born. Thus Benatar''s asymmetry applies. Not experiencing good, does not matter if there is no actual person being deprived. However, it is always good that someone was not exposed to adversity or harm needlessly (or for a parents' agenda-- like your notion of someone has to live out a good life for some elusive idea of having a "net benefit" obtain in existence. Odd, but since it is not the usual way of looking at things, you automatically dismiss it.

There would be a loss in potential. — S

And this matters why and for whom? No actual being to be deprived would care. It almost seems like in your universe, there is a hidden god that cries over potentials missed. Not experiencing good is neither good nor bad, if there is no actual person to be deprived. It is always good to prevent harm, especially if no one needed to be born to experience it in the first place. By the way, this is essentially just an elaboration from the book, "Better Never to Have Been" by David Benatar.

Not an overall good, only in the much weaker sense. — S

Why does a total matter here? If we are summing up bits of good from everyone in some grand total (in what, a calculator in the sky?) then one can conclude that billions of lives only barely worth living would be the best outcome, but that would make no sense. This idea called the "Repugnant Conclusion" by Derek Parfit, is the kind of outcome you get with utilitarian notions of simply summing up net positive and negative the way you seem to explain it. Rather, it should be looked at on the level of harm to the individual, not how an individual somehow adds to the grand total of some universal utilitarian calculation.

Not wrong in itself, but wrong in your opinion. You're entitled to your opinion, but that's all it is. — S

Granted, my opinion comes from the idea of the asymmetry. No person will be harmed, and it is not good or bad if someone is not born to experience good.

What a funny thing to question! Are you really asking why you need to be born to live a good life? How else can that be achieved? — S

No one needs to be born. A good life doesn't need to be had by anyone. No one loses out by not living out a good life. Certainly it is good though that no actual person was exposed to adversity that needed to be overcome. You put a value on "the good life" needing to be carried out by someone in the first place. Why does this need to be carried out by an actual individual? What is wrong with no actual person obtaining "the good life"? What, besides the parent who is projecting a future person, actually loses out form this? However, preventing adversity where it didn't need to be experienced by any particular person is a good thing. It would be wrong to create someone in order for them to experience the burdens of adversity, because perhaps, there is some goal of a good life, that that person can obtain. Who are you to expose people to harm/adversity in order for your agenda to be carried out (which it may not)- that someone needs to live in order for a "good life" to be obtained by that person?

X is only needed when S (some subject) desires x, or desires something else, y, that can not obtain without x.

So whether creating adversity is needed solely hinges on actual persons' wants. — Terrapin Station

No actual person needs adversity prior to his/her birth. Why make an actual person in the first place who needs to experience adversity?

Many agree that life has redeeming qualities, however. — Tzeentch

People should live life because it has "redeeming qualities". Is this enough reason to procreate people who will face adversity, if they otherwise never needed to exist in the first place to face adversity? Why should people be born only to be redeemed by various qualities of life? Why put people through the gauntlet of life if there didn't need to be a person at all in the first place?

I don't understand what your argument is here. You seem to be saying that from a negative utilitarian perspective, bringing new children into the world is bad? But you've not addressed the opposing arguments within your metaphor. Are you wanting to discuss those opposing arguments from within negative utilitarianism, or are you trying to support negative utilitarianism itself by this metaphor (in which case I don't see the argument, you'll have to spell it out for me). — Isaac

Nothing needs anything. Nothing needs to live a good life, if it doesn't live in the first place. However, not exposing someone to adversity is a good thing, especially if there no one needed the adversity-strengthening experience in the first place. Adveristy can be good if it makes you stronger...a person need to practice such and such to be better at it, let's say. But if there is no person that exists to need adversity (to be stronger, better, or whatever "positive" comes from this), then it is wrong to create situations just so a person can go through adversity to become stronger. Thus, it is best not to procreate, as this is creating new people who will feel adversity that wasn't necessary to feel in the first place.

Your point about necessity is really weak. I could spend all day listing actions that aren't necessary but acceptable nevertheless. So that aspect is irrelevant and your emphasis of it misguided. — S

Necessity part GOES with the if no one is around to need adversity part. In other words,why are we creating situations where someone should go through adversity, since there was no one there to need it in the first place. That is not weak. That is valid point to consider. Why create people who are exposed to harm, when they don't exist to be harmed in the first place? If as people claim, adversity is necessary to make one stronger- a non-existent person never needed adversity as they never existed to need to be stronger in the first place.

And no one to live a life worth living. :roll: — S

And who exactly is feeling the negative affects of not living a life worth living?

I never said anything about getting stronger. The point is so that they can live a good life, which would be impossible otherwise. — S

No one who does not exist needs to live a good life, especially with the fact that you are exposing new people to adversity, when THEY DIDN'T EXIST TO NEED IT. A good life is only necessary for those who are already alive. To make someone be born so they can live a "life worth living" you are also exposing a new person to adversity when there wasn't anyone there that needed to go through adversity. Thus, your agenda of making new people so they can "live a life worth living" makes no sense in light of also creating adversity for a new person.

The person themselves. — S

That make no sense. Is there some sort of Platonic calculator in the sky that will be unsatisfied if someone doesn't exist to score points in the "greater good calculator machine". Rather by not being born, one is prevented from adversity, and nothing is lost for any actual individual. Nothing is harmed, especially not some "greater good calculator" that you think will not be satisfied by maximizing greater good.

If they don't exist, then they can't be bothered or affected by any decision I make. :lol: — S

Correct

And if they do exist, then they have a chance of living a good life. — S

That is a moot point. They only need to try to live a good life if you make them so that they need to follow this agenda. Otherwise, no one needs anything.

Straw man. You can't live a good life if you aren't alive in the first place. And a good life is... well... good. — S

That makes no sense. Why do people need to be born for the chance of leading a good life in light of the fact that you are also creating someone who will experience adversity where there didn't need to be someone who will experience adversity. Why is it some divine will or law that people need to be born in order to experience a good life anyways? This is on top of the obvious argument that not everyone will achieve this (that is its own good argument).

It's obviously a choice, just like educating children is a choice, and like I said, the justification in both cases can be made on the basis of a greater good, which can be in the form of a life worth living or an improved life. — S

Again, why are we creating scenarios that aren't necessary in the first place, so that someone has to go through the gauntlet of adversity for the reason of "getting stronger". If no one exists, no one exists to need to get stronger. What's the point of creating someone so they have to go through adversity to get stronger? Why are we using indivdiuals for your notion of a "greater good". Greater good for whom? The species? So individuals need to be born now to go through adversity to enhance the species? That is its own silly argument. What justification would you have to expose someone to adversity/harm in order to improve the species as a whole? What gives you the right to make someone go through adversity for your agenda for what is "good" for them, if they don't exist in the first place to need that "good" for them? What gives you the right to say that someone should be born to experience adversity, to get stronger, to improve the species?

But you're not. The whole point of the analogy is that you're comparing it to an actual person. — Terrapin Station

This is incorrect sir.

The problem is that you keep writing things that suggest that despite the denials,. that's really how you think about it. — Terrapin Station

No, that is your little spin. Where did I say that? All I am saying is it is wrong to create conditions of adversity to someone else, when it wasn't needed in the first place.

You are having a problem with "wasn't needed in the first place". You think there needs to be a person who didn't need it in the first place. But look at where that leads... That would be a performative contradiction. In order for the statement to be true for you, someone would have to be born in order to be an actual person who will already be exposed to the very adversity that is not good that they were exposed to in the first place. But that needn't be the case that they have to exist. All that need to be the case is that adversity is wrong to give to someone, even if there was no actual person (with some identity) who will benefit from not being exposed to adversity.

Yeah, it's suggesting that prior to birth, there are people in some state. Even though you keep denying that you're suggesting that. — Terrapin Station

Nope, I am not. I am just saying to prevent adversity, not that some actual person is benefiting from it. Preventing adversity for someone else is all that is needed to be acceptable/right.

This analogy would be nonsensical to you if you didn't think that prior to birth, there are people in some state. You rationally realize how absurd that idea is, maybe, but emotionally, you keep returning to it. Hence this analogy. — Terrapin Station

It is not absurd at all. No actual person needs to be in the equation for it to be wrong to create adversity for someone else. The action of creating a new person will expose an actual person to adversity, hence it is wrong and therefore, it is good to prevent an actual person from being exposed to adversity. You are making a strawman or a red herring, either wittingly or unwittingly. It sounds good to Terrapin Station but has no impact on the argument at hand.

Giving someone a burden they didn't need to experience is not wrong, unless there is no greater good to be gotten from it. There are plenty of examples where this is acceptable. Do you disagree with educating children? Strictly speaking, they don't need to be put through that experience, to be given that burden, but we do it for the greater good. — S

But you didn't pay attention to the whole argument. The argument is that no one needs to give someone else a burden if they didn't need to be exposed to it in the first place. That is to say, a potential child (a person that could exist if a parental actors decide to go ahead and procreate), does not need to be exposed to adversity (by being born in the first place), if there was no need for that potential person to be exposed to adversity in the first place. Just because there is no actual person who will benefit from not being born, this does not mean that it is then acceptable/right to go ahead and procreate a new person whereby it will de facto experience adversity from being born into a world with adversity.

Two thoughts come to mind.
The first: Why would anyone wish for another to experience adversity and struggle? This seems like a profoundly malevolent act, unless one believes the struggle and adversity will benefit the person. Even then, it is not up to the instigator to decide what is good or bad for another, unless one is asked specifically for their advice. — Tzeentch

I completely agree. Hence why it is wrong to procreate. Procreation exposes adversity for someone else on their behalf. A new person didn't need to be exposed to adversity in the first place. No harm, no foul, no person (as in no actual child that will be born), right?

The second: The instigator does not let the Buddhist suffer. The instigator merely brings about a change of circumstance and the reaction of the Buddhist is to make himself suffer. In Buddhism, all suffering is seen as a result of attachment to wordly matters. In this case, the Buddhist was attached to life and feared death and starvation. — Tzeentch

While I agree perhaps the Buddhist principles only worked for this individual in the very confined space of begging for food and meditating all day routine, the point of the story was not how to be a better Buddhist but whether it is good to cause adversity for another. It is exactly like procreation. Now that someone is born, they have to cope and deal with the situation. They have to struggle at it, just as the Buddhist must learn to do in his changed circumstances.

It is said Buddha once fasted for a long period of time, during which he consumed no food except that which by circumstance came to him. This naturally weakened him and when during his travels he attempted to cross a river he nearly drowned. This is when he experienced enlightenment. — Tzeentch

Interesting.

We don't know that. That's a presumption. If that is how you feel about it, then so be it. — Wallows

Do you think it is right to expose another person to adversity when they didn't need to be exposed to it? What exactly would be the reason? Would that reason be justified in light of the fact that you are creating adversity on behalf of someone else.

So, I see we boiled down the issue. — Wallows

I don't see how it was not boiled down from the beginning. The analogy wasn't meant to be hard to make between the two ideas of the Buddhist/adversity potential person/adversity.

Then isn't that a straw-man or a simple overgeneralization to state things that way? — Wallows

Not really, the story was to illustrate the point. The point has always been, there is no need to create adversity for someone else when that person did not need to experience adversity in the first place.

So, life is the person or entity telling the person that they need to experience life "in reality"? — Wallows

If by entity you mean the person who is forcing the Buddhist into adversity, and by life you mean the people who are procreating the potential person into existence, then yes.