What again? And were you meaning without the explicit dichotomy - the bleeding "apokrisis" that I even choose as a user-name? >:O — apokrisis

Huh? Some inside joke, but not sure what you're getting at.

Several African origins myths are almost exactly like genesis, and hundreds if not thousands of years earlier. — Sir2u

Yep, funny how ancient human cultures devise similar myths in different regions. Some may have been influenced by others (Israelite traditions definitely influenced by previous Babylonian myths, etc.). Makes you want to read Joseph Campbell!

emergent product — apokrisis

Define emergent product without having a hidden dualism (i.e that which constituted the product and the product itself).

At the very beginning.

How do you think the Bible came into existence? You must think the High Priest of the Temple went into the Holy of Holies one Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur) and found a stack of scrolls on the Mercy Seat with a Post-It Note™ stuck to it saying, "Hot off the press -- the Old Testament. Hope you like it. Love, YHWH ps: working on New Testament now" — Bitter Crank

The Hebrew Scriptures probably came about as an evolution of fragments and wholesale revisions. Parts of Genesis, Exodus, and Numbers were probably the oldest parts. They may have been written by Israelite and Judahite priests stitching together both region's traditions of various accounts by the end of the 700s (after Assyrian destruction of Northern Kingdom of Israel and influx of Israelite priests to Jerusalem in the Southern Kingdom of Judah).

Then there was the Deuteronomic author (possibly the author being mentioned in The Book of Kings itself as Shaphan) who more-or-less consolidated the earlierhenotheistic Israelite-Judaic tradition into a strictly monotheistic one around 600s under the reign of King Josiah of Judah.

Leviticus probably came last, written by the Solomon priesthood who were descended from the Sons of Zadok and who probably inserted the idea of Aaron as Moses' brother and being descended in some way from Moses' family, thus giving themselves legitimacy as priestly rulers. Further redactions probably took place in the Babylonian Captivity as traditions were consolidated, the very final version being stitched together by Ezra and his team of scribes to be brought back to Jerusalem with Nehemiah and the governorship under the appointment of Persia's King Cyrus.

Thus early Judaism took on many interpretations even within the Torah's text itself as it was pieced together to make a more coherent narrative. For a while, in early Second Temple Judaism the Temple Priests were essentially the conveyors of the law, but eventually "men of letters" (who essentially were learned in the art of hermeneutics) became a large faction of authority. Their interpretation was evolutionary in method as they applied what was written in the text of the Law to a contemporary problem that was beyond the original text or rather to a situation which had "outgrown" the time period that the text was written in. This evolutionary-hermeneutics approach was developed by the Pharisees, and their compendium of evolutionary interpretation became known eventually as the Oral Law or Talmud.

The elite Temple priestly class was mainly championed by Sadducees, those who rejected such methods. They fought often under the Hasmonean Dynasty from 160 BCE- 63 BCE. By the time of the Romans, the Pharisees were seen by the populace in and around Jerusalem as the most trusted faction for legal interpretation. When the Romans destroyed the Temple around 70 CE, the Pharisees reconstituted Judaism in a way without a Temple complex, priestly caste, and sacrifices.

Good overview.

For you its all reified nouns. I'm trying to get you to think in verbs. But I can see that ain't happening. — apokrisis

Not really. I accept its process philosophy basically. It is you who accuse I propose otherwise. However, I do also claim the "shocking" idea that the process has an inner aspect. According to you, accepting that there is inner experiential qualities of (at least certain) processes is somehow antithetical to your theory. Also, reified verbs aren't much better than reified nouns. Process occurs but the process is not the experience any more than the regions lighting up in an fMRI is the experience of green. It may be the physical processes but not the experience itself. The experience itself is "something". That something has to be analyzed for what it is in itself, not how it can be mapped mathematically or logically. Your assumptions just don't allow you to excavate the experiential aspect.

Ah, up pops your "experiencer". Because of course if you have experiences, then an experiencer is there already just waiting for his Cartesian theatre to roll. It's "logical" says the simple-minded "cause an effect" reductionist. — apokrisis

So far I've seen plenty of experiencers in your model, but they are hidden. There is emerging. There is interpretant. There is degrees of freedom. There is triadic relation modelling. All of these are kind of like place holders for "and experience happens", which is essentially saying a dualism exists. The dual aspect of the inner experience accompanied by its observable phenomena of constituents by the very thing that is experiencing. You don't have to give up your modelling to be a dualist, it is simply saying there is a dual aspect- one of the observable (the modelling) and other of the process happening (experience). The process happening is qualitatively different, though it may be composed of the same constituents and can be mapped like other physical constituents. However, the dual aspect remains.

In crude but familiar psychological terms, general concepts shape our particular impressions while those particular impressions in turn build up habits of conception. — apokrisis

Concepts/impressions don't live in a vacuum. They have the quality of being experienced by an experiencer. Thus cart before horse. Or perhaps simply more map no territory.

The global constraints shape the local degrees of freedom — apokrisis

In context of the experiential self, how does that translate? Sounds all map.. Local degrees of freedom? Is that the experience? Why does green "feel" like something and is not simply non-feeling communication.. well it emerges.. Well what is that emerging that is no other except in this modelling relation. Experience is never really excavated.

If you are dead or in a coma, for example, there is no modelling relation. But when you are in a lived and active engagement with the world, what supports your claimed counter-factual here?

Not seeing it. (Hey, another counter-factual!) — apokrisis

But this goes beyond counterfactual to what is. Experience is a phenomena. What is the phenomena of experience? Your insistence on counterfactuals here makes no sense because you are constantly looking for a map in a question of metaphysics. What is existence? It is the feeling of experience- BEING the model, NOT OBSERVING the model. Being the model has this experiential quality that is somehow NOT primary to the constituents but EMERGES into its own thing. How is that not a dualism? You cannot get out of it be referring back to the constituents and ignoring that its emerged (into something different.. which you never explain other than referring back to the map).

It's like you have zero comprehension skills. Don't just claim counterfactuals are irrelevant to facticity. Demonstrate how that is an epistemically credible stance to be taking. — apokrisis

The fact that there is a feels-like-something along with the modelling. The feels like something is the flipside/inner quality whatever you want to call it. It is not the map of the model, but the actual modelling itself processing from the inside. But "what" is this inside? That is the dualistic nature of the problem.

No, the point is WHAT IS IT NOT? If you can't provide the suitable counterfactual, you ain't got nothing, buster. — apokrisis

But that's the point! It exists qua its own phenomena. There is no counterfactual as there is just feeling-like-something, the territory that you keep missing for the map. Perhaps that's when you know you hit territory and not map :D.

Talk about qualia has the same formula. Why is green green? Why is the scent of a rose like the scent of a rose? The question form itself fails the counterfactuality test. There just is no comparison possible as green is always green. And it still would be as far as I'm concerned even if it were to switch to bleen. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_riddle_of_induction)

Aristotle made the same point. Talk of causality is always a question about a reason for a change. Without counterfactuality, the game doesn't even get off the ground. The question you are asking is not really a question if you the questioner fail to provide a reasonable counterfactual basis for it.

The burden is on Schop to show why he is asking a good question ... if he now again denies that the question was answered. — apokrisis

But that's not the point. The point is WHAT is experience? You at least have to admit of the dualism of the constituents AND the "Feels like" first person perspective. THAT is the dualism. Whether you call the feels like aspect an illusion or not, the illusion HAS to be accounted for to solve the hard problem.

Clearly it is the feels like something! :P When you ask "what is" you can only answer in terms of other things. So if you ask what is an apple? I can answer in terms of other things: a fruit, red, etc. Of course none of those independently are what an apple is. To a certain extent the debate between you isn't only about metaphysics, but also about what you mean when you each ask the questions you ask. — Agustino

WHAT is experience as opposed to its constituents. If you read the thread from the beginning and other ones between me and apokrisis, it should be apparent.

Edit: For the record, I kind of resent your style on here. You come into my conversations and appear to troll my answers. I can't put my finger on it. I can debate apokrisis all day and I'm fine with that, but your style seems meant to provoke it seems. At least that is my reaction, and I rarely get that from other members I disagree with. Just food for thought on your style.

You are ridiculous. You don't even understand the fundamental question. You missed the target. It wasn't whether I can agree if modelling conditions "feel like something". Again, we can talk all day about constituents. WHAT is the feels like something? That case is definitely not closed as you have yet to either grasp the importance of the question or are dodging it.

Start by answering honestly why a modelling relation with the world wouldn't feel like something. On what basis can you simply presume that? — apokrisis

I don't know, "WHAT" is this "feel like something"? You presume a non-dualism when right here is admittance. There IS a feel like something. What is THAT? You can't run to the idea of illusion as you are going to have to explain THAT then. More a=a. I can agree with you all day that modelling relations have feel like something aspects to it. That is not the hard problem. The hard problem is WHAT is the feel like something?

So just the experience or interpretance relation, no ghostly experiencer or interpreter. — apokrisis

I don't even dispute that necessarily. My question is "what" is this "experience"? You use the word emerging like a parlor trick. You have not addressed the issue of what this illusion of mind is that "emerges" other than being self-referential to its constituents. You answer it with things like there needs to be an "interpreter" which just sounds like some form of background experiencer has to be there in the first place. Wow, sounds suspiciously panspychic, and you knew I was going to say this because that is exactly what it sounds like. Just because the background interpreter needs symbols and signs as it learns and gets more complex, doesn't mean that there isn't "something" there, interpreting in the background, according to your OWN schema. You cannot escape it. Either first person experience exists in the equation or there is a dualistic nature to reality. Unfortunately, you don't get that your triadism collapses into a dualism, despite you really really wanting it not to.

In other words, "feel like something" is its own phenomena that must be reckoned with. You never do, so therefore you always avoid the hard problem. You refer to it as the map, and never deal with it head on as this "other thing" which is the actual "feeling like something". WHAT is this "feeling like something". Explain the territory, not the map. In map world, everything is a map. But clearly, first-person "feels like something" experience is not just map but has this "feels like something" (experiential quality). What is this? Not what are its constituents in map world, but what is experience?

What say you? — schopenhauer1

@apokrisisI guess no answer.

No you never. You just reverted to asking the same questions about matter or information. You've been so obsessively repetitive with that tactic that even you got bored enough to start simply cutting and pasting yourself. — apokrisis

Because I'm bored with you dodging the hard problem and de facto "copy and pasting" your past responses by regurgitating them. Again, I said thus:

In other words, "feel like something" is its own phenomena that must be reckoned with. You never do, so therefore you always avoid the hard problem. You refer to it as the map, and never deal with it head on as this "other thing" which is the actual "feeling like something". WHAT is this "feeling like something". Explain the territory, not the map. In map world, everything is a map. But clearly, first-person "feels like something" experience is not just map but has this "feels like something" (experiential quality). What is this? Not what are its constituents in map world, but what is experience?

What say you?

You are very good at replying why being a state of matter shouldn't feel like anything. Likewise a state of information.

But you go curiously silent on the question of why wouldn't a lived neural model of the world feel like something?

Hmm. — apokrisis

No, I answered you. You just fundamentally do not get the hard problem. WHAT is this "feel like something" you talk about? I already said earlier: WHAT is this feeling in the first place? That is the hard question. You can keep pointing back to the map but all you are saying is a=a. It is analytic. It isn't SAYING anything other than what the physical constituents are. You will always have the problem of a dualism. Emergence only works when it is physical phenomena producing other physical phenomena. It is all MAP. The subjective/first person EXPERIENCE (what it "feels" like) is metaphysically different in that it is the thing which observes the map. It is the territory, so to say. WHAT is this territory? Well you keep pointing to the map, and we are no longer in map-world, we are in territory world.

In other words, "feel like something" is its own phenomena that must be reckoned with. You never do, so therefore you always avoid the hard problem. You refer to it as the map, and never deal with it head on as this "other thing" which is the actual "feeling like something". WHAT is this "feeling like something". Explain the territory, not the map. In map world, everything is a map. But clearly, first-person "feels like something" experience is not just map but has this "feels like something" (experiential quality). What is this? Not what are its constituents in map world, but what is experience?

So you avoid my question as usual.

Are you saying information is "just physical phenomena"? How does that work in your ontology?

Again then, why shouldn't a modelling relation with reality not feel like something? Information or matter alone doesn't have reason to be feeling like something. But to form a lived model of the world - one where informational possibility and material circumstance are in close and pragmatic interaction - just does seem as though it should feel like something.

Can you tell me why it wouldn't? — apokrisis

WHAT is this feeling in the first place? That is the hard question. You can keep pointing back to the map but all you are saying is a=a. It is analytic. It isn't SAYING anything other than what the physical constituents are. You will always have the problem of a dualism. Emergence only works when it is physical phenomena producing other physical phenomena. It is all MAP. The subjective/first person EXPERIENCE (what it "feels" like) is metaphysically different in that it is the thing which observes the map. It is the territory, so to say. WHAT is this territory? Well you keep pointing to the map, and we are no longer in map-world, we are in territory world.

I will also point here to a very well-written response close to mine from another poster:

You have two distinct forms of information in your description. You have information within the dissipative structures and you have information within the semiotics. There's a big gap between these two, because in "semiotics" information is a property of matter, and in your "dissipative structures" information is supposed to be prior to matter. Because your attempt is to conflate these two distinct conceptions of information, you have left yourself no idea of what "matter" even is. It's just some vague thing which emerges as "necessary", necessary to assume, in order to account for bodily existence. But it's not really necessary because it just emerges as random chance. And that's all nonsense, because as I say, you have it backwards. — Metaphysician Undercover

Good job, @Metaphysician Undercover

Why shouldn't richly structured modelling feel like something (and largely unstructured activity with no self concept feel like pretty much nothing to no-one)?

I don't recall you ever said why. — apokrisis

I've stated why many times. You cannot get experience from fiat. Emergence of physical phenomena from physical phenomena is part of the easy problems. Emergence of mental phenomena from physical phenomena is different based on the fact that mental phenomena is actually needed to observe the rest of phenomena. It is that which needs to be in order for other things to be known. Without the knower, there is no known.. (whether it actually exists without the knower is a different question, so no this is not solipsism or Subjective Idealism necessarily).

To then claim that pansemiotics DOES claim to have a knower and a known all the way down is a sleight of hand, as mental and physical (according to YOUR physicalism) CANNOT be of the same substance with a dual aspect. There can be signs, referents, signifers, etc. in the physical, but no mental phenomena in the mix already. Thus we are back to the problem of physical can emerge other physical but how does physical produce EXPERIENCE (MENTAL)?. Well, when we have theories of "just so" like "blue is distinct from green which is distinct from x, etc. etc." we are discounting that the originary vague sight phenomena has to be there in the beginning before the connections/distinctions of person/world interaction even takes place. So the cart is put before the horse in your theory as the vagueness (however indistinct) is still something which needs to be there for the distinction to arise.

This "epistemic cut" you tout is very vague in itself and is never really satisfactory an answer for why the experiential (mental) exists beyond the material constituents. The FACT is, experience- this qualitatively different mode of existence, is so different than other properties (charge, mass, etc.) and processes (e.g. thermodynamic events) because it is indeed the backdrop for which all the others are ONLY known. All other phenomena are only known through the MAP, while THIS property is known directly through the territory of inner experience. It doesn't matter, by the way, whether this inner experience "distorts reality", but only that there is a direct, first person, "what it's like" of being rather than a "that which is observed".

This is an observation after the fact. It is not causal onto itself. — Rich

True. Is there a "what it's like aspect" to cells? Perhaps yes. However, if you are asking "Why did this trait appear?" I can easily say, a mutation occurred and it became stable as time went on and it was able to reproduce and survive at a longer and faster rate than other organisms without this feature.

Now, does mind need to exist for other things to exist? That is a bigger question, but this is a very specific one and can be answered in the framework of things already existing. Thus, this falls into the realm of easy problems and not the hard problem.

This is where the sleight of hand occurs. Somehow, somewhere, something called natural selection emerges. It is not the end of the sleight of hand, but it permits others down the road. One by one, human traits (e.g. selection) are buried somewhere in the explanation. Where is this natural selection coming from? From around the cell? From within the cell. It's somewhere, it is guiding, and it's persistent, and it's repetitive. Very much like the mind.

It is absolutely mandatory that traits of the human mind are introduced in where explanation. The reason is because it actually is the mind that is doing it.

As the story builds, the introduction of mind traits becomes more and more egregious, but it is acceptable because we have already established that chemicals can be viewed as little minds. — Rich

Well, I may find the hard problem relatively intractable at this point, but if I can explain it by answering the questions with easy problems, I will. In other words, problems related to why some biological trait occurred have a well-known process of explanation through biological processes. Natural selection is simply the name for differential reproduction survival rates among a range of differences amongst a population. So in this case, it makes sense that cells benefited from mitochondrial invasion and thus survived better. Those with a mitochondrial invasion where the nucleus regulated aspects of its reproduction perhaps improved its survival rate even more.

So if you want to imagine a vague state of sensation, it is like a blooming, buzzing, confusion. Maybe like getting tumbled in a heavy surf, but without yet any sense of self as well as just sensory noise. — apokrisis

So there is an experience of sensory noise you at least admit. What is this experience (not what are its constituents of interactions)?

Related is what I asked but you did not address earlier:

Well, again the "interaction" and "process" is "something" a phenomena in and of itself which must be explained as it is. The interaction is happening in this event called experience. What is that as opposed to simply naming its constituents? — schopenhauer1

Newborn human babies have wired and functioning brainstems and so the level of sensory and orienting processing that goes with that. — apokrisis

It sounds here that you admit there is inner sensation however vague. What we do not want is simple analytic statements of a=a. We know that experiences have their physical correlate. But simply repeating the physical correlate as an answer to why there is inner sensation is not an answer. Again, that is just saying a=a.

But it is surprising how lacking in neural differentiation they still are at the cortical level. — apokrisis

No one is debating that part.

You see it is you that is wedded to a Cartesian theatre. You can't conceive of mind except that it is already like that. A space with a self watching a parade of definite sensations. But a baby has only the vaguest notion of a self separate from a world. It doesnt even have hands it controls.

So yes, the traditional Jamesian blooming, buzzing, confusion is as apt a characterisation as any. — apokrisis

No one is debating that the newborn experience is much different. The hard question is what is the nature of the experience of this blooming, buzzing, and confusion. It is there nonetheless, even in its primitive, very vague form. What you cannot do is get something from nothing like so much fiat. Saying "Green is not blue is not red" and therefore emergence of experience is only explaining how distinctions are created not how there is a sensation in the first place.

You said earlier:

It is the third thing of their interaction which is the process making a world. — apokrisis

Well, again the "interaction" and "process" is "something" a phenomena in and of itself which must be explained as it is. The interaction is happening in this event called experience. What is that as opposed to simply naming its constituents?

If the mitochondrial ancestors had a mutation that didn't allow them to reproduce, guess what? No mitochondria. The assertion is that just by chance a mitochondria that will soon perish off the face of the earth because it can't reproduce drifts into a cell, that rather than killing it in fact has the capacity to allow it to reproduce and maintain it's health? That's one hell of a happy coincidence. — MikeL

If given enough time, there is probably a ratcheting factor. Where perhaps only one step in the mutation allowed for a slightly smaller reproduction rate (mitochondria that reproduced still but provided energy), died out quicker than the cell next door that had an extra mutation that allowed for the mitochondria not to produce on its own by transferring DNA functions to nucleus. This secondary mutation provided a much quicker selection rate and outlived its only slightly improved cousin who probably died out rather quickly compared with the cell that had the secondary mutation.

The Peircean or systems approach is about having three categories, with vagueness or firstness as the undifferentiated from which generality vs particularity arises. — apokrisis

So the vagueness of the newborn = the newborn has no inner sensations? There is nothing of what it is like to be a newborn in your view? Again, that seems extreme.

Even granted this (which is a big granted), you have not explained how the connections "emerges". It's green because it's not blue is not explaining the experience just the causes. Again switching the hard for easy in a just so story.

What fascinates me about the mitochondria I referenced earlier is that the battle occurred in the pitch dark. The chemically formed cell doesn't possess the sentience to know that there is a physical body inside it. The story is that a foreign cell (a mitochondria) invades a eurkaryote. Chemicals go crazy. In the end, rather than killing the mitochondria, the very exact part required for reproduction of the mitochondria is deleted from the mitochondria and appears in the nuclear DNA of the cell. WTF
--Chemistry would have an awfully hard time explaining that based on reactions. — MikeL

Although I disagree with Apokrisis, this problem you pose of why the mitochondria survived the engulfment of the cell without being destroyed or destroying it is simply natural selection. The mitochondrial ancestors that destroyed the host cells clearly never made it as a symbiotic partner. The mitochondrial ancestors that were able to be destroyed by the host partner cells also never made it as symbiotic partners. However, mitochondrial ancestors that had the mutations that allowed for them to not reproduce but continue to survive in the cell, and the cells that had the mutation to allow the mitochondria to stay and provide its energy were selected for as they did better at survival than other cells that did not have this advantage.

In fact what makes me think that is a lack of cortical connections in the newborn brain. The wiring hasn't even grown. — apokrisis

But notice I didn't disagree with you regarding the idea of learning making the distinction occur. It is you who have placed a strawman. Pay attention to what I'm saying rather than purely reacting to stock answers.

It takes time for the newborn brain to form its discriminatory circuits. We can tell that from EEG recordings. Early on, a stimulus creates generalised firing. The brain reacts much the same to any environmental source of energy. Then the firing of individual cells starts to correlate with an ability to make perceptual discriminations. The brain does get specific and consciousness thus becomes a high contrast qualitative state. We can definitely be seeing red as we are not seeing green, etc. — apokrisis

Here again, you completely bypassed what I was saying. I said that you are moving the goal posts from qualia in general to distinct qualia. I already agreed that distinct qualia are created by learning (i.e. perceptual discriminations), but I did not agree that qualia itself was not there in some fashion as an event that is occurring. In other words SOME event of internal aspect is occurring to the newborn, even if not the one we are familiar with as discriminatory perception. There is some internal aspect of what it is like to be a newborn. Your major problem is replacing the HARD PROBLEM with EASY PROBLEMS and then constantly dodging the real question when it goes back to it. The result is that now we have semi-absurd answers like newborns do not have inner sensations.

It is the third thing of their interaction which is the process making a world. — apokrisis

And where the hidden dualism lies- the Cartesian theater you wish to avoid. @Rich was right. Sleight of hand. I don't even have a stake in the game. In fact, I WANT it to just be physicalism with some overriding theory- but the sticky situation of hidden Cartesian theaters keep arising.

You constantly change the goal post. My guess is you are in the camp that thinks a newborn has no internal sensation (inner experience) because they have not learned distinction (between sensory nuances like "green" and "blue") etc. But you already moved the goal post from qualia in general to some particular qualia (i.e. green, blue, etc.).

I don't think philosophic pessimism can be fully separated from a negative mood or state of mind, even if it is just melancholy or moderate depression. There wouldn't be a problem with the things pessimism identifies if there wasn't a negative reaction to them. Lots of other people think there's problems in life that don't constitute life in the way pessimism sees its problems as - as such, these people can simultaneously affirm life while still remembering that there are certain imperfections with it. — darthbarracuda

Yeah, that's why I said those with Philosophical Pessimism tend towards acute depression. It is hard to imagine someone not feeling the negative affirmation, rather than simply intellectualizing it. I am sure it is possible for someone to simply read a philosopher like Schopenhauer and feel jazzed about life, but somehow academically understands that it is in reality suffering. However, it is doubtful that this is common, if it occurs at all.

There's no issue with being intermittently happy, but I strongly believe that being a pessimist entails some primary negative experience, like dread, ennui, sadness or whatever that comes as a natural response to the problematic things pessimism identifies. Think about how absurd it would be for someone to say "life is suffering" and smile while doing so. — darthbarracuda

Agreed.

This is why I think it's wrong to call someone like Camus a pessimist, since he definitely affirmed life with the existential rebellion. Or, rather, why I prefer affirmative/negative rather than optimist/pessimist. A negative thinker is one that when asked why they haven't killed themselves, replies "I don't know" or "because I'm stuck in life" or "because life isn't bad enough yet" or "because I haven't gotten around to it" or maybe "because I have ethical duties in life." Life becomes simply a postponement of death. — darthbarracuda

I agree with your assessment of Camus- he should not be thrown in the pessimist camp which I often see in literature about modern pessimism. The affirmative/negative is a good dichotomy (or perhaps spectrum) to use to define Pessimism as opposed to perhaps just Existentialist or other similar (but definitely different) attitudes. Nietzsche is considered a Dionysian Pessimist. It too is affirmative and therefore, perhaps should also not be considered in the Pessimist camp.

The trouble with the truth-sensing ability of the depressive group is that the healthy, happy group doesn't sense the same thing, and thinks the depressive group are mis-perceiving the world. (Of course, sometimes the depressive group does mis-perceive the world, and so do the happy people.) — Bitter Crank

I think it is also how happiness is perceived. Pretty much most pleasures fall under, aesthetics, engrossing mental/physical activities, pleasure, relationships, learning, and achievement. The Pessimist finds this either: 1) too far between/infrequent 2) too short in duration 3) simply an addiction of sorts in the marry-go-round of endless desires and a way to flee boredom 4) are masking a deeper angst that we must fill 5) can be lost and lead to worse pain then never obtaining 6) are unequally distributed 7) comes at a cost of some other pain, etc. etc. One common theme is that there is sort of an emptiness at the end of any of these pursuits that the other "happy group" does not seem to feel. It is that gulf where the distrust lies.

I think there is a subtle but significant difference between Pessimism (as a philosophy) and depression (as a mental health issue). One can live a relatively typical Westernized/modernized lifestyle (go to work, have hobbies, have friends, etc etc.) and yet still have a worldview of pessimism in the background of things. In other words, one can still get benefit from things like relationships, learning, pleasure, aesthetics, and achievement but still see life as structurally suffering.

Generally Philosophical Pessimism (similar to Buddhism) views desire as being always something that motivates us and keeps us in a complete condition of burden-to-overcome. Either we are rushing this way towards survival-related-activities or that way towards entertainment (fleeing boredom/angst). If looked upon in a transcendental way, like one moving farther and farther from Earth, it is absurd the repetitious nature of each day, and our desires butting against the cultural structures of our environs. Anyways, long story short, one can still be in the relatively normal range of moods (probably a slight bit more towards acute depression though), and still work within a wordview that keeps in mind the Pessimistic trademarks of relentless desire, the burdens of life, and an understanding of the absurd.

I would add that this underlying drive becomes more evident to people who have suffered from depression, where there is little motivation to do anything other than survive, and somehow pass the time with as little effort as possible. — CasKev

Yes, this would be a concept akin to depressive realism: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Depressive_realism . But beyond that rather loaded term, one usually sees this in one of two ways- the absurdity hits the individual full-on in a flash (i.e. watching a person screaming into the phone behind a closed door brings up the absurdity of any human endeavor), or the cool, detached self-reflection of looking at life as a whole rather than caught in the moment of this or that particular goal.

People who are quite happy with the life experiences and socially constructed norms they have encountered thus far would be more likely to deny these as motivating factors, in favor of self-affirmation and other such ego-based desires. — CasKev

Yes, the question of pleasure presents an interesting argument. Don't people just do what's most pleasurable/desirable to their sensibilities rather than avoid dissatisfaction (boredom/survival)? I would say that the fact hat we want pleasure in the first place is where to start, not the pleasure itself. That is the Schopenhauer approach at least. Ultimately, pleasure/satisfaction is most likely the tool to decide which is the best goal to maximize one's preferences, but the preference-seeking system is still a thing. Hence, we are always becoming (need preferences satisfied, goals met, to do something to do something to do something) and we can never be (no desires, no preferences, no goals being met). The impulses to flee boredom, and pursue survival-related goals, and avoid discomfort are always there giving form to the angst.

Survival happens by accident--at least most of the time. Once in a rare while (we hope) survival is at stake -- you find yourself tiring as you try to overcome the riptide that seems intent on drowning you, some thug is pointing a gun at you -- but most of the time it is just a question of whether or not we are going to be very bored. — Bitter Crank

When I use survival as a term here, I do not mean the immediate dealing with a life or death situation (gun to head, falling off a cliff, riptides, etc.). By this I mean, how we go about in our historical-cultural milieu to obtain the resources necessary for sustaining our bodily functions (food, proper body temperature, etc.). Due to cultural contingencies, the bar for what "comfortable" survival looks like, may be different for everyone. Since we tend to obtain survival through cultural means (economics, society, learning, etc.), it is more complicated than just immediate food-in-mouth, as you already understand.

As for survival (the very broad sense not the immediate one, as explained above) being one main contributor to our motives for goal-seeking, I will point back to the though experiment I gave earlier (I'll copy and paste it):

I am printing off this paper. Why? I need to get it to a client who needs this information. Why? That information is important to the client to get their financials figured out. Why? If I don't do this then he won't get his financials figured out and his business might suffer and I might lose my job. why? This is part of the job. This job requires it. Why do I need to do this job? I need to make money and in this type of economy, I give up my time and effort for pay. I use this pay to pay for goods so I can survive in this particular economic setting. Why do I consume goods in this particular economic setting? Survival.

So I am just claiming at the root of our intermediary goal-seeking (printing the paper, getting financials, walking that paper over to the person, etc. etc.) is the need to survive in a historical-cultural environment.

The same question-asking will lead to boredom for our other pursuits. Again, I'll copy and paste the example:

I painted a landscape. Why? It absorbs my attention, and I enjoy the pleasure of being absorbed in something where I can create something of beauty that I and others can enjoy. The process of combining colors and using fine-motor skills is also enjoyable. It is also a way to think of something creatively. Why do I like being absorbed, use fine motor skills, and be creative? The option is available and I know it is satisfying. Why follow any option that you think is satisfying? I would get bored.

Now, the third broad category that I don't mention much is discomfort. Why do I want to do the laundry? My clothes smell, this bothers me. Well, that is something clearly not related to boredom or survival. Again, it is always in the context of a culture (some cultures don't care about washing clothes, or even have much clothes to be washed), but the deep-rooted discomfort motivation is still there.

So in general the angsty-drive of humans generally lands in the spectrum of survival, boredom, and/or discomfort and all taking place in the environment the individual finds themselves in.

As you also know, this is in the Schopenhauer tradition that desires are bad because they are something negative. It's a dissatisfaction with just "being" and always needing to "become" (to do to do to do). Looking at it in a much broader sense- life is a repetitious event, even with novelty. This repetitious surviving (in cultural system) and fleeing boredom and discomfort (in a cultural system) just repeats and repeats and repeats.. Some people see this as if from a transcendental position- this is called the "absurd".

No, it's laughable that you compare yourself with Plato. — Agustino

Plato wrote some stuff- some thought-providing stuff, but he is not god or a prophet, man. He is was a brilliant intellect for sure, and we can all study his work and draw from it, but his thinking, like any other thinker, is still prone to many criticisms and flaws, like anyone else.

No, I haven't accused you of being uncharitable. I've accused you of failing to read what I write, and here's another instance of just that. — Agustino

Well, I'll grant you that, I skim your posts because I am bored with them. I still say you read pretty uncharitably though. I have long drawn out arguments with posters here that are frustrating and highly contentious but I still somewhat enjoy them. For whatever reason, I do not like your style and thus put minimal effort in these discussions. I'm also as of recent very busy but still feel compelled to answer posts (to my unhappiness).

You haven't provided any justification for why I should believe you, it's no surprise that I don't. — Agustino

So you bring up Plato's tripartite theory of soul which perplexes me of all things he said you would try to defend. Of course humans have a plurality of faculties (not just three distinct categories). If I was to be CHARITABLE I would say you can just skip the whole tripartite thing and go straight the fact that humans can choose to follow some goals over other goals. So if I am thirsty and I'm really compelled to want to drink the lake water, but another understanding based on the water being contaminated overrides my initial feeling to drink the water, and I really don't want to possibly get sick, what should I do? So we use information about the outcomes of our actions to achieve desired ends. In other words we weigh our desires against each other to achieve a particular goal. This has little to do with my argument though. This goal-weighing is in the realm of practical goal-seeking. It is intermediary goal-seeking stuff, not what makes goals in the first place. For this do some more digging. Here's a thought experiment- for every goal you do question the reason for why you did it.

I am printing off this paper. Why? I need to get it to a client who needs this information. Why? That information is important to the client to get their financials figured out. Why? If I don't do this then he won't get his financials figured out and his business might suffer and I might lose my job. why? This is part of the job. This job requires it. Why do I need to do this job? I need to make money and in this type of economy, I give up my time and effort for pay. I use this pay to pay for goods so I can survive in this particular economic setting. Why do I consume goods in this particular economic setting? Survival.

I painted a landscape. Why? It absorbs my attention, and I enjoy the pleasure of being absorbed in something where I can create something of beauty that I and others can enjoy. The process of combining colors and using fine-motor skills is also enjoyable. It is also a way to think of something creatively. Why do I like being absorbed, use fine motor skills, and be creative? The option is available and I know it is satisfying. Why follow any option that you think is satisfying? I would get bored.

Of course, the questions can be much more convoluted so it may take many many more questions to get you to the base answers, but generally speaking, survival and boredom are the two great motivators.

So it is clear to me you cannot see the contradictions in your own arguments, especially the ones you just made about Plato when compared to what I said. Based on this, and your poor analogy to the bird having angst and comparing it to humans having angst (when angst, of course, does not become a motivator until self-reflective beings arrive on the scene), I cannot continue this discussion with you. The human condition of being an existential being does not translate to other animals without linguistic self-reflection. Certainly we share many other traits, but most likely, not this one. You accuse me of being uncharitable, but it is clear you came in here meant to throw grenades and I've seen no charitable reading from your part- just complete opposition and trolling at all costs. Frankly, your arguments are mere assertions and simply shows you have a particular animus to this view for personal reasons probably related to cherished theological views. I would almost think you are trying to simply piss me off than have a real discussion, but of course, that's just conjecture.

No, Plato didn't actually sit on a chair and dream up the tripartite soul. Rather he (and others) based this conception off experience and then verified it by ensuring it is applicable to all sorts of different cases encountered. — Agustino

So it is a legitimate theory if Plato uses his own experiences and conceptual analysis, but not if I do? You just contradicted yourself. You stated that my basis was not legitimate but was exactly the same one you are using (or Plato rather). You have got yourself in a little bind there. Also, it seems like since this is the case, you are not just being a hypocrite but committing the fallacy of appeal to authority, as Plato obviously is your authority on these matters.

Yes it does deserve an answer. Goal-seeking, on your own terms, is to humans what singing is to birds. Birds don't sing because they're angsty, what makes you think humans seek goals because they're angsty? — Agustino

Your analogy makes no sense in this case. Angst is part of the human experience and not part of a birds. Therefore there is no analogy here. Birds sing because of the instinct/mimicking attributes of the bird, and humans goal-seek due to their propensities that I have stated. Just because they both have innate tendencies does not mean they have to have the same innate tendencies. But that should be obvious.

I do understand what your theory states, but just look around you! There's an abundance of evidence that it is too narrow and simply fails to explain many cases, like for example mine. — Agustino

I don't think so. When you keep on questioning the root of your goals, they go back to very basic drives. A bit of survival instinct, a bit of boredom, a bit of discomfort- plopped down in a cultural setting you use as the template to make your goals related to these broad categories. Everything else is a romanticization, a post-facto rationalization.

What you're saying is nothing but the popular conception of Plato. — Agustino

So where did Plato come up with the tripartate soul? The latest scientific research? Statistical data? No, his own conceptions or just the traditions of those who may have had ideas previously.

Okay, so we've settled that you don't know about it. — Agustino

And either do you! Or does god talk to Agustino and he speaks to the world? At least I admit that this is all speculative philosophy. In fact, much of metaphysical and ethical philosophy is speculative or simply conceptual analysis.

Fine, why should I (or anyone else) believe your theory? You're still not answering my questions. I've asked for what justifies your theory. Now, you're telling me that it's other people's experiences :s . What about those many experiences which contradict what you're saying? Here is one: — Agustino

I didn't say I take what they say at face value for their underlying motivations. It takes a bit of digging. You don't have to believe anything anyone says.

Why do birds sing? Because they're angsty? :s — Agustino

Are you just trying to troll me? Does this even deserve an answer? Did I not go at lengths to explain that we are a self-reflective, linguistic animal- the only one to deal with existential questions? Or are you still not paying close attention?

Neither does a dog. What makes you think we ought to sit there like a rock? — Agustino

That's not even my point. I didn't say we ought to sit there like a rock, but simply that it is our nature to not just be, but become. In other words, we need to always be doing. Just existing isn't enough. We have to make and achieve goals- goals that are ultimately motivated from an angst.

No, that's totally false. For example. If I look at my life, everything I do is pretty much focused around one major goal, which is so large it will take my entire lifetime to try and achieve. I want to change the way society, culture and the world are organised for the better, and hopefully bring about a spiritual renovation of the world.

That means I need health, wealth, power, knowledge, wisdom, and all the rest. Almost every single action I do - exercising, gym, running, shaving, studying philosophy, writing on this forum, working, making money, even things that I will probably do in the future like forming a family, getting married etc. will be directed towards my larger goal - mere steps towards that goal. For an ambitious person such as myself, your theory makes zero sense. You talk about the need to be entertained... what is that? I have no idea what entertainment is, apart from the few things I do while resting and not working or studying. Even things like listening to music or playing music - I enjoy them because of the insights they provide into myself and the world. They sharpen my skills, my sensitivity to the world, and my sensitivity to myself. I rarely experience boredom, because there's so much for me to do. Survival, I'm only concerned about it because I'm concerned about my bigger goal.

Now why do I have such a goal? I wanted to change the world ever since I was a small child. It's almost my very first memory. It's nothing else than the pure expression of my inner being, the way a bird expresses itself by singing its beautiful song in the morning. I have this utter sense of purpose, that I have a mission in the world, and it's my duty to achieve it. That God will hold me accountable for it. And my ultimate failure and success is of course not in my hands, but I have to do my best. I too am just a pawn in God's plan and nothing more. But we each have to do our duty. We also have to leave the people we encounter better off than they were before they met us. That is the minimum from everyone.

Now, not everyone experiences a sense of purpose that is given the way I experience mine. So perhaps for such people, they experience life differently. They have to seek out entertainment, etc. — Agustino

You've had a sense of purpose. That's great. You want to leave people you encounter better off.. You seem to aggravate me with what appears to be trolling. But after reading this, I perhaps see why this might cause some distress as you see your life. I don't want to go in a back-and-forth flame war with you over who is right or what justification we have for this or that. This will not produce much for anyone.

My theory is simply that there is a vague angst at the bottom of our motivations. We have an urge to strive. Our linguistic brains put this constant striving into some goals. This vague angst can be broadly categorized in three main categories- survival, boredom, discomfort. Now, based on these main categories we create goals based to achieve some related to these categories. Often times, goals build upon each other to the point that the underlying factors are not even seen. However, every once in a while, you may see that indeed, most goals do lie in a certain emptiness of boredom, or desire for survival needs (obtained through cultural structures).

How do you know this is the ultimate underlying motivation? By what criteria have you established that? Why do you discount the answers people generally give? What reasons do you have to doubt those answers? — Agustino

First, I find it ironic you are presuming an empirical approach in this particular post based on your preference for Plato who was arguably one of the best examples of non-empirical philosopher. But, that is an aside not a response..

I don't know this is the ultimate underlying motivation. This is just my attempt at a theory based on my own experience, analyzing other's experiences, and a priori conception analysis and synthesis of what it means to be a linguistically-based, self-reflective animal-being. Existential-based questions get existential-based answers.. that is to say, existential problems are in the realm of subjective/inner experience not, for example the neural cortex or hypothalamus, or neural connections. In other words, it is squarely in the frame of everyday, socially-constructed, linguistic-based immediate life that we inhabit. If we were discussing the evolution or causation of these experiences, that would be a different realm that would very much involve those types of concepts. (Even then, the hard problem of consciousness would be a bit thornier than just causative answers..gets deep with metaphysical stuff).

Anyways, part of existentially-based questions is what motivates us (this self-reflective, linguistically-based animal). We are an animal that deliberates. That is to say, we can make conscious decisions on what to pursue, and we do this much of the time. We choose a goal and seek out ways to achieve that goal, creating smaller goals along the way. The natural question is causes us to seek goals? Well, this is a different question than what causes us to prefer one goal over another. This is not to be confused. For example, we usually prefer what is most pleasurable. So, creating works of art may be more pleasurable than watching tv, thus goals are taken to pursue this goal over the other. Anyways, that is not the question though. The question is why do we seek goals in the first place? That is not why we choose some goals over others, or why we should choose some goals over others (for some longer term pleasure or sense of satisfaction). Well, we are angsty creature. We do not sit there like a rock. We are linguistic-based, self-reflective creatures that must survive in a certain contingent world of a historical-cultural setting. In this cultural setting, we must make goals related to survival and goals related to entertaining ourselves as to not get bored..

That is the real short answer.. Again, I have some intermediate goals of survival based on my cultural setting's set-up that I must now pursue.. I will be back to explain further..

Either way, if your attention is engrossed fully or not, it is a way to alleviate that initial need to pursue something to focus your attention in a way that seems most pleasurable to you based on your personality.