Radical time is a past which is changed by the present it functions in , and this present anticipates beyond itself. This complex structure defines a single moment, not three separate time positions. — Joshs

The radically temporal approaches of Derrida, Heidegger, Gendlin and Kelly reject this adaptionist view of the relation between feeling and intention-cognition. They begin from a different motivational principle than that of causal interaction between little bodies(neurons, particles, etc). They dont begin from the notion of 'body' or 'object' at all,, but from something more primitive and fundamental than a body or object. — Joshs

Lacan has offered a scheme of time that achieves similar results by different means. It is not about an intention, being, and self that transforms itself to be itself due to inherent, pre-given mechanisms of 'radical time.' Differently, paradoxical features of time appear due to a gesture of change, transformation, or subversion from the outside. We are not born possessing a-priory
structure of time. One becomes the social and temporal being via the process of interpellation or its modifications.


"A crucial feature of the graph is the fact that the vector of the subjective intention quilts the vector of the signifier's chain backwards, in a retroactive direction: it steps out of the chain at a point preceding the point at which it has pierced it. Lacan's emphasis is precisely on this retroactive character of the effect of signification with respect to the signifier, on this staying behind of the signified with respect to the progression of the signifier's chain: the effect of meaning is always produced backwards, apres coup" (Slavoj Zizek. "The Sublime Object of Ideology.") Our present experiences can decisively determine our past and future due to the displaced processes of socialization.The event of the traumatic and supressed submission to the law and an acceptance of its demand for conformity may continually structure our temporality.

When you use words, you have a belief about how words are used. But what about when you need to use a screwdriver? Do you need words to use a screwdriver, or just the visual of someone using a screwdriver? — Harry Hindu

Any YouTube video about learning how to use a tool has a complement of verbal or finger-alphabet instructions. When one learns how to work with a screwdriver, she necessarily places herself into an already-given organized space where physical motions and bodily dispositions are combined with a set of cognitive operations, believes, and attitudes. There are no mere imitations, mimicking or the manifestation of instinctive tendencies. It is the enactment of the heterogeneous variety of social presuppositions. A learning process presupposes the existence of various institutionalized practices, ordered by the hierarchical system of oral or written instructions, guidelines, programs, etc.

communicating beliefs is a seperate issue than having beliefs. Making sounds with your mouth is a behaviour that expresses your belief just as covering your head and running inside does.

As an observer of others, your only have access to their beliefs via their actions. Do you need to observe your own actions to know you have beliefs? — Harry Hindu

As far as I understand, your point is that our mental states are ultimately independent of the corresponding verbal expressions. This position fails to take account of the complex social and collective character of our beliefs. They are developed, shaped, and exercised within the networks of our interpersonal interactions. Can we reduce them to simple rituals and behavioural patterns, deprived of the signifying symbolic mechanisms?

Beliefs are not about what can be put in propositional form. How beliefs are communicated is a seperate problem than what beliefs are. — Harry Hindu

If I believe that it is raining, there is my mental state that is expressed in belief. Yet, would my mental state be identifiable and recognizable if I could not understand and articulate it in a sentence “It is raining”? The existence of the statement has two propositional dimensions: ontological subjectivity and a completely objective fact.

What is the debate about? Is it about something being the case - the ontological nature of propositions and beliefs? Does a debate not assume that one side is closer to the truth than the other side, and that each side tries to show how their scribbles are more of an accurate representation of the ontological relationship between propositions and beliefs? — Harry Hindu

Likely, when @Banno asserts that belief is always about states of affairs, this claim indicates a limited domain where beliefs are easily verifiable:
“If I were to say that belief is always about states of affairs, would you agree? Then it only remains to point out that a state of affairs can always be put in propositional form for us to see that beliefs are always about what can be put in propositional form”. However, one can believe in God because one cannot know for sure that He exists. Similarly, one could believe in democracy, communism, climate change, etc. Here, knowledge has to be supplemented by belief; a belief emerges in order to compensate for the failure of knowledge. Even if knowledge and belief can assume the propositional form, they nonetheless express different manifestations of truth.

What you are missing (I think?) is that I count myself among them. — f64

Sorry, I did not understand.

I do wonder how perfectly Plato narrated the story of Socrates. It seems likely enough that he swallowed up a more radical figure in order to cough up yet another story of this-is-how-it-is. We might call it a false assimilation of the negative. — f64

Maybe you are right about Plato vs. Socrates relations. Even if
Plato’s representation of Socrates’s story was polished and censored, it contained scandalous and shocking elements. Differently, nowadays, we see an enormous augmentation of suppressing mechanisms that are ultimately pushing away any expressions of dissent and disturbance. Many of them are deployed at an undetectable, unconscious level of ordinary social interactions. Others are incorporated within the structures of public institutions and social networks. Likely, the individual unconscious self-censorship and self-control function as the most crucial factor in maintaining our social order.

My feeling is that, of the two things you mention, this 'void' is closer to absolute loneliness than death. But I think, at its essence, its an instinctive fear of re-encountering forgotten emotions and memories which are very painful (or a means of delaying encounter with 'pending' emotions built up from things you've lived without fully digesting) — csalisbury

Likely, we do have different personal experiences of the void. Nevertheless, to find common ground, our task could be to conceptualize it. For Zizek, it is a crucial part of his project: "in order to enact the shift from capitalist to analyst's discourse, one has merely to break the spell of objet a, to recognize beneath the fascinating agalma, the Grail of desire, the void that it covers" ((Zizek, 'Incontinence of the void'). The first hypothesis is that the void could be a break, a dysfunction, or social bond destruction. It is how Lacanian classical psychoanalysis proceeds: any treatment procedure to the disruption of some refers to socialization's setting (for example, the mirror stage). Accordingly, the hyper-fascinating retaining of self could be understood as a perversive compensatory reaction, expressing the hyper joy of retaining the lost identity.

The results of my own self-experimentation lead me to think that the idea of a 'void' is a sort of veil over very complex, differentiated fullnesses. — csalisbury

Zizek proposes a more elaborated model. His void is now the current libido economy, directly incorporated into economic, social, and political systems. In fact, Zizek implicitly accepts and further develops Deleuze and Guattari's position that desire is an integral part of economic and political infrastructure. In this case, the void is the newest 'capitalistic' way of organization of the social.
When Zizek states: “: objet a as the void around which desires and/or drives circulate, and objet a as the fascinating element that fills in this void (since, as Lacan repeatedly emphasizes, objet a has no substantial consistency, it is just the positivization of a void)”, he proposes that the fascinating structure of desire is in mutual presupposition with the whole field of desire, the ‘capitalistic’ organization of libido.

The results of my own self-experimentation lead me to think that the idea of a 'void' is a sort of veil over very complex, differentiated fullnesses. Many of those are complex, differentiated fullnesses of (quite serious) pain. But there are also little pockets of something you might call happiness, or peace, within that pain, and you have to withstand the pain to expand those pockets. — csalisbury

I understand what you say, but however painful and traumatic our experiences could be, they tend to acquire inertia and become masochistic:
“one should assert its underlying principle: jouissance is suffering, a painful excess of pleasure (pleasure in pain),
and, in this sense, jouissance is in effect masochistic… We thus
have two extremes: on the one hand the enlightened hedonist who
carefully calculates his pleasures to prolong his fun and avoid getting
hurt; on the other hand, the jouisseur proper, ready to consume his very
existence in the deadly excess of enjoyment—or, in terms of our society,
on the one hand the consumerist calculating his pleasures, well protected
from all kinds of harassments and other health threats; on the other hand
the drug addict (or smoker, or …) bent on self-destruction”. (Zizek,Incontinence of the void")
Both extremes, poles of the spectrum of desire are the necessary products of our society.
We should be able to relate our experiences to our social reality. Likely, it is easier to say than to perform.That is what Guattari tried to accomplish in his therapeutics.

I don't assume that we are different in the same ways, but I think that critical writers (Lacan, Freud, whoever) appeal to creeps and weirdos. I use those term playfully. A small subset of the population maybe just can't embrace various ordinary pleasures without some kind of self-consciousness that gets in the way. Like Zizek can't dance, because it's 'obscene.' — f64

For me the critical writers are some kind of violent alternative self-affirmation that also involves continual self-negation. It's like a drug addiction. And part of that self-negation gets around finally to mocking the master of various useless lingos, useless unless and until one is famous or paid, etc. — f64

You represent a relatively common point of view: all these thinkers are freaks and nuts, having enormous and baseless ambitions. It is understandable and widespread. Yet, this opinion is as old as philosophy itself: Plato has perfectly narrated the story of Socrates.

I will try to explain myself. Of course, I like this kind of philosophical stuff. Yet, there are a few more things. Pleasure, all types of enjoyment and self-enjoyment are everywhere. People aspire to achieve happiness through the possession of material goods and ordinary self-affirmation. Many of them experience joy, maybe at least for some while. Unfortunately, for some reason, I am different. Therefore, I try to apply my reading to reconstruct various behavioral models connected to desire theories and then experiment with my situation. For me, there are two significant philosophies of desire: Lacanian and Deleuzian. My self-observation and experience incline me towards Lacan's model. Yet, it does not give any way out since it prioritizes an ultimate traumatic character of desire. Differently, Deleuze asserts the existence of lines of flight towards the unknown and creative connections with the forces from outside. Honestly, sometimes I doubt that either Deleuze or Lacan and Zizek are still relevant to explain what is going on right now. As you said:" There's no need for us, in 2020, to approach these matters as though we're living in Paris between 1940-1980." 'The matters' are dizzily super-fascinating!

I've found that, for me, reading Zizek (and many other writers of theory) only led to meta-fascination: fascination with becoming-fascinated — csalisbury

People seem to get addicted to the 'discourse', reading about the same cluster of ideas from different angles, never actually changing anything, but going back to the bookshelf again and again and again. — csalisbury

Zizek is right about the link between fascinating objet a and the void. The addictive meta-fascination, going back to the same self-experiencing again, and again, and again indicates the hyper-accelerating motion around the void. But what is this void? It is a mode of death; it is an experience of death or absolute loneliness. Likely, since one cannot find ways out, and since one’s social self-affirmation could fail, one’s self starts to vibrate at the same location forcefully. It could be possible to find here the Lacanian split and doubling of ego, expressed by an intensive inner monologue between the interiorized Other and the imaginary self
of the mirror stage or a similar structure ( Althusser’s interpellation). One becomes governed by some model of death or fear of death. So, it could be about fear and the actualization of the transcendent subjectivation scheme.

What's being got at in that Wilden quote is something I'd describe as 'the structure of fascination.' Fascination is a gravitational force : it pulls you toward one thing at the expense of all other things. Fascination is also an enervating force. It saps your capacity for action in order to sustain itself as fascination.Something seems charged with a mysterious power. It seems important to keep your attention focused on it, to trace its contours, to hum it like a kind of refrain. It's something you always feel like you almost get, but are possibly in danger of losing so you keep returning back to it. You have to trace its outlines again and again to remind yourself of what it is. It's definitely what's important and it's always tip of your tongue. Sometimes you get it for a second, but then it slips away. You know for sure you had it, and you still feel like you almost have it, so you return to it again, wherever you see its form crop up, to retrace it.

I think the most subtle form that fascination can take is fascination with the story of becoming-fascinated.

If you draw your attention away for a second then a kind of thought pops up: 'remember it's important and necessary to pay attention to the story of how one become fascinated'. — csalisbury

It is an excellent phenomenological mapping of our desire. And it resonates with Zizek’s account of our ontological conditions:
” What one should do here is distinguish between the two aspects of objet a clearly discernible in Lacan’s theory: objet a as the void around which desires and/or drives circulate, and objet a as the fascinating element that fills in this void (since, as Lacan repeatedly emphasizes, objet a has no substantial consistency, it is just the positivization of a void).” (Zizek, ‘Incontinence of the void.’) Yet, Zizek does not stop on a mere description or a phenomenological account. Likely, to avoid the lure of the fascinating narcissism, he tries to perform a task of critical analyses.

I also don't think that we can chalk it up to 'capitalism' (Lacan's is one iteration of an ancient structure that far-antedates the late 2nd millennium. — csalisbury

On the contrary, Zizek deals with ‘capitalism’. He utilizes formidable Lacanian, Marxist, and Hegelian theoretical recourses: “this is how the capitalist discourse functions: a subject enthralled by the superego call to excessive enjoyment, and in search of a Master-Signifier that would constrain his/her enjoyment, provide a proper measure of it, prevent its explosion into a deadly excess (of a drug addict, chain-smoker, alcoholic, and other -holics or addicts)… in order to enact the shift from capitalist to analyst’s discourse, one has merely to break the spell of objet a, to recognize beneath the fascinating agalma, the Grail of desire, the void that it covers.” It is Zizek’s project: to move from ‘capitalistic discourse,’ where we unconsciously follow pre-given and pre-programmed affective patterns, to the analyst’s discourse of critical analyses.

There is a sort of retro-twilight beauty to gardening old parisian post-structural fads, in the same way a good historical novelist might play with old intellectual tropes (say, Pynchon's Mason & Dixon) but there's no need, at all, to stay here. If you find joy in it, then it is worthwhile; if not, there is no necessity to remain. — csalisbury

No, for me, it is not about the enjoyment (once again, here is the fascinating narcissistic trap!) of being immersed into “old Parisian post-structural fads.” The discord is alive and actual. Zizek, the most influential contemporary Lacanian, has almost depleted the heritage of his teacher. His re-interpretation of objet-a as the fascinating structure brings him to the discovery of the void behind it, of the ultimate lack and negation. He consistently avoids a recourse to Deleuze’s philosophy of desire or Foucault’s pragmatics
of pleasure. They assert that there is no void behind our intimate experiences, fantasies and imagination. They are in mutual interdependence and presupposition with our social reality. Zizek’s account of desire could be replaced by another one, having positive and constructive dimensions.

Deleuze & Guattari have all sorts of useful stuff, much of which I love, but they also have a self-consciously radical tone, which, as in a manifesto, loves to play 'this is absolutely bad, this is absolutely good' games... & this is perfectly calibrated, whether intentionally or not, to tap into the psyches of people very hungry for maps of good vs. bad ways of thinking/being/living. — csalisbury

I agree with you; their style is too militant. Yet, they have offered the
the most comprehensive critique of the Lacanian theory.I want to get back to your account:

The infant has a relationship with its mom. It's a complicated relationship - there's intimate touch, exchange of fluids, face-to-face communication, talking. There are intense feelings: love, hate, joy, fear. The baby knows in many many ways who mom is. There are two people in a very particular kind of relationship. — csalisbury

So far, primarily, you are right. But when you write:

The introduction of 'you' as the kid learns language is another element added to the mix. It's another element in a constantly evolving thing. — csalisbury

,
a Lacanian would completely disagree. For Lacan, when the kid enters into the symbolic world,
there is an ultimate and traumatic transformation of a whole system of her relationship with herself and her immediate environment. The transcendent Lacanian scheme manages and directs what

It can use its understanding of 'you', 'me' and 'I', as it grows, to participate in the world in new ways. — csalisbury

Therefore, for Lacan, there is no spontaneous and 'natural' process of learning and development, but the realization of the rigorous transcendent model of production of subjectivity.
Deleuze and Guattari do not merely reject the Lacanian model. They maintain that
it owes its efficiency and workability to broader immanent social determinants.
For example, they claim that wherever we find what can be recognized as a working Oedipal complex, the actual ground is not a failure of 'normal' Lacanian interiorization. It results from the particular 'capitalistic' process of production of subjectivity and organization of desire, responsible for both psychological dis functionality and habitual ways of being in the world. Indeed, the whole complex of the infant's relationship with his mom and various manifestations of our lives follow clear, repeatable patterns.
If they are not governed by transcendent models or 'traditional' cultural determinants, we should seek alternative conceptual frameworks.

The infant has a relationship with its mom. It's a complicated relationship - there's intimate touch, exchange of fluids, face-to-face communication, talking. There are intense feelings: love, hate, joy, fear. The baby knows in many many ways who mom is. There are two people in a very particular kind of relationship. The introduction of 'you' as the kid learns language is another element added to the mix. It's another element in a constantly evolving thing. It can use its understanding of 'you', 'me' and 'I', as it grows, to participate in the world in new ways. As with anything. But the 'you' was already prepared in an exchange of attention. Just a mom and a kid paying attention to one another in a particular way.

Isn't this enough? What do we gain in understanding by adding the rest? — csalisbury

You articulate here 'a common sense' psychology. It reaffirms a 'natural understanding' of a child development, but it can help neither understand our society better nor treat various mental disorders. On the contrary,
Lacan offers both: his model lays the ground for psychoanalyses, theories
of subjectivation, discourses' functioning, and even principles of neoliberal capitalism.
(Zizek, https://www.amazon.ca/Incontinence-Void-Economico-Philosophical-Slavoj-Žižek/dp/0262537060/ref=sr_1_27?dchild=1&keywords=zizek&qid=1606753980&sr=8-27. )
Lacanianism has become the influential source of authority and knowledge. So, I would reformulate your question 'where Lacan starts to go wrong.'
(by the way, it can become an enormous task, considering the scope of what Lacan left). The question could be: why should we reject Lacanianism? Does it reinforce inferiority and the sense of guilt? Should one submit herself to a psychoanalytical treatment? Should she reaffirm her particular self-understanding?
Should she trust the validity of knowledge applied, as well as the authoritative status of a psychoanalyst?

I see what you're saying, but what do these theoretical models and terms add here. How does it enrich? — csalisbury

If we need to challenge the self-sufficiency and truth of Lacanianism, we should seek models that allow one to understand oneself in a broader social context. I am not sure that Sloterdjic’s critic of the mirror stage (according to your quote)
is sufficient enough. Deleuze and Guattari offer up a set of concept-tools for undoing certain habitual ways of being in the world, and constructing our lives, producing our own subjectivity. They aim to dismantle and then reconstruct Lacanian models of production of subjectivity as well as the most prosaic modes of our life. Their paradigmatic example is the bouncing balls from Kafka’s ‘Blumfeld, an Elderly Bachelor’. The proposed model lays the ground for the apprehension of the constitutive subjective split of the mirror stage and the case of ‘Blomfield’.

Nathan Widder, 'A Thousand Plateaus and Philosophy
— Number2018

From the essay collection? I've a couple of articles in there, but not that one. Sounds interesting. — StreetlightX

https://www.amazon.ca/Thousand-Plateaus-Philosophy-Henry-Somers-Hall/dp/0748697284/ref=sr_1_3?dchild=1&keywords=a+thousand+plateaus+and+philosophy&qid=1606745798&sr=8-3

There is essay #7, “Year zero: faciality”

@csalisbury

I would go on to further emphasize though, is the necessity of appending to all this a 'materialist' analysis of all this: i.e. the 'primacy' of the one or the other (imaginary or symbolic) should be thought not just in ideal, stadial-teleological terms, but also with respect to the conditions which 'bring out', as it were, the one of the other in a sociological setting. — StreetlightX

Nathan Widder has recently developed this line of argumentation. He tries to
reinterpret Lacan's scheme of a child's subjectivation via Deleuze and Guattari's conceptual framework of the faciality machine. Accordingly, instead of being the product of universal psychological and social determinants, the mirror stage becomes a result of particular machinic and power operations. By Lacan, the Other's voice is one of the stage's necessary operators, ensuring the completion of the process of identifying and a child's entry into the symbolic world. However, this voice acts differently: "The mirror stage is precipitated by and imbued with what Deleuze and Guattari call 'order-words,' which link acts – here the infant's recognition– to statements and serve as redundancies for significance and subjectivity (ATP 79). Order-words effect' incorporeal transformations', which change nothing of the physicality of a body but everything about its sense and meaningfulness: 'that's you!' – the order-word that transforms the infant and paves the way for later stratification by the signifier and the subject."
(Nathan Widder, 'A Thousand Plateaus and Philosophy').

by no means does the image in the mirror appear as the first and all-surpassing information about its own ability to be whole; at most, it makes an initial reference to its own appearance as a coherent body among coherent bodies in the real visual space, but this integral being-an-image-body means almost nothing alongside the pre-imaginary, non-eidetic certainties of sensual-emotional dual integrity." — StreetlightX

It is possible to show that all essential Lacanian elements of the mirror stage were present at an earlier stage of child development, namely during breastfeeding. Here, the infant's initial gestalt of the human face occurs and consolidates. Deleuze and Guattari maintain that 'maternal power operating through the face during nursing' is as open to the entire social field as any Lacanian development stage.

I would like to comment on them if you find them interesting as well. — David Mo

Yes, of course.

That it is "neither visible nor hidden" is a paradox that needs to be explained or it will remain confuse. In common language hidden and visible are an exclusive alternative. — David Mo

The statement is not hidden (in Foucault's sense) if we do not need to look for a hidden meaning, to interpret it according to a founding transcendental principle. 'Not visible' means
that we should not look for an apparent logical or grammatical structure. Foucault opposes here the two principal techniques: formalization and interpretation.

according Foucault, because the statement is the same "in itself". In itself? What is the "itself" of a statement? — David Mo

‘The statement is the same in itself,’ is the essence of Foucault’s archaeology. The primary criterion for the existence of ‘the statement in itself” is the manifestation of its repetition, or, more precisely, its inherent variation. The statement repeats itself due to its ’regularity,’ its enunciative function. Does Foucault succeed in avoiding a pure metaphysical founding of the statement existence? And how his method is different from an empirical contextual analysis?Foucault always starts with a limited corpus of linguistic datum. As his later works showed, the chosen datum is operated by and exposes the enunciative function inherent to a field of particular power relations. For example, in "The will to power," the discursive formation of various verbal performances of ''sexuality'' is not hidden nor visible. The statement reflects the intensification and the function of the power relations in our society. It is disclosed, and found out under the chosen phrases and prepositions, behind their ''natural'' meaning and logic. Therefore, the 'initial' meaning becomes transformed.
That should clarify your question

What means the modality of existence of a statement which is independent of its different possible meanings? — David Mo

The surface where the statements appear is discovered and even invented. Likely, Foucault's originality lies in the way he immerses himself into the field of contemporary forces. That is why he refers to '’the foreign element”,” something else'' that lies at the same level as the statement itself. The repetition, the variation of the statement, is maintained by exterior, unrecognizable forces. The speaker may not recognize it, and she becomes ''one'', or ''non-person''. To give a place to "the statement in itself," Foucault eliminates, erases himself as the author of his text. He replaces himself with the anonymous '' murmuring'' of discourse: “Must we admit that the time of discourse is not the time of consciousness extrapolated to the dimensions of history, or the time of history present in the form of consciousness? Must I suppose that in my discourse I have no survival? In speaking I am not banishing my death, but actually establishing it; rather I am abolishing all interiority in that exterior that is so indifferent to my life, and so neutral, that it makes no distinction between my life and my death.”

See this:

Generally speaking, one can say that a sentence or a
proposition - even when isolated, even divorced from the natural context
that could throw light on to its meaning, even freed or cut off from all the
elements to which, implicitly or not, it refers - always remains a sentence
or a proposition and can always be recognized as such .
On the other hand, the enunciative function - and this shows that it is
not simply a construction of previously existing elements - cannot
operate on a sentence or proposition in isolation. It is not enough to say a
sentence, it is not even enough to say it in a particular relation to a field of
objects or in a particular relation to a subject, for a statement to exist: it
must be related to a whole adjacent field . (AoK: 97)

Warn this: even when isolated, even divorced from the natural context that could throw light on to its meaning (!)

Here there is an implicit recognition (?) that context (could?) change the meaning of a statement. How can it be said that a statement can be recognized without an external context? — David Mo

I disagree.
"Generally speaking, one can say that a sentence or a
proposition - even when isolated, even divorced from the natural context
that could throw light on to its meaning, even freed or cut off from all the
elements to which, implicitly or not, it refers - always remains a sentence
or a proposition and can always be recognized as such ."
This 'means’ that we should avoid doing this: for Foucault, there is no ‘natural context’ that could ‘throw light on to statement’s meaning.’
"On the other hand, the enunciative function - and this shows that it is
not simply a construction of previously existing elements - cannot
operate on a sentence or proposition in isolation. It is not enough to say a
sentence, it is not even enough to say it in a particular relation to a field of
objects or in a particular relation to a subject, for a statement to exist: it
must be related to a whole adjacent field."
All right, for a statement to exist, the enunciative function relates the statement to a whole adjacent field. Yet, this relation, this link is not provided by the evident contextual circumstances. It is the essence of Foucault’s archeology: “the statement is neither visible nor hidden.” Therefore, the statement has to be disclosed, found out under the covering phrases and prepositions, behind their ‘natural’ meaning and logic. The surface, the ‘plinth,’ where the statements appear, must be discovered, polished, and even fashioned or invented. So, 'an external context' is primarily determined and chosen by the statement's formation, by its enunciative function. Foucault’s seemingly meaningless statement AZERT indicates his political and philosophical aim not to consider too meaningful, understandable, and recognizable texts and examples.

Domain of material objects possessing a certain number of observable physical properties, a domain of fictitious objects , a domain of spatial and geographical localizations, a domain of symbolic appartenances and secret kinships;e a domain of objects that exist at the same moment and on the same time-scale as the statement is formulated, a domain of objects that belongs to a quite different present -
that indicated and constituted by the statement itself, laws of possibility, rules of existence.

These are Foucault's exact expressions in The Archaeology of Knowledge which constitute the domain of the enunciative value. Do they not refer to the context of the enunciation? Space, time, location are not external factors? — David Mo

Foucault asserts that "A series of signs will become a statement on condition that it possesses 'something else'(which may be strangely similar to it, and almost identical as in the
example chosen), a specific relation that concerns itself- and not its cause,
or its elements". If so, the relations of a statement with 'external factors' are the derivatives
of the essential enunciative function. The statement is essentially self-sufficient and autonomous.

The concept of the generative function of language does not appear in The Archaeology of Knowledge,. Are you not applying alien concepts in your interpretation of Foucault? What do you mean with "generative function"? — David Mo

“The statement is not therefore a structure (that is, a group of relations between
variable elements, thus authorizing a possibly infinite number of concrete
models); it is a function of existence that properly belongs to signs and on
the basis of which one may then decide, through analysis or intuition,
whether or not they 'make sense', according to what rule they follow one
another or are juxtaposed, of what they are the sign, and what sort of act
A series of signs will become a statement on condition that it possesses 'something else'(which may be strangely similar to it, and almost identical as in the
example chosen), a specific relation that concerns itself- and not its cause,
or its elements. The subject of the statement should not be regarded as identical with the author of the formulation - either in substance, or in function. He is
not in fact the cause, origin, or starting point of the phenomenon of the
written or spoken articulation of a sentence; nor is it that meaningful intention
which, silently anticipating words, orders them like the visible
body of its intuition; it is not the constant, motionless, unchanging focus
of a series of operations that are manifested, in turn, on the surface of discourse
through the statements. It is a particular, vacant place that may in
fact be filled by different individuals; but, instead of being defined once
and for all, and maintaining itself as such throughout a text, a book, or an
oeuvre, this place varies - or rather it is variable enough to be able either to
persevere, unchanging, through several sentences, or to alter with each
one. It is a dimension that characterizes a whole formulation qua statement.
It is one of the characteristics proper to the enunciative function and
enables one to describe it.”
Foucault applies here terms of “a function of existence,” and of “the enunciative function.” He asserts that the statement is different from a logical proposition,
a meaningful phrase, or a speech-act. It is a general function of a few variables.
A statement entertains a few links with affiliated spaces of a discursive formation,
subjective positions, concepts, and material elements. His prominent example is AZERT. The meaningless group of letters, listed in a typewriting manual, becomes a statement of alphabetical order adopted by French typewriters. What makes it a statement is the repetition due to the power
that cannot be attributed to external causes or conditions. A statement defines itself
by establishing a specific link with ‘something else’ that lies on the same level as itself. A hidden repetition animates the statement. It is surprising that formally Foucault’s definition of the statement as the enunciating essential function is similar to what Derrida proposed as the fundamental iterability: “The iterability of an element divides its own identity a priory…It is because this iterability is differential, within each individual ‘element’ as well as between the ‘elements’, because it splits each element while constituting it, because it marks it with an articulatory break, it is a differential structure escaping the logic of presence”.
(Derrida, Limited Inc).
As well as differance, a statement is in itself a repetition, even if what it repeats is ’something else.’ Is there a fundamental difference? AZERT refers to the focal point of contemporary power relations, effectuating the typist’s fingers.

There is no mention of Austin in The Archaeology of Knowledge. — David Mo

In "Archeology of knowledge," Foucault shows how his statements are related to speech-acts. — Number2018

"Can one not say that there is a statement wherever one can recognize and isolate
an act of formulation - something like the speech act referred to by the
English analysts? This term does not, of course, refer to the material act of
speaking (aloud or to oneself) or of writing (by hand or typewriter); nor
does it refer to the intention of the individual who is speaking (the fact
that he wants to convince someone else, to be obeyed, to discover the
solution to a problem, or to communicate information); nor does it refer
to the possible result of what he has said (whether he has convinced someone
or aroused his suspicion; whether he was listened to and whether his
orders were carried out; whether his prayer was heard); what one is
referring to is the operation that has been carried out by the formula
itself, in its emergence: promise, order, decree, contract, agreement,
observation. The speech act is not what took place just prior to the moment
when the statement was made (in the author's thought or intentions) ;
it is not what might have happened, after the event itself, in its wake, and
the consequences that it gave rise to; it is what occurred by the very fact
that a statement was made - and precisely this statement (and no other) in
specific circumstances. Presumably, therefore, one individualization of
statements refers to the same criteria as the location of acts of formulation:
each act is embodied in a statement and each statement contains one of those
acts. They exist through one another in an exact reciprocal relationship.
Yet such a correlation does not stand up to examination. For one thing,
more than a statement is often required to effect a speech act: an oath, a
prayer, a contract, a promise, or a demonstration usually require a certain
number of distinct formulas or separate sentences”(Ibid, pg 83)

the difference between his theory and that of "Anglo-Saxon philosophers" does not seem to be one of theoretical principles, but rather of the backgrounds to which they apply, — David Mo

Foucault proposes that the statement exists as a primordial generative function that does not depend on external factors. The founding principle of fundamental redundancy distinguish a statement from a non-statement. So, a series of letters which one might write down at random would become a statement. "The keyboard of a typewriter is not a statement; but the same series of letters, A,Z,E,R, T, listed in a typewriting manual, is the statement".

It would have been nice if Foucault had mentioned the author or authors he was targeting with his criticism. But it is somewhat rare for famous philosophers to critically mention contemporary authors. They probably expose themselves to the discovery that they have not been seriously read them. This is often the case.

If Foucault's criticism refers only to the contextuality of meaning, it seems to me that it is not very original. I suspect that there is something else. — David Mo

It was not just about the contextuality of meaning. In "Archeology of knowledge," Foucault shows how his statements are related to speech-acts. Later, he opposes his conceptualization of performative acts to Austin's theory in "The government of self and others.”: “In a performative utterance, the given elements of the situation are such that when the utterance is made, the effect which follows is known and ordered in advance, it is codified, and this is precisely what constitutes the performative character of the utterance. In parresia, on the other hand, whatever the usual, familiar, and quasi-institutionalized character of the situation in which it is effectuated, what makes it parresia is that the introduction, the irruption of the true discourse determines an open situation, or rather opens the situation and makes possible effects which are, precisely, not known. Parresia does not produce a codified effect; it opens up an unspecified risk. And this unspecified risk is obviously a function of the elements of the situation”. Differently from the performative, parresia constitutes a rupture with the dominant significations, an irruptive event that creates a fracture. Also, to accomplish a performative utterance, the status of the subject is necessary, but just as a formal function. What makes “Excuse me” a performative is what one says. Whether one is sincere or not is of no importance. On the contrary, the parrhesiastic enunciation not only produces effects on others, but primarily affects the enunciating subject.

.

to understand Foucault, if such a thing is possible, we should go to p. 90 ff. of The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York, Pantheon Books, 1972) where he explains his peculiar conception of "statement".
However, I doubt that it can be understood because he resorts to markedly metaphorical expressions that he does not explain ("field of emergence", "spaces of differentiation"...).

One can see in any case that the description of this enunciative level
can be performed neither by a formal analysis, nor by a semantic investiga­-
tion, nor by verification, but by the analysis of the relations between the
statement and the spaces of differentiation , in which the statement itself
reveals the differences. (Wittgenstein, Ibid, p. 92)

Perhaps someone can explain this Foucaulian entanglement. I would appreciate it. — David Mo

“The statement is not the direct projection on to the plane of language
(langage) of a particular situation or a group of representations. It is not
simply the manipulation by a speaking subject of a number of elements
and linguistic rules. At the very outset, from the very root, the statement
is divided up into an enunciative field in which it has a place and a status,
which arranges for its possible relations with the past, and which opens up
for it a possible future. Every statement is specified in this way: there is no
statement in general, no free, neutral, independent statement; but a statement
always belongs to a series or a whole, always plays a role among
other statements, deriving support from them and distinguishing itself
from them: it is always part of a network of statements, in which it has a
role, however minimal it may be, to play. Whereas grammatical construction
needs only elements and rules in order to operate; whereas one
might just conceive of a language (langue) - an artificial one, of course whose
only purpose is the construction of a single sentence; whereas the
alphabet, the rules of construction and transformation of a formal system
being given, one can perfectly well define the first proposition of this
language (langage) , the same cannot be said of the statement. There is no
statement that does not presuppose others; there is no statement that is not
surrounded by a field of coexistences, effects of series and succession, a
distribution of functions and roles. If one can speak of a statement, it is
because a sentence (a proposition) figures at a definite point, with a specific
position, in an enunciative network that extends beyond it.” (Foucault, Ibid, p. 99)

Foucault implements the double move here. First, he rejects a formal analysis or a semantic investigation to perform a structuralist conceptualization of a discursive formation: his statement represents a group of associated statements with inherent formation and enunciation rules. No statement can appear without the co-existence and co-operation of similar, opposing, supporting, etc. ones. Secondly, he tries to replace the structuralist approach: a family of affiliated statements is not homogeneous. When one operates discursive formation statements, there are different systems effectuated in the same process: observations, descriptions, calculations, institutions, etc. Also, the operating rules themselves are not general permanent axioms; they are variable or optional. They do not determine a structure or a system; any rule applied is primarily determined by a current enunciative context and, simultaneously, changes this context.
The principle of an inherent variation substitutes for formal structuralist
rules of construction and transformation.

So what's the principle you advocate here, that the 9 Justices act as philosopher kings and either re-write or strike down every law that, in their opinion, results in a bad consequence? Perhaps the ACA is unconstitutional, but perhaps it is not, but what difference does it make for the analysis to look at how many Americans will be lose coverage when making that determination? — Hanover

It is a fundamental ambivalence here. In principle, the field of justice is autonomous and independent. Likely, when philosopher-kings in SCOTUS impose the final decisions in the most divisive political and social disputes, no one (even themselves) can be certain about the 'real' reasons for their choices. Consciously, they may think that they judge exclusively based on Law and The Constitution. Yet, unconsciously, they may be led by their partisan (liberal or conservative) values. So, the ACA's constitutionality can function as a rationalization for disguising the favourable perspectives.

So far, the Dems grill Barrett on how she would rule on California v. Texas, a constitutional challenge to the ACA that is set to be argued before the Supreme Court on Nov. 10.
Senator Feinstein: "This well could mean that if Judge Barrett is confirmed, Americans stand to lose the benefits that the ACA provides… More than 130 million Americans with pre-existing conditions could be denied coverage or charged more to obtain health insurance." At the same time, the GOP's position is the independence of the field of justice of the current political issues.

It looks like Biden tacitly admitted that, if he is elected president, he will preside over the end of the filibuster. Consequently, it would allow Democrats to pack SCOTUS and add two new Democrat-majority states.

It's a concept that a power-class can make use of in order to control society. Law gives a class the ability to use violence. — JerseyFlight

Just a few marginal groups or individuals embrace such a radical perspective on Law. The waste majority of people do not take The Supreme Court, the Rule of Law, the nomination and confirmation of Supreme Court Justice, etc. as merely disguising violence and control of society. On the contrary, they consider them as necessary and useful parts of the whole system. If so, you have to explain how the subordinated groups (classes) are induced to mistake their own interests for the mirage of the ‘general’ interest. How are they duped into affectively investing in power mechanisms that oppress them without ever noticing the contradiction?

you seem results oriented, less concerned about the legal analysis than in whether your political ideology is advanced. Is that how nominees are to be judged, as to whether their rulings help those you wish to help, instead of whether they are legally accurate? — Hanover

Please correct me if I am wrong: probably, for the majority of people, judge Barrett’s professional or personal qualities almost do not matter. Maybe, some reject her due to pure ideological reasons: she is a conservative, and the Constitution is a “conservative” document. To defend the Constitution, to judge according to the Constitution would mean to preserve the existing system rather than swiftly and dramatically change it. Yet, likely, the current political conjuncture matters more than ideological reasoning: it is about the upcoming elections calculus. Both sides will try to benefit from the confirmation process. The Dems will try to discredit Barrett, the whole confirmation process, and Trump’s authority as a legitimate POTUS. For Trump and GOP, it could be a chance to represent their platforms better, and attract additional voters: women, Catholics, etc. Therefore, even if ACB is a brilliant and virtuous judge, she will be seen primarily through partisan glasses.

For anyone who seriously wants to look into this topic in depth (law as ideology) there are some superb Marxist resources on it. — JerseyFlight

Could you expand your apprehention of law as ideology?

What are you saying here? That when the POTUS declares he will contest the election if he loses, he intends to discount votes that don't tend to go the desired way, he even incites his own voters to commit voter fraud, everyone else has to pretend that it's going to be business as usual? — Kenosha Kid

I am not saying that it is going to be business as usual. I am saying that all sides play politics of fear and affect: there is almost no place for reasoned positions built around rational interests.

Casting doubt on the election result at all prior to the election constitutes election meddling. And Trump is a fascist, that is clear. — Kenosha Kid

It is common to blame Trump in undermining the trust in the integrity of the upcoming elections, and, consequently, destroying democracy. It is impossible to deny that Trump plays politics of fear and replaces rational political conviction by the appeal to inchoate feelings and emotions. Yet , we must admit that another side shares equal responsibility. Thus, Hillary Clinton called Biden not to concede ‘under any circumstances'. Also, on August 3rd, TIP, primarily pro-Biden institute, published report. It should be considered as the self-fulfilling prophecy information operation: any result of the elections will probably be regarded as illegitimate and lead to civil unrest.

“"Planners need to take seriously the notion that this may well be a street fight, not a legal battle; technocratic solutions, courts, and a reliance on elites observing norms are not the answer here."
"Groups, coalitions, and networks should be preparing now to establish the necessary communications and organizing infrastructure to support mass mobilization."
"If there is a crisis, events will unfold quickly, and sleep-deprived leaders will be asked to make consequential decisions quickly. Thinking through options now will help to ensure better decisions"
The Dems also maintain the narrative of the illegitimacy of the possible elections results.

The Democrats had leverage against Kavanaugh because there was a credible sexual assault charge against him — Maw

Assuming Amy Coney Barrett hasn't murdered someone she will quickly be confirmed by the senate (although they'd probably confirm her regardless). — Maw

Ford had made her case publicly to a friendly press. From a prosecutor's perspective, that was a doubtful way to handle allegations. The allegations were made without first going through extensive investigation to determine the accuser's credibility, whether there was corroborating evidence, and whether there was contrary evidence. Since the media played a crucial role, we cannot exclude a similar pattern.

Let us start of by saying that there is a factual perception, there is a real force which exerts its influence and at least part of this force is being consciously activated by the producers of the ad. From the perspective of the producer, there is a strong motivation to find a correlation between the effects of the ad and the success of the ad however this might best be determined. How are the effects of the ad known? I suspect a few methods, firstly by listening to people who have watched the ad describe the effect it had on them, secondly through understanding likely psychological and emotional reactions to possible components of the ad, thirdly through trial and error and the list goes on.

We can assume that the selection pressure on ads based on performance is very high as it is a very competitive field with huge sums of money behind it. To create a better ad than competitors - both for your job within the company and compared to competitors outside, you can not simply imitate, you need to understand why what works works and enhance it in your own production. Competition means you don't care about what you think about your production, which is just a means to an end, what you care about is having success.

The production team is targeting a clear demographic, they know who buys the advertised products and they aim to have the best possible understanding of why. In the perfume example, they have little time and a few goals, first to capture our attention, then to communicate the purpose of the product, what makes it unique and the general explanation. — Judaka

Likely, your description can be easily transformed into the abstract diagram
of primary ad’s industry determinants, working strategies and tactics, all competitive
factors and presuppositions, processes of production, adaptation, modification, verification,
etc. If the production team’s members won’t follow the set of formalized or intuitively
accepted directions, they will fail. Regardless of distinct personal experiences, a complex interaction of pre-individual, functional subjectivities plays the decisive role, similar to what StreetlightX proposed. I tried to outline a less functional, diagrammatic scheme; the arrangement means an assemblage of heterogeneous factors, composing the working machine. Definitely, the system won’t work without conscious individual engagements.

Each member of the production team of the successful perfume ad may explain their success differently, we could create categories for explanations given by those who wanted to buy the perfume as a result of the ad. A certain percentage said X, a lesser said Z and so on. — Judaka

Different individuals would present various personal accounts and stories. Yet, despite the variety of unique private experiences, the system would not function differently after replacing a few individuals.

Why can't a race be a subjectivity? Why not a gender? A disability? Isn't this just streetlightx's method of legitimising his bigotry? This concept is at best to only be used in very specific circumstances, it is more of a potentially useful creative endeavour than a fair and practical way to describe the world. What subjectivity could we create which would be anything but a construction which could be disputed on every level? — Judaka

One interesting feature of this discussion is that we know almost nothing about each other. I can't consider your age, gender, experience, culture, social life, education, occupation, worldviews, objectives or much of anything really and the same for you with me. To conceptualise this "capitalistic subjectivity" would have ramifications, which we'd care about as thinkers, across a whole range of topics. I would formulate my ideas using my range of nature/nurture/personal factors and you yours. So if I create a "capitalistic subjectivity" which supports or is a natural component of my worldview should we be surprised? If I create a "capitalistic subjectivity" which is impacted by my biases, circumstances, preferences and such, should we be surprised? — Judaka

You make the crucial point here. From my perspective, "capitalistic subjectivities" work beside "age, gender, experience, culture, social life, education, occupation, worldviews, objectives etc.” The fact that we are still able to maintain a dialogue can be used as the evidence of the existence of 'primary subjectifies.' ( Haw are they related to ‘thinker’s subjectivity’?) The process of deconstruction of "capitalistic subjectivities" necessarily involves transforming or eliminating our conventional identities as secondary derivatives and effects of capitalistic arrangements. It is a kind of 'philosophical experimentation.' I tried to make this point in one of my posts in the thread of white privilege: "One of the latest achievements of gender politics (which is also identity politics!) is the appearance of individuals that have not to have a particular gender. In some countries, 'no gender' becomes an institutionalized right. Paradoxically, due to identity politics' latest twist, we are necessarily obliged to have one of the two prescribed races. Does one have a right not to have a race?"

seeing yourself as a consumer, which you can be because you have money, which allows you to partake in hobbies and self-improvement, which are sold to you by the advertisement. Much of our existence is orientated around the acquiring and spending of money, this process is promoted as the path of the responsible, successful adult. The capitalistic arrangements can be really simply described as various "besides truths" around acquiring and spending money. Our culture embodies these "besides truths" seamlessly and we live resigned to them equally seamlessly and effortlessly. Do you think this is an adequate alternative explanation of what you were saying? — Judaka

Thank you for your patience.” Much of our existence is orientated around the acquiring and spending of money, this process is promoted as the path of the responsible, successful adult. The capitalistic arrangements can be really simply described as various "besides truths" around acquiring and spending money”. I do not think it would be correct. Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between two kinds of money: ‘money of the wage earner’, money of payment, and “money of the enterprise and banks”, money of financing. Likely, you refer to the first kind. Yet, not just much of our existence, but all our existence cannot endure today without financial flows and/or their digital equivalents. For example, on this site we discuss ideas and issues that are far away from money and capitalism. Yet, the digital platforms and the Internet networks, maintaining this site, are impossible without the flows of signs and impulses, convertible into the financial flows. (money of the second kind). We can call them the flows of money; but they are entirely different from money that we earn or spend.
“In the one case, there are impotent money signs of exchange value, a flow of means of payment relative to consumer goods and use values, and a one-to-one relation between money and an imposed range of products ("which I have a right to, which are my due, so they're mine"); in the other case, signs of the power of capital, flows of financing, a system of differential quotients of production that bear witness to a prospective force or to a long-term evaluation, not realizable hic et nunc, and functioning as an axiomatic of abstract quantities” (Deleuze and Guattari, ‘Anti-Oedipus’). When we post on this forum, we unintentionally animate the system of machinic flows. We are trained to think that the total digitalization (and implied financialization) of our lives brings just benefits and conveniences. But it also brings a variety of complications (not necessarily negative) that deeply impact us.

These subjectivities are arrangements and rely on psychologising, characterising, narrativising the role being inhabited or just existing which constitutes the subjectivity. Again, there is no way to bypass the individual's involvement in the creation of an arrangement and its structure is going to always be more or less contentious. There is a difference in what you would include/exclude, describe, emphasise and so on than me and these differences make the resulting description of any "subjectivity" contentious. I don't see a way to resolve this problem. — Judaka

I understand your point. You mean that my articulation of subjectivities is a subjective construction
itself without the objective grounding. You are right: dismantling and deconstructing prevailing subjectivities is a subjective act of the creation of a counter-subjectivity. Can it function as a ground for
a shared understanding?

When you refer to the possible subjectivity that is the ad viewer, what is this? An ageless, genderless, experienceless, no nurture, no nature, inhuman abstract thing? Are we to pretend that it makes no difference if the perfume ad is being seen by a man or a woman? If these differences are included then how are they included? And what about how all differences interact with each other? — Judaka

I will try to reformulate and modify again my last attempt to articulate my apprehension of the ad of the perfume. It was still missing a few important features. Despite so many nuances and differences, is it possible to extract and to conceptualize the working arrangement (the truth besides the truth) that stands behind the production of the ad of the perfume? Does this assemblage organize and manage not just this ad's perception, but also the production and perception of countless other advertisements, maintain consumerism principles, and even affect the ways we see things and interact with others? If so, it would make it reasonable to conceptualize 'capitalistic subjectivity' as one of our beings' essential modii.
Both Lacan and Baudrillard, despite their differences, underline a few crucial feathers of the art (science) of advertisement. It constitutes a closed system; it is self-referential. It has its criteria for a successful operation. It is self-sustainable. It includes individual, personal reactions and processes as secondary
and subordinated working parts. "As far as the advertisement is concerned, the actual truth of the quality of the perfume is irrelevant." But why? At the moment of the ad's production, she embodies a particular mode of desire to be – pretty, successful, romantic, etc. that exists and has to be satisfied regardless of the perfume's real quality. She shares this desire with the potential viewers and embodies it as a consumer in her private life. Further, a consumer and the actress from the advertisement necessarily address an imaginary Other. Any act of consumption presupposes an admiration, a gaze from aside, an exchange with the other. Objective information (price, product specifications, and instruction of the user, etc.) is necessary for any advertisement. Still, it always functions in a particular way, as a raw material for the production's engine. The successful ad makes one recognize that there is indeed a scene of
self-fulfilling prophesy: for many, there is a high chance of the self-enjoyment and self-affirmation due to the consumption of the image as the primary product. What makes this advertisement universally 'capitalistic' is a set of several presupposed crucial determinants: a particular mode of the relation with the Other, specific investments of the desire, a significant role in the construction and function of social reality, the imposition of money as the universal mean of integration and evaluation of various heterogeneous registers, and the production of different forms of surplus-values,
driving and animating our society. Factually, the advertisement arrangement is just one of the numerous capitalistic apparatuses of capture, emptying our intimate desires and drives and then converting them into the flows of money and consumptive images.
” Only an erotic drive, a desire for the absent other, is capable of putting the
productive apparatus in motion, but it aims at something that will never be there and that
makes the voyeur's gaze obsessive when he is gripped by his double reflected on the mirror,
moving in the middle of the things offered/ refused in the windowpane-mirror. In the reflected
image, the spectator sees himself dispersed among what cannot be grasped (the painted
images of things). Among desiring subjects, there re-mains only the possibility of loving the language that substitutes itself for their communication. And that is indeed a model of language furnished by the machine, which is made of differentiated and combined parts (like every enunciation) and develops, through the interplay of its mechanisms, the logic of a celibate narcissism.” (Michel de Certeau, 'The Practice of Everyday Life').

If you feel it is helpful to bring up this idea of "subjectivity" then there will need to be a discussion about it. I am happy for you to rewrite what you wanted to say without it but while I am open to having my mind changed, I do not like this term and if I am to use it then many questions and problems need to be addressed. I wanted to respond to your comment without addressing the term but I don't think I can. — Judaka

Probably, you feel that I try to impose concepts and themes that are far from what you would like
to discuss. I would completely understand it if you do not respond or ignore what I write. Anyway,
I assume that capitalistic subjectivities could be defined as impersonal diagrams and arrangements, unconsciously interiorized and appropriated by concrete individuals. They compose the truth besides the truth of our lives and the social fabric of our society. Likely, the capitalistic apparatuses of capture and extraction of surplus values can successfully function just due to this symbiotic coexistence. Therefore, I do not think that the discussion of subjectivities leads away from the central theme of your OP.

We can analyse what effects the capitalistic arrangements produce but how can we judge those effects? From the perspective of the capitalistic arrangements, the actor is rational and purchases according to their desires or needs and is satisfied with their purchase until it comes time to make the next one. — Judaka

Likely, the capitalistic arrangements primarily produce particular subjectivities. A subjectivity could be defined as a cluster of behavioural patterns, emotions, feelings, cognitive operations, rationalizations, abilities, and utilized discourses. Differently from social or professional roles, they are based
on primarily unrecognizable modes of production and reproduction. We could say that the consumer of the ad is also a kind of subjectivity. One is acted upon by various factors. I can like or dislike the advertisement for the perfume. But I don't ask your question: "What is being sold here?" I find "The experience of the ad, with the serene music, the camera flipping from angle to angle, the woman at the end while smiling at you saying, "because you're worth it", natural and appropriate. I unmistakably and immediately recognize the produced scene; it has become my way of seeing things. But why? What is the practice of learning? And, as you said: "What is all of this careful construction aimed at maximizing, and why is it effective?" Similarly, I can find that I often behave in a pre-programmed, automatized way in various domains and situations of my life.
This topic was discussed by @StreetlightX https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/220119
“'subjectivities' have nothing to do with 'consciousness' and have everything to do with one's range of capacities in a particular situation. A 'subject' here is one that can act or be acted upon in a range of ways, depending on the context at hand; so, for example, one can speak of a subject of street-walking: the subject of street walking is involved in traversing a certain terrain, in making a way to a destination, of admiring sights, of avoiding traffic, of waiting at traffic lights, and so on… the 'subject' doesn't even have to be embodied: one can speak of the subjectivity of the internet browser: this subjectivity is largely disembodied, interacting with his or her computer though a mouse or keyboard, mostly passively absorbing words or pictures on the screen, while only sometimes actively involving themselves in the world they are exploring by, say, posting on an internet forum, or 'liking' a Youtube video. The subject of the internet browser is very different from the subject of the street walker. The subjectivities involved draw on different ranges of capacities, interests, attentions, limits, and approaches to creative action. One important thing that this should make clear is that a subject is not simply a correlate of an 'individual': an individual may traverse different subjectivities, first as a walker on the street, then as a browser of the internet - and so on. of the various reasons why studying different subjectivities is important, chief among them are the political and ethical implications of these differing subjectivities: every kind of subject is bound, in some way or another, by the possibilities afforded by the environment of which that subject is (this is what it means to be a subject: to be subject-to-...): subjectivities, in other words, are contextual, and more than that, are produced by those very contexts in which they inhere”.
I would disagree with the last statement that subjectivities are primarily contextual. First of all, they are products of a particular social, economic, and political order. Not just crossing the street, browsing the internet, or being the viewer of the perfume, but almost all my life activities are organized and managed by ‘subjectivities’. They make it much easier to adapt, to succeed, and to fit in. Yet, where is the limit of my adaptability? If I do not recognize that almost my entire life, my ego, my rationality, and my irrationality are covered up, absorbed by the patterns, imposed beside my will, I may be entirely happy. But what if I disagree with this imperative programming?

I don't know what a satisfying direction or conclusion for our discussion might be. There is no escape, we have to choose something, some system by which we live, from within the capitalistic arrangement, I am not pointing out any particular problem, only that we should aim to know why we're doing what we're doing and be correct in our reasons for doing what we're doing. — Judaka

This discussion could help us to better understand who we are and what we can do. Subjectivities,
produced by capitalistic arrangements, do not compose a compelling totalizing repressive network. They have gaps, overlaps, controversies, disbalances, and instabilities. They can reinforce or weaken each other. Likely, it is possible to explore the existence of not ready-made, pre-given subjectivities.

I think we should aim to be rational but if we aren't aware of what undermines our attempts to be then we have no chance. If one were resistant to having their rationality undermined by advertisements in the aforementioned way then it would be due to their awareness. The only way we can become aware is to accept some responsibility for their effectiveness, to acknowledge how we diverge from our ideal selves. — Judaka

We aim to be rational but should we ever expect to be entirely rational? The aim here for me is to reimagine the ideal in light of the best possible understanding of what we can and can't be reasonably expected to do. I see myself as the watchdog for my own rationality, ever sceptical and distrustful, expecting but forgiving myself for being realistically irrational. — Judaka

The problem here can probably not be solved with the help of the distinction between ideal, rational
selves, and the illogical or irrational motivations. The advertisement for the perfume is perfectly
rational: there is the rationality of marketing, advertising production, and a customer’s patterns and satisfaction. All involved individuals make rational and weighted choices and pursue their self-interest. Yet, the rationality of self-interest is necessarily and fully converted into immediate satisfaction. Not just the product of this particular ad, but our entire lives should bring us life – satisfaction. Whatever we purchase, do, act, or work – should bring us an increasingly impressive achievement. What is the definition of “success”? Are we able to define it logically or rationally?
If one buys the perfume, she can enjoy its qualities and the effects of the image it brings just for a short while. There is the imperative to renew the process, to reanimate the equation of self-interest = life-satisfaction. Rationality of any choice swiftly becomes outdated and irrelevant. Further, the perfume advertisement is just a small working part of the neoliberal capitalistic arrangement. It includes individual rational calculus of choice, affective personal and impersonal registers, and the apparatuses of financial and economic determinants. The surplus-value is extracted by the operations of the capture of manifestations and activities of everyday life. How can we differentiate rational from irrational here? And, what can be the outer position, allowing to stand by and to change the perspective?

The experience of the ad, with the serene music, the camera flipping from angle to angle, the woman at the end while smiling at you saying "because you're worth it". What is all of this careful construction aimed at maximising and why is it effective? Does anyone ever get to have the final say? I see this as being very problematic for ever coming to a satisfying conclusion. — Judaka

We could resolve the ad's paradox if we will rigorously apply your suggestion:

What I would argue is that both the "besides truths" are included in arrangements and are themselves arrangements. — Judaka

We should reject the false opposition between mere facts and social, constructed facts. So, to resolve the paradox of the apparently 'fake' ad's effectiveness, independent of "the actual truth of the quality of the perfume", we should change our criteria for verification. Baudrillard wrote:
“The problem of the 'veracity' of advertising should be posed as follows: if advertising men really 'lied', they
would be easy to unmask. But they do not. And if they do not, this is not because they are too intelligent, but because 'the advertiser ' s art . . . consists largely of the art of making persuasive statements which are neither true nor false. For the good reason that there is no longer either any original or any real referential dimension and, like all myths and magic formulas, advertising is based on a different kind of verification, that of the self-fulfilling prophecy. The successful advertiser is the master of a new art: the art of making things true by saying they are so. He is a devotee of the technique of the self-fulfilling prophecy. Advertising is prophetic language, in so far as it promotes not learning or understanding, but hope.” (Jean Baudrillard, 'The consumer society' )
The arrangement of the ad's truth does not include the external reference to "the actual truth of the quality of the perfume" that may or may not result from the independent consumer's taste and decision. On the contrary, what makes the ad effective is producing the virtual image of jouissance, hope, beauty, success, and possession. A viewer gets automatically involved in the processes of identification and recognition. 'The self-fulfilling prophecy' of the ad is the embodiment of the particular mode of being. Even before the ad is showed, a collective viewer's identity is virtually present and utilized at the ad production's time. The actress lives through the viewer's anticipations and aspirations; she does not represent the enjoyment. Further, when the viewer identifies herself with the actress, it is only the actualization of the virtual image's fundamental doubling. This mirroring creates the effect of the self-affirmation, of the self-fulfilling prophecy. Don't we observe a similar avatar during the Oscars Red Carpet Shows? So, the ad's effect is not the changing one's mind and convincing to buy the perfume regardless of its real qualities. One may not like this particular perfume, but one resonates with the impetus to permanently resume the search for the pleasure of the successful identification's consummation. The ad indicates the subtle organization and modification of collective impersonal investments of desire. On the contrary to Lacan's conception of desire as lacking the fundamental unity with the Other, capitalistic desire constitutes the truth besides the truth of our drives, motivations and aspirations.

The culture of consumption both affects how we see things while also being itself affected, it's social role is deeply interactive. How do I even begin to explain the way in which we extract and assert meaning? The model is actualising our desires, the potency wouldn't be there without that, however, the desires being actualised are not restricted to the product but include her, herself. Advertisements are often about a happy family, a successful marriage, happiness from the act of purchasing, beautiful houses, beautiful people, happy people, what's really being sold here? — Judaka

What is being sold is the inclusion and participation in the unrecognizable capitalistic desire arrangements and the capitalistic financial axiomatics. The fulfillment of one’s dreams and desires are possible just by making money, the anticipation of money, incurring debts, and becoming a working part of financial apparatuses. In our society, the desire to be is unseparated from the desire to be involved in money flows. The meaning is just one of the effects of the complex interplay of the flows of desire and money, signs and images.

Consider also the latest trend of "woke" ads, selling the idea of social justice even though it has nothing to do with the product. — Judaka

No idea can exist somewhere outside of the various mainstream media platforms and social media networks. Their narrations support ideas, articulate our existence, and convert fictions
into the real present.

The question shouldn't be to ask "is this arrangement true?" but to ask "is the arrangement useful" or effective? By acknowledging that what causes the pattern to exist likely also exert its influence on us, we can prepare for that and more easily spot it. What we shouldn't do is throw out the pertinence of the pattern on us by shifting blame, it is wishful thinking. We can challenge whether it's illogical or irrational to have these narrative structures to begin with, they may be instrumentally rational in the effects they produce. Alternatively, they may simply be the culmination of other factors which often meet and produce these effects. Either way, it becomes an ego trip to exclude oneself from processes simply because the results they produce are in some way unpalatable.

I think we should aim to be rational but if we aren't aware of what undermines our attempts to be then we have no chance. If one were resistant to having their rationality undermined by advertisements in the aforementioned way then it would be due to their awareness. The only way we can become aware is to accept some responsibility for their effectiveness, to acknowledge how we diverge from our ideal selves. — Judaka

You are right, but this task is almost unachievable. Our selves are propped and maintained by our various desires
that have become working parts of the capitalistic infrastructure. On the level of the infrastructure, one could face the inhumane outside/inside of the machinic processes. Our rationality is not undermined by advertisements and the media operations, we have to deal with the real they produce. How can we accept responsibility for this monster machinery? Hamlet's dilemma : "To be or not to be."
It is more or less clear what does it mean 'to be' today. But what about 'not to be'?
.

The experience of the ad, with the serene music, the camera flipping from angle to angle, the woman at the end while smiling at you saying "because you're worth it". What is all of this careful construction aimed at maximising and why is it effective? Does anyone ever get to have the final say? I see this as being very problematic for ever coming to a satisfying conclusion. — Judaka

Thank you for posing this problem. There is a paradoxical situation: we know that
all of this is made up, and we approximately understand how it is produced, and anyway, it works perfectly. Further, you are right that "As far as the advertisement is concerned, the actual truth of the quality of the perfume is irrelevant." I think that the final effect of factual perception of the ad is primarily not the outcome of logical operations, but it is a combination of conscious and unconscious determinants. It will likely take me some time to modify and reformulate what I previously offered by applying Lacan's capitalistic discourse model.

The experience of the ad, with the serene music, the camera flipping from angle to angle, the woman at the end while smiling at you saying "because you're worth it". What is all of this careful construction aimed at maximising and why is it effective? Does anyone ever get to have the final say? I see this as being very problematic for ever coming to a satisfying conclusion. — Judaka

You are right. We still do not fully understand it. I will try to analyze it again.

I am still grappling with Lacan but my preliminary understanding of Lacan's model is that it is very intuitive. He is taking things a step further and exploring how the individual, other, truth and interpretation/product are exporting their influence on each other in discourse. This is a very intuitive next step and Lacan describes these particular differences that he has identified and in psychoanalytical terms and I appreciate the aim here. — Judaka

Lacan is extraordinarily influential and interesting, but he is not a guru, and we can reject his models if they don't help us. His ambition is to construct a universal theory, explaining
a child's development, a hysteric person's patterns, and a variety of conventional
contemporary situations. There is an imaginary other that I imagine while I interact with somebody.
And, there is the Other of the symbolic order, culture, or religion. Also, there is the Real of my desires. I can realize some of them after reflecting, but most of them are unconscious and even impersonal. Finally, as a subject, I am ultimately split; my imaginary psychological subjectivity
is separated from the discursive and cultural totality. My strongest and unrealizable desire is to overcome the gap.

I don't fully understand what Lacan means by "truth" nor how he characterises the arrow from truth to agent. I believe the agent actively and biasedly arranges truth to understand it. Often purposefully or subconsciously asserting different priorities or characterisations based on changes to the narrative. — Judaka

There are four positions in each of the four first diagrams. The bottom left is for truth. The Upper left is for
the acting agent. The upper right is for the other, the addressee of the interaction. The bottom right is for
the product. Let’s take the first scheme: the discourse of the Master (or of the Teacher).
S1 is the Other of discourse. It is a Master-Signifier. ( God is talking to Moses). A teacher
is talking to a child. It is a discursive phenomenon, but behind it is a non-visible subject, which constitutes the truth of this discursive act. When S1 appears, it addresses and facilitates knowledge (or culture, or symbolic order) S2. Moses gets ten commandments. A pupil gets knowledge. But the final product is the desire: to love and satisfy the master, to be similar to the master, to become the master of oneself, etc. The hidden truth of this scheme is the manifestation of the subject. Generally, the top-left position is the place of agency or dominance; the factor occupies it in most active and evident discourse. The bottom left standing is the place of (hidden) truth, the factor that underlies, supports, and gives rise to the dominant factor, or constitutes the condition of its possibility, but is repressed by it. On the right, the side of the receiver, the top position is designated as that of the other, which is occupied by the factor called into action by the dominant factor in the message. The activation of this factor is a prerequisite for receiving and understanding a given message or discourse. What is produced as a result of their allowing themselves to be thus interpellated by the dominant factor of a discourse is represented by the position of production, the bottom right.
All in all, Lacanian schemes are compact, intelligible, and contain various psychological, social, and discursive determinants. Yet, they are too universal; they cannot fully encompass and reflect our complicated situations.

If we noticed patterns and commonalities in our narrative structures and created an understanding of how common arrangements of truth produce common responses, this too would become an arrangement. The question shouldn't be to ask "is this arrangement true?" but to ask "is the arrangement useful" or effective? By acknowledging that what causes the pattern to exist likely also exert its influence on us, we can prepare for that and more easily spot it. What we shouldn't do is throw out the pertinence of the pattern on us by shifting blame, it is wishful thinking. We can challenge whether it's illogical or irrational to have these narrative structures to begin with, they may be instrumentally rational in the effects they produce. Alternatively, they may simply be the culmination of other factors which often meet and produce these effects. Either way, it becomes an ego trip to exclude oneself from processes simply because the results they produce are in some way unpalatable.

I think we should aim to be rational but if we aren't aware of what undermines our attempts to be then we have no chance. If one were resistant to having their rationality undermined by advertisements in the aforementioned way then it would be due to their awareness. The only way we can become aware is to accept some responsibility for their effectiveness, to acknowledge how we diverge from our ideal selves. — Judaka

You are right. This is the real problem. We are trained to be rational, but unfortunately,
our world is crazy. :smile:

You can try Michel de Certeau “The practice of everyday life”.
There is a comparative critique of both Foucault and Bordieu. A little bit outdated, it gives a different
perspective.

I think that Lacan's conceptualizations represent different arrangements of truth. (Connections to your previous OP are possible and workable). Lacan challenges the conventional apprehensions of truth. The first four schemes are indeed about "the truth besides the truth." Here, the Lacanian truth is the working machine's primordial part, producing a particular effect (what is positioned in the right bottom corner). Yet, the lust, 'capitalistic discourse’ scheme, goes even further. There is no primary referential position, and the effect of the truth has been produced and consumed at any chosen referential point.

An example:

An advertisement shows a pretty woman holding using a perfume, she smiles at you while offscreen a man with a deep, masculine voice describes the qualities of the perfume.

"The Truth" most would advocate should be sought is the actual quality of the perfume but the "truth besides the truth" is that the perfume will be sold by the image of the beautiful, possibly famous woman and the authoritative, dependable voice which explained how good it is.

The science behind the advertisement which explains the best way for the perfume to be advertised has already addressed what is really important. As far as the advertisement is concerned the actual truth of the quality of the perfume is irrelevant. Even "The Truth" of what the advertisement is trying to do - which is not a secret. — Judaka

Your analysis points out to Lacan's discourse of the analyst. (I do not insist that I am right; it is just a preliminary attempt to apprehend this situation). Accordingly, the existing symbolic order (or, more specifically, the theory and marketing)S_2 in-forms the desire to sell. Further, the arrow in the diagram points to the acting agent (subject) of the operation. For your example, the subject is the consumer, whose decision results in the master signifier's production: the successful result of the whole process is the creation of the master-signifier, the sovereign discursive capitalistic Other S_(1.)Then, the desire to sell and buy will be again reinforced (the arrow from〖 S〗_1 to a). Yet, if we take another model, Lacan's capitalistic discourse, we will need to change our perspective.
Previously, all the stages were pre-given and pre-programmed by S_2. Now, it is not known for sure.
[/img]A pretty woman represents a consumer, expresses an act of consuming. She is in-formed
by desire to sell, but more than that, she embodies the desire to consume, to-be-enjoying, to actualize the virtual image of jouissance. This subject animates (and is animated by) the master – signifier S_1 (the man's voice in your example). The next arrow points to S_2: the theory of marketing, the culture of consumption, the whole totality of our discourse, elicit, underpin, and maintain the climate of opinion. S_(2 )generates various personal affirmations of type I like, or I dislike, and further produces its effect the desire to-be-the -subject of the sovereign economic will, represented in discourse as S_1.
This assemblage exists just as the incessantly working machine; each working part enacts others, and at the same time, is enacted by them. A woman synchronically effectuates all the operative elements. Therefore, they cannot exist without and beside this performative act. We cannot assert that she merely represents a written script and realizes the ad's model created beside the ad's scene. In this context, 'the truth besides the truth' is a machinic assemblage, generating various effects, including what we may percept as true or false. Due to the omnipresent operations of capitalistic arrangements, we have probably lost the ability to distinguish between authentic and counterfeit experiences. So, it may confirm this chain in your line of argumentation:
"As far as the advertisement is concerned, the actual truth of the quality of the perfume is irrelevant." But why? A pretty woman's experience at the moment of the ad's production may be the quite similar to what happens when she tries a perfume in her private life. Most likely, many of her private modes of life have also been pre-formed, in-formed, and in-acted. She does not convince the viewers; she has become one of them.
It could be argued not just about advertisements, heavily mediated and framed. In the vast majority of the contemporary public discursive performances, it is often impossible to distinguish right from false, honest from dishonest, authentic from counterfeit.
You are right: “This science of interactions is what we should seek to know, to know ourselves.”
Yet, I do not understand why you claim: “To reiterate, the truth besides the truth is how we perceive and react to things. When we dismiss the science behind the patterns as the result of a lack of intelligence or education, we dismiss our own humanity and enter into delusion.” Does it mean that ‘the science’ leads towards our humanity? Following Nietzsche, “human, too human” has been justly disqualified by so many thinkers. Likely, it leads us towards the inhuman. The most authentic experience, still resisting the totalities of simulating productivity, is the experience of death.

More important than what is true, is the science of interaction between the human perspective and the human reaction. The perspective which can be described as involving some truth, falsehoods, interpretation, feeling, experience and so on. The reaction of having being exposed to one or more of the aforementioned "perspective", usual responses or effects. — Judaka

For Lacan, truth plays a crucial role in each of his four paradigmatic discursive conceptualizations. Any apparent discursive act presupposes differently functioning models of truth.

The left-hand positions are occupied by the factors active in the subject speaking or sending a message. The right-hand positions are occupied by the factors that the subject receiving the message is summoned to assume. The top position on each side represents the overt or manifest factor; the bottom positions the covert, latent, implicit, or repressed factor that acts or occurs beneath the surface. More specifically, the top-left position is the place of agency or dominance; the factor occupies it in most active and evident discourse. The bottom left standing is the place of (hidden) truth, the factor that underlies, supports, and gives rise to the dominant factor, or constitutes the condition of its possibility, but is repressed by it. In each of the four diagrams, the position and function of the hidden and repressed truth can be taken by the discursive, subjective, or gratifying determinants.

An example:

An advertisement shows a pretty woman holding using a perfume, she smiles at you while offscreen a man with a deep, masculine voice describes the qualities of the perfume.

"The Truth" most would advocate should be sought is the actual quality of the perfume but the "truth besides the truth" is that the perfume will be sold by the image of the beautiful, possibly famous woman and the authoritative, dependable voice which explained how good it is.

The science behind the advertisement which explains the best way for the perfume to be advertised has already addressed what is really important. As far as the advertisement is concerned the actual truth of the quality of the perfume is irrelevant. Even "The Truth" of what the advertisement is trying to do - which is not a secret.

"The Truth" becomes an ideal, the dream of what should and shouldn't influence people. A dream of a world where people are guided only by logic and reason. An ideal it shall remain, for the truth besides the truth describes the very thing they want to disregard. — Judaka

Likely, for this example, we could apply Lacan’s capitalistic discourse scheme. The position of truth has lost its privileged status of the indiscernible determinant. The truth can be attributed to any position; it is incorporated into the closed circle of motions and displacements.

So one can be white, be conscious of systemic racism, and be in opposition to it? If that is true, whither "white privilege?" If I denounce any claim to it and actively work against it, how is it properly applied to me?

Your point about reducing complex problems to simple formulations may be especially apt in this case. — Pro Hominem

What does it mean that one is white? This identity has been changing
so rapidly over the last time. @Judaka has presented this image of an imaginary white:

What about being white makes the moral responsibility to challenge systemic racism greater than having a different skin colour? Why is the onus on being white here at all? If you're going to say that it's because of power, wealth, political influence, social influence and so on, why not actually put an onus on the actual possession of the things which lead to your actions having greater consequences and therefore there being a greater imperative for you to do something?

Secondly, being the beneficiary here doesn't usually actually give you the ability to do something about it precisely because most of the time, you aren't actually even a beneficiary but rather just someone who is not targeted for disadvantages. Most of the time you aren't going to even be aware of it, even if you're aware of the reality. How can you tell if you got a job easier due to your skin colour? Specifically, you, as opposed to just "people generally of your race"? When is it ever the right time to stand up and say "no, you are just giving me a free pass here because I'm white" or "you wouldn't be so generous if I wasn't white"? Overt racism already gets obliterated, you can lose everything if you're caught. — Judaka

Likely, this identification's disbalance is expected now: one starts from self-identification, "I am white," then admits being against systemic racism, but does not like its consequence of "white privilege." It could create a moral or emotional dissonance. We should resist the current escalation of identity politics.Jordan Peterson offered one of the possible strategies: "Your identity is not clothing you wear, or the fashionable sexual preference or behaviour you adopt and flaunt, or the causes driving your activism, or your moral outrage at ideas that differ from yours. The continually expanded plethora of "identities" recently constructed and provided with legal status thus consist of empty terms." His thesis is that "traditional" identities have been created through continuous and long-term social construction; therefore, they have served as indispensable modes of social interactions and individual self-awareness.
Peterson aims to resist gender politics' intensification as the threat of the conventional social and individual order. It is one of the conservative lines of arguments. Another one is based on the juridical model, so that identities are derivatives of the Law, and "white privilege" is no more than exercizing a set of fundamental rights. Both strategies do not work against the latest revival of racial identity politics. The latest version of systemic racism incorporates the most archaic racial segregation as the essential premise and the final result of the complex social, economic, and cultural processes. Yet, our society is no more racial than it is a patriarchal society, class society or the spectacle's society. Our identities, and in particular racial identities, gender identities ("traditional" or not) are primarily not the derivatives of essential entities or the results of the long-term social construction and negotiation (social contract). They are moments of an open-ended, accelerating dynamics of the processes of individuation. In this context, one's whiteness, awareness of systemic racism, and the sense of discomfort due to "white privilege" could be considered synchronically enacted components of the newest transindividual "racial" arrangement. Sense of guilt, resentment and ressentiment are the secondary effects of the determinant affective register, generated by the various media. Please note that in most cases white people started experiencing the dissonance only after George Floyd death. We cannot ultimately eliminate our identities, but a proper apprehension of their production and function could help with our dissonance's situations.


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