Are we trying to sort out whether knowledge exists without language; by determining whether a belief can exist without language? So, we started talking about dogs? Last time I ran into this quandary it pages on children burning themselves. How about a kill shot;

Do you have any beliefs you've never bothered to formulate? I think I do. What am I drawing from by stating my belief's if not from a source of unspoken things. The belief doesn't come into my mind after I've said it.

Or I could join the party arguing that unconscious realization of object permanence is direct evidence of knowledge without language.

I actually I do agree, but would add that we may not ever know if it is actually ontic, because of this liability.
— Cheshire

The proposition that there is nothing ontic directly entails the following: — javra

Well, there's certainly a difference between "nothing ontic" and lacking the knowledge that a thing is ontic. So, the explanation that follows doesn't really fit the claim I'm making here.

Here's a crucial point in which we disagree: that our awareness of what is ontic is liable to error does not then entail that there is nothing ontic. — javra

I actually I do agree, but would add that we may not ever know if it is actually ontic, because of this liability. Simply put, objective truth may be possible, but knowing when it occurs might not be.

Just my quick answer. I intend to give your entire response the attention it deserves.

And stop it with the “sir”, mon senior. We’re all brats here, me thinks. :smile: [or maybe this was just you being a brat just like the rest us :razz: ] — javra

Yes, I was having a bit of fun.

Don’t know if you’ve been keeping track of the conversations on the thread; I added the “grounded” part due to them. For simplicity of argument, however, I’ve no issue with sticking to the concept of “justification” as traditionally understood. — javra

Can rational justification be infallible, i.e. perfectly secure form all possible error? I don’t believe it can. This does lead into a major quandary in philosophy, but, if its untrue, can anyone here supply evidence of an infallible justification (e.g., such that all premises and means of justifying are themselves evidenced to be perfectly secure from all possible error)? — javra

Rational justification doesn't imply infallibility, so falling short of infallibility does not leave a thing unjustified.

Otherwise, it seems to me that all justification will be deemed sufficient for its intended purposes when it satisfies those for which the justification is provided (be it one’s own self or others to which its expressed). — javra

And here lies the issue I have and repeat. All justification can not be said to be sufficient based on the criteria of any given audience. Can it appear as such? certainly, but this is no fault of the concept of justification. An argument can't said to be justified because of who is judging it.

So the issue of how and when knowledge is deemed to be, such as in relation to the examples previously provided, still remains. — javra

The issue remains if we continue to subscribe to JTB in a dogmatic framework. I don't find justification to be the best measuring stick for the quality of knowledge. So, I'm a bit indifferent to how well somethings been justified. I would rather know that it had been criticized and remained unfalsified.

You’d have to explain this better for me to understand. Are you alluding to the law of noncontradiction? — javra

No, I probably could try to; but I was alluding to the third law of thought. "What is, is." The fact you posses an unknown error in your knowledge is simply a matter of being human subject to error. So, there is no need to state it from a position of authority any more than stating other obvious undoubted things.

As stated, I can find this disposition warranted. Nevertheless, what I was attempting to emphasize is that there’s no need to become paranoid about being wrong about any particular upheld known—not until there’s some evidenced reason to start believing it is, or at least might be, wrong. But yes, remaining at least somewhat open to the possibility is part and parcel of the epistemological stance I maintain: fallibilism (or, a specific form of global skepticism that, unlike Cartesian skepticism, is not doubt-contingent). — javra

Well, stating that the error is unknown to the individual implies to me at least that we aren't discussing a single upheld known, but rather the set of upheld known. So, I suppose I agree. I'm thinking we may be doing the same dance to different songs.

You seem to find that where our justification is subject to error our true beliefs fall short of knowledge.

I'm really just skipping the middle man and suggesting our definition of knowledge falls short of reality. Because either our apprehension of what is true or our justification for what is true will be subject to error so long as we are human. I think we nearly agree.
.

As I’ve indicated in my previous posts on this thread, all our held beliefs of what is true are—I argue—susceptible to error, hence to being wrong. Though this in no way entails that they are. Until they’re falsified in so being, there’s no reason to believe that they are wrong. — javra

I think there's reason to be certain at least some of them are wrong and by trying to falsify our beliefs we eliminate our errors and our knowledge improves or specifically becomes a better approximation to ideal knowledge. Without this assumption of unknown error we are left guarding beliefs when we should be testing them. It's a subtle, but significant difference in positions.

In which case, why should I believe you in lieu of proper justifications for this? Due to an authoritarian commandment? — javra

Why should you believe that in all the things you know at least one is a mistake? I would maintain you accept it based on the law of identity.

The way I’ve asked the question, “if it’s a believed truth that is justified (or warranted) to the satisfaction of its bearers”, then intends to get at more significant examples of knowledge. — javra

Don't you have to torture the meaning of "justified" in order to maintain this position?" By saying to the satisfaction of its bearers" it seems to erase justification's implied rational characteristics.

My reason for presenting it in the way that I did was, largely, to illustrate the difference between justified / well-grounded beliefs (in the latter example) and those that are not (in the first example). — javra

And the result of this trespass is a new variable. The 'Grounding'; which feels nice intuitively, but have we solved a problem here or created one? What does a belief alone mean to us now? The answers given randomly to binary questions, but held without discern-able reason?

No sir, you put justification back where you found it and play with your own toys.

No, not a straw man: Why do you appraise it as nonsense—this if it is a believed truth that is justified to the satisfaction of its bearers? — javra

Ok, so I reread the matter and probably will have to again, because the examples used to make your point are a bit awkward. I have a cat and I enjoy it's fluffy indifference to my affections, but on no occasion do I defer to it on matters of scientific inquiry. If I asked anyone a question and their answer included a reference to what their cat was currently doing I would call into question any answer they gave going forward. Because, whether their conclusions are correct becomes a matter of happenstance.

I believe it's an attempt to reduce my rather generalized concept of knowledge to be so weak as to include the answers given by mad men concerning the weather, which seems strawman-y at the least. It's not what you intended based on your response, but I struggle with producing a better interpretation. No fault implied.

Still, I’m not big on when I give replies without having my honest questions answered in turn. A personal quirk wherein I typically find other things I’d rather be doing. Again, why do you find some believed truths justified to the satisfaction of its bearers to be nonsense rather than knowledge? — javra

That's fair, I wanted to give your replies more consideration, so I just replied to the aspects I had already thought through. I'll return in kind.

Hence, following your specifics, we fallibly know 11 things, all of which are subject to error. — javra

Not according to this novelty, If you ever prove that things are not subject to error you have to prove that something is subject error. Specifically, the statement in question. So, if you could hypothetically disprove it you in turn prove it. So, 11 things, 10 subject to error.

>>> At this point I should ask: If someone were to tell you it’ll be sunny today for the reasons just mentioned, and whether or not it’ll be sunny today holds some degree of risk/importance for what you do today, would you then yet hold their belief to be knowledge? And, therefore, act in accordance to this known? — javra

It's a bit of straw-man isn't it? If an individual told me something absurd I wouldn't confuse it with the subject of knowledge.

So, I’m arguing, we can only appraise what is and is not operational knowledge by appraising whether or not it conforms to ideal knowledge. If it’s falsified in potentially so being, then we deem it to not be knowledge. — javra

We have an ideal concept of circles, but we don't call the one's we draw operational circles. Because we never draw ideal circles, so the operator is redundant.

It’s an interesting thought experiment, but I think it obfuscates the primary issue. Here, we’re trying to apply (meta-)operational knowledge to what is and is not particular instances of operational knowledge given the circumstances.How do we know if we only know nine or none of the ten formerly thought to be know givens? The question of what knowledge is to begin with still remains. — javra

It would obfuscate if in fact the demon was necessary. In actuality, suppose all the things you know. I'm asserting 1 of them is wrong and you don't know which one.

It was a false choice. In this experiment we know 11 things and 10 of them are subject to error.

Yet the knowledge in this latter statement is not the conceptual standard of ontic knowledge—which is ontically true belief that can thereby be justified upon request—but is, instead, the only form of knowledge that can be had in practice: subjective knowledge. — javra

If the only knowledge that can be had in practice is 'subjective knowledge' then what is the point of calling it subjective, beyond differentiating it from a bad definition. Ought the knowledge we have be called knowledge and anything else be better qualified. I understand that we can posses ontic knowledge but not necessarily know when we do.

Here's my attempt at a thought experiment, I don't know that's going to be coherent but I might post it anyway in hopes of highlighting the error in my thinking that makes me subscribe to a non-JTB framework. I might need to borrow a philosophy demon to help me out in this one. Which is oddly fair game.

At a particular moment in time let's suppose you know 10 things. And then, my philosophy demon informs you that one of the things you know is wrong, but not which of the things you know is wrong. So, you turn and tell me you in fact know 9 things. I argue that, no you know 10 things because you can't tell me which 9 are actually correct or you know zero things because 1 of the ten is wrong and it could be any of the 10.

My definition....

There is more to this, but this is a start. — Sam26

I get it, I just don't thinks its correct. It's the "later on..." part that bothers me because there's always a "later on..we find out..." about one thing or another. I was working on a thought experiment sans farm structures that might better make my point, but it eludes me presently. I'll be back.

This idea that Gettier somehow showed that JTB is flawed is just not the case. It's as if Gettier performed a slight of hand, and people think it's an actual picture of reality. It's true that some philosophers think this, but I would consider that all Gettier pointed out is the difference between a claim to knowledge, as opposed to actual knowledge. So if I make a claim, and that claim appears to be JTB, but in the end turns out to be false, then it's simply not knowledge. There is nothing difficult here. No amount of thinking something is JTB, amounts to something actually being JTB. — Sam26

If I recall it wasn't simply a matter of knowledge being subject to time, but rather a case where JTB criteria was met but the matter still found to not be knowledge. I think the slight of hand is ignoring that our understanding of things is the result of what we know and what we know in error. The 'truth' element to JTB makes J&B largely irrelevant. And it creates a concept of knowledge that is untenable when it's placed in the context of humans subject to error. To me it seems self evident and if you prove it wrong then you prove it right. It's not my theory of knowledge anyway. Karl Popper laid it out as the basis for critical rationalism which is really an excellent approach to revisiting quite a bit of tired dogma.

I am ambivalent about it. The advice that I gave you about seeing how it works in a philosophical context is the advice I would take myself. I haven't read enough, haven't burrowed deep enough into surrounding issues (partly because I didn't find them interesting) to make a competent judgement. — SophistiCat

Well, shouldn't JTB be able to meet it's own criteria? If you can't believe it, then it isn't knowledge right?

Well, how familiar are you with contemporary epistemology? Even from a very superficial look, it is hard to see where you got this idea - see for instance SEP article The Analysis of Knowledge. — SophistiCat

Well, that is excellent news. Tell me, do you believe JTB is the best description for knowledge in a non-general sense? I know you can justify it, but I'm curious as to whether you believe it.

Like I said, if the goal was to just give an accurate account of how the word "knowledge" is used in the language, you probably can't do better than a good dictionary, together with an acknowledgement that such informal usage is imprecise and will almost inevitably run into difficulties with edge cases like Gettier's. — SophistiCat

I'm not so much interested as how its used 'in language', but rather how it's used in reality. I know exactly zero people that actually consider an idea based on a JTB scheme or accept an idea because it fulfills one. And before you object, I mean to say especially philosophers, when I say people. My primary reason for making JTB a target is just because it's so well guarded from criticism and taught as if were a law of thought; when as Gettier showed in nearly satirical fashion the emperor has no cloths.

I suppose the way to proceed is abandoning the notion there's a set of criteria which knowledge contains and disqualifies all else or change JTB, or change the philosophical definition of knowledge. It's a bit Gettierish, but saying all knowledge is JTB or Not would technically silence my objections.

Set out the difference between belief and knowledge. — creativesoul

Gladly, if you'll set out the difference between a belief of knowledge and knowledge.

Yup. — creativesoul

Oh, I would say it was knowledge and had since been falsified. It doesn't make sense to have falsified knowledge. Knowledge intends to be true. I thought you would claim it never was knowledge, but just totally treated the exactly the same as if it were knowledge. But, remember its not actually knowledge, only completely indistinguishable from knowledge(At the time).

According to you, they are still knowledge. — creativesoul

Did you mean to say this the way you said it?

The suggestion is nonsense, and leads to self-contradiction. — creativesoul

Compelling.

I do not agree with Sam regarding what counts as justified belief. It does not require being argued for(the act of justification) on my view. — creativesoul

It has to be arguable, but doesn't have to have been argued?

Conflating between truth and belief... — creativesoul

I'm accounting for the beliefs that have been conflated with truth. I acknowledge conflation is done in error, but because it persist it should be considered a part of our knowledge.

No one has any problem saying knowledge is true, but suggest it can also be false and your burning down the house.

We can believe that something is true even if it isn't, and we can believe that we know something even if we don't. — Michael

Then why would we to define our products in such an ideal sense and still expect they correspond to the facts? If knowledge is always true, then how is it our knowledge changes?

I'm saying that the second in each case is false. — Michael

It goes without saying I thought? It's absurd to claim one's beliefs change the truth the of the matter. I understand how it could be read that way, but I don't understand why it would be read that way.

There's also no observable difference between what's true and what's false at any given moment, but we don't then say that something is true just because we believe it to be so. — Michael

Don't we? Every time I say something is true is just because I believe it is true. Otherwise, I'm not properly truthing.

Janus seems to confuse justified with true, and Banno argues that a proposition can be true without any act of verification which would justify the proposition. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not really reading Janus quite the same way. If we count 1000 things as true, we'll probably discover some amount were actually not true at a point later in time, so allowing for this inevitable seems worth while to me. To be counted as true allows for errors, to simply be true ignores the reservation.

↪Cheshire Apparently there is:
The action of speaking or acting in accordance with the truth. — Banno

that's got to be some type of record. Well played sir.

It doesn't follow from this that we should talk about "wrong knowledge" rather than "not knowledge".

I would say that if I think I know that your name is John and if I find out that it's not actually John then it's better to say that I didn't know that your name is John than to say that I knew but was wrong. — Michael

Really? I can understand "I guessed your name was John and it wasn't", but if you thought you knew then, you must have had some reason; then it makes more sense to say what I knew was incorrect. To say "I thought I knew" implies a process which made you think it was indeed knowledge. It goes back to my assertion there is no observable difference between "what I know" and "what I think I know" at any given moment, so I cannot exclude the latter in my description of knowledge. I don't feel compelled to concede the matter, but I'm not sure how to expand on the idea.

And why “acknowledge that some knowledge will eventually be proven wrong” when we can instead acknowledge that some things we don’t actually know? The latter seems a far more reasonable approach. — Michael

Because we cannot tell the difference between what we actually know and what we think we know until it's proven wrong.

↪Cheshire It’s not always going to be the case. Sometimes the things I think I know are true, and so I really do know them. — Michael

It's always the case "that sometimes....."

↪Cheshire It’s not always going to be the case. Sometimes the things I think I know are true, and so I really do know them. — Michael

I'm arguing that without the certainity of what is true or false apart from your "thinking" it's true or false we're left with a description of knowledge that's too idealized to be practical beyond philosophical exercises. I don't think philosophy ought to be limited by it's own definitions.

And why “acknowledge that some knowledge will eventually be proven wrong” when we can instead acknowledge that some things we don’t actually know? The latter seems a far more reasonable approach. — Michael

I mean, yes, that's totally rational. But, technically problematic because we don't know what we don't know so to speak. I think instead of playing these word games we cut to the chase and say our knowledge contains our errors and inaccuracies. And until such a time as all errors from our knowledge have been eliminated we cannot and ought not hold that all knowledge is true. Really, it's a better mirror to how knowledge actually seems to progress. We don't so often establish the all-determinate truth of a theory, but rather find out where the error lies and improve upon it. I think Socrates would like it.

The question is whether something can be true without this verification process which establishes that it is true. — Metaphysician Undercover

Doesn't this beg the question against your position? I can suppose verification would show something hasn't been proven false, so in that light it would make an assumption of truth rational, but aside from particles verifying only brings light to truth, but it can't create it.

In a physical reality I measure something but the measurement doesn't change the thing measured.

In such a case you didn’t have knowledge; you just mistakenly thought you did. — Michael

Which I'm claiming is always going to be the case, so why not just acknowledge that some knowledge will eventually be proven wrong.

Knowledge is a success word, it accomplishes a purpose, that of being true. Knowledge is not a matter of simply saying something is true, it requires that the belief be correct. — Sam26

I think knowledge intends the success of being correct, but realistically it turns out to be rational conjecture that hasn't been proven wrong yet. So, if you wanted to augment JTB with or F, then I would be satisfied for today.

If it ain't true, then it ain't knowledge. — creativesoul

You have never known something and then later found out it was incorrect?

I agree , the theory of JTB is consistent within itself. However, I think I can maintain that it is always the case some of our ideas will be believed, justified, and taken as truth, but in error none the less. The theory says that wasn't 'actual knowledge': I'm instead claiming that some knowledge is always false while being taken as you say to be correct, so a better theory of knowledge would acknowledge that we know many things and some of what we know is wrong. I understand using the term knowledge without the assumption of truth has to be maddening in this context, but I believe it is a better approximation to the facts.

You're conflating one's statement that something is true, or is a piece of knowledge, with the definition of knowledge — Sam26

Yes, except it isn't conflation if it is accurate.

If some knowledge is always held in error, then all knowledge cannot be true.

I greatly appreciate the charitable read and I agree. So long as JTB isn't meant to actually describe the real world and is only maintained for the purpose of an exercise I suppose I no longer object. Thank you for the reference to Gettier; I'm aware my arguments or causal assertions must appear quite naive.

Do you think you could produce an example of these two different types of knowledge? The general and the technical?

I suppose I'm agreeing with Gettier in a sense, but avoiding his objection. He's saying hey your system doesn't work because it can produce mistaken knowledge. I'm saying some knowledge is mistaken.