1. If God is omnibenevolent, He cannot do/be evil
2. God is omnibenevolent
3. God cannot do evil (1,2 MP)
4. If God cannot do evil, he cannot have part with sin
5. He cannot have part with sin (3,4 MP)
6. Humans have sinned
7. God cannot have part with humans (4,6 MT) — Ben Hancock

Hi Ben,
I think you provide a viable alternative definition of omnibenevolence, but even granting that, I do not think your argument is sound.

Firstly, I find it a little unclear what you mean by "have part with sin." Maybe if you gave that phrase a working definition, I could follow the assumptions between (4) and (7) more easily. As it is, I do not think (7) follows from (5) and (6) [or from 4 and 6, which is what you listed in your argument form, but I think the MT is 5 and 6]. I imagine "have part with" to mean something along the lines of "be in proximity to" or "associate with." If it is true that God cannot be in proximity to sin or associate with sin, it still does not necessarily follow that he cannot be in proximity to and associate with people who have sinned at some point in time. It seems that all (5) implies (under the definition I've attempted to provide) is that God cannot be near a person actively committing a sin, and that God cannot himself commit a sin.

Perhaps you could phrase it like this:
1. If God is omnibenevolent, He cannot be or do evil
2. God is omnibenevolent.
3. God cannot do evil.
4. If God cannot do evil, he cannot be associated with or in proximity to sin.
5. He cannot be associated with or in proximity to sin.
6. Humans have been known to sin at times.
7. God cannot be associated with or in proximity to humans when they sin.

If these circumstances are true, then God could remove, and possibly punish, people that are still actively sinning, and then bring them back to him when they have stopped. This conclusion seems more in line with Francesco's original conclusion, although it does not necessarily support the argument that he used to reach that conclusion.

However, with this new phrase (which I take to mean the same thing as "have part with") substituted into the argument, it seems more apparent that the first half of (4) does not entail the second half. God could certainly be around evil or sin, and even be associated with sin, without himself actually doing any evil. So I would contend that neither of these arguments are sound past the conclusion in (3).

1. If you believe that Christianity is true, you must believe that Christian testimonies about miracles (i.e. those found in the Bible) are true but miracle testimonies from other religions are false.
2. You believe Christianity is true.
3. Therefore, you must believe that your testimonies about miracles (i.e. those found in the Bible) are true but miracle testimonies from other religions are false. (1,2 MP)
4. In order to be justified in believing that Christian miracle testimonies are true and non-Christian miracle testimonies are false, you must have adequate reasons for believing the probability of the Christian miracles happening is much higher than the probability of the non-Christian miracles happening.
5. You lack such adequate reasons.
6. Therefore, you are not justified in believing that Christian miracle testimonies are true and non-Christian miracle testimonies are false. (4,5 MT) — Empedocles

(Premise numbering added for visual clarity.)

Hi reasonablewave,
I believe you may have misread Empedocles' argument, or perhaps Empedocles' could have been a little more clear with how the point that he makes interacts with this argument form.

Empedocles says that the best support with which one could deny (5) is "first that a god exists through arguments such as the Ontological, Teleological, and Axiological arguments." This means that the support for the credibility of miracles, if proven via this method, draws on a separate argument for Christianity which the non-Christian may or may not agree with. And so, if one disagrees with the ontological, teleological, and/or axiological argument, then the argument from miracles will hold no additional sway, since it requires that the others are proved first. This is what Empedocles means when he says the argument "declaws miracles" -- the argument from miracles no longer convinces the people that it is meant to convince.

You object to (5) by drawing on the trustworthiness of Jesus, but this actually has the same "declawing" effect that Empedocles suggested was problematic. Support like this would fail to convince anyone who was not already convinced of Jesus' trustworthiness.

Hopefully I understood you both correctly. Feel free to say so if I have mischaracterized anything.

1. If Christianity is true, then God designed us to conceive of ourselves as male or female based on our reproductive structures.
2. If so, then it is immoral to conceive of oneself as male while being biologically female, and vice versa.
3. If so, then contemporary transgender ideology is immoral.
4. If so, we shouldn’t perpetuate it by using revisionary pronouns.
5. So, if Christianity is true, we shouldn’t use revisionary pronouns. — Iwanttostopphilosophizingbutikant

I'd like to preface this by saying I agree that Christians and other religiously minded people should be encouraging compassionate attitudes towards the transgender community. However, I think your argument could use some work - both the original form that you lay out, and your objection to it. I added number labels in my quote just for visual clarity, but I didn't change any of your wording.

Firstly, your objection is useful, but I'd like to point out that it seems to apply more to (1) than to (2) or (3). Children born with non-standard genitalia or reproductive organs could challenge the premise that God designed genitalia to assign our gender, but it applies less directly to morality.

Secondly, the argument that you construct in order to pose your objection against it could be phrased much more charitably. Currently, it is not sound. For (1), the phrase "If Christianity is true" could entail a large variety of things, many of which would be subject to debate. I do not think it is clear that the Christian God designed people to "conceive" of themselves as male or female based on reproductive organs. That would mean the second half of (1) is not necessarily entailed by the first half.

Furthermore, (2) is not entailed by (1). Even if God designed us to conceive of gender by our reproductive organs, it's possible that choosing to conceive otherwise is not immoral. For example, a video game developer could design a game to be played exclusively with your left hand. I could still choose to play this game with my right hand. While it may not be what the designer had in mind, it does not necessarily follow that I have done anything immoral.

Then if (1) is not entailed by itself, and (2) is not entailed by (1), I think the other premises lack support. So the argument does not stand up.

We might think we were free willed because we wouldn't be exposed to any sinful behavior. However ultimately, we would just be going about life blissfully ignorant of the existence of sin. — Belouie

I don't think you've refuted my counterexample about free will. I can certainly grasp that living life without the ability to do a number of things that I can currently do would see like it limits your free will. However, the key distinction here is that limiting free will does not remove free will entirely. If someone were to lock me in a small cell, where I couldn't go anywhere else, I would still retain my personal free will. Similarly, I currently cannot choose to grow wings and fly, but that does not mean I do not have free will.

The example I gave may not sound ideal, but it does function as an objection to Iwanttostopphilosophizingbutikant's premises.

I have not read the comments in this read that were posted after your reply to me, so I apologize if I bring up anything that you have already responded to in a separate post.

The GCB would not have a limited attention — adhomienem

This is a difficult concept to grasp, but I'll grant that it seems possible. However, assuming you are speaking about the Christian God, there are many examples of that God in the Bible displaying specific attention and having emotions. This does not necessarily refute your statement; God could have gained this ability or began using this ability that he always had after the beginning of the universe. If that is true, then it seems that, at least after the universe began, God does change. Or, if you contend that God always experiences all emotions, then biblical descriptions of God experiencing emotion are meaningless. You may have no problem granting that implication - I just thought it was worth pointing out.

Without the existence of clocks, time would be immeasurable according to your definition. Immeasurable time, then, leads us back to the same question I posed earlier — adhomienem

I think you misunderstand what I mean by my proposed definition of time - time is not simply the measurement taken by a clock. It is the fundamental unit which a clock can measure. Likewise, length is not just the numbers on a ruler, even though rulers measure length. Length does not disappear when rulers disappear. Time does not disappear when clocks disappear.

I agree that we run into problems attempting to understand timelessness when we ourselves are bound by time. — adhomienem

I'd like to contend that, because we have no way of perceiving anything outside of time and we also have no factual examples of a being existing outside of time, we cannot discover anything meaningful about a being outside time through mere discussion. As every experience that any human has ever had has occurred through the lens of time, we have no way of perceiving something outside of that lens.

why isn't the dog-eat-dog morality one of our morals? — Play-doh

From an evolutionary perspective, groups of humans that cooperated were more likely to survive than groups that competed, and so cooperative social behaviors were passed on more often. I believe this answers most of the questions you pose in your first paragraph.

The soldier question is slightly more complex, but still explainable. Humans have developed a myriad of instincts through evolution that promote social bonds on various levels, such as family, city, and country. Each of these serves a purpose in promoting the survival of the individual. The soldier functions as a defense mechanism of one of those social circles (the country), but the average person that kills in the street does not.

If evolution got us to a point where we think that killing should be frowned upon, there shouldn't be a situational deviation; it should be all good or all bad no matter the situation — Play-doh

I don't really understand the inference you make here - why wouldn't evolution allow for deviation in morality? It allows for deviation in other traits, like amount of fur or beak size. Morality doesn't seem to function like those simple examples, but we can find situational deviation in other instincts as well. We could consider that evolution has equipped us with adrenaline that typically engages a fight-or-flight response when we are frightened. However, I've experienced many potentially frightening situations, like scary movies or sudden noises, that did not engage that response, usually due to mitigating circumstances. Perhaps I was alone in my room and felt very safe. Regardless, the point is that there's lots of room for situational deviance in evolutionary traits, including morality.

I haven't necessarily proved that morality completely stems from evolution here, but I hope I've defended the theory from some of your objections. So to respond to your title-question, "Should the Possibility that Morality Stems from Evolution Even Be Considered?", I'd say yes, we should continue to consider that possibility.

If God gave mankind free will, then He wanted mankind to freely choose to take part in spiritual growth.
If God wanted mankind to freely choose to take part in spiritual growth, then God designed the world and nature to challenge us.
If God designed the world and nature to challenge us, then He wants to make sure the mankind is ready to join in the marriage between God and the church.
Therefore, if God gave mankind free will, then He wants to make sure the mankind is ready to join in the marriage between God and the church. (1, 3 HS) — Iwanttostopphilosophizingbutikant

Your argument is phrased a little confusingly for me. I can't quite follow any of the inferences you're making between and within each premises. I think these are the beliefs you hold:
1. God gave mankind free will.
2. God wanted mankind to freely choose to take part in spiritual growth.
3. God designed the world to challenge us.
4. He wants to make sure mankind is ready to join in the marriage between God and the church.

I've written only the part of each premises that introduces new information, just for the sake of clarity. It seems you are trying to connect them logically by phrasing them as "if, then" statements, but none of these beliefs necessarily follow from the assumption made in premise 1 (that God gave mankind free will). He might have done so for any number of reasons. To have some fun, for a random example.

By my understanding, the assumption made from premise 1 to premise 2, as well as the assumption made from 2 to 3, are part of the conclusions drawn from the Soul-Making Theodicy. These premises cannot be the correct argument, or it would be circular (its premises would contain its own conclusion).

Also, I believe that you make a mistaken assumption in the beginning of your final paragraph. The question of "Why didn't God put us in heaven from the beginning?" is not an objection to the theodicy, the theodicy is a response to the question.

You make a couple of claims after this that need some support.
1. If mankind were created without the ability to sin, free will would not exist.
2. If mankind did not have the ability to sin, everyone would be the same.

I'll object to both with a counterexample. Free will does not require any specific ability besides the ability to choose. I can choose to either play basketball or baseball, and thereby demonstrate my free will. I have not necessarily sinned in playing either sport. Furthermore, since some people might choose basketball, and some baseball, then everyone would not necessarily be the same.

I'd like to object to premises 3 and 5, despite your rebuttals.

In your defense of premise 3 you state that, for a being who knows all things, thought does not qualify as change because the being gains no knowledge. But my own personal thoughts change constantly without the acquisition of knowledge. A more accurate description might be that my attention is shifting, but this still counts as change. For example, even though I've had many emotions before and know exactly what they are like, my state can still change from happy to sad.

And as for premise 5, that statement only remains true when using a common description of time such as Merriam-Webster's. However, time can be defined scientifically as the fundamental unit measured by a clock. Time does not necessarily require change to exist. It is simply a measurement that applies to every being.

You might say that time itself is a process of change, and so for time to pass, change must occur. However, we know of no quantity to have ever definitively existed without time (since everything ever studied scientifically has existed within this universe), and so attempts to define time in this way fall short. We cannot necessarily provide a correct definition of time without knowing what timelessness would actually look like.

Again, the specific point I would like to make is that Collins' "rigorous support" for the argument from design does nothing to advance the core debate. When we ask why the Big Bang occurred, we are veering away from that point. To me, it seems that in saying

This question of why would persist no matter what the preconditions of the universe — Ben Hancock

that you agree with my original point. Am I understanding you incorrectly?

Separately, I can understand why it seemed as though I was invoking a version of the anthropic principle in my original post. I was not attempting to do so, and perhaps my example could have been more clear. I fully agree with the story about the sharp shooters.

However, to broaden our discussion again, I disagree with many points in your final paragraph. It also seems as though you are drawing on the ontological argument, which is a separate line of reasoning from the design argument. I'll attempt to address both briefly.

this is only a problem if we understand God as something created — Ben Hancock

I could also contend that this is only a problem if we understand the universe as something created. The Big Bang implies a beginning, not a creation. And to put on my (very inadequate) speculative astrophysicist hat, perhaps the Big Bang is not even a beginning, but simply the start of a form that we recognize. We do not know what came before.

The Universe is evidently not the greatest of all possible beings, as we can, in our own minds, imagine a Universe that is perfect. God, however, is not dependent on any other if He is the greatest of all possible beings — Ben Hancock

Is it true that we can imagine a perfect universe? What are the specific requirements? I find it hard to imagine a concrete list of attributes that compose a perfect universe. Perhaps I could suggest a few improvements, but by no means does that imply a finite list of steps to take to reach perfection. So, in fact, I'd say we can't really imagine a perfect universe.
Similarly, I find it difficult to imagine what a greatest of all possible beings would look like. I can easily attach adjectives to this being -- omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent -- but these attributes raise intricate questions that the Big Bang does not. When we first engage the origins of the universe, we ask one complex question: is there a cause for the Big Bang? When we arrive at the solution of a self-creating God, we must ask many complex questions. Personally, I do not find it satisfying to trade one mystery for several.
To clarify, I am not implying that an atheistic view of the universe offers more answers than a theistic one. I am saying that when we wonder about the Cause of Everything, our current notions of God should not satisfy us.

The trick is in the title. It should read, "A Sophistic Argument for the Existence of God," — tim wood

I'm not quite sure I understand what you're saying here. Do you mean that you agree with my assessment that the science does not support his argument? But that you disagree with my belief that the argument overall doesn't succeed?

It's from the same family of reasoning that proves a ham sandwich is better than God. (A ham sandwich is better than nothing,,,,) — tim wood

I realize that this was meant to be a silly example, but a ham sandwich is not better than nothing as an explanation for the universe. A ham sandwich that preceded the Big Bang would raise more questions than we already deal with. If you read my response to Ben Hancock, you'll see that I believe the idea of God does not provide us with a solution to our problem, and therefore is not better than nothing.

1. There are no required conditions for the Big Bang
2. If there are no required conditions for the Big Bang, then the outcome of the Big Bang is essentially random
3. If the outcome is random, it cannot be designed
4. Our existence naturally fits into the laws of the universe established by the outcome of the Big Bang
5. The existence of specific laws of the Universe is irrelevant to the design argument (theism) — Ben Hancock

I'm not necessarily implying that the Big Bang was random, or that randomness would necessitate lack of design. Specifically, I'm saying that new information and calculations do not support the argument for a creative designer. That was the main point I tried to illustrate in my example.

If we want to broaden the discussion to the entire argument from design, then I can provide my thoughts there as well. Firstly, "producing something from nothing" is not a type of logical fallacy. I can see why some people would take issue with the idea, but it's not a logical fallacy in the way that equivocation or appeal to authority are.

Secondly, the idea of the universe requiring an Unmoved Mover does not convince me. If the universe cannot arise from nothing, we can ask the same question about God. Who would have designed God? If God does not need a designer, then why does the universe? Collins attempts to address this in his essay, but he does not answer the question. Instead, he contends that the universe as we know it is more likely to occur under the guidance of a god-designer than out of nothing. But if that god-designer came from nothing, then I don't think we've made any real progress. We still face the same question - how can something come from nothing? God does not answer that.

And to briefly consider your example, it is true that energy cannot be created or destroyed. However, it can be transformed. Einstein's famous E = mc(^2) is an equation for converting energy into mass. I'm purely speculating here, but perhaps there was something before our universe that energy and mass came out of. Or perhaps there was nothing. I do not think the argument from design solves this problem.