That verse seems to be about humanity, not about the universe we're in. Is anyone saying that this specific universe is special?

Who is actually saying that this universe is special?

The most satisfying response, in my opinion to the problem of petitionary prayer, is an attack on premise 1. Why do we characterize God as omnibenevolent? There are many examples of God acting in scripture where it doesn’t seem like he is really doing what is best. I’m thinking specifically of the near-genocide God commands of the Israelites to enter the promised land. If we assume that justice as humans perceive it is not unwholly like the justice that God employs, then it seems like God didn’t do the right thing in commanding them to do this act. Of course, there is also the problem of evil. Is God really doing what is best when he allows for gratuitous suffering? I don’t think so. Perhaps God is as loving and as good as possible, and true omnibenevolence is impossible.

This argument is simple:
If God is omnibenevolent then he will always do the best thing
God doesn’t always do the best thing
God is not omnibenevolent (1,2 MT)

Then we really have no problem with petitionary prayer because God is not held to an impossible standard of goodness. If we ask we shall receive and if we seek we shall find, but God needs and wants to hear our prayers to decide what is best to do next.

We obviously don’t want to leave God only as good as humans, and so I propose that we conceptualize God as being all-loving. Theists often characterize God as all-knowing (knowing everything that can be known) to avoid paradoxes related to omniscience, they will also call him all-powerful (has the power to do any possible thing) to avoid paradoxes related to omnipotence. Why not think of God as all-loving (doing the best possible) instead of omnibenevolent to avoid paradoxes like these.

While I generally agree with the conclusion that this argument comes to, I strongly disagree with one of the more foundational premises.

2. Humans are limited to referring to and conceptualizing God analogously. — Francesco di Piertro

I think you would be hard pressed to prove this point and it breaks down in two ways. For the ‘referring’ part, it seems like we could simply call God ‘God’ all the time and we would be referring directly to the greatest conceivable being without analogy. For the conceptualization, it seems as if someone asked me ‘what is God?’ It is true that I may say “He’s like a father.” But it is just as likely that I might say ‘He is all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-loving.’ I can build up that person’s conceptualization of God in most if not all ways without referring to an analogy. I don’t think it’s fair to say that humans are limited to analogy in their ideations of God.

Again, I agree with the conclusion generally, but I disagree with the ‘abandonment.’ The Abrahamic religions have many many analogous terms to help refer to and conceptualize God. It’s, in fact, a common preaching trope to have a sermon series on ‘The Names of God.’ There are dozens of Biblical titles for God and nearly all of them are analogous: Alpha and Omega (Revelation 1:8), the Ancient of Days (Daniel 7:9), The Creator (Hebrews 1:8), Shephard (Hebrews 13:20-21), Counselor (John 14:16-17), Jesus, Holy Spirit etc.

Of course, if you started to call God God the Mother in front of Christians, they would be taken aback, but they don’t realize that the language is all metaphoric anyways.

You still haven't shown why God must be omnibenevolent to be God. If God is not omnibenevolent I think I could still argue that God is worthy of praise. However, even if God is actively malevolent and absolutely unworthy of worship they could still be God, we just wouldn't like that. If we do take worship to be a necessary characteristic of God then I think I could agree with your argument, but many people don't worship God and that doesn't change the fact that God is still God.

I agree with you on your third premise but I just take that as proof the greatest conceivable being is God, and one of the necessary characteristics of the GCB is omnipotence.

I agree that these are commonly held beliefs about the Christian God, but I don't think they're required characteristics of the Christian God, and even less so for a general God.

Building off this thought, could God or a god exist in a many-universe hypothesis? Could one universe have Buddhism to be the major (and very real) religion, but in another universe, God exists to rule over that universe? Or—if there is a deity—if it exists in one universe, must it exist in all universes as well? But would that then take away from the idea of many universes in the truest sense of the idea—that there must be a universe where a god exists and another where it does not? — Play-doh

Getting back to your main question, I don't think there could be. One reason being that many conceptions of God are contradictory. For example, if the Judeo-Christian God is the God in any universe, then they must be the God of all universes. If that were the case, then the Hindu gods could never exist in any universe UNLESS God, for whatever reason, decided to create a Pantheon of lesser gods. In any case, there would still be the one highest God.

I see where your thought process is going though; if there are an infinite number of universes, then there should be infinite possibilities. For example, there could be a universe where the two of us were both Batman, and we had to fight it out to see who gets to marry the Joker. So why wouldn't it be the same for the divine? Wouldn't there be different divine rules in different universes?

I think the major 'problem' of your reasoning is which comes first, the universe or the God? If the universe comes first and the universe produces a divine aspect of itself, then yeah, I think there could any combination of true religions depending on what universe you're in. But if you believe that God comes first and then creates the universe(s) then no, there can only be one (or many if you're into that) over all universes.

you think harming other people is right in the short term?

I'm not convinced that your equation shows a contradiction in the idea of the GCB.
I can think of a being that is omnipotent. I can conceive of a being that is omniscient. I can conceive of a being that is omnipresent and even omnibenevolent. I can conceive of a being that is all these things, and I think it shouldn't take too much imagination for you to as well. Let's forget talking about whether this being exists or not for now.

If I'm following your logic correctly, you're saying that even if you could conceive of my GCB you would just conceive of a GCB+1. This makes sense on paper, but the reality is you have not added anything to the GCB.

If you conceived of a table that was the Greatest Conceivable Table it might have properties like "it can support any weight," "it always has enough space for any number of people," and "it keeps the food at exactly the right temperature." This would be the GCT. I could object to your idea of the GCT by saying that, in addition, my GCT also has "the finest grain wood in the world" because I'm adding to the properties of the GCT. I cannot, however, say that my GCT is Jeremiah's GCT+1. That doesn't make sense. I haven't added anything to the GCT.

Eventually, we would get to a place with the GCT where no more properties or characteristics could be added to make it meaningfully greater, and that would truly be the GCT. You could still say that your GCT+1 is still greater, but that doesn't actually mean anything.

I don’t think I agree with your first premise; I don’t see why a monotheistic God must be omnibenevolent. That’d be great, of course, but I don’t see why ‘the one true God’ has to be on our side. Maybe God is cruel and omniscient; maybe God is fickle and omnipotent. Examples for both of those behaviors can easily be found in the Christian faith. I’d like to hear why you think a monotheistic God must be both omnibenevolent and omniscient.

Your defense of premise two is stronger but, to borrow a tad from wayfarer, our definition of ‘good’ may be limited by our lack of omniscience. Perhaps if we could see and know all things we would be able to see that these obviously evil things lead somehow to a better world that could not exist without it. Personally, I’d still take the world without suffering. I think you could fortify the argument by adding something about needless suffering.

The thing I think is ridiculous is the notion that we can choose our beliefs based on the potential for benefitting, rather than based on our usual methods for evaluating the truth of propositions. — Relativist

I'm right there with you, except that this is not a debate between evidence and evidence, this is a debate between two (supposedly) equal ideas theism and atheism. If we cannot tell for certain which is true, we should move on to other methods of decision making.
I think All sight's point about desperation is meaningful, when the options for traditional reasoning are all used up we have to move on and try something else, or we will be paralyzed

I think there’s a major problem with your interpretation of the argument. Another way to formulate the argument is:
If God is omniscient, then God would know each individual’s action before it happens
If Individuals can freely choose their actions, then there can’t be any foreknowledge of what they are going to do
Either God is omniscient and individuals don’t truly have free will or individuals have free will and God is not omniscient.

You take the side of the conclusion that includes free will, but the conclusion could just as easily say that God IS omniscient.

Your solution sounds good and maybe a nice way to think about it, but when people say “God knows what you are going to do before you do it,” they are referring to a specific action that you will take, not all the possibilities.

True free will and omniscience cannot co-exist. Either God does not know all things, or we do not truly have free will. However, this does not release us from the burden of choice, it ’s obvious that we know our actions and choose them when the moments arise. So while God may know each decision we make, WE do not, and we have to choose between right and wrong, good and evil. It’s not a problem that God knows what you will choose; it’s that you choose at all.

I don’t understand what you’re saying. Why would God have to be fooled? Who said anyone was trying to fool God?

Pascal’s wager has nothing to do with popularity, if it did we could just say that since most of humanity has believed in some kind of deity all throughout history then we should presume theism.

Out of curiousity, what would a religion based around rationalism look like?

I’m not arguing for the existence of God, I’m arguing for the presumption of theism. Insofar as Pascal’s wager is used as an argument for God I agree with you. But when we’re talking about if the burden of proof lies on the atheist or theist the wager gives a solid case in the theists favor. Other arguments such as the ontological or cosmological arguments can be used to debate God’s existence.

I think your comment about the “real god” being offended is covered in this discussion as well. I’m not arguing for any particular god, simply some type of god, some type of theism