princessofdarkness,

I'll use Abecedarian's reformulation of your argument to continue the discussion, though I disagree with his counterargument that we are not to be compassionate to everything that is weak and helpless:

"1. If something is weak and helpless, Jesus told people to be kind and compassionate to it
2. Animals are beings that are weak and helpless
3. Therefore, Jesus told people to be kind and compassionate to animals."

I agree that we should be kind and compassionate to animals, and I think you offer some good suggestions as to how we should go about that. It seems wise to not kill for sport, but only for necessity (be it for nutrition, for clothing, etc.). Granted, one could argue the extent of our necessity to eat meat at all. It certainly seems unnecessary and not at all compassionate to harm animals through any sort of abuse, such as pit bull fighting or greyhound racing. Yet, even there the lines are blurred – horse racing seems to be acceptable and everyone argues about the importance or lack thereof of zoos and aquariums.

However, these sorts of disagreements are not only pertinent to weak and helpless animals – the same sorts of arguments are had regarding impoverished people across the globe. Life is complex! So, I don't think the difficult nature of determining how to be compassionate should dissuade us from pursuing compassion towards the weak and helpless.

Yet, if we look at what Jesus said and did on this earth, there is a certainly a distinction between his comments about animals and his comments about people. While I think your argument is still valid, I do see Abecedarian's point that it would be a bit difficult to consider plants, animals, and people as equally weak and helpless and in equal need of compassion (particular if we consider "compassion" to be defined in such a way that requires abstaining from eating said plants and animals and humans...there seems to be a delineating feature there). So, it seems there needs to be a clarifying argument that explains the difference in one's compassion to animals and to humans (I'll ignore plants for the moment, as they weren't the primary focus of your post):

1. If humans were created in the image of God (Gen. 1:27) and animals were not created in the image of God, then humans are distinguished from animals.
2. If humans are distinguished from animals, then we have the freedom to treat humans differently than animals.
3. If we have the freedom to treat humans differently than animals, then we can show compassion to humans differently than how we show compassion to animals.
4. So, if humans were created in the image of God, then we can show compassion to humans differently than how we show compassion to animals (1, 2, 3 HS)

I look forward to your thoughts!

I apologize for the late response. Thank you for referring me to the video regarding subjective beauty and atheism; I did not see that before posting. I would like to respond in regard to your argument about subjective beauty (copied here for convenience):

"1) if beauty 100% subjective, then everyone who calls something beautiful is wrong.
2) it seems pretty unlikely to me that everyone who describes a sunset as beautiful is wrong.
3) therefore, beauty is not 100% subjective"

I would argue subjectivity inherently implies a lack of absolutes – there is no "right" or "wrong" in something that is subjective, whether we are talking about beauty or importance or any other sort of subjective opinion. The dictionary definition of subjective is "based on or influenced by personal feelings, tastes, or opinions." If that's the case (though I leave room for your perhaps using a different definition of the word!), I agree with your premise 2. Indeed, it is very unlikely that everyone who describes a sunset as beautiful is wrong. This is due to the fact, however, that "personal feelings, tastes, or opinions" cannot be wrong. I could see a sunset and think it's ugly, while you could think it's the most beautiful sunset you've ever seen. Thus, this is my response in argument form:

1. If beauty is 100% subjective, then everyone who calls something beautiful is expressing their opinion.
2. Beauty is 100% subjective.
3. So, everyone who calls something beautiful is expressing their opinion (1, 2 MP)

In regard to your original argument and my original response, I still think you're better off moving your argument away from the ideas of "objective" and "subjective" beauty. While you (and others) might disagree with argument about the capacity of beauty, I do think it's wise to move in that sort of direction (toward thinking about some innate capacity granted by God) rather than focusing solely on this argument of objective versus subjective beauty. I look forward to reading your thoughts as you continue to develop your argument!

Thank you for your comprehensive explanation of your argument. I had never considered this in depth before, so I appreciate your thoughtfulness. I do wonder, however, about your premise 5: "You lack such adequate reasons [for believing the probability of the Christian miracles happening is much higher than the probability of the non-Christian miracles happening.]" For instance, let's take the story of Jesus healing the blind man (John 9). First, we see that the blind man whom Jesus heals believes and worships as a result of the miracle (v38). So, the miracle had convincing power for the formerly blind man, at the very least. However, I recognize your focus is on miracle testimonies, rather than the miracle itself. If we look at the miracle testimony within this chapter, we see that the Pharisees, who saw the man themselves, still did not believe that Jesus was the Messiah (alas, thus reinforcing your point that miracles are not particularly convincing!). However, what are we to do with v. 3-5?

3 “Neither this man nor his parents sinned,” said Jesus, “but this happened so that the works of God might be displayed in him. 4 As long as it is day, we must do the works of him who sent me. Night is coming, when no one can work. 5 While I am in the world, I am the light of the world.”

The miracle testimony as composed by John includes these few verses at the beginning of the chapter that offer some information about who Jesus is and what He was sent to earth to do. One could cite many more examples about what one learns from reading the different miracle testimonies – concepts about Jesus and God that are important to one's understanding of who they are and how they can be trusted. I argue it's what the miracle testimonies teach you about Jesus versus what the Book of Mormon teaches about Joseph Smith, etc. that make miracles have their convincing power.

In sum, I believe the adequate reasons for believing that the probability of the Christian miracles happening is much higher than the probability of the non-Christian miracles happening are founded in the character of the miracle worker (Jesus, Joseph Smith, etc.). Thus, I argue the following in response to premise 5 of your argument:

1. If Christians believe that Jesus is more trustworthy than any other supposed miracle workers, then they are justified in believing the testimonies of Jesus' miracles over any other miracles.
2. Christians believe that Jesus is more trustworthy than any other supposed miracle workers.
3. Therefore, Christians are justified in believing in Jesus' miracles over any other miracles (1,2 MP)

I look forward to your thoughts.

I also disagree with Hariss's quote, though for a different reason than your challenge to premise one. While I agree with your assertion that "many would argue having a religious faith actually boosts their compassion," I think the primary issue in Harris's argument has more to do with his understanding of the meaning of compassion. I don't see how believing that a traumatic incident could be a part of God's plan lacks compassion. Sure, it might not be the wisest comment to make to someone in pain, but I don't think that worldview leads to eroded compassion.

Instead, I would argue that the link between theism and those seemingly "callous" responses is due to theists' need to explain the problem of evil and their personal understanding of theodicy. (Certainly atheists do not have this problem, as they do not have a need to reconcile their belief system with the existence of evil.) Whether this explanation is kept in one's head or impolitely expressed to a person in the midst of struggle seems to have less to do with religiosity and more to do with having appropriate knowledge of how to communicate compassion. (As previously stated, I agree that religious faith can, in fact, increase one's compassion.)

My revised argument attempts to explain the comments Harriss finds worrisome without placing the blame on religious faith for eroding compassion. I propose the following changes to Harriss's argument as you outlined:

1. If you have a religious faith, then you need to explain how your belief system answers the problem of evil.
2. In view of tragedies, your religious faith spurs you to say, “this might be all part of God’s plan”, “there are no accidents in life,” or “everyone on some level gets what he or she deserves” (Which are not only stupid but extraordinarily callous).
3. Thus, your religious faith leads you to explain how your belief system answers the problem of evil. (1, 2 MP)

I look forward to reading your thoughts.

Following the discussion thread of whether or not objective beauty is possible, I'd like to add that it seems your argument entirely hinges upon the fact that objective beauty exists. As other posters have mentioned, it's difficult to argue for the idea of objective beauty. Personally, I do think beauty is a subjective trait.

If beauty is subjective, who is to then say that in the supposedly "ugly" world of atheism that the subjective human beings in that world will not decide that grey rainbows are beautiful? They could create their own scale for beauty based on the limited ugliness they have access to within their world. In that case, subjective beauty seems just as probable within an atheistic world as in a theistic world.

If you simply look at the objects or phenomena within our world that some call beautiful (and others don't) in order to see the design of God, I think your argument does fail. Yet, there is something about the act of recognizing beauty that does seem to point to a creator. As such, I'd suggest the following revision to your argument to make it stronger.

Rather than focusing on what we decide is beautiful and how that object, phenomena, etc. points to a creator, I think you should redirect your argument's focus to the capacity to see beauty. How do we decide what is beautiful? Why do we think anything is beautiful (even if we disagree on the beauty of ballet)? Would human beings existing in a world without a creator have the ability to recognize beauty? If the capacity to recognize beauty is a trait designed within us so we connect that beauty back to our creator, it seems doubtful that those within an atheistic universe would have the capacity to recognize beauty.

As such, I propose this argument instead:

1. The capacity to recognize beauty within the universe is improbable under atheism.
2. The capacity to recognize beauty within the universe is not improbable under theism.
3. If we have two hypotheses and some evidence is not improbable under the first hypothesis but is improbable under the second, then that evidence counts as evidence for the first hypothesis.
4. Therefore, the capacity to recognize beauty within the universe counts as evidence for God’s existence (1,2,3 Modus Ponens)

I look forward to your thoughts.

While I also disagree with Rachels' argument, I do not agree with your challenge to premise three. As such, I will counter your claim that "some human beings are not, in fact, morally autonomous agents." Rather than seeing human beings with disabilities as individuals who are at the mercy of others who "exert [their] morality over them," I'd argue that any human being who is able to take a morally significant action is a "morally autonomous agent," as used in premise three of Rachels' argument. While persons with disabilities may not have the same mental or physical capabilities as you or I, it does not seem reasonable to suggest that they are not autonomous.

For instance, say Person A is incapacitated in such a way that the only control they have over their physical faculties is to use a device that allows them to move their wheelchair with the movement of their eyes. Otherwise, they cannot speak, move, etc. Yet, I would argue that they still have the potential to make morally significant choices. Sure, their opportunities for such actions may be minimal, but when they do arise they have that capacity. Should a small child be in danger of being run over by a lawnmower, they could move their wheelchair toward the lawnmower in order to indicate to the driver that there is a potential danger. This action, while small, is morally significant, because Person A could have instead chosen to not move their wheelchair and let the child be run over.

In regard to mental disabilities, a similar thought process follows. Even if an individual only has the IQ of a 4 year old, they are still capable of autonomously making decisions that could have moral significance. Their ability to recognize and obey God is a different matter entirely, but that does not change the fact that they are able to make morally significant actions with or without the influence of God.

In sum, my counterargument is as follows:
1. If a human being is able to make a decision or take any action that ultimately proves to be morally significant, then that human being is a morally autonomous agent.

2. Persons with mental and/or physical disabilities are able to make decisions and take actions that can ultimately prove to be morally significant.

3. Therefore, persons with mental and/or physical disabilities are morally autonomous agents.

flight747,

Like you, I agree that there is an issue with premise four of your outline of Dr. Aikens' argument that human beings should be frustrated by God not revealing himself. However, I differ slightly in the way in which I see the issue with that premise.

While I do believe that God does reveal Godself throughout the Bible, as you said, I'd argue that the Bible is not the only way in which God has chosen to reveal Godself throughout time. Even in absence of the Bible, I believe that God has been and continues to be visible to all of God's people. Romans 20:1 states the following: "For since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities—his eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that people are without excuse." It seems one can gather from this verse that God, making Godself know through "what has been made," is visible throughout Creation (meaning both people made in the image of God and in nature). Thus, I find issue with premise four not only because of the existence of the Bible, but also because of the revealed nature of God through Creation.

Bitter Crank,

You asked:
"How could an infinitely knowing, present everywhere at all times, unlimited in power being reveal the Divine Existence to primates who have been sort of sapiens for a few hundred thousand years?"

After pondering your question, I find issue with premise one and the resulting conclusion found in the third point of Dr. Aikens' argument as presented by flight747. I would like to direct your attention to Exodus 33:18-20:

Then Moses said, “Now show me your glory.” And the Lord said, “I will cause all my goodness to pass in front of you, and I will proclaim my name, the Lord, in your presence. I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion. But,” he said, “you cannot see my face, for no one may see me and live.”

From this Scripture it is clear that there is certainly a limit to the fullness of the glory of God that humans can handle to encounter. I admit, I have not read Dr. Aikens' dissertation, so it may be that he more clearly explains what he means by God revealing Godself to humans. However, if he is implying that God should fully reveal Godself to humans in the sense that Moses requested in the above passage, it seems unwise and unnecessary for God to reveal Godself in such a way.

Instead, I suggest a revision of the first three points of the argument as follows:

1. If God demands obedience from humans, then God should reveal God's law to humans.
2. God demands obedience from humans.
3. Therefore, God should reveal God's law to humans.

From here, one could certainly formulate different arguments based on one's beliefs regarding how God reveals Godself and God's law to all or some of humanity. Based on my previous statement about how God reveals Godself to all, one could argue that the observation of the qualities of God are enough to extrapolate God's law for us. However, I also see how one could continue the argument of frustration based on the fact that not everyone throughout the world or throughout time has had access to God's law as depicted in the Bible.

I welcome your thoughts regarding the continuation of this counterargument.

Abecedarian,

Thank you for laying out Play-doh's argument. I partially agree with your argument against the first premise, as it does seem that Matt 24:36 clearly shows that there is at least some lack of information sharing amongst the trinity. Could it be that Father God is the only entirely omniscient being of the trinity and that the omniscience of the Father alone is sufficient to declare the triune God omniscient?

In your example of Matt 24:36, only the Father is aware of the time at which Jesus will return. Elsewhere in the Bible, we see Jesus state that "the Father is greater than I" (John 14:28). Later in that chapter, Jesus says "I do exactly what the Father has commanded Me, so that the world may know that I love the Father" (John 14:31), further highlighting the power differential between God the Father and Jesus. While one cannot be certain, I would be interested in editing the first premise as follows:

1. If Jesus or the Holy Spirit has knowledge, then God the Father also has this knowledge.

Even if I edit premise one and accept premise five (ignoring the potential issues of the experiential knowledge of lust and envy), I'm not entirely sure how to handle the remainder of Play-doh's argument in regard to one element: time. If God the Father requires both Jesus and the Holy Spirit in order to be fully omniscient (relying on the aforementioned information passing from those two to the Father), then I am not sure just how omniscient God was during the time of the Old Testament.

While I recognize that there are differing views of the idea of time, let's accept for the sake of this argument that God is outside of time and is able to be fully present in any moment. If God relies on Jesus and the Holy Spirit as agents of knowledge gathering (for lack of a better term), I am uncertain as to how God was able to retrieve, at the very least, "people's souls, desires, and virtues" (premise four) during the time of the Old Testament. Although there are certainly mentions of the Spirit of God in the Old Testament, the Holy Spirit as we now think of it (found within every Christian believer, defined as comforter, etc.) was not recognized until the time of the book of Acts, thousands of years later.

So, if the Holy Spirit as we think of it now was not around for thousands of years, does this mean God the Father was unable to gather knowledge integral to God's ability to be omniscient during that time? I highly doubt it. Thus, while I do believe the Holy Spirit can provide God with some sort of knowledge (which may or may not contribute to the data bank necessary for omniscience), I would hesitate to rely on premise four as a needed component for the triune God/God the Father's omniscience (as detailed in premise five). Or, perhaps I need to redefine my idea of the Holy Spirit as presented in the Old Testament as a means of recognizing how the Holy Spirit does provide God the Father with knowledge necessary to the triune God's omniscience.

I am still pondering the paradox of omniscience, however, so unfortunately I do not yet have a clear argument to offer to you instead. I welcome your comments and suggestions as I continue to grapple with this issue.

Belouie,

Thank you for sharing your personal experience and resulting beliefs. While I agree with some of your argument, specifically that heaven was created by God (premise 1) and that heaven is the antithesis of hell (premise 3), I would like to challenge your second premise and resulting conclusion. Please note that for this argument I am writing from an explicitly Christian view point, thus excluding the other aforementioned Abrahamic faiths.

"2) If heaven was created by God, who is love, then heaven is for people who inspired, cultivated and perpetuated love while on Earth."

"4) Therefore, hell is a place for people who inspired, cultivated and perpetuated hate while on Earth."

I believe that these premises do not entirely capture the importance of Jesus' great act of salvation on the cross and the resulting grace offered to those who believe. Although your argument sounds like a wonderful system of universal discipline at first glance, upon further review I find it hard for me to determine where I would reside after my time on earth ends.

Unfortunately, I often cultivate hate of some form, be it my personal disdain for a certain politician, my implicit hate for the earth through my blatant disregard of my gasoline usage, or simply the absence of love for a neighbor in need. Sure, I often love others as well (and certainly strive to do so regularly), but on any given day the balance between love and hate may ultimately lean toward my place in hell as described in your argument. (Although, to be fair, I recognize you did not attempt to delineate the exact tipping point between cultivating hate and cultivating love.)

Thankfully, I recognize the grace offered through the death and resurrection of Jesus on the cross. As He took the punishment for my sins (or, in other words, my habitual hate), I do not have to worry that when I sin/perpetuate hate I will be forever separated from God in heaven. Instead, I can rest assured that I will be with God due to the fact that I have chosen to accept God's gift of love by my belief in Jesus and acceptance of the grace given to me as a result of His resurrection. I know that the only way I will be separate from God in the afterlife, is if I choose to deny God's gift of love through blatant disbelief.

There's obviously much more to the concepts of grace and salvation, but in an effort to be concise, I offer my version of your argument as follows:

1) Heaven was created by God, who is love (1 John 4:8 ).
2) If heaven was created by God, who is love, then heaven is for people who accept God's gift of love by believing and accepting the salvation and grace offered by Jesus.
3) Heaven is the antithesis of hell.
4) Therefore, hell is for people who deny God's gift of love by not believing and not accepting the salvation and grace offered by Jesus.

I welcome your questions and comments. Thanks for reading.