Surely you have something better than a pedestrian attempt at semantics?

Nope.

He used the terms either / or.

Clearly he thought it was a possibility that the Russians only meant to threaten Kiev.

And no amount of copium is going to make those words go away. Sorry.

So Mearsheimer expressly disagrees with you that the northern offensive was just meant to distract Ukrainians while Russians take the south. — Jabberwock

Untrue.

As I have stated before, he expressly considers it a possibility that the Russians meant to threaten Kiev:

The Russian military did not attempt to conquer all of Ukraine. That would have required a classic blitzkrieg strategy that aimed at quickly overrunning all of Ukraine with armored forces supported by tactical airpower.

That strategy was not feasible however, because there were only a 190,000 soldiers in Russia's invading army, which is far too small a force to vanquish and occupy Ukraine, which is not only the largest country between the Atlantic Ocean and Russia, but also has a population of over 40 million people.

You're not gonna conquer, occupy and absorb a country of that size with a 190,000 people. And you're not even gonna have enough troops to launch a classic blitzkrieg, which is essential to conquer the entire country.

Unsurprisingly the Russians pursued a limited aim strategy, which focused at either capturing or threatening Kiev, and conquering a large swathe of territory in eastern and southern Ukraine.

In short, Russia did not have the capability to subdue all of Ukraine, much less conquer other countries in Europe. — John J. Mearsheimer

You understand that nothing he says in that March 2022 interview takes anything away from the contents of the lecture he gave in May 2022.

If anything, the lecture represents a more up-to-date representation of his views.

So I'm not sure what you think you have proven.

... Mearsheimer says himself that the limited objectives that Russia had was to take or threaten Kyiv. — ssu

Ta-daa.

If Russia had started moving towards Kiev in the conservative fashion it advanced upon Kherson, — Paine

I don't see what's conservative about the way the Russians advanced into Kherson. They penetrated quite deeply, and seemed to have encountered very little resistance until they were counter-attacked.

The difference is that Kiev was heavily defended, which should have been entirely expected.

Instead, the Russians attempted an incredibly risky airborne infantry move. — Paine

Leaving the reading of strategic intentions aside, stupid or not, the issue not touched upon in your analysis is that the airborne operation could have worked. — Paine

Your thesis does not make sense of what success might have led to. — Paine

Even if everything went the Russians' way, Kiev was way too heavily defended to be taken given the amount of troops the Russians deployed. Unless you have different information than me, I don't see any way the numbers could be interpreted to fit this idea.

The Russian force movements don't seem to imply they were preparing for a months-long battle either. In the north, huge swathes of land were bypassed and never cleared - something which would have been absolutely crucial in preperation for such a thing.

If they had advanced into Ukraine from Belarus to establish defensive lines as they did in the east, that would have pinned the forces to the northern front more effectively than joy-riding tanks with no infantry support. — Paine

I think that's untrue.

The Russians went into Ukraine being outnumbered, even though military logic would dictate going on the offensive would require a sizable numerical advantage.

This is why the Russians ended up overextended, and retreated from the north in April 2022.

Forming a defensive line in the north and attempting to hold onto both the north and the east was probably unfeasible from the start. Forming a defensive line in the north would have also given away the fact that the Russians had no intention of taking Kiev, which would have severely decreased the strategic impact it might have had.

The feint theory assumes the Russians had a plan going into this, and thus it does not rely on the argument that the Russians were incompetent. That's why I think it is a lot more compelling.

Tzeentch, you have to understand that when you give as reference or say that someone has the same thing in mind, you simply have to have the ability to produce a direct quote or a copy-paste quote that people can see that they really think so — ssu

That's not the video I meant. By now I have dug up and shared these links so many times I can't be bothered to do so again, since none of you seem to take any of the contents to heart anyway.

If you want the information, it's all there in my posts. You use the forum search function to look them up.

I'm past putting any effort into educating you.

If you have information that only 20000-30000 troops were on the Kiev axis, please provide it. — Jabberwock

I already have. Direct communications by the Ukrainian General Staff.

If you had anything better you would have provided it by now, so all of this is just posturing.

Come with sources, or spare yourself the effort of replying.

So now its hypotheticals. — ssu

Essentially everything we talk about here is hypothetical, because hard facts are not available.

I hope this is nothing new for you.

[...] and anybody with the slightest understanding of how militaries work can see that this wasn't a feint. — ssu

Simply untrue.

Mearsheimer considers the possibility in one of his lectures which I have already linked here. Seymour Hersh states it outright in an interview which I have also linked.

But I suppose these are people without "the slightest understanding of how militaries work." Oddly they are also some of the few that go against the western propaganda narrative.

That's not a coincidence.

Understanding that Ukraine put up a fight, understanding the pre-attack intel was horrifically wrong, and above all the attack being got stuck with lots of losses, Russia withdrew it's forces from the Kyiv operations area to reinforce other fronts as a) Ukraine won't follow them to Belarus. [...] , what happened was a withdrawal. — ssu

Even if we would assume everything you write here is true, it does nothing to discredit the feint theory.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the Kyiv attack had not been part of the Feb 24 invasion.

In terms of strategy, what might reasonably have been expected for north-Ukrainian/Kyiv forces? — jorndoe

This is quite hard to say (too many moving parts to make even an educated guess, in my view), but in a general sense if there had been no significant threat to Kiev, the Ukrainian defense would have been a lot denser, because there would have been less frontline to cover. This is generally seen as being in favor of the defender.

More strawmanning.

The amount of BTGs involved in Ukraine is entirely part of your argument.

My argument is that we have information showing 21,000 (numbers ranging between 15,000 - 30,000 depending on different reports) troops moved on Kiev. (and 190,000 troops maximum operating in Ukraine at the onset of the invasion).

That's from where I draw my conclusions.

All this math and mental gymnastics you're doing is you not being able to accept that 21,000 troops is all you have to work with and it's woefully insufficient for what you're claiming the Russians intended.

Stop pretending any of what you're spinning here is part of my argument.

But wait, your whole claim for the 21000 attacking Kiev was supported by the calculation based on that inaccurate assumption. — Jabberwock

Ehm, no.

This was in reply to your claim that 190,000 troops would translate into 283 BTGs.

The confusion lies primarily with you.

If the goals were different, then the invasion force would seek to achieve a goal different than just grabbing the land bridge. — Jabberwock

Taking the land bridge would obviously still be of vital importance, because the negotiations failing was a clear possibility from the start.

Perhaps not all Russian soldiers were deployed in BTGs.

Anyway, the 190,000 figure is provided by Mearsheimer as the upper limit of troops the Russians deployed at the start of the invasion. I don't think that number is actually being seriously disputed, and I take Mearsheimer quite seriously.

I think it's more llkely there's something lacking in your logic, and not in his.

Your claim was that the bridge of Crimea was the primary goal of Russia in the war. Now you also claim that in the negotiations Russians would accept Ukraine out of NATO, but it would lose the bridge. — Jabberwock

The land bridge with Crimea was Russia's primary goal if negotiations failed. There, are you happy now?

You have given the number at least three times. — Jabberwock

Sure. The 21,000 (31 BTGs) figure is pretty solid.

The 190,000 as an upper limit for how many soldiers the Russians field is too.

Those are the numbers I've used.


Your math with how many BTGs the Russians supposedly fielded and what percentage the 31 BTGs participating in the invasion is part of your argument, and not mine. So I'm not sure why you're trying to accuse me of inconsistencies in an argument you are making.

This is strawmanning at its worst.

You just choose to ignore the reality of what has actually happened. — Jabberwock

Taking Kiev with the numbers the Russians fielded was unfeasible, no matter how you twist the numbers. That's the reality you're ignoring.

All you have is 21,000 troops marching on Kiev.

You do not need bargaining chips to negotiate your defeat. — Jabberwock

This is why I told you to look up information about the peace negotiations.

The Russians were bargaining to keep Ukraine out of NATO, and under those circumstances the land bridge to Crimea could be given up.

There's nothing inconsistent about that.

You were already given many clues what their aims might be: Putin's speech, claims of propagandists, the order of the battle etc. You just ignore them. — Jabberwock

That's rather ironic, considering the Russian order of battle included no more than 190,000 troops, making the notion that the Russians had large territorial goals something that can be dismissed outright.

One third of the BTGs were committed to the northern axis, [...] — Jabberwock

We don't know that. That's an assumption that you seem to keep hinging on, so you're questioning your own assumption here, and not mine.

how exactly forming a 60 km immobile column works as a feint? Was it planned or not? — Jabberwock

How should I know?

The question is irrelevant as to what the Russian goals might've been. Columns will be found during any large-scale military operation. Mistakes will be made and losses will be incurred regardless of the Russian goals. That's inherent to military operations.

Your source claimed that Russians were ready to give up the land bridge to Crimea which you claim was the primary goal of the invasion. That basically means that your source claims that Russians were ready to surrender their primary goals. — Jabberwock

If you take half a second to think about what you just wrote, you'll understand why this isn't contradictory at all.

Why would they need 'threatening Kiev' for that? — Jabberwock

To negotiate you need bargaining chips. Kind of obvious.

They took some land, but the goals of the war were not achieved. It is a matter of interpretation how much success is that. — Jabberwock

I think the primary goal of the invasion was safeguarding a land bridge to Crimea. However, neither me nor you know what the actual Russian goals are/were.

Western media have tried hard to spread a narrative that the Russians were essentially hoping to take over all of Ukraine. Of course, given such a narrative it is easy to frame the Russian operations as a massive failure.

However, scholars such as Mearsheimer underline that given the 190,000 troops that participated in the initial invasion, the Russian goals must have been limited. Mearsheimer doesn't rule out the possibility that the operations in the north were meant to threaten (and not capture) either.

Seymour Hersh in one of his interviews states directly Kiev was a feint, and the number of Ukrainian defenders in and around Kiev he puts on 60,000. With that, we arrive at a whopping 180,000 troops necessary to reach a bare minimum of a 3:1 advantage with which the Russian could go on the offensive.

Instead, we see 21,000.

There is literally no way these numbers could be interpreted to support your view.

We could halve the number of Ukrainian defenders to 30,000, and double the Russian troops to 40,000, and we wouldn't come close to numbers with which the Russians could realistically take Kiev.

I was just pointing out that the source you have provided contradicts your previous claims. — Jabberwock

It's perfectly possible for a military operation to have multiple purposes, so I'm not sure where you're getting this idea.

The fact that it was unable to sustain its movements shows their embarassingly bad execution, not lack of trying. — Jabberwock

I think the casualty figures clearly imply said lack of trying.

No, committing one third of forces to a diversion is not reasonable, it is absurd. — Jabberwock

That leaves less than 40 in the South, for the 'real' offensive. — Jabberwock

And the southern operations were successful, weren't they?

So now you are claiming [...] — Jabberwock

I'm hypothesizing.

I suggest you read up on the peace negotiations that took place during March / April 2022.

First of all, you haven't given ANY reasoning for your idea (here ↪Tzeentch) — ssu

I have provided my reasoning, in our current discussion and the many we have had before.

But in case it was unclear, my reasoning is:

- 21,000 troops are completely insufficient to capture Kiev. It doesn't even come close.
- The behavior of the Russian forces does not suggest a blitz.
- The casualty figures do not suggest intense fighting.

Then even the link that you gave yourself states done in February 26th states: — ssu

Kyiv axis: Russia’s likely main effort to rapidly isolate Kyiv and force the Ukrainian
government to capitulate has failed as of February 26.

As I said, I'm not particularly impressed by the ISW's analysis and I disagree with most of it. But they do provide hard data - 31 BTGs. That's why I referenced it.

Hence Russians advancing in long columns close together is an obvious irrefutable proof that they weren't suspecting a fierce fight from the Ukrainians. — ssu

You'll find long columns during virtually any large-scale military operation, so I don't share your point of view this is 'obvious and irrefutable proof'. It's nowhere close.

They expected a blitz and failed. — Jabberwock

A blitz means punching through defensive lines with massed numbers and firepower. In a blitz operation one doesn't stop at the first sign of resistance, but will attempt to overpower the defensive lines with maximum force to keep the momentum going.

Had this been the Russians' intention, we would have seen a lot more casualties and intense fighting.

Do you think it is reasonable to use one third of invasion forces for a diversion? — Jabberwock

Yes, I think that's perfectly reasonable.

A threat must be credible in order to serve as a diversion. Consider also that the threatening of Kiev may have had an additional objective, namely that of getting Ukraine and NATO to the negotiating table.

Russia and Ukraine in fact entered negotiations shortly after the invasion, and we have accounts that claim there was a peace accord being written up before the negotiations were blocked by the US.

The 31 BTGs, roughly equivalent to 21,000 troops, comes from an ISW report, which in turn gets the figure directly from communications by the Ukrainian General Staff on the days of the invasion.

The 70,000 figure comes from an off-hand comment by Ukrainian Defense official Oleksandr Pavliuk which was made several months after the fact. There's no mention in the ISW reports of 70,000 troops.

That of course doesn't add up.

If the Russians really wanted to occupy Kiev, why is there no mention of these extra 50,000 troops anywhere else, including in any of the ISW reports? To take a city with several million inhabitants they would have needed every soldier they had. If you want to argue they participated, show it to me.

One would expect these forces on the frontline, attempting to punch through Ukrainian defensive lines with massed firepower in a classic blitz.

We saw nothing of the sort.

Casualty figures surrounding the Kiev and Kharkiv offensives (as far as those are known) do not reflect prolonged high-intensity combat, with casualties over a two-and-a-half-month period ranging in the hundreds up to perhaps a few thousand for both battles respectively.

Compare this to the casualty figures of the battle of Bakhmut, and you will see the story doesn't add up.

Besides, the RUSI article used captured plans to make out what the plans were. — ssu

'Captured plans' - sure. Show them to me.

Ironically, RUSI seems to use ISW's daily reports as its main source, most of which I've actually read, and I wasn't terribly impressed with them.

The reports provide very little hard evidence. The 31 BTG figure is one of the more concrete numbers they give, and it's retracable directly to its source, coming from the people directly involved.

Until you can give me a hard figure that shows something different, all your arguments are just conjecture. And so are RUSI's, or ISW's for that matter. No data, no bueno.

Still no sources. I've already given you mine.

Also, what losses are you talking about here?

If this would have been a feint, then obviously it would have been totally different. The forces wouldn't have been committed to face such losses. — ssu

Sources, or no bueno.

The whole goddam battle for Kiyv wasn't even going on!!! — ssu

What a curious remark, coming from someone who keeps referencing the battle of Hostomel Airport (24th - 25th of February by the way, when "the goddamn battle of Kiev wasn't even going on").


Anyway, your source provides nothing in the way of troop counts, so I'm not sure what you believe it proves.

First of all, where do you get the number 20,000? — ssu

It was reported directly by the Ukrainian general staff.

31 BTGs, each comprised of roughly 600 - 800 officers and soldiers, amounts to roughly 21,000 troops.

The Russians hoping to take Kiev with 20,000 troops is a laughable fantasy.

Sorry. but it can't be put in any other way.

It's pretty obvious that the Russians in terms of territory aimed for south eastern Ukraine. However, admitting as much would mean admitting the Russians may have achieved some sort of victory, which is of course anathema in western media.

I prefer your sense of humor over your interpretation of the facts.

A diversion, most likely.

There's a strategic element to it as well, where the West might've been persuaded to the negotiating table upon Kiev being threatened. That's in fact what happened in the early stage of the war, but the US blocked negotiations.

A shame, because back then purportedly a peace agreement lay on the table that kept Ukraine almost entirely intact in terms of territory.

Kiev is well outside of the realm of reason. Let there be no misunderstanding about that based on my last reply.

The plan was to take Kiev, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Odessa, possibly Dnipro. If it suceeded, there would be little to no resistance, as the entire government structure would collapse (with Lviv being the only remaining bigger center). Ukrainians would have no choice but to accept peace on very unfavorable terms, most likely with puppet Russian government installed. How exactly does that 'dismiss the entire western narrative of the Ukraine war'? — Jabberwock

The dismissal happens when I measure your narrative to the 190,000 figure, and conclude that there is no way a 190,000 troops could have achieved the goals you purport the Russians had.

In fact, had the Russians intended to take and hold Kiev, 190,000 troops would barely be able to achieve just that, assuming 60,000 Ukrainian defenders (which is roughly what sources seem to agree on).

And they would have been able to achieve nothing else.

However, we know only ~20,000 Russsian troops participated in the Battle of Kiev.

You see a discrepancy here?

The Russian army went into Ukraine with at the very most a 190,000 troops. There is absolutely no way the Russian army, comprised of a 190,000 troops, could conquer all of Ukraine. — John J. Mearsheimer

I'd just like to point out how absolutely pivotal a piece of information like this (that has been public knowledge for a while) is to deciphering the actual goings-on vis-à-vis Ukraine.

For many months now I have defended the position (leaning quite often on Mearsheimer's arguments, I will admit) that the Russians never intended to take over all of Ukraine with their initial invasion.

Unless someone wants to argue the 190,000 figure is false, we can essentially dismiss the entire western narrative of the Ukraine war. I hope people realise that.

Present Russia is a prime example of a country where it's leaders are so seduced about it's imagined greatness they will ruin everything absolutely everything. — ssu

Ironically, this describes Washington equally well.

For once in America's recent history, it's realpolitik goals and the morality of the situation happen to intersect: helping the Ukrainians is the right thing to do. — RogueAI

The Americans played a principal role in causing this war. They have no moral high ground to speak of.

This reminds me a little of the Chinese balloon incident, which many claimed was merely a story purposely blown up to divert attention to various failures of US policy.

Having said all that, if I was the Russians I would be very very nervous because, in the immortal words from the opening scene in Patton : "Americans are winners, we hate to lose and love to win" And in this instance winning is going to require something from left field. — yebiga

And not just the Russians.

The US empire spanned the whole globe, and it's unlikely the Americans will let it crumble without a fight. The key question is where that fight is going to take place, since it seems the US is already weak to a degree that it cannot fight on all fronts.

In my view, it won't be in Ukraine, since the United States shows no real commitment to a Ukrainian victory. Besides, Ukraine holds no direct strategic value for the United States, and its involvement there has more to do with attempts at hamstringing the Russians, which already seem to have failed.

Then there's the Persian Gulf - the most important geopolitical area to the US, outside of the American mainland. Again, no sign of a reaction from the US while the area completely seems to slip from its grasp, into the hands of its former adversaries and geopolitical rivals. This is perhaps most shocking of all, and way more significant than anything that happens in Ukraine from a geopolitical point of view.


The only place where the American sphere seems more or less intact is the Pacific, and with China being the real peer competitor to the US (not the Russians or the Iranians, etc.), this is where I believe the US will make its stand.

However, in typical fashion the Chinese are biding their time, essentially waiting for the US to weaken further, as it's unable to commit to other threats to its sphere in fear of losing its grasp over the Pacific.

In an ironic twist the Americans' trump card - Taiwan - seems to have turned into its achilles heel, basically requiring constant attention under threat of a Chinese invasion, disallowing them from turning their attention to other flashpoints.

The UN voted a few times prior, but the suggestion of peacekeepers and votes could depart some from that, or at least perhaps bring more of what the parties want out in the open.
Worthwhile? Try? Waste of time? Futile? — jorndoe

The UN General Assembly can vote, but such votings have no actual power. Only Security Council resolutions do.

So until both sides are interested in a truce, these types of proposals should be seen as more political in nature. A way for nations to signal their stance on issues.

As long as one or both sides are interested in continuing the war, UN involvement is practically impossible. For one, because Russia can veto any UN resolution it doesn't like, and secondly, one of the basic principles of UN peacekeeping is to have consent of all involved parties.

I'm sitting across the table from a self-identifying incel of the virulent online kind I've earlier described. Let's call him a friend of a friend I have just met. He brazenly begins to expound on his misogynistic world view. What do I do? Is silence complicit? Is compassion complicit? Is polite debate legitimizing? Is opprobrium counter-productive? I'm reminded of Nietzsche's advice that to spare someone shame is the greatest charity but this someone is so immersed in shame and so apparently in love with it, it seems that neither further shaming nor compassion can work. What can work? We don't want them leaving the table thinking talking this way has no consequences but we can't batter them into submission either. — Baden

It depends on what one's goal is.

If one genuinely wishes to help a person, anything that might nudge them in the direction of self-reflection would be enough. Rather than attempting to convince a person of their faulty ways in one fell swoop (such an approach virtually always fails), a single thought-provoking question may be enough to get a person to reflect. Note that asking such a question may signal one's disagreement in a non-judgemental way.

If one's goal is to punish or discipline, then probably one ought to consider first whether it is one's place to do so.

If one is defending against what one perceives to be a threat to one's own beliefs, then the issue lies as much with oneself as it does with the other person.

The latter two goals are in most cases not going to be constructive. One's energy is best spent elsewhere.

Going by the comments I have read on this thread, most seem to pursue the latter two goals, hence the lack of constructivity.




For those interested in the wider social context of this 'incel' phenomenon I would recommend this documentary on Japanese 'hikikomori'; young, socially isolated hermits.




The Japanese generally seem to have a more 'enlightened' way of dealing with social problems. Perhaps the fact that Japanese society at least makes an attempt at helping these people urges them to reflect rather than become resentful, which seems to be what happens in the West.

Uhh, actually no.

It's not so simple, actually. — ssu

I never said it was simple.

I said the fact that Russian air defense systems being able to take down anti-radiation missiles is a critical difference which your example doesn't account for.

The real issue is fire discipline and the ability for the radar operator to know when to shut his radar off. The survival of a SAM unit isn't in it's ability to shoot down missiles, it's simply to understand when to not use the radar, when not to engage when to engage. Move and conceal your SAM's and use them only when the situation favors you. — ssu

Air defense systems have a purpose: to defend critical targets.

When they have to turn off their radars and reposition to dodge incoming missiles, SEAD is effectively Suppressing the system while (assumedly) other air assets are taking advantage of this.

Thus, being able to take down these incoming missiles rather than having to relocate is a big advantage.

Obviously you need both, but once you have the air force capable of winning air superiority, then you don't need so much GBAD. — ssu

Since Ukraine and probably also Russia will not meet that criterium at any point during this conflict, I don't see why this would be relevant.

Ok, first an S-300 or S-400 system is quite useless without it's radars working. — ssu

Of course. The key here being that radars can be replaced. To destroy these modern systems it would take a lot more.

Old iron bombs were used in Vietnam, so even that can work (if one is very careful). — ssu

Unguided bombs versus an S-400?

I pity the pilot who gets that job.

If the Ukrainians were keen on losing their F-16s as fast as possible, they'd use this approach.

A great example is Israeli attack on Syria GBAD in the Bekaa Valley during "Peace for Galilee" operation named Operation Mole Cricket 19. The Syrian systems weren't so old in the early 1980's. — ssu

You're comparing two different eras.

The Syrian air defenses weren't able to engage the anti-radiation missiles fired by the Israelis, because ground-based anti-missile defense wasn't really a thing back then. All their anti-air systems (coming from the '60s, mind you) were built to engage air planes.

Russian air defense can engage incoming missiles, and the AGM-88, even the G variant, falls well within its maximum target velocity.

This is of course a crucial difference.

No, it is true. Just look at history: if you have a capable air force that can gain air superiority, then most of the kills will be done in air-to-air combat. Air superiority is the single most important factor in
deciding the outcome of a modern conventional war. And when either side cannot gain air superiority, well, you have a war that likely will go on for a long time. Hence for the Ukrainian air force as it is smaller than the Russian air force, it's first objective is simply just to exist. — ssu

Exactly. And not having any combat aircraft is a huge disadvantage: even having a small contingent of aircraft that are sheltered and not used are basically a fleet-in-being. As long as they exist, it limits the actions of the other side.

First of all, GBAD cannot gain air superiority above enemy territory. Hence aircraft are crucial in winning an air war. An effective GBAD will result in what basically has happened in Ukraine: the other side simply won't fly in the area where there is the effective GBAD. That's what GBAD can do. But it won't destroy the enemy air force if the enemy doesn't fly. In this war both sides have opted just to use artillery, fire missiles at each other from their own airspace protected by their own GBAD. — ssu

The idea that an air force is a "more effective" method of air defense is untrue, as I explained. It functions as part of an air defense network, and it won't function on its own.

But you simply can have early warning system and get the jets into the air to intercept them. — ssu

All my objections assume early warning.

My country's own air force has dealt with this from it's birth and has never assumed to gain air superiority. For some reason, you never saw them flying high during the Cold War, but dashing on treetop level when flying from one place to another. — ssu

Even if the S-400 has a great range, again basic physics comes to play as you remarked to Boethius. The Earth is round and also Ukraine a big country. Hence you can do the math just how this effects target acquisition of radars and their ability to track low flying aircraft. — ssu

This is obvious.

You don't seem to understand that flying low severely limits the effectiveness of fighter aircraft, especially for a nation like Ukraine which is starved for resources.

Your argument was that the weapon system was old. — ssu

No. My argument was that modern Russian AA like S-300 and S-400 can shoot the AGM-88 down.

Why don't you do your due diligence and figure out what type of AGM-88 the Ukrainians are receiving and how that relates to my argument?