Sometimes, it is difficult to distinguish what is a genuine desire to understand from a confident assertion that something is the case. Oh wait, you were talking about other people.

I have read this text before. Are you offering it as an argument in the context of the discussion underway?

The material world we live now is a shadow of the true world of Idea. — Corvus

We live in the shadow of our images, the results of our attempts to imagine what is happening. Noticing that is happening doesn't put the "material world" in a place. That would be pretty arrogant after just saying you didn't know what things are.

Yes, that passage is the start of the argument against the "scientists." But before the explanation of what should be accepted as "natural" is given, the matter is connected to the role of convention:

[890a] is at that time authoritative, though it owes its existence to art and the laws, and not in any way to nature. All these, my friends, are views which young people imbibe from men of science, both prose-writers and poets, who maintain that the height of justice is to succeed by force; whence it comes that the young people are afflicted with a plague of impiety, as though the gods were not such as the law commands us to conceive them; and, because of this, factions also arise, when these teachers attract them towards the life that is right “according to nature,” which consists in being master over the rest in reality, instead of being a slave to others according to legal convention. — Plato, Laws 890,translated by R.G. Bury

The matter of nature versus convention is being directly connected to a discussion of who is above the law. That certainly did not come up when I studied the behavior of fruit flies. It involves other issues than a person believing or not believing in a divine agent. The next statement from the Athenian brings in a tiny bit of Socratic persuasion while considering proper punishment for the crime:

What, then, do you think the lawgiver ought to do, seeing that these people have been armed in this way for a long time past? Should he merely stand up in the city and threaten all the people that unless they affirm that the gods exist and conceive them in their minds to be such as the law maintains2 and so likewise with regard to the beautiful and the just and all the greatest things, [890c] as many as relate to virtue and vice, that they must regard and perform these in the way prescribed by the lawgiver in his writings; and that whosoever fails to show himself obedient to the laws must either be put to death or else be punished, in one case by stripes and imprisonment, in another by degradation, in others by poverty and exile? But as to persuasion, should the lawgiver, while enacting the people's laws, refuse to blend any persuasion with his statements, and thus tame them so far as possible? [890d] — Ibid

The Dialogues challenge us to ask how much to accept or question convention while seeking the actual Good rather than poor copies of it. The distance between that openness to discover what is not known and this argument for the gods upon the basis of service is large.

I spoke too broadly when saying the account of soul in the Laws did not fit the story of the Timaeus. It is an edited version of some details to serve a rhetorical purpose. Regarding how to view "materialism" versus "form" there is this observation:

Athenian: The sun's body is seen by everyone, its soul by no one. And the same is true of the soul of any other body, whether alive or dead, of living beings. There is, however, a strong suspicion that this class of object, which is wholly imperceptible to sense, [898e] has grown round all the senses of the body,2 and is an object of reason alone. Therefore by reason and rational thought let us grasp this fact about it,—
Clinias: What fact?
Athenian: If soul drives round the sun, we shall be tolerably sure to be right in saying that it does one of three things.
Clinias: What things?
Athenian: That either it exists everywhere inside of this apparent globular body and directs it, such as it is, just as the soul in us moves us about in all ways; or, having procured itself a body of fire or air (as some argue), it in the form of body pushes forcibly on the body from outside; [899a] or, thirdly, being itself void of body, but endowed with other surpassingly marvellous potencies, it conducts the body. — Ibid

It sounds like what we have sorted out as materialist or not in our modern lexicon is not a deal breaker to accepting the divine for Plato.

The law is arbitrary and and does not fit with the Timaeus or the limits of understanding the natural world as expressed by Socrates in a number of dialogues.
The use of the statement as a justification for outlawing impiety is interesting because it defends the existence of gods by demanding a certain view of the natural world rather than citing how angry gods will get if not worshiped properly.

The first is that Socrates confines the possibilities of what death is to just two things, which correspond to the atheistic and theistic versions: there are no third nor fourth, etc, options available. Why does belief in god(s) require the immortality of soul? Because we wouldn’t believe in them unless we were granted the same immortality they enjoy? — Leghorn

That is an interesting question. It reflects how our use of the division "atheist versus theist" is a species of the "modern educated liberal student " you referred to before. In the Laws, starting from 885b, Plato argues that the legislation of piety requires declaring that the soul was created prior to all other things as the explanation for natural causes. This entangles the distinction between what is natural from what is artificial in terms quite different foreign from our modern discourse. We take the recourse to adequate means to seek natural causes for granted. Plato did not have recourse to such a nifty tool.

The way we treat theism/atheism as an inseparable pair may frame our desire for immortality as the reason we talk of the gods.
It does not help address these questions from Fooloso4:

When the question of whether or not Socrates was an atheist is raised we need to ask just what specifically it is that one thinks is being denied or affirmed. Did he believe in the gods of the city? Did he believe in one or more of the gods recognized as gods today? — Fooloso4

There is no doubt that in the Ancient Greek worldview going back to Homer and probably before, language calls things into being by naming them. The poets craft images of things by calling or naming them into existence. Poetry, poiesis comes from the verb poieo, “make”, “produce”, “cause”. Hence Plato calls the Maker or Creator of the Cosmos ho Poion (Timaeus 76c). — Apollodorus

The dialogue of Cratylus specifically addresses the matter. Unlike the presentation of the Timaeus, Socrates offers an opinion upon it.

As for Jim deciding for herself whether or not her conduct is religious, I wonder what Jim's opinion ads to our understanding. For instance, in the case referenced, the chaplain is a member of religious order, but there still seems to be quite the debate as to whether his atheism precludes his religiosity regardless of his views on the matter. If meaning is use and Jim calls herself religious, I suppose it is one more piece of evidence in favor of Jim being so, but as participants in the language community (or at least this forum), don't we get to evaluate Jim's conduct for ourselves? — Ennui Elucidator

I take your point that Jim is presenting his case in front of a community whose language connects meanings in ways that include him and his listeners. I did not mean to introduce the element of the personal as an example suggesting otherwise but as evidence, of a kind, that might support your view.

I can accept some elements of your thesis while objecting to other parts of it at the same time.

I have to admit at the outset that I am unable to entertain the idea of predestination as an alternative to the role necessity plays in various attempts to understand causality. I sort of can see it as a premise to a science fiction novel. I usually pass out before finishing those.

I get the idea of accepting fate as a package one cannot avoid. What connects that awareness of the situation to saying the outcome is not dependent upon our response?

It is pleasant to be cast in exciting movies that I will never appear in. I appreciate the attention.
I have no idea what you are talking about, however.
I meant to discourage rude behavior and now I am in a Fellini movie, riding with others in a car, wondering what the other passengers are on.

He doesn't know what we will choose. That part is the philosophical part of the discussion — Gregory

It is also "theologically" relevant because the Gospels present Jesus saying that not everybody is going to be saved. The mustard seed grows in some places but not in others.

If it is not really a test, the whole enterprise is absurd.

I figure Jim will have to decide that question for herself.

In the context of the shared language we now use to agree or disagree, the expressions of religious differences generally refer to one personal view of the world versus another. The reason we can use theism versus atheism as a division that doesn't require much qualification is because of a broad acceptance toward seeing the matter through the lens of what a person accepts or denies to be happening.

That common ground is not a great fit with the "religion as a language community" that was expressed through centuries of mortal conflict with other "languages."

In the key of talking and the desire for language, I am reminded of my favorite prayer: "Lord, please situate a table between me and my enemies."

I did not mean to say that you did.
I was asking if you had skin it the game, and if not, what was your interest?

If you have a thesis you think opposes another, state what that is.
Badgering other people to answer leading questions is juvenile.

It's seems like a comparison of two perspectives in order to make a point. Thinking you know something and being wrong about it is two mistakes. Socrates at worst just didn't know anything. It's meant to show the value of a classic skeptical position relative to over confidence or unawareness of ignorance. It is illustrative and obviously not a personal inventory of Socrates knowledge. Has this really been confusing people? — Cheshire

As far as I know, Apollodorus is the only one to have suggested that such a personal inventory is what was meant. The OP uses that personal inventory to argue against the position he imagines others are taking.

There is still a lot at stake in the matter.
I don't want to suggest I have a greater understanding by wanting to approach the problem through specific arguments rather than accept it as a self explanatory condition. Perhaps the limitation is mine and mine alone.

If you are going to refer to Christianity, treating it as an established body of agreed belief runs into the problem of how many people have died expressing alternate versions.

I wonder whether you care about the answer to your question. If you are talking about a problem other people are having but you do not, what is the point of bringing it up?

I found Spinoza addressed the problem as I was having it. It seems like your question regarding duality involves something else. Wondering if the fear of death shaped the divisions formed in metaphysics is a project of psychology and a formidable one at that.

I figure Wayfarer and 180 have shown the "mind /body problem" as the child of metaphysics, so it is connected to it by default. I agree with 180 that Spinoza provides the most elegant surpassing of it. By emphasizing that there is more than one kind of phenomenology, I meant to wonder if the mind body problem exists outside of framing it as one. Is it a component of the human condition that needs to addressed like death and taxes?

My comment regarding the physical aspect of the mind was not really germane to the distinction I was making about the Cogitatio. The isolation and immediacy of the thinking "I" is separated from everything it is not. That is not equivalent to separating the "mind" from the "body" in the manner of Aristotle, for example.

The phenomenology that developed from the separation has gone along many different paths following different premises.

In the course of arguing with aspects of Husserl's phenomenology, Ortega y Gasset gives a very cogent view of Descartes in his What is Philosophy. I would quote some but I cannot find a free version online and I lent my copy to someone.

Whoa there, fellow reader of the Dialogues.
I did not mean to argue whether Socrates was an atheist or not.
You referred to a bit of text as amounting to something. I took issue with the reading.
If the difference is not a difference in your mind, just ignore it.

If there is a part of the body that is considered to be where the mind hangs out, then Descartes' distinction challenges all the others, including yours.

If it cannot be relied upon to map out the terrain you wish to travel, is it a distinction without a difference?

That might be an interesting question. Without an argument, it leaves your reader to fill in what you have not.
I am done with guessing what other people might mean.

in the Phaedo (98b) Socrates relates how he started his true philosophical career by renouncing Anaxagoras' materialism. — Apollodorus

He did not renounce it, he declared it insufficient for his purpose to understand the causes of things.

I do agree that the 'I' is hard to explain as an entity rather than us being a mass of experience. — Jack Cummins

I was hoping to separate Descartes' project from any that would explain the difference between identity and experience. Rather than viewing the isolation as a desiderata, consider it as refuge from the churning struggle over what a person was and why they were here. Wars over religion, the Inquisition, the struggle to have a nice bath, it all gets too much after a while.

Descartes does not own the isolated self. Think of it as a studio apartment he is renting from who ever built the place. He has access 24/7 but is not permitted to furnish the place; And don't even think about having girls stay overnight.

I believe that it is this which lead to the idea of dualism in the first place, because even if it is illusory, it involves a certain sense of distance or separation from the body and experience itself, and it is this 'I' of consciousness which many believed to be an inner aspect of consciousness which could even survive death potentially. — Jack Cummins

I am suggesting that the duality of Descartes was, ironically, an attempt to escape the duality discussed for centuries regarding the soul.

I expressed myself poorly.
Descartes argues that "I", the thinker, the one who can doubt what is understood, cannot doubt that such thinking is happening. To arrive at the necessity of the isolated thinker is not to view oneself as a resource or explain the necessity in any way:

As a result of these considerations, I begin to recognize what I am somewhat better and with better clarity and distinctness than heretofore. But nevertheless, it still seems to me, and I cannot keep myself from believing that corporeal things, image of which are formed by thought and which the senses themselves examine, are much more distinctly known than that indescribable part of myself which cannot be pictured by the imagination. — Decartres, Second Meditation, translated by L.J. Lafleur (emphasis mine)

How it came to be that such an "I" should exist amongst thoughts of what is not I is not explained nor can it be from this vantage point.

Going back to Descartes, the awareness of the 'I' was about going within oneself, but alongside this, was the exploration of the outer world, and empirical investigations. — Jack Cummins

Saying: "the awareness of the 'I' was about going within oneself" makes it sound like a resource or a means of understanding only available to a person isolated from other persons. At least some part of Descartes' purpose was to oppose any view of subjectivity that did not accept the manifest quality of it.

That is a country mile from explaining where to find this "I" amongst what is not "I"

Apart from the question of rights and whether guns help protect them, there is a beautiful form of life to be found through being able to go out and buy breakfast without a thought at all about who might interrupt that. Being compelled to strap on a piece before setting out kills the vibe and my freedom to seek it out.

I have lived in places where gun ownership did encourage a recognition of boundaries. I have lived in places where that forced people to live in shameful and disgusting ways.

It is funny how an instrument can be taken up to escape compulsion and yet lead to new forms of compulsion. Cue the Pesci bit in Goodfellas regarding the different possible meanings of "funny."

I just lost ten pounds from reading that.
Don't worry, I am still not permitted to wear Lycra according to a strict interpretation of the guidelines.

Cant I delete this question? — Prishon

That is one for the Mods.
Being a Rocker, I am not qualified to say.

I don't think of it as a matter of people necessarily having no recourse than such a response. Trolls do exist. The utility of identifying them during a conversation is certainly worth asking about. I question the utility of you doing so immediately after complaining about it.

I see it as a species of meta-discussion, where the discussion itself comes to dominate the discussion. I have come to regret a number of times when I participated in such.
They often become traffic circles that don't provide any actual exits.

It would be easy for a modern educated liberal student of him to be unable to believe that Socrates actually believed in gods— and it would be difficult for a theist not to be heartened by Socrates’ prayers and worship. To the former I would point out all these signs of Socrates’ piety; to the latter, I would point out that we cannot know what is really going on in the mind of a man who prays silently. — Leghorn

Well said.

That observation returns us to the beginning of the OP and the proposal of a continuity of meaning from Plato down through the last of the Neoplatonists. However one stands upon the issue, the latter are unmistakably theist in their language and read Plato as a unified cosmogony. Augustine took hold of the package and remodeled it for the purpose of explicating Christian doctrine.

In the context of those conditions, being able to read Plato without assuming it was a theological text is a relatively recent development.

I accept the withdrawal of your arguments from opining what other people might think.
Good night.

Don't worry, I will follow your example :grin: — Apollodorus

Do you mean by dealing with statements as given rather than avoiding challenges they might incur?

In any case, I hope that your lack of accountability to others means you will no longer be claiming who other people are or what they think.

Nor do you take responsibility for what you say.

How was I to know that this is what you were arguing??? — Apollodorus

I don't know. How about all the efforts made to bring it to your attention? Or the attempt to separate the problem from other positions you had taken?

After that, how can I know what you are able to know?

Wow.

I am arguing for a distinction to be recognized and after pages of you dodging the problem, you now suggest that I am the one denying it because Socrates knows of the distinction.

It is rare when such heights of rhetorical persuasion have been reached by mortal man.

The importance of the statement involves the distinction between opinion and knowledge, as demonstrated throughout the dialogues.

It does not refer to whether he recognizes beings from one day to the next. This has been repeatedly pointed out to you.

My previous comment aside, you still have not explained why Socrates claims to be ignorant when you wish to qualify the statement as not really meaning what it sounds like it means.

That is the only thesis I am trying to address. If it is not worthy of answering, just ignore it.