As the Wiki article goes on to note, the nature of the distinction between nous and "the processing of sensory perception, including the use of imagination and memory, which other animals can do" was and is a highly contested topic. The following passage is particularly focused upon:

"For that which acts is always superior to that which is affected, and the first principle to the matter.[Actual knowledge is identical with its object; but potential knowledge is prior in time in the individual but not prior even in time in general] ; and it is not the case that it sometimes thinks and at other times not. In separation it is just what it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal. (But we do not remember because this is unaffected whereas the passive intellect is perishable, and without this thinks nothing." — Aristotle, De Anima, 430a18, translated by D.W Hamlyn

As Aristotle goes on to develop the differences between perception and thinking in Chapter 7, he says the following:

To the thinking soul images serve as sense-perceptions (aisthemata). And when it asserts or denies good or bad, it avoids or pursues it. Hence the soul never thinks without an image. — ibid, 431a8

With these set of conditions being put forth as an explanation of our experience, "divine illumination" seems to be the only light bulb around.

I would strongly advise against reading Maimonides. He probably had no access to Platonic texts and learned about Plato through Arabs like al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. He complained that there are so many parables in Plato's writing one can dispense with it and stick to Aristotle. The fact that he is held in high esteem by the likes of Leo Strauss speaks volumes. — Apollodorus

I am open to arguments for or against this or that point of view. But to propose not reading an author is an odd proposition. How will we know how right you are if we don't try it out for ourselves?

Seeing Ecclesiastes and Maimonides: Guide for the Perplexed together reminds me that Spinoza tried to be a bridge between the ancient and the modern. The perspective of change happening over generations is a difficult perspective. It has been tried before.

Yes, a good resource. That is where I quote text from.

The Nag Hammadi Library. — Noble Dust

Yes. They are literally messages in a bottle. Usually, what gets erased stays that way.

In the context of the Dialogue of that name, the idea of recollection was introduced, proposing we are able to understand new things because we already have a kind of understanding of them.
You seem intent upon separating the "paradox" from one of the possible solutions.
How does your approach relate to leaving the Platonic element out of it?

That is a tough measure. But there it is.

If we refer to Aristotelian terminology, and his effort to disambiguate the use of "cause", we'd see that the ratios would constitute the "formal cause". However, there is still a need for an "efficient cause", as the source of activity. Efficient cause is "cause" as we generally use it. We do not, in our common language use, refer to principles like ratios as causes. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not sure how the observation relates to your dispute with Fooloso4 but Aristotle did wrestle with distinguishing "cause" from essence in a use of language sort of way:

We should not ignore the fact that sometimes we are unaware of whether a name signifies the composite substance, or the actuality or shape, for example, whether "a house" signifies the composite, that is a covering made of bricks and stones laid in such-and-such a manner, or actuality or form, that is, a covering, whether a "line" signifies twoness in length or twoness, and whether an animal signifies a soul in a body or a soul; for it is the soul which is the substance of the actuality of a certain body. The name "an animal" may also be applied to both, not as having the same the same formula when asserted of both, but a being related to one thing. But, although these distinctions contribute something to another inquiry, they contribute nothing to the inquiry of sensible substances, for the essence belongs to the form or actuality
For a soul and the essence of the soul are the same, but the essence of "a man" is not the same as a man, unless the soul is called "a man" accordingly, in some cases, a thing and its essence are the same, in others this is not so. — Aristotle, Metaphysics, translated by Hippocrates G Apostle, Book Eta, Chapter3

6
It seems hard to separate conformation bias from appreciation of interesting ideas. — jgill

That is a difficult element to examine. One cannot claim a universal answer for everybody because what is interesting to some people is boring to others.

So, maybe there is a an objective world that is what it is but we will never be able to talk about it without confusion because of the way we talk about things.

Things that exist don't care what we think about them. That is not to say that our intentions will not change those things. They do all the time.
But "we" do not understand how that works.
Not yet, anyway.

Point taken.
So how do you see it connected to something you care about?

It is like Pascal's wager but there are differences.
Pascal presumed you had some days to live before the end so changing your relationship to it could kick in before one's death. The offer only being viable for a limited time.

Socrates doesn't have a lot of time left. He does not seem interested in making some last minute deals.

How does that "logical sense" relate to anything I might experience?
We get to see what power does in our lives.What does imagining having an "infinite" amount of the stuff relate to our circumstances?

Hmmn, the creator with a death wish.
Creatures are not necessarily on board.

The thing about psychology (as opposed to other speculative enterprises like, say, evolutionary biology), is that one has to have a theory. We can't just postpone speculation until we've honed the method to a properly scientific one, we interact with other people all the time, we make decision which affect them. Every time we do this we do so on the basis of some theory about their psyche which dictates how we think they'll respond. So we can't do without psychology, we're all psychologists. It's just a question of whether we can do anything to even slightly improve the utility of our models. — Isaac

That seems like a good description of the Boulder Model, which is the basis for training "scientist-practitioners." From what I have heard from clinical psychologists, many institutions handle cases as teams, consisting of a number of disciplines to develop diagnosis and response. Taking responsibility for treatment is a demanding and complicated process.

I don't know. It seems like you take the "discipline" needed for granted. Socrates does not seem to take efforts of those kind for granted. It is a rare moment when he simply concedes a point of view.

In any case, I don't recognize my comment in your reply. It does not appear worthy of effort from your point of view.

Maybe the suffering is the knowledge that things can be scarce and can always be taken away? — TiredThinker

That seems likely. But putting it that way does not frame desire as a process we have options for. The texts suggest a course of action is recommended in spite of circumstances; not providing an explanation but proposing a degree of freedom.

Your point is well taken that Socrates demands direct engagement with ideas from his interlocutors and eschews arguments based upon authority.
It is also true the conversations between say, Socrates and Cebes in the Phaedo and Socrates and Theodorus in the Theaetatus, are shaped by the degrees of mutual understanding possible between one and the other.

On the other hand, so much of the work of Socrates was to question what "personal" expressions of experience might mean seen against the background of our world.

There is the drubbing of Protagoras in Theaetatus claiming "man is the measure of all things."

In the Philebus, Socrates influences the views of Protarchus concerning the centrality of pleasure in human experience by prefacing his argument thusly:

"Well then, Protarchus, don't let us shut our eyes to the variety that attaches to your good as to mine. Let us have the varieties fairly before us and make a bold venture in the hope that they may, on inspection, reveal whether we ought to give the title of the good to pleasure or to intelligence or to some third thing. For I imagine we are not striving merely to secure a victory for my suggestions or for yours; rather we ought both of us fight in support of the truth and the whole truth."
-translated by R. Hackworth, section: 14 b

In the Cratylus, Socrates moves Hermogenes to accept that the meaning of names is neither completely arbitrary or necessary. In the latter part of the dialogue, Socrates argues with Cratylus about the importance of the original "namers', saying:

"Socrates: Well, but do you not see, Cratylus, that he who follows names in the search after things, and analyzes their meaning, is in great danger of being deceived?
Cratylus: How so?
Socrates: Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to his conception of the things which they signified?
Cratylus: True
Socrates: And if his conception was erroneous, and he gave names according to his conception, in what position shall we who are his followers find themselves? Shall we not be deceived by him?
-translated by Benjamin Jowett, section 436a

There are many other ways to portray the demand for a universal truth over other kinds but I will stop here to see what you say in response.

Beginning your reply with "I'd like to make it helpful, but I'm afraid of what commitments you might have to convention that might interfere with the effort." is a pompous observation that does not advance your point of view.

Personal character was the engine of ideas, and Socrates found in this participation the engine of reality itself. — Gary M Washburn

Perhaps you could assemble the texts that encourage this point of view. I suppose the view is a part of you saying: "The personal character each of us brings to the recognition of terms separates subject and predicate from each other in the person of that discipline. Reason is personal, not an impersonal mechanics."

The "predicate" in the Dialogues is constantly being challenged as something given on the basis of matters far from the personal. In Cratylus, Parmenides, and the Philebus, overconfidence in what a thing "is" becomes the fulcrum for arguing for something else. And the interlocutors are treating Socrates as the unconventional one. It kind of sounds like the opposite of what you are arguing.

The first book that really grabbed me was The Republic by Plato.

But the character of that participation is neither one thing nor the other. It is, rather, the personal discipline and drama by which each is recognizably not the other. The act of being that drama is the articulation of the person of that discipline. The personal character each of us brings to the recognition of terms separates subject and predicate from each other in the person of that discipline. Reason is personal, not an impersonal mechanics. — Gary M Washburn

I see the interaction of terms playing a part in the way we talk about things but it seems to me that the remark: "The personal character each of us brings to the recognition of terms separates subject and predicate from each other in the person of that discipline" is a psychological observation that translates all arguments into another register.

That does not help me.

1. How have you arrived at your belief that God exists? Was it after some theoretical or logical proofs on God 's existence or some personal religious experience? Or via some other routes? — Corvus

Presumably, if God exists, the action is happening without my view of the matter mattering very much. It would be a pretty wimpy god who could only get along if I supported the entity. The possibility of the existence is an element in various arguments proving this or rejecting that but such a reality is either the case or not.

That question is why I appreciate thinkers like Kierkegaard who framed the matter as what is actually happening with oneself. The matter of belief is bound up with perception of our becoming.

Framing it as a matter of "belief" is to make the topic exterior to experience by default.

The similarity is striking.

There are a number of Zhuangzi passages where artisans are connected to how results appear. Plato works with that kind of "knowing" as leverage in different dialogues.

In both traditions, the connection is different from what has been established as "scientific" since then.

I don't find much favor with the teleological part COJ either, especially where he brackets Spinoza as an error of theism rather than a challenge to his view of causality.

But maybe the enterprise does reflect upon the distinction between methodology and "speculative" metaphysics that you commented upon previously. He says things like: I can't rule this out on the basis of my previous work but opine thusly anyway.

Can or ought this be done through psychology, why or why not? — Shawn

I propose that the matter of individual development requires a psychological register. There are various theories concerning what should be regarded as fundamental conditions that produce one person or another. What is more important than any explanation is a way to understand causes.

We cause things to happen and how much degree of freedom to do this or that is what consumes every waking hour.

The Popper remark about being able to change things reminds me of Cratylus 387a

"Socrates
Then actions also are performed according to their own nature, not according to our opinion. For instance, if we undertake to cut anything, ought we to cut it as we wish, and with whatever instrument we wish, or shall we, if we are willing to cut each thing in accordance with the nature of cutting and being cut, and with the natural instrument, succeed in cutting it, and do it rightly, whereas if we try to do it contrary to nature we shall fail and accomplish nothing?"

Translated by Fowler

But if a broadening lexicon of terms is the entailed result of conserving them, then we can hardly claim this mere sentiment or deny the growing lexicon we share is any less rigorously achieved than the discipline of conserving our premises. — Gary M Washburn

That is an interesting point of comparison. I will think about it.

By the way, if you mean to respond to a particular post, there is a swoopy reply button that appears next to the time of post text.

I am not sure how you are presenting that observation as a response to mine. Kant did not ask that the CPR prove what he believed as a Christian.
Or are you contesting that view?
EDIT: Wait, I should have just have expressed the first thought. Too much presumption involved with the latter.

Regarding Kant and Plato, The Critique of Judgment discusses the origin of life in the section upon Teleological judgments. There is a very interesting part where evolution is recognized as possible from an a priori standpoint but experience is said to suggest that the situation is more like the perspective established in the dialogue of Philebus, where the source of of things points more to the existence of an intelligence as part of the cause rather than whatever not having that might mean.

My hovering of the cursor only produces a jerky circular movement of the cursor.

I don't like it.
But now that it is in operation, I am curious how many receivers of hearts are givers of them as well. Maybe one can have the numbers side by side, a token economy of imagined love.

Excellent summary of the matter.

I am asking that you don't respond directly to Fooloso4,
at least for some time.

Does that mean you agree to the deal?

The deep dive is to just go ahead and read The Critique of Pure Reason. It is not a three hour tour.

The Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics assumes you have read that but addresses some of the general topics brought up most often in recent (the last 100 years or so) of academic discussion in response.

Good.
How about you, @Apollodorus?

Stacking the deck. Now that is more Hunter S Thompson territory.

The High Court has been staked with Christian conservatives. — Tom Storm

I figure you meant "stocked" but your version gives a Kafka flavor to the milkshake.

Have you read any Kant?
I am not asking to be intimidating but to know how to reply.

To put that in a more Kantian way is to say that "objects" are a result of our perception and cognition of what we encounter in experience. If you were "given" these objects as themselves, you wouldn't have to go to all the trouble of distinguishing pure reason from the practical.