The equality of persons as persons does not refer to their capacity or lack thereof. The idea is that, as a person, you are just like other persons, no matter the circumstances one finds oneself within.

That perspective is not concerned with what is properly allotted to people according to circumstances or merit.

Robin Trower and James Dewar rock my boat.

This is a live recording. Pretty tight.

He was, as you said, from Parmenides' school. It was not a school of sophists. — Fooloso4

In the Theaetetus, Socrates refuses to trash talk Parmenides because Socrates had met him when he was young and had witnessed his sincerity. That is a clear reference to Plato's dialogue of Parmenides where the theory of Forms is critically examined. The Sophist makes more sense as the continuation of that review rather than a caricature of what to avoid.

In contrast, the Sophist uses elaborate arguments, including superficially convincing ones, to claim that there is no higher goal, no means of attaining it, and no need to even think of leaving the cave. — Apollodorus

Point to an example of that.

I don't understand the basis for calling the Stranger a Sophist. Can you point to one of the arguments he makes by way of example?

The same Stranger speaks in the dialogue of Statesman. Are you suggesting that dialogue is also an example of 'sophistry?'

I did not mean to say that living with "ones own terms" excluded what is shared amongst us.
As the only one you know who can observe what you know, the privacy is not an argument for or against any way to explain the world.

Is it always 'your terms'? — Tom Storm

Maybe not. But how will you tell the difference? We only have our experience of ourselves to go on.

So the idea of personal verification is spoken more from a position of poverty than some kind of vision of triumph.

How does one intentionally participate in philosophical dialogue? — Bret Bernhoft

When you are not satisfied by previous statements and ask that the conversation happen on your terms.
That presumes some familiarity with the matter as commonly discussed but a dissatisfaction at the same time.

It is a very old thing.

To count rest, change, and being as three would be mistaken. Being is a higher order than rest and change. It is not a third thing to be counted alongside them. — Fooloso4

In the Timaeus, the qualities of Being and Becoming are starkly differentiated:

For there were no days and nights and months and years before the heaven was created, but when he (the Demiurge) constructed the heaven, he constructed them also, they are all parts of time, and the past and future are created species of time, which we unconsciously but wrongly transfer to eternal being, for we say that it 'was,' or 'is' of 'will be,' but the truth is that 'is' alone is properly attributed to it, and that 'was' and 'will be' are only to be spoken of becoming in time, for they are motions, but that which is immovably the same forever cannot become older or younger by time. — Timaeus, 37e, translated by Benjamin Jowett

In the Theaetetus, the dyad of motion and rest is found to be insufficient to counter Protagoras' claim that 'man is the measure of all things.' Starting at 179c, an effort is begun to find an alternative to accepting the either/or of 'all things change' (as expressed by Heraclitus) against 'being never changes' (as put forth by Parmenides). As the dialogue proceeds, it is found that beings are encountered through the organs of perception but knowledge of those beings is different from perceiving them (186e). While that development puts Protagoras' claim to doubt, the problem of what knowledge is, in the realm of becoming, is not thereby resolved. The remainder of the dialogue tries out different explanations but finds none of them adequate to the challenge.

How does this sort of careful separation of different arguments relate to grand claims of explaining what is happening? It seems like Plato did both.

The tolerance for accepting other views is not without its own spiritual dimension. The vision of the world as a commons, greater than any particular group, is a trust in more than whatever story might be told to explain the situation. A universal condition becomes the basis for perceiving the particular.

I think I understand the "the public/private split" Loy is presenting. What I question is the value of seeing that development as a religious and psychological change outside of the political and cultural process in which the development occurred.

One important component of what we know as the secular came from centuries of people killing each other as a way to discuss what is sacred. The agreement to stop doing that was built upon toleration of different beliefs in the space of some established common space. The truce that was the beginning of ending religious wars in Europe was based upon the principle of cuius regio, eius religio. With the religion of a place being determined by the rulers of it, the political dimension was introduced that spelled the demise of the medieval system. The principle of toleration has had its own logic in the role of the "individual" becoming increasingly important.

I didn't mean to say Loy was writing a polemic against Protestants. I wanted to point toward how what we know as the "secular" had a life before the Protestants.

Weber's reference to the "work ethic" is a religious one. Is he not in his way trying to find a way to talk about the "secular" as not something easily explained in either a political or religious register?

By privatizing an unmediated relationship between more individualized Christians and a more transcendent God, Luther’s emphasis on salvation-by-faith-alone eliminated the intricate web of mediation – priests, sacraments, canon law, pilgrimages, public penances, etc. – that in effect had constituted the sacred dimension of this world. The religiously-saturated medieval continuity between the natural and the supernatural was sundered by internalizing faith and projecting the spiritual realm far above our struggles in this world. — David Loy, Terror in the God-Shaped Hole

As a child of the Protestant tradition, I wish to point out some elements that do not fit into this picture.

Luther pointed to the Church selling tickets to Heaven (via indulgences) as the severance of the "unmediated" relationship between man and God. The complaint was that the Church had become too secular. From that point of view, preserving the distinction between the City of God and the City of Man required a reestablishment of the original news of the Gospel. In this rejection to the necessity for the orthodox institution, many very different forms of community were developed. Were these communities "projecting the spiritual realm far above our struggles in this world?" For many of them, they were joining together what had been severed.

You remind me of Thrasymachus; you are bright and knowledgeable and persuasive—but there is something in your soul that is too recalcitrant, too blind to evidence, too entrenched in an already solidified belief-system... — Leghorn

He is more like Meletus in the Apology than Thrasymachus. When reviewing his posts, a view is revealed of a Socrates who he has passed out of the world of opinion and is basking in the light of true knowledge next to the pool outside of the cave. The restless pursuit of Socrates, the investigator, has come to an end. This attainment of the telos is combined with a mystical view of Plotinus where the order of the divine is argued as the best possible true belief. We have transcended the realm of discursive reason and all the problems attendant upon the activity.

So, when the Gift of Apollo is challenged on the claim that Socrates has wrapped up his work as an investigator, he treats the idea as blasphemy against his true God. This is a crime in the Polis of the Gift.
When Strauss and his band of Jewish buddies come to town in order to destroy it, the Trojan Horse they used to sneak in was not turned away at the gate. They must be put on trial for crimes against the City.

Thrasymachus may have been rude and abusive but at least he had the virtue of causing a conversation to begin. Meletus was only interested in silencing unbelievers.

P.S: There is more to Plotinus than his mysticism, but that is an account for another time.

The Forms are part of a whole that is indeterminate, a whole in which there is necessity, contingency and chance. — Fooloso4

This condition is reflected in Aristotle's explanation for why there can be no science of accidental being:

A sign of this is the fact that no science, be it practical or productive or theoretical, take the trouble to consider it. For the builder who is building a house is not producing at the same time the attributes which are accidental to the house when built, for these are infinite; for nothing prevents the house from being pleasant to some men, harmful to some others, useful to still others, and distinct so to speak from any other thing, but the art of building produces none of these attributes. — Metaphysics, Book Epsilon, 1026b, translated by H.G Apostle

Rather than begin with cosmology, the Timaeus begins with the question of the polis at war. Two points to make on this. First, Socrates wants to see the city he makes in the Republic in action. In line with twofold causation, the story of the city in the Republic is incomplete. It is a city without chance and contingency. Second, the dialogue begins with the polis because an account of the whole must take human life into account. — Fooloso4

One way that war as an element of human life shows how the reality of eternal qualities differs from ours is the way virtues contend with each other. In the Statesman, the Stranger compares the vigorous benefit of the "fast and aggressive" to the benefits of the "slow and moderate:"

Young Socrates: What kind of evils do you mean?
Stranger: Of course I mean all which concern the organization of the community as a whole. Men who are notable for moderation are always ready to support 'peace and tranquility.' They want to keep to themselves and to mind their own business. They conduct all their dealings with their fellow citizens on this principle and are prone to take the same line in foreign policy and preserve peace at any price with foreign states. Because of their indulgence of this passion for peace at the wrong times, whenever they are able to carry their policy into effect they become unwarlike themselves without being aware of it and render their young men unwarlike as well. Thus they are at the mercy of the chance aggressor. He swoops down on them and the result is that within a very few years they and their children and all the community to which they belong wake up to find that their freedom is gone and that they are reduced to slavery. — Statesman, 307e, translated by J.B. Skemp

The "rational order of the cosmos" is a big question to deal with. That is not the only factor in proposing the world is integrated with our understanding of it. In the vision of Plotinus, for example, the nature of our understanding, the experience of ourselves as creatures made possible by the existence of soul, and the production of everything and person we encounter is all connected. Approaching experience from that point of view gives one a perspective not available to an ego in a bunker.

I don't think that the view is challenged by scientific frameworks of provable facts more than other kinds of alienation. The tradition that fostered that idea of integration also gave rise to life as as struggle against natural inclinations. Pauline Christianity says our souls will be judged on a case by case basis; Our experience here is connected to an experience outside the world.
Copernicus noticed the Earth is not the center of the universe. I could go on.

The problems and opportunities of being individuals seem to involve more than an indulgence in "scientism".

Just a young man confusing people he talked to, especially women.
Comedy as remembered tragedy.

Understood. Thanks for the clarification.

Right. You will get back to me.
Whatever.

I will let you work that out with your partner.

Why were America’s top bankers and industrialists sponsoring anti-Platonist academics? — Apollodorus


I'm not at all convinced by that line of argument. As I said before, I think it's part of the much broader 'culture war' between scientific secularism and religious belief, or even anything that can be so construed. Lloyd Gerson analyses that in his work on 'Platonism and Naturalism': — Wayfarer

When you say "it's part of the much broader 'culture war' between scientific secularism and religious belief", do you include the rhetoric being used by Apollodorus as part of a larger story or reject it? Being unpersuaded is very different from rejection. What Apollodorus is proposing is a cultural war against what allows us to have this conversation.

The Bailly dictionary uses French terms not available to Plato. Referring to them to resolve the matter is pointless and bizarre.

You still have not produced any example of Greek text that supports Lee's use of the words.

The fact is that like most words, pseudos can have different meaning depending on the context. This may be inconvenient to you but that's your problem. — Apollodorus

No, that is your problem. You argue on the basis of this claim but offer jack to back it up with illuminating passages to prove your case.

Your challenge regarding the different forms the words took in the text and in the lexicon has been explained. We have moved on from debating the meaning of specific words to observing your unfamiliarity with the basic properties of the language as a language. Only you can remedy that deficit for yourself.

Your questions reveal a complete ignorance of how Ancient Greek works as a language. Only you can help you now.

Ever since I heard the Animals sing that, it has become the soundtrack of more of my life than was strictly necessary.

So .... according to you ψευδομένους and ψεῦδος are one and the same thing?
Or is it ψευδομένους and ψεύδω?
Or, perhaps, it is ψεύδω and ψεῦδος? — Apollodorus

Greek has different endings and prefixes to show what part of speech the nouns, verbs, and prepositions,etcetera belong to. See this outline for clarity on the matter.

Edited to add information.

When using the lexicon, the nouns are typically given as singular in number and nominative in case. When you read the entries giving different examples of words usage, note how the form of the word changes as reflected in the translation of each phrase.

Verbs are typically given as first person singular, in the present tense. So ψεύδω, for instance, says "I lie."

Er, the word in question is Ancient Greek, not French. It feels really strange having to bring that to your attention.

Presumably, in your opinion, the Greek words "pseudos", "mythos", "logos", "eidos", etc. all mean "lie" and "lie" only and in all circumstances and no matter what. I think that's just wishful thinking, to be honest. — Apollodorus

I was just talking about the words I quoted. I have no idea what you are talking about here.

And now you are saying that you are not talking about Republic 414c but about Cratylus! — Apollodorus

Cratylus is devoted to the origins and meanings of words. Are you suggesting that Plato has a different use for the word "ψεῦδος " in each of the different dialogues? That seems unlikely. Perhaps you could provide some examples.

So far, I am doing all the work while you surf conspiracy sites. You still haven't provided any examples of Greek text that support Lee's translation.

Is not something that is not known to be true but said as if it is the truth and persuades some that it is the truth not a lie? — Fooloso4

I will have to ponder upon that. It at least can be observed that Socrates not knowing whether it is true or not is a different matter than misrepresenting something he does know the truth of.

The word ψευδομένους is a form of the verb ψεύδω.
The word is defined thusly in LSJ Middle Liddell:

ψεύδω Root *y*u*d
A. [select] to cheat by lies, beguile, Soph., etc.:—Pass. to be cheated, deceived, Aesch., etc.
2. [select] ψ. τινά τινος to cheat, balk, disappoint one of a thing, id=Aesch., Soph.; also c. acc. rei, ἐλπίδας ψ. τινά Xen.: —Pass. to be cheated, balked, disappointed of a thing, ψευσθῆναι ἐλπίδος, γάμου Hdt.; δείπνου Ar.
3. [select] Pass., also, to be deceived, mistaken in or about a thing, ἐψευσμένοι γνώμης mistaken in opinion, Hdt.; ἐψευσμένοι τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων δυνάμεως deceived in their notions of the Athenian power, Thuc.; ἐψεῦσθαι ἑαυτῶν, Opp. to εἰδέναι ἑαυτούς, Xen.:—also, ψευσθῆναι ἔν τινι Hdt.; περί τινος Xen.: also c. acc., αὐτοὺς ἐψευσμένη Ἑλλάς deceived in its estimate of them, Thuc.
4. [select] of statements, to be untrue, ἡ τρίτη τῶν ὁδῶν μάλιστα ἔψευσται Hdt.
II. [select] c. acc. rei, like ψευδοποιέω, to represent a thing as a lie, to falsify, Soph.:—Pass., ἡ ψευσθεῖσα ὑπόσχεσις the promise broken, Thuc.
B. [select] earlier and more common is the Mid. ψεύδομαι
1. [select] absol. to lie, speak false, play false, Hom., etc.
2. [select] c. acc. rei, to say that which is untrue, ὅτι τοῦτο ψεύδομαι Plat.; ἅπερ αὐτὸν οὐ ψεύδομαι which I do not speak falsely about him, Andoc.
3. [select] to be false, perjured or forsworn, Hes.
II. [select] like Act. II, to belie, falsify, ὅρκια ψεύσασθαι to break them, Il.; so, ψ. γάμους Eur.; so in plup. pass., ἔψευστο τὴν ξυμμαχίαν Thuc.; τὰ χρήματα ἐψευσμένοι ἦσαν had broken their word about the money, Xen.
III. [select] like Act. I, to deceive by lies, cheat, Aesch., Eur.; ψ. τινά τι to deceive one in a thing, Soph., Eur. — Perseus web site

The word γενναῖόν is defined by the same lexicon as:

γενναῖος γέννα
[select] suitable to one's birth or descent, οὔ μοι γενναῖον it fits not my nobility, Il.
I. [select] of persons, high-born, noble by birth, Lat. generosus, Hdt., Trag.; so of animals, well-bred, Plat., Xen.
2. [select] noble in mind, high-minded, Hdt., attic: τὸ γ. ῀ γενναιότης, Soph.:—also of actions, noble, Hdt., Trag.
II. [select] of things, good of their kind, excellent, notable, Xen.: genuine, intense, δύη Soph.
III. [select] adv. -ως, nobly, Hdt., etc.: comp. -οτέρως, Plat.: Sup. -ότατα, Eur.

In addition, I refer to my quote of Cratylus upthread where truth (ἀληθής) and false (ψεῦδος) are exact opposites without shades of ambiguity.

As you say, there is no other language under discussion. I see no use of the word in Ancient Greek that is similar to how other languages use the word "lie." You seem unable to bring in an example of any kind to support Lee's interpretation.

That resource uses Liddell and Scott for Ancient Greek. You have not provided an example of the use in Greek to support Lee's interpretation.

I have not claimed Plato is telling lies about Forms. The lie I commented upon was the one where Socrates suggested saying humans are born from the Earth.

You have once again failed to distinguish between your various interlocutors. Wayfarer is the one who asked Philoso4 if he was saying Forms were a possible lie.

I cannot find a single entry in Liddell and Scott that even remotely supports Lee's statement.
Are Liddell and Scott also "Straussians"? That means the guy was able to travel back in time. That's pretty nifty.

Your account has a frothy fever reminiscent of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.

In this case, we have the interpretation of the word by Socrates himself:

[421b] ὄν οὗ μάσμα ἐστίν (being of which the search is). And ἀλήθεια (truth) is like the others; for the divine motion of the universe is, I think, called by this name, ἀλήθεια, because it is a divine wandering θεία ἄλη. But ψεῦδος (falsehood) is the opposite of motion; for once more that which is held back and forced to be quiet is found fault with, and it is compared to slumberers (εὕουσι); but the addition of the psi conceals the meaning of the word. The words τὸ ὄν (being) and οὐσία (existence) agree with ἀληθής with the loss of iota, for they mean “going” (ἰόν). And οὐκ ὄν (not being) means οὐκ ἰόν (not going), — Plato, Cratylus, 421b, translated by Harold N. Fowler

No, the term is used in a variety of ways to mean different things. I identified the indeterminate dyad as one of Plato's metaphysical principles. — Fooloso4

The problem of how to see the "unlimited" in a relationship with the "limited" is the central focus of Plotinus in the Enneads. The separations between the One, Intelligence, and the Soul are based upon judgments of what Plato and Aristotle said touching upon the matter.

It is important to understand that Greek ψεῦδος pseudos is not the same as English “lie”. It is less strong and it has a broader range of meaning than the English word. It can mean story, tale, poetic fiction, faint, etc., not just plain falsehood or lie. — Apollodorus

Prove that claim, with examples to support the opinion.

If you have any respect for Liddell and Scott, they are not going to help you with this interpretation.

How does one justify belief, through scientific methodology or through other means of verification of personal belief systems? — Jack Cummins

If one needs to justify a belief, is it not then an opinion, comparable with other opinions?

To accept something on the basis of faith is to trust as expressed in the Greek word πίστις. The trust involves not subjecting the matter to comparisons.

And that meaning is related to the Latin expression of Fidelity. The love that is tested by comparison is not the love that keeps faith without recourse to such.

I agree, but divergence from an historical account should be marked out as such. Don't present your own ponderings as the essential Plato. — frank

We have some text that has survived until now. There are some historical accounts that have as well. I am trying to understand Plato, not speak for him. My attempts, like any other reader, may miss the mark.

Do you mean to say that an interpretation of the text can conflict with historical accounts to a degree that it becomes fanciful?

Do you think I'm saying that 'nothing can be learned from these old arguments?' I hope I didn't convey that impression. — Wayfarer

You did not convey that impression. I meant to say that the "interpretation of the Platonic dialogues" is an engagement in metaphysics that you say has been lost in the transition to modernity. I don't accept the claim that the only path to engaging with the thinking is through the lens of preserved models.

The quote from Parmenides you cite is a call to carry on with the existence of forms despite all the difficulties he enumerated that faced anyone who would try. That includes us "moderns" who wrestle with those problems.

The historical conditions you see "moderns" being shackled to is itself a metaphysical proposition. I don't accept that confinement as an unavoidable fate.

I've been trying to make a point of the diminution of metaphysics in Western culture, generally, by way of responding to the OP. I notice it keeps getting diverted back to the interpretation of the Platonic dialogues - which, incidentally, I greatly value, as it is something I need to learn much more about. BUT, there's an underlying cultural dynamic here, which is generally not being commented on. — Wayfarer

The Parmenides quote does challenge the basis for a relativity you have described as the basis for the Modern perspective. So, it is commenting upon the underlying cultural dynamic to notice there were disagreements at the time these statements were made.

The scholarship to pay attention to these old words is a testament against the relativity you abhor. If nothing can be learned from these old arguments, why bother?