I am being helped by all the contributions given by all the contributors and am glad there is a discussion with enough center of gravity to allow the ideas to survive different points of view.

Most of the discussions I have had along these lines in meat space have been conditioned by impatience of one kind or another.

And what is that end?
Sounds like that will require some thought.

Good point. Your observation reminds me of the coined phrase: "don't go postal on me."

OK — Eugen

Does that mean you agree with my comments?

in your opinion, in spinozism, the consciousness is an attribute created by a conscious or a non-conscious God? — Eugen

I don't understand the use of the term "spinozism". Unlike "Platonism", we are not discussing a class of thinkers who based their ideas upon Plato's works. Spinoza's philosophy is being discussed here by itself.

According to Spinoza, you are not in a position as to ask whether consciousness is an attribute created by a conscious or a non-conscious God because you are a caused being. See Proposition 18, Book 1, Ethics:

"Since God’s intellect is the sole cause (as we have shown) both of the essence and of the existence of things, it must necessarily differ from them both in regard to their essence and to their existence. For the thing caused differs from its cause precisely in what it has from its cause. For example, one human being is the cause of the existence of another human being but not of his essence; for his essence is an eternal truth.
Therefore they can completely agree in their essence; but in their existence they must differ. This is why if the existence of one comes to an end, the existence of the other will not therefore come to an end. But if the essence of one could be taken away and be made false, the essence of the other would also be taken away. This is why something that is the cause of both the essence and the existence of an effect must differ from that effect both in respect of essence and in respect of existence. ​But God’s intellect is the cause of both the essence and the existence of our intellect. Therefore God’s intellect, insofar as it is conceived as constituting the divine essence, differs from our intellect both in respect of essence and in respect of existence, and it cannot agree with it in anything except name, and this is what we set out to prove. One may make the same argument about will, as anyone may easily see."

The way you put it is far removed from the way Chalmers has presented the problem.

The limits of those models don't establish the limits or capacity of what the models are trying to explore. From this perspective, one cannot prove or disprove that the experience of consciousness derives from "matter." The limit in the ability of those models to reduce consciousness to a function of the phenomena that is narrowly defined through them resembles a viscous circle to some degree.

A testable hypothesis needs to be narrowly defined for the results of experiments to be measured and qualified. The "function" that the phenomena is reduced through is possible because of what the model excludes in order to get closer to what is happening. If a model excludes the phenomena of conscious experience upon an operational basis in order to delineate what is being observed, it cannot be too surprising to find out later that the model doesn't explain consciousness very well.

There is also a circular motion to be observed in your use of "matter" as something that has self evident meaning. The word has developed its meaning through a relationship to something that is "not-matter." For Aristotle, the relationship was expressed as form/matter. For Descartes the relationship was Mind/matter. You seem to be putting Consciousness in one box and Matter in other as a starting point and then asking others to explain what connects them. I don't see how one can move from your presuppositions to any other result than where you started. I cannot improve upon Willow of Darkness' account of the dualism that embraces.

I am not sure what you think the "hard problem/combination problem" to be.

In the essay I linked to previously, Chalmers says our experience of consciousness cannot be reduced to a function of our present scientific models developed through hypothesis and experimentation. In your comments made so far, I can't make out how the truth or falsity of that statement establishes the basis to evaluate the philosophy of Spinoza.

Only human beings have conscious minds. — Ken Edwards

That is not self evident. Experience with other animals brings that presupposition into doubt.

It does make a big difference. I do think there are separate experiences being considered here.
I will mull in the idea while considering the other translations.

The use of "being" and "non-being" seems to mean something different in this verse than it does in other verses, as I noted in particular, Verse 1. — T Clark

The meanings do seem to change in different verses. Maybe it has to do with us having to pursue different paths to approach what is the same. I like D.C Lau's version of this in Verse 1 as way to separate the experiences.

"The nameless was the beginning of heaven and earth;
The named was the mother of the myriad creatures.
Hence always rid yourself of desires to observe its secrets;
But always allow yourself to have desires in order to observe its manifestations.
These two are the same.
But diverge in name as they issue forth."

Perhaps the differences of meaning are related to which kind of observation is required.

Nothing is set in stone.
I think it is important not to be rigid with fixed beliefs.
I think that reading the TTC and similar can help increase flexibility and and awareness of our own limited perspectives. — Amity

I agree. I was trying to express that up-thread by saying that the agenda Lao Tzu strives to replace is not the same kind he is advocating for. That difference is where the Taoist challenges many views of Confucius.

We can see how this might relate to our navigating the real world.
It isn't about some knowledge of a spiritual force, available only to the few.
We have to make our way through events as they arise.
There is no time to consult a manual, map or master. — Amity

I read the works as centrally concerned with how to navigate the real world.
There are elements of the mysterious that are important not to exclude. The different translators express different opinions on this dimension. Talking about those matters seems to be the biggest divide in traditions.
So, with that in mind, The Enchiridion or Handbook of Epictetus matches a lot of the imperative quality of the speech even if what the problem is said to be starts from such different beginnings.

The rejection of a manual requires its own manual.

Actually - I like that. We possess the pitcher, but we use the emptiness. Or - We hold the pitcher, but we use the emptiness. I like that a lot. — T Clark

I like that too. It closely hews to the Lin version I was trying to articulate earlier but is more elegant.

Your comments regarding the logic of the characters reminds me of the fierce debates that surround the book Chinese Written Character as a Medium for Poetry regarding the "ideogrammic" nature of the writing.
The debates have been going on for a hundred years now and reflect many problems delineating differences in how languages convey meaning.
I am not qualified to offer an opinion on the matter but reading the book gave me an appreciation of how poetic expression provides different paths of association and order through different languages. For instance, the first word of the Iliad in Ancient Greek is Wrath; There is no way to express that sequence in English.

It included the idea of 'resistance'. Where there is no resistance, action is effortless. Where we meet resistance, or obstacles on the path, then action is deliberate. — Amity

To my reading, being sensitive to resistance leads to perception of what one is working upon. Some element of that is moving with careful attention:

'However, whenever I come to a complicated place, I size up the difficulties, tell myself to watch out and be careful, keep my eyes on what I'm doing, work very slowly, and move the knife with the greatest subtlety, until — flop! the whole thing comes apart like a clod of earth crumbling to the ground."

This being able to perceive seems to be related to a number of places in Dao De Jing where the follower of the way is described as "hesitant." This language is used in verse 15, for instance.

Another element of the butcher story that pertains to the being nonbeing distinction discussed here is that joints are the empty or undetermined parts of an animal. The butchers work is effortless because he never tries to cut in any other place.

The pitcher must exist for it to be a benefit to one. The utility that makes it beneficial is possible through the non-being. The wheel makes carriages exist and move. The non-being involved in the wheel is what makes the being of the carriage possible.

Then what is the value of the pitcher? The benefit? How does it make my life better? — T Clark

I read Possibility's remark to mean the benefit is the direct utility of the result; The pitcher holds water. The wu permits it to be filled and emptied.

The text does not agree with your impression:

[337D] “Then what if I show you a different answer about justice,” he said, “beyond all these, better than they are? What penalty would you think you deserve to suffer?” “What other penalty,” I said, “than the one it’s fitting for someone who doesn’t have knowledge to suffer? And it’s fitting, no doubt, for him to learn from someone who has knowledge. So I think I too deserve to suffer this penalty.”
“You’re amusing,” he said, “but in addition to learning, pay a penalty in money too.” “Okay, whenever I get any,” I said. “He’s got it,” said Glaucon. “So as far as money’s concerned, Thrasymachus, speak up, since all of us will chip in for Socrates.” [337E] “I imagine you will,” he said, “so Socrates can go on with his usual routine: he won’t answer but when somebody else answers he’ll grab hold of his statement and cross-examine him.” “Most skillful one,” I said, “how could anyone give an answer who in the first place doesn’t know and doesn’t claim to know, and then too, even if he supposes something about these things, would be banned from saying what he believes by no inconsiderable man? So it’s more like it [338A] for you to speak, since you do claim to know and to have something to say. So don’t do anything else but gratify me by answering, and don’t be grudging about teaching Glaucon here as well as the others.” And when I’d said these things, Glaucon and the others kept begging him not to do otherwise. And Thrasymachus was obviously longing to speak in order to be well thought of, believing that he had an answer of overwhelming beauty. But he made a pretense of battling eagerly for me to be the one that [338B] answered. But making an end of this, he gave way, and then said, “This is the wisdom of Socrates; he himself is not willing to teach, but he goes around learning from others and doesn’t even pay them any gratitude.” “In saying that I learn from others,” I said, “you tell the truth, Thrasymachus, but when you claim that I don’t pay for it in full with gratitude, you lie, for I pay all that is in my power. I have the power only to show appreciation, since I don’t have money. And how eagerly I do this, if anyone seems to me to speak well, you’ll know very well right away when [338C] you answer, for I imagine you’ll speak well.” “Then listen,” he said. “I assert that what’s just is nothing other than what’s advantageous to the stronger. So why don’t you show appreciation? But you won’t be willing to.” “First I need to understand what you mean,” I said, “since now I don’t yet know. You claim that what’s advantageous to the stronger is just. Now whatever do you mean by this, Thrasymachus? For I’m sure you’re not saying this sort of thing: that if Polydamas the no-holds-barred wrestler is stronger than we are, and bull’s meat is advantageous to him for his body, this food [338D] would also be advantageous, and at the same time just, for us who are weaker than he is.” — Plato. Republic, translated by Joe Sachs

One thing I like about the passage is that paying a penalty is on the basis of some kind of justice that applies to Thrasymachus and Socrates equally. Otherwise, there would be no reason to honor the debt incurred.

What is a philosophical method? — T Clark

I think it was a philosophical problem tied to an ethical crisis. There was a prevailing set of categories and standards and they were found to be deficient to the point that they had to be opposed, in the old fashioned sense that something needs to be stopped. But this alternative is not presented as an antithesis in the Hegelian sense of history. There is something seriously not continuous in Lao Tzu calling for a frame of reference that does not start from where everyone else started. The view doesn't reject traditional values but it changes how to understand why they are viable.

I like the way you touched upon terms of conflict on the way to measuring a proportion of effective methods versus not particularly helpful Platonic ideas.
One of my favorite parts of the Republic is when Socrates' brother stares down Thrasymachus and assures him that any wager made would be satisfied if he should lose.
Thrasymachus left the room shortly afterwards.

Before going further along my line of thought, I would like to ask if it seems like complete blather or is there a point of departure where it made some sense and then stopped making sense.
If it is the former, I don't want to clog the thread with attempts to make the perspective more germane.
There are plenty of other elements to consider without it.

That is very helpful to me. The absolute infinity doesn't have a dancing partner in an Antinomy.
*Valentinius smacks forehead*

One element that seems to be consistent in all the text is the disdain for pompous rulers and extravagant wealth. There is the often repeated relationship between placing too high of a value upon some ideas and things and the manifestation of unwanted results. We are doing something wrong and something has to change if we are to do better. The need for correction is shown on a grand scale in Dao De Jing and Zhuangzi has many instances where one individual chastises another on these grounds.

But it also is made clear that the correction cannot happen by simply replacing one table of values with another. While bad agendas lead to bad results, the problem is also caused by how we use agendas. While the logic of causes can explain the first problem, addressing the second is not as straightforward. It certainly is not as simple as finding an opposing value to promote as a replacement.

So there is an asymmetry between the two problems. Finding a way to proceed with a correction is a method that always keeps the asymmetry in view.

I agree that Spinoza emphasizes that a vast sea separates human experience from whatever that might mean for the God we are in. But Spinoza goes to a great effort to explain the difference as a category mistake rather than simply a measure of how tiny my mind is compared to God's in the style of Descartes and Anselm.

In contradiction to the way I was just representing the Sage as playing a part in nurture, I think it is important to look at verse 5 where it seems nothing could be further from such an element:

Heaven and earth are ruthless, and treat the myriad creatures as straw dogs., the sage is ruthless, and treats the people as straw dogs.
Is not the space between heaven and earth like a bellows?
It is empty without being exhausted:
The more it works the more comes out.
Much speech leads inevitably to silence.
Better to hold fast to the void. — Translated by D.C. Lau

Are the opposing perspectives of what is beneficial to people and a harsh view of where it comes from something that is resolved into a more encompassing perspective?

The verse reminds me of line 5:13 of the Analects:

Zi Gong said: “What our Master has to say about the classics can be heard and also embodied. Our Master's words on the essence and the Heavenly Way, though not attainable, can be heard.” — Translated by A.C. Muller

Can Lao Tzu's sage be "embodied"?

Your point is well taken that 'philosophy itself is not (equipped to effectively engage) in the 'theoretical explanation' business." In the paper I linked to, Chalmers says he doesn't want to give up on developing testable models. Toward that end, he seems to point toward the sort of work Tononi and Seung are doing with information systems as possibilities. What I was trying to wonder about is: If those efforts bear fruit, isn't that going to change the parameters of the models Chalmers says could handle the "easy" parts?

Elaborate. I'm not following this ... — 180 Proof

Chalmers argued that the "problem" could not be solved by reducing the fact of experience to a result of functions:

"When it comes to conscious experience, this sort of explanation fails. What makes the
hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance
of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the
cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience—perceptual discrimination,
categorization, internal access, verbal report—there may still remain a further unanswered
question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience? A simple
explanation of the functions leaves this question open."

This is a good observation and the paper goes on to suggest other approaches including the Bateson information parallel between "knowers" and what is known. But if such approaches are possible, the starting point of physical and computational functions that were deemed inadequate for the task at the beginning seem arbitrary in their subtraction from what is possible. I can take away something from the beginning and give it back to myself later on.

Your interpretation touches on a quality that greatly interests me. A method is being promoted that often sounds like a rejection of all method. But it is not that. The sage is somehow the good mother and the baby being cared for. The difficulty of making out the ways of those in the Way suggests that the demand to be simple is not simple to carry out.

Another question is how the competing method relates to the one that is being rejected. The bad method is displayed as the accumulation of its deleterious outcomes. It might come as a matter of surprise to some of them that they have been identified as adherents to a "yes -action." philosophy. In that sense, calling for Wu Wei is clearly an act that is not interested in hiding the virtue of their point of view.

When I was a young teenager, I read science fiction novels to escape the drudgery of my existence. The more immersive they were, the better. I used to dismantle the books and intersperse the pages into my textbooks so that I could enjoy them all day at school.

After many years of doing this, I came to realize that I already lived on a strange planet and had no idea why it was the way it was. I haven't gotten very far in my explorations but can now understand some of the language. I have a working visa but still have not become a full citizen.

In D.C. Lau's version of verse 10, he makes a reference to how the Heavenly Gate is described in Zhuangzi that may interest the ongoing discussion of being and non-being:

"There is life, there is death, there is a coming out, there is a going back in - yet in the coming out and going back, its form is never seen. This is called the Heavenly Gate. The Heavenly Gate is nonbeing. The ten thousand things come forth from nonbeing. Being cannot create being out of being; inevitably it must come forth from nonbeing. Nonbeing is absolute nonbeing, and it is here that the sage hides himself. — Chapter Gensang Chu, translated by Burton Watson

The letter is interesting. One can certainly see the anguish in The Metamorphoses. It makes a chilling passage in the story even more chilling:

Upon hearing the mother's words, Gregor realized the lack of any direct human exchange, coupled with the monotony of the family's life, must have confused his mind; he could not otherwise explain to himself how he could have wished to have his room cleared out. Did he really wish his warm room, comfortably furnished with old family heirlooms to be transformed into a lair in which he certainly would be able to crawl freely in any direction but at the price of rapidly and completely forgetting his human past? — Translated by Donna Freed

The drive to go beyond the perspective of blame is clearly visible in Kafka's Reflections on Sin, Pain, Hope and the True Way. The reference to eating droppings from the table appears in aphorism #69:

He eats the droppings from his own table; thus he manages to stuff himself fuller than the others for a little, but meanwhile he forgets how to eat from the table; thus in time even the droppings cease to fall — Translated by Willa and Edwin Muir

.

You expressed what I was thinking better than I did when you said:

"Mind" (or "consciousness"), therefore, is an activity, or process, and not a thing in Spinoza's ontology — 180 Proof

Whatever makes it possible before it happens exists without interruption afterwards. So the hard problem comes down to subtracting something at the beginning and being surprised by its addition.

One way to approach the matter is that "consciousness" was/is not a property or quality that can/could be recognized as a thing in itself without describing a world it was happening in.
So, everyone has to start at the beginning. There are no artifacts.

I think that's you looking at it through the prism of modernity. As I said to T Clark, in practice Taoism is allied with nostrums, potions, and all manner of magic spells, it's about as far from materialism as you could imagine. — Wayfarer

I was looking at the attempts to understand experience that was framed in the language established here. It is not about my point of view as a thinker but the body of work that was done from this head water.

I see that but he didn't seem interested in alternative responses as changes in the narrative. The narrative is a player too. In another aphorism, he said:

"The true way goes over a rope, not stretched at any great height but just above the ground. It seems more designed to cause people to stumble than to be walked upon."

I read a good portion of Kafka as pointing out how we become partners to agents intent upon our demise. The general ethic I get from those observations is that while you probably won't defeat the forces arrayed against you, don't add insult to injury by helping them.

Thrasymachus returns.

That's why Taoism and other Eastern disciplines are much more than simply verbal - they're pointing to a different way-of-being (which is why it is not amenable to 'discursive reason' i.e. discussion). Hence the practices of Tai Chi, meditation, and general spiritual culture (sadhana) which aims at a reconfiguration of cognition (called 'metanoia', in Greek philosophy). — Wayfarer

I recognize the emphasis on a way of being that is beyond "discursive reason" is central to what is happening in this book. But the work also provided the framework for empirical investigations and attempts to understand health and disease as processes. The logic of rejuvenation is anchored to a view of why anything is alive. What is experienced by an individual organism is the result of a condition happening to all organisms. It is exquisitely "materialistic" in many ways.

I agree that there are 'anonymous' people who work back of house to effect change, but usually by working very hard, by lobbying, organizing and with relentless energy. — Tom Storm

Being a child of the South in the U.S., I can report that a lot of things changed upon an interpersonal basis. The political element was critical to change. It would have all come to naught if the thinking of people did not change.

I am not very far along but I have received many tangible benefits.
I did not mean to suggest I had any direct feeling to the book through my practice. It is more like I spent years working in restaurants and have come to view text as recipes.
That doesn't mean I can cook the dish.

One of the members of my TTC reading group is a Tai Chi instructor. He brought a really helpful perspective to our discussions. — T Clark

I am glad you mention that because I was introduced to these ideas as guides to a practice. It was only after a long time of reading that I became aware of the thinking behind it. It is difficult for me not to see the work as a manual of instruction.