Certain assumptions shared by Descartes' arguments for the existence of God, be the arguments a posteriori or a priori, are that the ideas of the infinite and the perfect are ontologically prior to the ideas of the finite and the imperfect, and that the ideas of the infinite and the perfect are innate to the human mind because they are implanted there by God. For example, for Descartes my idea that I think contingently (which is my idea of a finite and imperfect activity) presupposes an ontologically prior, innate idea of what it means to think necessarily (which is my innate idea of an infinite and perfect activity). Or, to understand that I think contingently (a finite and imperfect activity) requires that I must have some ontologically prior, innate understanding of what it means to think necessarily (an infinite and perfect activity). However as this line of reasoning relates to my central theme, I would submit, contrary to Descartes' position, that my understanding of the idea of necessary thinking activity (an infinite and perfect activity) is NOT innate to the human mind and is NOT implanted there by God.

Neither is the idea of my contingent thinking activity (a finite and imperfect activity) obtained, as Descartes would claim, by limiting or bounding, in some way, the ontologically prior, innate idea of necessary thinking activity (an infinite and perfect activity). Instead, my idea of necessary thinking activity is a direct result of my deliberate attempt to try to remove, albeit unsuccessfully, that characteristic from the idea of my contingent thinking activity which limits and constrains it; viz., its vulnerability to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. This, I submit, is the genuine way in which I arrive at an understanding of the idea of necessary thinking activity (an infinite and perfect activity).


Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow, either from the former interpretation of Descartes or from my latter interpretation, that I can have a DIRECT PERSONAL EXPERIENCE of necessary thinking activity (an infinite and perfect activity) in the same way as I do, in fact, have a DIRECT PERSONAL EXPERIENCE of contingent thinking activity (a finite and imperfect activity).

As I see it, the central issue is not a matter of the possibility of my being able to have, or not to have, an IDEA of perfect thinking activity or an IDEA of perfect being - be those ideas innate, adventitious, or factitious. Instead, the central issue is a matter of the possibility of my being able to have, or not to have, a DIRECT PERSONAL EXPERIENCE of that perfect thinking activity or of that perfect being.


Or, approaching it from a slightly different direction, doubts and desires may come from an understanding that I lack something, and that I would not be aware of that lack unless I was aware of a more perfect being that has those things which I lack. However, my ability to have an IDEA of, or CONCEPTION of, or UNDERSTANDING of, or AWARENESS of a more perfect, or infinite, being that possesses all those things which I lack (inclusive of necessary thinking activity), does not mean that I am also able to have a DIRECT PERSONAL EXPERIENCE of that being and its necessary thinking activity in precisely the same way as I am able to have a DIRECT PERSONAL EXPERIENCE of my being and its contingent thinking activity.


Certainly, I can postulate the existence of a being that thinks necessarily and exists necessarily, but I cannot have a DIRECT PERSONAL EXPERIENCE of the necessary thinking activity which would simultaneously yield an intuition of the indubitably certain existence of such a necessary being. Again, I CAN PERFORM the "Cogito contingenter, Sum contingenter," but I CANNOT PERFORM the "Cogito necessario, Sum necessario."

In conclusion, I submit that Descartes' a priori argument for the existence of God is not an experientially grounded performative argument like the one he formulated to successfully and persuasively prove the existence of the human being. His ontological argument, lacking the crucial, indispensable, experiential foundation of necessary thinking activity, is destined to fail from its very inception. It is a non-persuasive, quasi-intuitive argument espousing a so-called self-validating idea of God which is given in consciousness and which represents God as existing, but which, in fact, completely misses the mark.

Well said, TS!

How interesting that, throughout history and across cultures, many mystics and thinkers who claimed to experience the TRANSCENDENT asserted that it was best characterized or described as being a divine NOTHINGNESS; thereby, unintentionally and ironically, precisely proving the point of my argument.

That which, by definition, falls outside the frame of reference of human consciousness; viz., the transcendent, is both nonsensical (because it is not at all accessible to our senses) and incomprehensible (because our minds cannot determine whether it has any meaning).

Yes, you're correct!. Unfortunately, certain kinds of people do, in fact, weave entire religious systems around their purported experiences of the transcendent and, to them and their followers, these purported experiences of the transcendent which ground their systems couldn't be more real. But, unfortunately, at no time, did any of them actually transcend consciousness, because there is no frame of reference we know of other than consciousness; at least, as long as we are alive. I simply cannot step outside of my consciousness to experience the transcendent; although I can sincerely convince myself that I do. Even false experiences (delusions, hallucinations, etc.) will register on an FMRI.

Yes! And transcendent experiences are recognized for what they truly are; viz,. meaningless, fictional Nothings!

Schopenhauer's Principle of Sufficient Reason is, for him, the apex of the transcendental, not of the transcendent (the Will).. If transcendent objects can not be verified empirically, they are meaningless fictions that exist in consciousness.

Their claims do not transcend experience and are, therefore, meaningless!

What you say is accurate. But how does it refute my contention about the "transcendent?

Exactly. So the "transcendent" is meaningless! The school of "Transcendentalists" have nothing to do with the issue!

If it is described as you describe it, then it is still meaningless!

Yes!!! Meaningless, incomprehensible, and indescribable!!!!

I would refer you to the following journal article: Jaakko Hintikka, Cogito ergo Sum: Inference or Performance, Philosophical Review 71 (1): 3-32 (1962)

Definitely interested in the reasoning supporting the answers. By the way, the position I took was based on the thinking of the Finnish philosopher Jaakko Hintikka.

What makes you think I view TPF as a game? Does my other post on TPF re: Descartes look like I'm playing a game?

Just wanted to see if someone could, in fact, really do justice to Descartes' Cogito Sum using one of those four alternatives.

Descartes' Cogito Sum may not be, primarily, a proposition at all and none of the four options may do it justice.
Perhaps, instead, Descartes' Cogito Sum is best interpreted to be a doing, a thought-act, which is existentially consistent and existentially self-verifying only when and while the meditator is performing it in the first person, present tense mode. Only then does the meditator experience (intuit), first hand, the truth of the Cogito Sum.

For one, what exactly are "invalidation effects"?

If one grants the assumption that a Defective Cognitive Nature (DCN) exists, then the invalidation effects caused by that DCN could be defined/described as follows:

If a person's Defective Cognitive Nature should cause her to experience directly the existentially inconsistent and existentially self-defeating counter-truths (I am not thinking, I am not existing) simultaneously with, and in place of, the existentially consistent and existentially self-verifying truths (I am thinking, I am existing) that she experiences when and while she performs the Cogito Sum in the first person, present tense mode, then invalidation effects could be said to have occurred.

The position I argue for is that a Defective Cognitive Nature does not exist precisely because it is impossible for its invalidation effects, as described, to be experienced directly in the first person, present tense mode.

Does Lex Newman have a paper available re: the argument you are addressing?

Do a computer search for Professor Lex Newman. You should easily locate his university webpage: https://sites.google.com/view/lexnewman . Click on his webpage and you will see a list off Selected Papers. In particular, read "Circumventing Cartesian Circles" and the relevant sections of the Stanford
Encyclopedia "Descartes' Epistemology" article of 2014.

The drunk driver could have behaved differently only if the drunk driver had possessed a different character; viz., a character which was able to respond positively, rather than negatively or not at all, to the cognitive realization (motive) that the risk of driving drunk was so great that it outweighed the impulse to do so. Over a lifetime, we all become better acquainted gradually with who we are (our character) by experiencing what we actually do or omit doing, how we actually behave or do not behave, when presented with different motives and circumstances. It is not the person's deeds, per se, which we praise or condemn. They are merely indicators of the person's moral character. And, in the final analysis, it is the person's moral character which bears the responsibility, guilt, praise, or blame for what was done or left undone. It is our character for which we feel responsible. And this responsibility makes sense and has meaning only if we were absolutely free to choose who we are. And when did this choice occur??? Now it gets metaphysical!

It seems to me that a person can be said to have an absolutely free will only if that person is in some mysterious sense self-created; that is, only if that person, in some way, was able to choose who they are (their character).
For, ultimately, it is the person's character which determines the motives to which he/she responds, or does not respond, and it is their character for which he/she feels responsible.
This I learned from Arthur Schopenhauer!

If there is an afterlife, I will know it once I die. If there is no afterlife, I will not know it once I die. Nothing more! Nothing less!

According to Nietzsche, a nihilistic person is one who adheres to any ideology, religion, or system of values that promotes and encourages a denial, rather than, an affirmation of the Will-to-Live.