I would move it. The thread seems more significant than the vast majority of mainline threads here; it reveals a huge landmine in propositional logic that I'm sure most aren't aware of (I sure wasn't), and is relevant to lots of other threads.

This does not belong in the lounge. This is a paradox that rest on a tricky difference between conditionals in language and conditionals in logic. The takeaway is, you have to be very careful translating language to logic, and very suspicious when others do so.

"If there is no God then it is not the case that if I pray then my prayers are answered" seems true. It seems true based on an everyday sense of "if then" by which a conditional may be false when its antecedent is false.

But the inference "If there is no God then it is not the case that if I pray then my prayers are answered, and I do not pray, therefore there is a God" is valid based on a different sense of "if then" by which a conditional is false if and only if its antecedent is true and its consequent is false. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I think this gets it right. There is simply no way to express the "everyday conditional" in propositional logic. I would call it the "real conditional"; it is what we actually mean by "if A then B". We certainly never mean A -> B, which is true whenever A is false. "If I were a billionaire I would grow 3 feet taller" is true in propositional logic, and clearly false in language.

The problem with the "everyday" or "real" conditional (given here by ↠) is that it doesn't have a resolvable truth table (its truth is not determinable by the truth of its arguments alone):

A B A↠B
F F ?
F T ?
T F F
T T ?

Only in one combination does A↠B have a determinate truth value. Any logic that incorporated it would also have to incorporate indeterminate truth values. (Not a hard thing to do at all, it would probably be an interesting exercise for another post).

I think it's more addressing that these mean different things:

1. ¬(P→A)
2. P→¬A — Michael

The problem is that 2 does not express what the statement is saying either, which is that there is no relationship between praying and having the prayer answered. Note that "answering a prayer" here does not mean that God's fiery hand descends from the heavens, it means that whatever is prayed for comes to pass. If you pray for something, it might come to pass, or it might not. But if it does, the prayer would have had nothing to do with it. In terms of a truth table:

P A ¬(P↠A)
F F ?
F T ?
T F T
T T ?

But the metaphysical naturalism of the physicalist posits that as the universe must behave in a law-like manner, i.e. in a way which is replicable and predictive (in principle if not in practice), anything we encounter in the universe that does not seem to behave so, must despite appearances, ultimately do so by virtue of its very existence. — Baden

Is it not thereby falsifiable, or at least made progressively more unlikely? At some point we might encounter a phenomenon whose behavior we despair of ever fitting a law like framework around. For instance, suppose beings seen in supernatural horror movies became commonly observed. Their seeming ability to bend reality to their will would pose a stark challenge to physicalism. Of course science would attempt to meet that challenge, and some movies will introduce an ersatz set of laws into their world, explaining their ghosts in a way that is supposed to satisfy our physicalist intuitions (but seldom successfully). But, science may simply fail to do so, especially if, as a matter of fact, no such laws existed.

Physicalism is the conviction that empirical phenomenon are determined(not necessarily deterministically) by physical laws (what that means is not clear, granted). This may not be the case.

From a little bit of searching, I'm satisfied - and surprised - that the words themselves are so loosely defined and used that no argument over just the words can prosper either side — tim wood

Really all that needs be said.

What do you say an investment is, what "investment" means in a financial context, then we can consider whether gold is an investment. — tim wood

An investment is something you purchase not to make use of, but with the hope it will make you money passively, just by owning it. This can come from appreciation in price over time, or from income in the form or rent or dividends, or both.

I don't agree, I think most people consider gold to be an investment. Nor do I agree with this distinction between speculation and investment. Every investment involves a speculative calculation, which involves undertaking more or less risk.

What I think they missed is there is no there, there in any currency.

Maybe there is for national currencies. That topic is above my pay grade.

But for, say, gold? Where is the intrinsic value of gold?

They were saying that when the crypto market cap was much much smaller, and they were much less institutionally entrenched than they are now. By any measure, they were wrong, the annoying zoomer enthusiasts were right all along.

When it comes to paradigm shifts like this, the intuition of an uneducated kid might count for more than an old investing past master.

Now if your simple idea of the value coming from "scarcity" be right — ssu

Is that what you think you are arguing against? The second sentence in my op:

It is a given that scarcity alone is not value, scarcity is a necessary but insufficient condition of value. — hypericin

You say

money doesn't work that way. It's not about scarcity, it's money moving in the economy and being used to buy stuff. — ssu

And yet in the quantity theory of money graphic you posted, both scarcity (money supply) and velocity determine price. I agree with the graphic.

Now if your simple idea of the value coming from "scarcity" be right, the a tenfold increase in Fed assets and the tripling+ of the M2 monetary base would have severe inflationary effects. Well, the annual inflation rate between 2003 and 2024 has been 2,59% annually. — ssu

This increase in supply does not sit stagnant like you suggest. It is invested in the stock market, in real estate, and other assets. If you measure inflation by the cost of goods you need to survive, inflation might actually be 2.59. If you measure by your ability to buy a house, inflation is quite a bit higher.

You see, the value of the dollar only goes down if that 100 trillion enters the economic system. Only then it will drive up prices and thus lowers the value of the currency. But as you have only had the time to buy a Ferrari and fifty boxes of Champagne before forgetting just where you parked the money, your actions haven't crashed the dollar. — ssu

I don't think so. Of course in reality this loan would have been flagged instantly. If this titanic mistake was somehow made, quintupling the total money supply in an instant, the dollar would crash. All confidence in the government's competence to maintain the scarcity of the dollar would be lost. The mere threat that the 100 trillion might be discovered and enter circulation would crash the dollar. Whether or not it ever actually does.

It's not just actual circulating money that matters. Perception also matters. Just imagine that the Fed announced that they were stimulating the economy by printing 100 trillion dollars. The dollar would absolutely tank, as everyone would try to unload them all at once. But then the Fed announces it was just an April Fools joke. The dollar tanked, yet not a extra single actual additional dollar entered circulation.

Hence if there's 100 trillion in some obscure derivatives market, that amount won't wreck the price of the dollar... as long as those 100 trillion stay in the obscure derivatives market! — ssu

That is not how it works. Some obscure derivatives market might have a market cap of 100 trillion. But that money can't actually be accessed. Only a fraction of it can. For the money to be accessed, the derivative must be sold. Selling en masse would crash the market for the derivative, evaporating the 100 trillion. .

Moreover, for a derivative to be sold, it must be exchanged for dollars. If the derivative is notionally more valuable than all the dollars in existence, where would the additional dollars come from?

The means of exchange probably needs to have some kind of )inherent value, such as gold has. — Leontiskos

Gold has some "inherent value" (as problematic as that is) but that (decoration, electronics) has little relation to it's value, the bulk of which derives from it's status as a store of value. Cryptos have acquired this status (during which process it is possible to become rich), like it or not.

. But with a few pushes on a computer, they could make tomorrow 100 trillion dollars. — ssu

What matters is not "actual" scarcity but perception of scarcity. If the belief spread that they might do this, the value of the dollar would plummet to 0, due to the belief in an imminent loss of scarcity.

How could that be scarcity in the meaning that we usually understand it? — ssu

Despite that, people labor long hours performing unpleasant tasks to acquire a few dollars. No one would spend a third or more if their waking time working if dollars were not scarse: that is, if they could be gathered on trees , or printed on a printer.

The common problem money printing creates isn't necessarily a lack of scarcity, but a lack of value stability. — Tzeentch

Loss of "value stability"(that is, decline) happens in proportion to loss of scarcity and loss of confidence in future scarcity.

People's perception of the longevity and value of the currency, I suppose. — Tzeentch

Sure. It was this basic feeling that kept me and most of us from being early investors. And it is this doubt that combined with greed makes the price so volatile.

If people think something is valuable and are willing to buy it, it's valuable. — ssu

They are willing to buy to the degree it is scarce. As I said scarcity is a necessary but insufficient condition for value.

What does "trustworthy" mean here?

At first I agreed with this 100% and this is certainly the traditional view, but then I remembered the sudden rise in dogecoin's value which is the furthest thing from scarce. — BitconnectCarlos

No, even dogecoin is scarce. Unlike Bitcoin it is inflationary, there is no cap on the total supply. But dogecoin must still be "mined", it cannot be otherwise created or found. Just as there is no cap on the usd that will ultimately be created. But that creation is still tightly controlled, creating scarcity.

All cryptocurrency, at least all that is valuable, is scarce.

Language befuddles us as philosophers because we invest into language more than what language actually is, which is a tool for thinking, creating, and communicating. Language is a cultural and biological artifact. But because all of our thoughts are linguistic, to us words appear elemental. It then becomes the seemingly natural task of philosophy to decide the nature of these elementals of thought.

If you look at the epistemic JTB account for knowledge as a justified true belief, it means that the overwhelmingly vast majority of true beliefs are ineffable and cannot possibly be justified. — Tarskian

They are ineffable, so they have no opportunity to be beliefs at all, and therefore no occasion to be justified.

Ineffable truths are never believed. And I guess, numerically, most truths are ineffable. But all of these ineffable truths seem quite irrelevant too.

What is one example of a subset of the natural numbers that cannot be expressed by language?

Also note that mathematical notation is a kind of extension to the natural languages.

But I do think that at a certain point repression can become indiscriminate insofar as totalitarian regimes go, almost to the point of doing it for its own sake, i.e. I don't think every suppressive law in North Korea, for instance, is a cog in some intricate machine that operates totally efficiently and always in a directed manner to serve a greater purpose. — ToothyMaw

No, it is never that, never 4d chess. 4d chess is almost always the wrong answer.

I think the idea is always "stability", where "stability" is implicitly or explicitly the perpetuation of the ruling regime. They achieve this by repression, by squelching any possible threat. And they might do this crudely, stupidly, without regard to human cost.

Ahh, "directly". Just great. So what can your voice directly do then? — NOS4A2

Also "immediate cause" or "proximate cause".
My voice directly stimulates cochlea, or a electronic sensor.

By your "metaphysics", a twitch of an index finger never killed anyone, nor usually a gun, but only bullets. So nothing to fear from someone with a gun.

No, I don’t quibble much in everyday conversation. I would say, “yes, I turned the lights off”. — NOS4A2

But you quibble here?

Why is your metaphysics "quibbling" in one context, but in the more important context of misinformation it is somehow relevant?

If the metaphysics were sound maybe that would be one thing. But it is not. You are confusing "cause" with "direct cause". My voice cannot directly turn off the lights. But it can still turn off the lights with Alexa.

To the extent ignorance is "enslavement", it is an enslavement imposed on oneself (assuming free access to information). While deception is "enslavement" imposed by an other.

But of course the topic is not mere deception, but disinformation, which is deception on an industrial scale.

Actually all air vibrations, including non-speech, are transduced into electrical energy in modern smart-home systems. In the case of speech recognition It is the software that filters out the speech from the non-speech sounds. So the speech has no more causal power than any other sound. — NOS4A2

So the speech, which caused the electrical signal that the software passed and interpreted, did not cause the lights to turn off? The software did? Or the electrical energy did?

If you are at someone's home, and say "Alexa, lights off" or whatever, and the host asks you why you turned off the lights, you answer "I didn't turn them off. The electrical energy did!"

Can you see why this is either a joke or sophomoric nonsense?

I do have a problem with that. The consequences of speech, for instance, is air and sound coming out of the mouth. To be fair, I'm willing to subject myself to a test if you wish to promote your harm theory. Let's see which injuries you can inflict on me with your speech. — NOS4A2

That speech has casual power beyond air vibrations is trivially obvious. Smart home systems are a clear modern example. Or, train a child to believe X, and that child will likely believe X, with all the consequences belief X entails.

It is up to you to demonstrate why speech in the case of misinformation is somehow not casual. I don't like your chances.

Ownership is a triadic relationship between owner, owned, and society that ratifies the ownership.

Between owner and owned, we think and behave differently with things we own than with things we don't. We use them as we please, exploit them, care for them, discard them. They bring us pride, or shame. We attach them to our identities like medals on our breast.

Society sanctions and enforces this special relationship. Enforcement includes shame and loss of social status, financial penalty, confinement, and violence. One of the jobs of parents is to instill the concept of ownership, and mete out (hopefully far less severe) punishments for violating it.

Without this social system underwriting ownership, it would exist only in the owner's mind, and so would be unreal. Because of our training, we implicitly understand our special perquisites with our belongings, and generally have a healthy respect of other's. We attach moral significance to the concept of ownership, and violate it at our peril.

I think you are mostly right, but usually when such laws are created in repressive societies, it isn't to fight the kind of edge case I describe above, but rather to repress for repression's sake or to enable authoritarian rule. — ToothyMaw

You don't repress for repressions sake. The above is not an edge case, it is the main case. They might brand the governments collusion with the neo Nazis as misinformation, or criticism of the neo Nazis themselves. Whilst their political opponents receive no such protection from the misinformation laws, the government itself would probably be an organ for spreading Disinformation about them.

dis

Thus, I think that the intent behind the implementation of such laws is probably a somewhat decent indicator of whether or not they will be easily abused; — ToothyMaw

Intent matters only because a government with bad intent will write the law such that it can be exploited by them. While a more benevolent government would take more care to add safeguards.

Misinformation is just false information. Under its heading falls satire, irony, fiction, exaggeration, miscalculation, and so on. — NOS4A2

Ridiculously overbroad definition. Misinformation and disinformation are

* Either knowingly false, or told with indifference to their truth
* Told for the benefit of the teller, likely at the cost of the hearer and society at large
* Crucially, they target populations, not individuals

The cost of misinformation is clear.

*Cost to the individual: one cannot act in ones best interest misinformed.
*Cost to society: The actions of the misinformed are often to the detriment of society at large
*Distortion of democracy: democracy is impossible in both the absence of information and the predominance of misinformation. The will of the people devolves to the will of the most potent disinformers.

There is no obvious solution. The chief danger of misinformation laws is that these same laws can be used to suppress the truth while effectively promoting disinformation. This is a common pattern in repressive societies

What it is like to experience.

This is seen by the inverted colors thought experiment. Suppose your internal experience of colors was inverted to everyone else's, such that everyone's red is your green, and vice versa. No one would no the difference. If this were the case, no amount of questioning would or could ever reveal it. That is because the contents of experience are inexpressible.

This is not surprising. When you learn the word red, your teacher points to a red truck, a red crayon, and says "red". Eventually you associate "red" with a particular color sensation. But the teacher is unable to point to the sensation itself, and say "red" if the sensation is red. The teacher can only point to objects that evoke that sensation in herself. So if the same object evokes your red in yourself and your green in herself, that is both just "red" às far as you two are concerned.

We lack language to express the content of sensations, we can only compare them to other sensations. This is equally true of all five senses, the "other" senses (proprioception, interoception, equilibroception, others?) , and emotion.

You are confusing the chronology. This is what you said in reply to your quote of me:

There is no good reason to believe this. It's just like what atheists say about people who believe in God, you just believe this because it makes you feel more comfortable. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no good reason to believe objects really selectively reflect light? Or that objects really appear the way they do to us?

There is no "true" way objects look, I agree with you. This is due not just to scale, but to the multitudinous perspectives one can have on an object (scale is just one dimension of these perspectives). Perception itself is radically perspectival, the redness of red, and the spherical appearance of a ball, is a perspective, and a co-creation between you and the ball. That is how perception to conscious beings necessarily works, in a world where there is no such thing as how things "truly" appear (to any of the senses).

That's why I objected to your post claiming that things really do "look" the way we perceive them to look, through the sense of sight. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course, I didn't say that.

Moreover they really do look the way they do: appearing this way (to humans) is a stable, mind independent property (just not independent of all minds, it is like a social reality) — hypericin

Read more carefully before knee-jerk replying.

Rather than "objects which reflect light", it might be better to say that we distinguish through our eyes, the energy levels of groups of electrons responding to their environmental conditions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Rather not. The micro scale is just one scale, one perspective, not more or less privileged than the human, planetary, or cosmic. What scale we talk in depends on context. On our human scale, there are not just protons and electrons, but vast assemblages of them which behave in the ways that are meaningful and relevant to us.

If by "coloured objects" you just mean "objects which reflect light which cause colour sensations" then sure. But that's dispositionalism, not naive colour realism. — Michael

Sure, but I feel people conflate two or all three of these different senses in which there really are colored objects out there (one of which is false), which contributes to the endless frustration of these discussions.

Depth is a characteristic of visual sensations, and so it seems as if there are coloured objects outside the body. — Michael

From the indirect realism thread, we have a similar perspective on this topic.

Yet part of what confuses these threads is that there really are colored objects outside the body, in the sense that there are really objects which reflect light in ways that allow them to be discriminated. Moreover they really do look the way they do: appearing this way (to humans) is a stable, mind independent property (just not independent of all minds, it is like a social reality)

Form doesn't seem particularly equivalent to information. Just as the same information might "reside" in different material substrates, it can reside in different forms of the same substrate. (i.e black or white text, small or big) Though form does seem "closer" to information than matter (the shape of text is closer to the message than whatever material the glyphs are composed of).

Information seems more like number, something that doesn't exist at all without interpretation, that almost seems to reside in a platonic realm of its own.

It is because of reification, the 'thingifying' tendency deeply embedded in modern thought, which believes that only things are real. — Wayfarer

Rather the opposite of reification. Instead of treating abstractions as real, it excludes parts of the real from the category "real".

often it seems that attempts to use information in a hylomorphic sense are hamstrung — Count Timothy von Icarus

Why hamstring? If matter has or coexists with form, matter has or coexists with information. What is the problem?

analog values, personal meanings, and perhaps even fractal dimensions, that don't lend themselves to yes/no digitization. — Gnomon

I don't think analog values are not information, while digital values are. Of course analog values are just as representable on machines. The difference with physical values is that in a machine precision is fixed and immutable, you cannot extract more or less. Whereas precision is more fluid in natural values, you can expend more or less work to extract more or less precision. But this precision is also ultimately fixed, bound by physical limitations.

While personal meanings are not in themselves information, but rather frameworks of interpretation. I think the conflation of information and interpretation is one of the main confusions of this topic.

The whole point of my op is that information and numbers are the same thing

As she sent it with a computer, absolutely.

so, my friend, if we speak of the real number line. — jgill

True enough. Instead of points I should have said integer marks

I've been thinking more about this. At first I thought I was just mistaken in my op. The set of all possible arrangements of bits is countable, so it is no wonder that we can uniquely assign a whole number to every arrangement. Just because bits are countable, doesn't establish some kind of identity between bits and numbers.

But then, the set of all quantities is countable, as is the set of points on a number line. Are these two any more inherently number than bits? Quantities have arithmetic operations defined for them that don't make sense for bits, and bits have binary operations that don't make sense for quantities. Is one set of operations more "number" than the others? Or are bit arrangements, quantities, number lines, all just countable things, and so all equally numeric?

Information crucially depends on the sender and the receiver (and noise, if any) - this is what is being neglected here. Divining from patterns of tea leaves or decoding random marks on clay gives you no information, because no information was sent in the first place, despite there being a message. Similarly, numbers in themselves are not information, because they do not encode any message - they are just there. — SophistiCat

This seems like a conflation of information and communication, where communication is the transmission of information from A to B. Tea leaves and random marks are rich with information, it would take a lot of work to accurately represent their states. But they are not communications, which are intentional acts.

The message "The cat is on the mat. The cat is on the mat." gives you no more information than the message "The cat is on the mat." even though the former contains more bits than the latter (I am discounting noise for simplicity). The message "Your name is X" gives you no information if your name really is X and you are not suffering from amnesia. So, information depends on the receiver as well. — SophistiCat

Information is not the same as how informative the information might or might not be to a receiver. "The cat is on the mat. The cat is on the mat." may be no more informative than "The cat is on the mat", but the former still carries more information (it requires more bits to represent, but less than "The cat is on the mat. The dog is on the log.") "Your name is X" may not be informative, but it is still information.

Similarly, numbers in themselves are not information, because they do not encode any message - they are just there. — SophistiCat

Just where exactly? If information is distinguished from communicative acts, and from being informative, then numbers are pure information: they are answers to a series of yes and no questions, seen clearly in their binary representations.

Exactly, how is it that the same marks on dry clay can carry more or less information in different contexts? — SophistiCat

I think they can't. They carry the same information, whether or not it happens to be decodable at the time.

And note that it's not just any marks that transmit information. Some random indentations and scratches on the same tablet would not do. How could that be if marks themselves were information? — SophistiCat

Why does that preclude the marks themselves being information? Marks, arranged in certain ways, are information. Arranged randomly, they are not.

and in your OP you went back and forth between numbers and computers, which, of course, are not the same thing — SophistiCat

The point was that computers, thought of as information processing devices, are just as much number processing devices.

Numbers or bits can serve as an abstract representation of an encoded message. — SophistiCat

Why not
Numbers or bits can serve as an abstract representation of an encoded message