Yeah, except this is a philosophy forum, discussing philosophical topics. You know, "what is really out there?" "What do we really know?" Not the pragmatics of using your hands.

Maybe you've just got the wrong forum? People have lived perfectly successful, pragmatic lives without raising a single philosophical question.

Ah well, nothing wrong with deliberately misquoting someone, is there? — Ciceronianus

:roll: Don't be so dense.
My point is that your list was incomplete. My version is the sense in which Descartes would doubt he had hands, were he to do so.

Is there any basis for this preference? One which makes it more likely to be correct than ED, for example? — Ciceronianus

Yes. Its sheer arbitrariness, for one.
And, the quantity of additional theory which is required to flesh out this universe. It must posit godlike beings (or being, in the solipsistic version) capable of sustaining this unfathomably complex delusion of only apparently stable objects. What is their biology? What is our own, since all we know of ours is just illusion? Are they supernatural, which would require an entirely new physics to account for?

These reasons are not definitive. They can't be, since we in principle cannot be certain it is not true.

Why should we care whether a theory fits all observations? What if it fit most observations, as opposed to theories which fit none at all? — Ciceronianus

If it fits most observations, then something must be wrong with the theory, or with the observations. If it fits none, then the theory is just nonsense.

Well put.
Now that I think about it some more, the argument is convincing.

Where did you find this? — Ciceronianus

This was my addition to your list, sorry I thought it was obvious.

is that it supports the existence of an Evil Demon as much as any other explanation of our observations? — Ciceronianus

Not "as much as".

You seem to be on the "quest for certainty." No certainty, no basis for judgment. — Ciceronianus

Funny, this strikes me as your attitude. You are the one who is conflating doubt with disbelief.

Certainty is what Descartes teaches us we must abandon. But this does not make all theories equal. There are any number of reasons why we might prefer one theory over another. I greatly prefer stable, mind independent objects, over ED. But we cannot be certain, that is just the condition we have to live with.

If so, the belief we're hatched from eggs by the will of God is just as reasonable as any other explanation of our existence. — Ciceronianus

Even if we could somehow shoehorn this theory to fit all observations, the resulting model would be so baroquely complex we would reject it. But so long as it really does match observation, it cannot be eliminated with certainty.

Going back to the OP.

English is a real language. The range of sentences expressible in English is infinite. Is that an infinity in the world?

Of course, these sentences can not be enumerated, at least in the world.

I guess whether there are enumerated infinities in the world depends on the nature of the world. Is space-time closed or open? Is there really a unit length, the plank length? Or do lengths truly map to real numbers?

Tell me, I was never any good at math.

My point is, every point on the line can be mapped to an edge of the cube. What about all the points in the rest of the cube?

The interleaving algorithm looks good to me. But then, you can map those interleaved points onto a single edge as well. This can go on and on in a cycle. Why is there not therefore a paradox?

This is getting painful to watch. A simple example shows that the "number" of points in the interior of a cube {p=(x,y,z):0<x<1,0<y<1,0<z<1} , is exactly the "number" of points on the line {r:0<r<1}:

1:1 correspondence demonstrated by r=.3917249105... <-> p=(.3795..., .921..., .140...)

Extending these ideas shows the cardinality of R^3 is the same as that of R. — jgill

Does this kind of reasoning really work? Since at the same time,
r=.xyzabc... <-> p=(.xyzabc..., 0, 0)
and
r=.xyzabc... <-> p=(.xyzabc..., 0, 0.0...01)
and so on?

And moreover,
r1=.xyzabc... <-> r2=(.0....1xyzabc...)
r1=.xyzabc... <-> r2=(.0....2xyzabc...)
...

You are allowed to disagree with a person's beliefs. You are not allowed to disagree with a person.

You seem to be deeply missing the point.

Descartes did not merely pretend ED.
He supposed ED, and lo and behold: this supposition is as consistent with our observations as our default presumption of a stable, mind independent world.

This is a nontrivial result. It reframes our knowledge of a stable, mind independent external world. It is not absolute certainty, but rather, presumption. No matter how likely we might feel this presumption to be, it cannot be confirmed with certainty, since whatever observation we can imagine, ED explains this observation equally well.

This underpins our modern understanding of science, that every theory is provisional in principle. This extends to our pragmatic, mundane lives: we cannot explain any phenomena definitively, another explanation may always come along which explains the same thing equally well, or better.

He believed he had hands without the certain knowledge he had hands — Ciceronianus

If you removed that defining feature, the larger context, how would you know which side of your body is right and which is left? — Metaphysician Undercover

Our right and left are not defined in terms of a larger context. We have the context built in to our bodies.
We have a built in forward: this is where our eyes look. We have a built in up: this points out of the top of our heads. These two directions together create a plane. Our bodies are symmetric about this plane. We call one side of the plane right, the other left. No reference to a larger context here.

I suggest you research local coordinate systems.

A good principle is to return meat to the status it occupied for many centuries in western culture — Bitter Crank

A nice principle, achievable only by ending the practice of factory farming. Otherwise there will always be $1/lb wholesale slop.

The problem with vegans is that these annoying people have the gall to point out that one of our great pleasures is in fact morally unsupportable. Worse, the arguments are inescapable: we have no chance of heading of climate collapse without drastically reducing our meat consumption, and our culinary delight comes at the expense of billions of sentient beings living entire lives of unimaginable suffering. The fact that our enjoyment is a supreme act of selfishness shall be thoroughly repressed. Any boorish nuisance who makes this repression more difficult becomes the rightful target of our scorn.

The right side and the left side of a figure are differentiated by the location of the figure within a larger environment. — Metaphysician Undercover

But this is not true.
Your right side and left side of your body is identifiable independently of your location. The notion is unconnected to your current environment.
The same is just as true of other symmetrical objects.

See Nothing to do with Dennett's if you are interested in my take. Did you participate in that thread? — Banno

No, I don't actually post here that often. The article is good, iconoclastic and well written, right up my alley.

think the OP is working on the premise that "facts of the world" are also such conventions — baker

Why would the OP, writing in defense of Naive Realism. believe this?

As if you can look at a sunset but not experience it...? — Banno

Depending on how closely you are attending to something else, you can see the sunset, and experience it fully, only somewhat, or not at all. The bandwidth of experiencing is more narrow than seeing.

Despite having read this several times, I can't see what your point is here. — Banno

Apologies. Communication is hard!

Is my distinction between the two uses of the word "see" clear? One refers to the process of seeing, the other to the experience of it, the qualia.

Then, if you ask, "do you really see the flower?", the answer depends on the usage of the word 'see'.

Process See: yes. The flower exists, light really did reflect off of it, your eyes receive it and function normally, as does your brain. The correct causal link is established, and the conditions of Process See are fulfilled. You really see the flower.

Experiential See: no. When speaking of the subjective experience of seeing the flower, this is not the flower. It is qualia, a mental construct. It is what seeing a flower is like, for you. But as you point out, there is no "what seeing the flower is really like". Therefore, what you see experientially is not what the flower is really like. You do not really see the flower.

Much of the confusion of this discussion comes from conflating these two usages of 'see'.

Take a look at Level 1 and Level 2 as set out at Theories of Experience. Is that roughly what you have in mind? — Banno

Not really. In my reading Level 1 and Level 2 both treat what I call Experiential Seeing. They ask, what is it? And how does it arise?

I am distinguishing between seeing as a process, and seeing as an experience. The word 'see' may refer to either.

Seeing as a process is just a way objects interact, via reflected light. We do it, microbes do it, robots do it. Experience may be a part of the process, or it may not. Even in humans it may not: "He saw the oncoming blow without being aware of it, and dodged purely by instinct" is a sensible sentence.

Seeing as an experience refers to the experiential component of the seeing process.

The point is, I maintain that you can consistently affirm that you see reality in the process sense, which requires the right kind of causal link between observer and observed. While denying that you see reality in the experiential sense, which requires that the experiential component of seeing coincides with the reality of what is seen.

I have a suspicion that the difference between our positions is more one of language than of content. — Banno

Part of the problem hinges on the word see. 'See' is used in at least two senses.

Process See: To 'see' is a process whereby light reflected from an object shines into an organism's eyes, whereby this signal may undergo many transformations as it is processed and potentially acted upon by the organism.
"I see 3 chairs in the room".

Experiential See: This usage is mostly confined to humans, refers to the last stage of internal transformation in Process See, which is subjective experience.
"Close your eyes and imagine the first chair. Describe what you see."

Lets get straight: no one here is denying the reality of Process See. Experiential See is at issue.

Naive realism claims that Experiential See is a faithful reflection of the world. This is the understanding we are born with, hence 'naive'.

I claim, Experiential See:
* Is usually causally connected to the world.
* Usually faithfully conveys information about the world.
* Is nonetheless something quite other than the world it depicts.

Here you will no doubt wave your finger in the air and shout "Depict to whom? A homunculus?!"

I feel homunculi are red herrings. If you insist on the strict identity of the subject and their perceptions, you would say "the subject undergoes the process of their own depictions", or something.
But I wonder how you make sense of the ordinary claim "I close my eyes and I see a red dragon". With sufficient powers of imagination, the red dragon appears as distinct from us as does the chair in the room.

Again, language is ambiguous. I would distinguish 'Bodily I' and 'Subjective I'. But this is enough for one post.

Again, if what you say were true, one would not be able to make true statements. — Banno

But I just demonstrated that is not the case, with the hologram example.

Ok, we don't spend time arguing about whether the cup has a handle or the car has wheels. — Banno

These are hypotheses which are not worth arguing.

Overwhelmingly, we agree as to what is the case — Banno

Not surprisingly, as we presumably live in the same world, share the same human nature, and the same broader culture.

We do not spend hours arguing about how many centimetres are in a metre or which city is the capital of Russia — Banno

These are conventions, not facts of the world. Truths because they are defined to be so. About these certainty is possible.

I may sit in a chair but cannot perceive the chair in which I sit. I may drive a car but cannot perceive it. Is there nothing about these statements that seem problematic to you? — Ciceronianus

We perceive the chair and the car. We just don't perceive them as they are. It is the nature of perception that it necessarily an illusion.

'Illusion' doesn't mean that what is illusory is not there. An illusion is simply that which is not as it appears. An illusion is always something, it is simply not as it presents itself. A hallucination, on the other hand, is nothing, at least nothing in the physical world.

The fallacy of naive realism is that it takes what is illusion to be what really is.

Doubt can only take place against a background of certainty - you can doubt that the liquid in the cup is water only if you already suppose there is a cup and a liquid. — Banno

You can doubt that the liquid in the cup is water only if your working hypothesis is that there is a cup and liquid. This is not certainty, in the face of true certainty doubt is impossible.

The issue becomes what it is reasonable to doubt. — Banno

Exactly so. This is the quandary of beings who lack certainty about the world, because they do not access it directly. The best they can do is make hypotheses, and question the ones worth questioning.

True, and so there is room for The Matrix/Philosophy 101 style doubts. This absence of independent verification is why these doubts cannot be disproven definitively.

Not so. Imagine a hologram of say a city from an overhead view. It is illusory, there is no actual solid, miniature city in front of you. But if you have reason to believe that the hologram is not purely a synthesis, that it is a projection of a real city, then you can derive true statements about how to navigate the city from this illusion.

The analogy with perception is exact.

1. You presume that we can say nothing about that which we cannot access directly.
2. We are dealing with them, but indirectly, via an illusory interface. No different than what you are doing with your computer right now. Are you dealing with opcodes and interrupts directly?
3. Vacuous, nothing to disagree with there.

'Qualia' is merely a less ambiguous version of 'perception', 'sensory experience'. etc.

An illusion occurs when the senses goes awry. — Banno

An illusion is that which is not what it appears to be. Perception itself is an exemplary illusion.

The word "direct" is not doing anything - except misleading you. — Banno

Not at all. Qualia are the elementals of our waking lives. Qualia, and nothing else, are immediately accessible to our awareness. Any knowledge we have outside of them is necessarily indirect.

those "phantom things" are not what we see, taste and touch; they are what our seeing, tasting and touching, at least in part, consists in. — Banno

So then we have a dualism. What we see/taste/touch, and what those consist in, for us.

As physical objects, we bounce around the world as well as any other. But as conscious beings, all we have direct access to is what our seeing/tasting/touching consists in. Anything more must be acquired by reasoning. This is the barrier of the op, and what is on the other side may as well be called things-in-themselves.

imposing a wall of "representation" or "illusion" which you assume precludes us from intelligent interaction — Ciceronianus

No, I am assuming nothing. Perception is an illusion, in that the sensory phenomena that appears to inhere to the world, the experiences of the 5 senses, are in fact phantasmal mental products. And yet, sensation is the projection of real environmental inputs onto the imaginary plane of qualia. This projection is information preserving, and so we can make intelligent decisions on the basis of these illusions. If we couldn't, we wouldn't have them.

Better, surely, to think of the plane as an individual, and your seeing it as something you might do, rather than as an individual. — Banno

Perception is an activity, not a thing. But, this activity consists in the construction of phantom things in the mind. These phantoms look, smell, taste, feel, sound certain ways. Naive realism says that this is so because things really do look, smell, taste, feel, sound this way.

In truth, everything we actually know about things, we know indirectly, through inference. Everything we experience directly is in fact illusion, constructions of the mind. Illusion because the presentation of these experiences is as if they are of the world itself.

You seem to be fascinated by your perception of me as a lawyer, or perhaps of lawyers in general. I suggest this unhealthy, as you say you believe it isn't real. — Ciceronianus

Lawyers are real, perceptions of lawyers are also real. While causally connected, they are not the same thing.

Not least because, the perception is not a thing at all. It is an event.

But not the naive variety.

QED, except that no one is arguing there is no plane.
The point is that blips, "plane"s, and planes are three distinct things. Therefore, when you see a blip and "plane", you are not seeing a plane.

But all that is irrelevant. — Banno

True.

Indeed. But the relevant point here is that they have made a claim about the plane. — Banno

You are missing the point. The fact that they can make any claim about the plane at all is because of the correlation between dot and plane. Were the dot to start blinking (unless the blinking signifies something else about the plane), that correlation would obviously have broken down. Therefore to make a claim about the plane's cycling existence and non-existence on the basis of the blinking is crazy.

Air traffic controllers do talk about the blip as the plane, and they are not wrong. — Banno

If the dot moves north and the atc says the plane is moving north, this is because they have a justified belief in the correspondence between the dot's movement and the plane's. But if the dot started blinking and the atc said the plane has begun popping in and out of existence, they would either be joking or insane.

How many worlds do you live in? — Ciceronianus

One world, with many different aspects which can be colloquially referred to as "worlds". You are being lawyerly, I guess.

There's nothing real in that mental world to begin with, apparently. — Ciceronianus

Words are real, perceptions are real. Both are removed from the realities they refer to. We can look up from books, we cannot look up from our perceptions.

Our heads are so crowded, then, — Ciceronianus

They are indeed crowded. But perceptions are more mental events rather than objects filling the brain with clutter. The bandwidth of these events is quite limited.

You must refer to your perception of a lawyer, — Ciceronianus

No, I refer to lawyers in the abstract. But this reference is, necessarily, mediated by words, and comprehension of these words is mediated by perceptual events, our perceptions of the virtual ink blots I made on our screens.

Nothing is direct in the mental world, everything is abstract and mediated. Do lawyers reside in these ink blots? No more does reality reside in perceptions.

There's a sound in my head? Are sights and smells in there as well? — Ciceronianus

"A sound" might be a perception (experience, qualia), or a physical event. The former is in your head.

Why should I know anything, if what you say is correct? — Ciceronianus

You can know many things without direct access to them. You must agree, or you would never read, and presumably make a terrible lawyer.

Books bear a correspondence to the reality they describe, and you can learn much from them. And yet, books are not that reality, they are ink blots, perfectly arbitrary ones.

Perceptions are the same way. They correspond to reality, and yet they are composed of arbitrary symbols. Unlike the example of books, they are all we have. Because of this, naive realists confuse these symbols with reality itself.

We began to insert (as it were) something between us and the "external world" some centuries ago, for reasons I find difficult to understand — Ciceronianus

It should not be so difficult to understand. The abolishment of naive realism ("naive", because that is how we start out in life, prior to philosophical sophistication) is one of the few definite results of philosophy. You should know it.

The naive realist believes perception reveals the world as it is. This is simply not so. Any perception is necessarily a co-creation of both the perceived and the perceiver. It cannot be any other way.

For something to be consciously perceived, it must be mapped onto a perceptual plane. This perceptual plane is contingent, and has everything to do with the perceiver, nothing to do with the perceived.

When you hear a pure 440hz tone, it sounds a certain way to you. But that sound in your head has nothing to do with the vibration in the air. Rather, it is a mapping from that vibration to your auditory perceptual plane. Which happens over many complex steps and signal transformations, from the vibration of your eardrum to the conscious event.

Others might perceive pure 440hz tones differently. Other species certainly do. None of these perceptions are privileged, none hear the tone as it really is. "Hearing it as it really is" is a contradiction in terms. "The world as it is" may be conceptualized, but it is perceptually inaccessible, due to the nature of perception itself.

We live immersed in a world of perceptual symbols, from which there is no escaping. It is like living your life in a library. You read words all day, every day. These words point to your understanding of the words, and as you read this understanding grows, as does your understanding of the world. But it's all book knowledge. You can't get out into the world itself, ever, the doors to the library are locked.

Please try to read more carefully. I was contrasting "loner", whose condition is voluntary, with an "outcast" whose isn't.

But I take your point, by definition no loners are in any pathological state — tim wood

I hope to avoid ever making such a ridiculous claim. Loners prefer to be alone, that is really all there is to it.

And you attribute to me a characterizations I did not and do not make. It being not mine, the "contempt," & etc. must be yours. — tim wood

These are my takes on the connotations of the word. I think most would agree, at least in my (American South) culture. It is quite hard to believe someone hasn't internalized these connotations who makes the the whopper of a claim that:

I do not think there is any such thing as a "successful" loner. To be a loner is already to have failed at life in perhaps the most significant ways — tim wood

Guess I'm just being defensive.

From this I infer - no doubt incorrectly - that you're something of a loner, and a bit afraid of it, certainly defensive. — tim wood

I happily claim to be something of a loner, though I go through phases. There were times people might have called me one behind my back (it is not something you say to someone's face, unless you intend to denigrate).