Let me try again.

By the state of the universe, I mean a snapshot of the types, positions and velocities of all the particles in the universe. I'm no physicist, so add onto this whatever else is necessary for a complete and precise description of everything.

Given a description, we can encode it. How? First question is, is this description finite or infinite?

If it is finite, we can encode it as a (very, very, *very* large) integer. Think of binary data as a universal medium of information. All binary data, no matter how large, is just a base 2 integer.

So now, how many possible universes are there? Intuitively, if would seem that U is a possible universe, there is a U' with an extra hydrogen atom here or an extra neutrino there, due to the most minute perturbation in the early universe. So I think we want to say there are infinite possible universes.

So then the set of all possible universes is representable as an infinite array of integers. Now the set of all universes in the multiverse would also be representable as an infinite array of integers. But there is no guarantee whatsoever that one infinite array of integers contains even a single member of another, let alone all of them. So, the op fails here.

Now, if the amount of information in the universe is infinite, then the op is doubly screwed. Then, at best the state can be encoded as an irrational number, and the argument fails for similar reasons.

The only way I can see the op succeeding is if the information content of the universe is finite, there are only a finite number of possible universes, and by some law universes cannot repeat in the multiverse.

nullum sensum facit — jgill

No? It's true that I struggled to express myself here.

Either the state of the universe can be represented by a real or it cannot.

If it can: an infinite set of reals does not exhaust all possible reals. Therefore op is invalid.

If it cannot: universes are presumably too complex to be depicted by a single real. But then, even simpler objects than the universe, reals, do not meet the requirements of the op. Then, it would seem to hold that the universe (representable only by a set of reals?) would also not meet the requirement.

The only way I can see the op is true is if the states of the universe are merely countably infinite, and if they cannot repeat.

I'm not staking my claim on whether you can or cannot. (Reals are continuous. Reals comprise of potentially infinite information, so I don't see why you cannot).

Either the universe can be so represented, or it cannot, because the universe is too complex. But if the latter, then my argument is only strengthened. If the op is not true of reals, then it is doubly untrue of the universe.

This is an old and tired fallacy.

Consider the state of the universe to be represented by a real number: say 1.12365...

Given an infinite set of real numbers, there is no guarantee whatsoever that any specific real number is a member of that set. There are infinite numbers to choose from, so for instance the entire set may consist of numbers between 0.6 and 0.61. And moreover, numbers may be duplicated.

With that expressed, I'm curious what the threshold is for "enough people" to perceive something/somewhere as sacred, for it to then become so? — Bret Bernhoft

If there is a threshold I imagine it would vary among individuals and cultures. There is no formula. This touches upon a tension in philosophy, between the real and the imaginary, that some day I will create a post on.

The imaginary may manifest in the world, it's just that it's ultimate substrate is mental. The sacred, nations, money are examples. You don't expect imaginary things to have rigid regularities that can be expressed in an equation. When you ask "what is..." of an imaginary thing, the question is definitional, psychological, and/or sociological. As opposed to asking of a physical thing. This boundary gets blurred constantly, both in philosophy and in reality. After all, nothing seems more real than national borders, money can literally move mountains, and yet every point of contact we have with a pebble is mediated by imaginary, virtual qualities.

Just saying thoughts.

That's an excellent question, and I'd assume not. But I could be mistaken. — Bret Bernhoft

I would also assume not. Therefore, the requirement that something be sacred must be that some, not all, people regard it so. Therefore, my example answers your op in the affirmative.

The alternative perspective is that of the true believer, whereby some intrinsic property of a space makes it sacred.

Despite the crude sophistry of the OP, the possibility does seem real that that time is an illusion.

Suppose it was, that every moment was contemporaneous, that the universe evolved from big bang to big crunch in an instant, and we experience every moment of our very brief lives simultaneously.

If this were true, we would still experience the world as we do now. Every moment would have a prior moment, established by memory. Due to the constancy of the laws of the universe, we would still anticipate a succeeding moment. And due to these laws, some processes would evolve at rates relative to others, such as clocks.

All that is required is the laws of the universe, and memory. Time as a real thing seems inessential to explaining what we experience.

Certainly it would, to some. — Bret Bernhoft

Is any, to all?

Happiness has intrinsic value. The positive valence of happiness is hardwired. That is what intrinsic value looks like.

"Do viruses have will?" is analogous to "are viruses alive?". In both cases the virus meets some of the criteria of the word in question, but not all. It is missing metabolism in the one case, awareness in the other.

Do we grant the virus will and life? In both cases, the question is ultimately definitional.

We can imagine a case where we believe we raised our arm: we have the intention, and receive the sensory motor feedback of raising out arm, but in fact, our arm stays at rest. This is enough to establish that the knowledge of our actions is not "unconditional".

The fallacy would simply be invalid premise. The full premise is implied, not explicit: We know that we always act directly/unconditionally. This according to Atwell is incorrect.

Change can be thought of as a meta property, a property of properties. My weight, a property, has the property of being in constant flux. My age has the meta property of linear change. My species, on the other hand, has the meta property of fixedness.

Suppose Jesus returned to earth for a few months and kept a blog of his slumming vacation. The Christians who knew of this momentous event took possession of the holy servers, adorned them with crucifi, candles, incense and other bric-a-brac, reproduced them endlessly, recited blog posts every Sunday. Would this not be a sacred digital space?

Decisions originating in the brain propagate to the peripheral nervous system which contracts muscles and applies forces to the system. The system is not violating any physical principle, when these forces are taken into account.

In general when thinking about free will it is helpful to consider robots. You can program a robot to always move up hill. Does this constitute a proof of free will of the robot?

Yeah, except this is a philosophy forum, discussing philosophical topics. You know, "what is really out there?" "What do we really know?" Not the pragmatics of using your hands.

Maybe you've just got the wrong forum? People have lived perfectly successful, pragmatic lives without raising a single philosophical question.

Ah well, nothing wrong with deliberately misquoting someone, is there? — Ciceronianus

:roll: Don't be so dense.
My point is that your list was incomplete. My version is the sense in which Descartes would doubt he had hands, were he to do so.

Is there any basis for this preference? One which makes it more likely to be correct than ED, for example? — Ciceronianus

Yes. Its sheer arbitrariness, for one.
And, the quantity of additional theory which is required to flesh out this universe. It must posit godlike beings (or being, in the solipsistic version) capable of sustaining this unfathomably complex delusion of only apparently stable objects. What is their biology? What is our own, since all we know of ours is just illusion? Are they supernatural, which would require an entirely new physics to account for?

These reasons are not definitive. They can't be, since we in principle cannot be certain it is not true.

Why should we care whether a theory fits all observations? What if it fit most observations, as opposed to theories which fit none at all? — Ciceronianus

If it fits most observations, then something must be wrong with the theory, or with the observations. If it fits none, then the theory is just nonsense.

Well put.
Now that I think about it some more, the argument is convincing.

Where did you find this? — Ciceronianus

This was my addition to your list, sorry I thought it was obvious.

is that it supports the existence of an Evil Demon as much as any other explanation of our observations? — Ciceronianus

Not "as much as".

You seem to be on the "quest for certainty." No certainty, no basis for judgment. — Ciceronianus

Funny, this strikes me as your attitude. You are the one who is conflating doubt with disbelief.

Certainty is what Descartes teaches us we must abandon. But this does not make all theories equal. There are any number of reasons why we might prefer one theory over another. I greatly prefer stable, mind independent objects, over ED. But we cannot be certain, that is just the condition we have to live with.

If so, the belief we're hatched from eggs by the will of God is just as reasonable as any other explanation of our existence. — Ciceronianus

Even if we could somehow shoehorn this theory to fit all observations, the resulting model would be so baroquely complex we would reject it. But so long as it really does match observation, it cannot be eliminated with certainty.

Going back to the OP.

English is a real language. The range of sentences expressible in English is infinite. Is that an infinity in the world?

Of course, these sentences can not be enumerated, at least in the world.

I guess whether there are enumerated infinities in the world depends on the nature of the world. Is space-time closed or open? Is there really a unit length, the plank length? Or do lengths truly map to real numbers?

Tell me, I was never any good at math.

My point is, every point on the line can be mapped to an edge of the cube. What about all the points in the rest of the cube?

The interleaving algorithm looks good to me. But then, you can map those interleaved points onto a single edge as well. This can go on and on in a cycle. Why is there not therefore a paradox?

This is getting painful to watch. A simple example shows that the "number" of points in the interior of a cube {p=(x,y,z):0<x<1,0<y<1,0<z<1} , is exactly the "number" of points on the line {r:0<r<1}:

1:1 correspondence demonstrated by r=.3917249105... <-> p=(.3795..., .921..., .140...)

Extending these ideas shows the cardinality of R^3 is the same as that of R. — jgill

Does this kind of reasoning really work? Since at the same time,
r=.xyzabc... <-> p=(.xyzabc..., 0, 0)
and
r=.xyzabc... <-> p=(.xyzabc..., 0, 0.0...01)
and so on?

And moreover,
r1=.xyzabc... <-> r2=(.0....1xyzabc...)
r1=.xyzabc... <-> r2=(.0....2xyzabc...)
...

You are allowed to disagree with a person's beliefs. You are not allowed to disagree with a person.

You seem to be deeply missing the point.

Descartes did not merely pretend ED.
He supposed ED, and lo and behold: this supposition is as consistent with our observations as our default presumption of a stable, mind independent world.

This is a nontrivial result. It reframes our knowledge of a stable, mind independent external world. It is not absolute certainty, but rather, presumption. No matter how likely we might feel this presumption to be, it cannot be confirmed with certainty, since whatever observation we can imagine, ED explains this observation equally well.

This underpins our modern understanding of science, that every theory is provisional in principle. This extends to our pragmatic, mundane lives: we cannot explain any phenomena definitively, another explanation may always come along which explains the same thing equally well, or better.

He believed he had hands without the certain knowledge he had hands — Ciceronianus

If you removed that defining feature, the larger context, how would you know which side of your body is right and which is left? — Metaphysician Undercover

Our right and left are not defined in terms of a larger context. We have the context built in to our bodies.
We have a built in forward: this is where our eyes look. We have a built in up: this points out of the top of our heads. These two directions together create a plane. Our bodies are symmetric about this plane. We call one side of the plane right, the other left. No reference to a larger context here.

I suggest you research local coordinate systems.

A good principle is to return meat to the status it occupied for many centuries in western culture — Bitter Crank

A nice principle, achievable only by ending the practice of factory farming. Otherwise there will always be $1/lb wholesale slop.

The problem with vegans is that these annoying people have the gall to point out that one of our great pleasures is in fact morally unsupportable. Worse, the arguments are inescapable: we have no chance of heading of climate collapse without drastically reducing our meat consumption, and our culinary delight comes at the expense of billions of sentient beings living entire lives of unimaginable suffering. The fact that our enjoyment is a supreme act of selfishness shall be thoroughly repressed. Any boorish nuisance who makes this repression more difficult becomes the rightful target of our scorn.

The right side and the left side of a figure are differentiated by the location of the figure within a larger environment. — Metaphysician Undercover

But this is not true.
Your right side and left side of your body is identifiable independently of your location. The notion is unconnected to your current environment.
The same is just as true of other symmetrical objects.

See Nothing to do with Dennett's if you are interested in my take. Did you participate in that thread? — Banno

No, I don't actually post here that often. The article is good, iconoclastic and well written, right up my alley.

think the OP is working on the premise that "facts of the world" are also such conventions — baker

Why would the OP, writing in defense of Naive Realism. believe this?

As if you can look at a sunset but not experience it...? — Banno

Depending on how closely you are attending to something else, you can see the sunset, and experience it fully, only somewhat, or not at all. The bandwidth of experiencing is more narrow than seeing.

Despite having read this several times, I can't see what your point is here. — Banno

Apologies. Communication is hard!

Is my distinction between the two uses of the word "see" clear? One refers to the process of seeing, the other to the experience of it, the qualia.

Then, if you ask, "do you really see the flower?", the answer depends on the usage of the word 'see'.

Process See: yes. The flower exists, light really did reflect off of it, your eyes receive it and function normally, as does your brain. The correct causal link is established, and the conditions of Process See are fulfilled. You really see the flower.

Experiential See: no. When speaking of the subjective experience of seeing the flower, this is not the flower. It is qualia, a mental construct. It is what seeing a flower is like, for you. But as you point out, there is no "what seeing the flower is really like". Therefore, what you see experientially is not what the flower is really like. You do not really see the flower.

Much of the confusion of this discussion comes from conflating these two usages of 'see'.

Take a look at Level 1 and Level 2 as set out at Theories of Experience. Is that roughly what you have in mind? — Banno

Not really. In my reading Level 1 and Level 2 both treat what I call Experiential Seeing. They ask, what is it? And how does it arise?

I am distinguishing between seeing as a process, and seeing as an experience. The word 'see' may refer to either.

Seeing as a process is just a way objects interact, via reflected light. We do it, microbes do it, robots do it. Experience may be a part of the process, or it may not. Even in humans it may not: "He saw the oncoming blow without being aware of it, and dodged purely by instinct" is a sensible sentence.

Seeing as an experience refers to the experiential component of the seeing process.

The point is, I maintain that you can consistently affirm that you see reality in the process sense, which requires the right kind of causal link between observer and observed. While denying that you see reality in the experiential sense, which requires that the experiential component of seeing coincides with the reality of what is seen.

I have a suspicion that the difference between our positions is more one of language than of content. — Banno

Part of the problem hinges on the word see. 'See' is used in at least two senses.

Process See: To 'see' is a process whereby light reflected from an object shines into an organism's eyes, whereby this signal may undergo many transformations as it is processed and potentially acted upon by the organism.
"I see 3 chairs in the room".

Experiential See: This usage is mostly confined to humans, refers to the last stage of internal transformation in Process See, which is subjective experience.
"Close your eyes and imagine the first chair. Describe what you see."

Lets get straight: no one here is denying the reality of Process See. Experiential See is at issue.

Naive realism claims that Experiential See is a faithful reflection of the world. This is the understanding we are born with, hence 'naive'.

I claim, Experiential See:
* Is usually causally connected to the world.
* Usually faithfully conveys information about the world.
* Is nonetheless something quite other than the world it depicts.

Here you will no doubt wave your finger in the air and shout "Depict to whom? A homunculus?!"

I feel homunculi are red herrings. If you insist on the strict identity of the subject and their perceptions, you would say "the subject undergoes the process of their own depictions", or something.
But I wonder how you make sense of the ordinary claim "I close my eyes and I see a red dragon". With sufficient powers of imagination, the red dragon appears as distinct from us as does the chair in the room.

Again, language is ambiguous. I would distinguish 'Bodily I' and 'Subjective I'. But this is enough for one post.

Again, if what you say were true, one would not be able to make true statements. — Banno

But I just demonstrated that is not the case, with the hologram example.

Ok, we don't spend time arguing about whether the cup has a handle or the car has wheels. — Banno

These are hypotheses which are not worth arguing.

Overwhelmingly, we agree as to what is the case — Banno

Not surprisingly, as we presumably live in the same world, share the same human nature, and the same broader culture.

We do not spend hours arguing about how many centimetres are in a metre or which city is the capital of Russia — Banno

These are conventions, not facts of the world. Truths because they are defined to be so. About these certainty is possible.

I may sit in a chair but cannot perceive the chair in which I sit. I may drive a car but cannot perceive it. Is there nothing about these statements that seem problematic to you? — Ciceronianus

We perceive the chair and the car. We just don't perceive them as they are. It is the nature of perception that it necessarily an illusion.

'Illusion' doesn't mean that what is illusory is not there. An illusion is simply that which is not as it appears. An illusion is always something, it is simply not as it presents itself. A hallucination, on the other hand, is nothing, at least nothing in the physical world.

The fallacy of naive realism is that it takes what is illusion to be what really is.

Doubt can only take place against a background of certainty - you can doubt that the liquid in the cup is water only if you already suppose there is a cup and a liquid. — Banno

You can doubt that the liquid in the cup is water only if your working hypothesis is that there is a cup and liquid. This is not certainty, in the face of true certainty doubt is impossible.

The issue becomes what it is reasonable to doubt. — Banno

Exactly so. This is the quandary of beings who lack certainty about the world, because they do not access it directly. The best they can do is make hypotheses, and question the ones worth questioning.

True, and so there is room for The Matrix/Philosophy 101 style doubts. This absence of independent verification is why these doubts cannot be disproven definitively.

Not so. Imagine a hologram of say a city from an overhead view. It is illusory, there is no actual solid, miniature city in front of you. But if you have reason to believe that the hologram is not purely a synthesis, that it is a projection of a real city, then you can derive true statements about how to navigate the city from this illusion.

The analogy with perception is exact.

1. You presume that we can say nothing about that which we cannot access directly.
2. We are dealing with them, but indirectly, via an illusory interface. No different than what you are doing with your computer right now. Are you dealing with opcodes and interrupts directly?
3. Vacuous, nothing to disagree with there.

'Qualia' is merely a less ambiguous version of 'perception', 'sensory experience'. etc.

An illusion occurs when the senses goes awry. — Banno

An illusion is that which is not what it appears to be. Perception itself is an exemplary illusion.

The word "direct" is not doing anything - except misleading you. — Banno

Not at all. Qualia are the elementals of our waking lives. Qualia, and nothing else, are immediately accessible to our awareness. Any knowledge we have outside of them is necessarily indirect.