.

As if there were one thing that "it is like" to be aware that your toe hurts, to be aware that the sun is out, and to be aware that Paris is in France. — Banno

The second two examples use "aware" in its other sense, which is simply to know a certain fact.

To be aware of a mosquito bite, aware of a sunset, aware of a feeling of jealousy, are all qualitative states. There is something it is like to experience each of these. What each is like is quite different. What unifies them is that they are all varieties of qualitative conscious states, they each have a felt quality. "Qualia" bundles this property of having a felt quality into a conceptual bucket.

And what, exactly, is the claim here? — Banno

The claim is that in order for you to be conscious of anything at all, that consciousness must have a felt quality. Absent that, you aren't actually aware. If something has no felt quality, no associated qualia, then it is not conscious.

"Doesn't the answer simply depend on what we count as being sentient? That is, it's something to be decided , not discovered?"

I would argue that qualia is the bedrock of sentience. To be sentient is to have qualitative states. But given that, it is still something to be discovered, if this is even possible. Unless consciousness is a physical property (which I doubt), we can never build a consciousness detector. The best we can likely do is identify the features of neuroanatomy, across very different species and neural architectures, which bring about consciousness.

There's no third person without the first person. — Wayfarer

I would add, to @Banno's question, that there is no first person without qualia. To be aware of anything at all, there must be something it is like to have that awareness. In other words, consciousness without qualia is contradictory. To do without qualia is to do without consciousness.

Probably not all that different. I think there really is a hard problem, and it is hard because of the relation between us and our own consciousness, vs. us and anything else we experience. All of our collective evolutionary and cultural problem solving machinery was developed to manage the latter. Whereas with the former we really only have our own example, and none of that machinery applies. Worse, All of that machinery is reflexively part of what needs to be explained, insofar as it structures our conscious experience. That is what makes it so hard.

. That said, there is no 'hard problem of consciousness' at all. The whole reason for Chalmer's polemic is to show up an inevitable shortcoming of third-person science. Once that is grasped, the 'problem' dissappears. But it seems extraordinarily difficult to do! — Wayfarer

I have a somewhat different take. Consciousness is real, and in principle it admits to explanation. The problem is our unique epistemic relationship with our own consciousness. Our whole access to the world, and to ourselves, is via consciousness. And so we have the problem of explaining consciousness from the inside.

It is like someone who lives alone wearing rose colored glasses, who can never remove them or even look at them, tasked with explaining the glasses that filter their vision.

Consciousness, which can experience so much, and explain these experiences so well, has a unique difficulty explaining itself.

SO you are at odds with those who have said elsewhere that qualia are just colours and so on. Because colours are not restricted to the first person... — Banno

Yes, that is exactly why we need the term, to specify we are talking about the first person aspect specifically.

And it seems to me that one simple explanation of this is that the notion is incoherent. — Banno

A very easy, simple recourse to incomprehension.

You have omitted qualia already. The word does no work in your explanation. The explanation works without mention of qualia. — Banno

A smell is a quale. You are free to be allergic to the word and never use it. And you are free to invent a world where qualia are just decor that don't do anything, or are incoherent, or don't exist. You are free to be wrong.

You seem very confident about that. Fine. To me they are instances of the same sort of thing, — Banno

I'm confident. There is more than a trivial distinction between meeting an old friend whose name you cannot place, and meeting a stranger.

There are three very distinct things: smell, recognition, naming.

But you want to add, in addition to the smell of coffee, something more: the quale of coffee, here, now, perhaps. Something of that sort. And the simple request is, why?. To what end? — Banno

No, I never said anything like this, and I keep feeling you are somehow missing the concept. The quale is not something in addition to the smell. The smell is an instance of a broader category, qualia, that includes everything with a subjective feel.

. The raw sensation by itself doesn’t explain why you identify it as "coffee." Therefore, "qualia" does no explanatory work in the theory of perception or cognition. It’s a label, not a mechanism. — Banno

In your mind, linguistic context somehow explains it? I don't think so.

It is really a very simple story. In your life you encounter aromatic things. In their presence, you experience a kind of qualia: a smell. In your mind, you form an association: smell <--> aromatic thing. In this case, coffee smell <--> coffee. Then later on, when you encounter coffee smell, your training tells you it's significance: coffee.

You cannot omit qualia from this story. Qualia, that which is a subjective feel, is how information such as aromas enter into our conscious awareness. Without qualia, it isn't clear how the information would enter into awareness at all. Maybe if we were some kind of hyper linguistic species, a voice would whisper in our ear: "coffee is near". But we are humans, and so our brains use qualia for this job.

How does linguistic context do a better job of explaining this?

What a grand vision! Compounding error with illusion. Rhetoric dressed as precision. — Banno

Lol, and here I thought it was just a definition.

A trivial distinction. To not recognise the smell is to not be able to place it, especially in terms of language. — Banno

Not recognizing something and forgetting the word for something are entirely different. You can know what a smell is, what produces it, while the name of what produces it might be elusive. Or you may know the smell is familiar, but have no clue what it is. Or, you may have never encountered the smell before at all.

Are we really arguing this?

It's unclear to me what this is claiming. Are you now saying that anger and imaginings are also qualia? Odd. Perhaps the next question is, what for you isn't a quale? — Banno

Yes. This is really standard, and it is odd to me that you have read papers on qualia, hosted topics on qualia, opine frequently on qualia, without even knowing that. Qualia applies to anything that has a felt, subjective character. "Qualia" specifically picks out only that felt, subjective character, discarding everything else. There is no suitable word that can be used in it's place.

Look again, with care. That is precisely what it does allow for - the smell is recognised, but the matching word is not: — Banno

No, forgetting the word is a different case. I'm talking about the case where the smell is not recognized.

Then is it anything other than what is commonly called a "sensation"? If not, let us use that term rather than invent a new one. It will suffice. — Banno

"Sensation " is not good enough. It is almost completely specialized to bodily feelings. "Red sensation", "oboe sensation", "angry sensation", "imagining a green sensation". are awkwardly disconnected from established usage.

It is clear in the text that the owner can look inside the box. — Banno

no one can look inside the box. — Banno

If you want phenomenology, there is no gap between my smelling that and my smelling coffee. That's the point. What there might be is a gap between my smelling coffee and my choosing the word "coffee" for what I smell. — Banno

This is demonstrably untrue. It doesn't allow for the common case where you smell something but cannot recall what it is. Despite not recalling, there is still something it is like to smell it. For this to be possible, there must be a difference between smelling something and identifying it, even if the identification is not always conscious.

...and that's the very question I asked, way, way back. If qual are just smells and colours, why bother? Why not just talk about smells and colours? — Banno

So are qualia redundant? Incoherent? Or non-existent? Which is it, you have claimed each of these at various times.

Qualia is a generic term for the individual, subjective experience of smells and colors, and anything else we experience. Invented, I suppose, because "experiences" and "sensations" are already too overloaded. Whereas, "smells" and "colors" can equally refer to the properties engendering these experiences.

no one can look inside the box. — Banno

This does not respect the structure of qualia. The owner of the box may look inside, but no one else. Moreover, the box is not disconnected from the world. There is perhaps a global beetle, and everyone's personal beetle is, though a network of cameras, an image which is a perspective on that global beetle.

it is unlikely that there is a table of any sort in your brain. More likely that there are neural paths that activate when there is coffee in the air. — Banno

Certainly. "Table look up" is at best a logical description of the operation, but not faithful to the actual mechanics.

Yep. But the qual plays no role. You want an explanation that goes odour→qual→table →coffee when one that goes odour→coffee will suffice. — Banno

"Odor" is supposed to be the molecules here? Sorry, but the gap is far too great. How do you get from odor to coffee?

Yep. Same for smell, which unlike a qual has temporal continuity. That is, your qualia become smells in order to be of any use. — Banno

What is a smell if not a quale?

Suppose that everyone had a box with something in it which we call a “beetle”. No one can ever look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. But what if these people’s word “beetle” had a use nonetheless? If so, it would not be as the name of a thing. The thing in the box doesn’t belong to the language-game at all; not even as a Something: for the box might even be empty. a No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. — §293

I still don't know how the"game" functions without the "beetle". Specifically, how you are able to accurately utter "l smell coffee" without the involvement of qualia.

So you have a qual, and you run down a table of qualia and match it to the qual you previously identified as "coffee". — Banno

Perhaps this suffices to describe what my brain does. I'm not generally aware, unless I'm struggling to identify an odor.

I just smell coffee. — Banno

That is a statement of what you do. It explains nothing.

Suppose that your qual for coffee changes over time, and your table of qualia also changes to match. You still run down the table to identify the smell, but it is a completely different smell.

What role did your qual play here? — Banno

The qualia I experience still matches my "table", even in the implausible scenario both are drifting.

Qualia are supposed to explain how we recognize things, but the recognition depends on stability, which qualia, as momentary sensations, cannot guarantee. — Banno

While qualia themselves are momentary, the cognitive machinery which produces them must be stable enough to allow for recognition through time.


Again, please explain how you identify the aroma of coffee without qualia.

Where do we make use of qualia - outside of philosophy fora? — Banno

For instance, I make use of qualia when I identify the smell of coffee. If I didn't recognize that particular subjective olfactory experience as coffee, I couldn't make the identification. That there is coffee in the air is revealed to me by the quale of coffee aroma.

I believe most humans, including neuroscientists, agree with me here. Does your brain somehow work otherwise?

Your qual change over time but you do not notice, yet the language game continues unchanged. Therefore the qual are irrelevant to the language game. — Banno

The quale can change, but memories must as well. This does not imply that qualia are irrelevant. What is required is the qualia are stable with respect to memories of them.

It is true that given a radically different cognitive architecture that does not make use of qualia, they would be irrelevant. But the fact is, we do make use of them. Given our cognitive makeup, without stable qualia (at minimum, stable relative to memory), we could never coordinate our experiences. It is on you to describe how we can agree that the aroma of coffee is in the air without them.

If the private-symbol model requires “lockstep drifting qualia” just to keep meaning afloat, then abandon the model. Meaning doesn’t live there anyway. — Banno

Wait what? Drifting qualia is your idea, not mine. I'm pointing out how implausible it would be for memories and qualia to drift in lockstep without our notice.

On the presumption that there is such a thing as "the correct subjective smell", which is the very point at issue. — Banno

You identify the smell as just another version of the chemical. This seems to imply that there is a correct subjective smell, which is absurd.

What I mean is, why is the form it's in not the form that it can most easily process and act upon? — Patterner

As the brain receives a sensory signal, it is just a signal, presumably without any qualitative content. The brain has to do the work so that the signal can be interpreted by (the conscious subset of) itself as qualitative.

The key insight is that the sensory manifold we experience is not accidental or epiphenomenal. It is a highly efficient way of organizing information that would otherwise overwhelm the nervous system.

Notice how the sensation has now become a symbol. — Banno

Not a new position. The smells are symbols. Smells exhibit the characteristic one way relation of symbols. The smell points to the event, brewing coffee, but you can analyze the coffee for a thousand years and you will never derive the smell.

Note that any suitable medium can function as symbols: roads use signage, books use glyphs, brains use qualia.

Suppose that your qual of coffee changes over time, but you do not notice; so that the way coffee smells for you now is utterly different to how it smelt to you as a child.

Now, what is it that is the same now as it was when you were a child? Well, it's not the qual, since that has changed. It's the language and behaviour around the smell of coffee that has stayed the same

The system functions entirely without the consistent private symbol. It is not required. — Banno

This does not follow.

It is theoretically possible that all of our private symbols vary over our lifetimes without our noticing. But for this to work, our memories have to vary in lockstep. If they do not, then not only would we notice, but the symbols would become useless. If what we remember as coffee yesterday smells like bacon today, then the symbol does not communicate anything.

It is as if you are arguing words are not required for language to function, because theoretically words might be varying without our noticing (along with our memories and all printed text).

Or, my preference, the smell of coffee just is those chemicals, under a different description. — Banno

This is very wrong. The smell is certainly not the chemical. This feels like naive realism.

If the smell were the chemical, an alien could analyze the chemical and derive the correct subjective smell. This is clearly impossible. The smell is not a chemical property. Smells are the end product of the conjunction of the chemical and the human sensory system.

Have we? Or have we co-ordinated our behaviour? — Banno

Both. We coordinated on the basis of internal sensations. That is part of the mechanism. Lacking this, you might say "I smell coffee", I might say "I smell bacon", one would be as groundless as the next.

What more, exactly, is there to "identifying my internal, private sensation as coffee" than is found in "I smell coffee" — Banno

Nothing. One just makes explicit what is already contained in the other.

Discourse functions even if our sensations differ... so what is the place of the sensation? — Banno

Since sensations are private, there is no need for them to be consistent between people. They only have to be consistent within an individual. Smell sensations are like a private, internal symbol table. We learn by consistently matching a public event, coffee brewing, with a private symbol, the smell of coffee. Then, when we later encounter the private symbol, the smell of coffee, we can infer the public event, coffee is brewing, is nearby.

How can this system function without the private symbol? And so how would smell discourse function without the system?

But I'm not seeing how a discreet internal event isn't as problematic as a "thing"; it remains that no one else can check that you are correct. — Banno

If you claim you smell coffee, I cannot look inside your head to verify. But I can attend to my sense of smell: do I experience the internal sensation I have leaned to associate with coffee, or don't I? I do. i can confuse that you are experiencing the same smell that I am. Or more sophisticated, that both of us are experiencing the internal event we associate with coffee (even if these are different).

That these sensations off coffee may be entirely different between us is ultimately only of philosophical significance, the discourse functions the same either way. But without these sensations, the discourse wouldn't happen at all.

That everyday discourse functions without the philosophical notion of qualia is not under dispute. But what relevance is that to us purported philosophers?

So if we agree to talk of a qual of coffee - even if here, now - what is it that is being agreed on? The term "the aroma of coffee" perhaps picks out a pattern of behaviour and report, coordinates shared expectations, and is indexical but public. But it does not pick out a thing. We may avoid the hypostatisation. — Banno

There is no hypostasisation. A quale is not a material thing, it is more an event. But it is concrete, not abstract. The "aroma of coffee" picks out the subjective character of the internal event that occurs when coffee is smelled. (While patterns of behavior, expectations, etc are all real, this is just not what "the aroma of coffee" refers to).

The privacy of qualia is philosophical, it doesn't necessarily have significance in linguistic practice. In practice, there is a cousin to naive realism, call it "naive intersubjectivism": the presumption that we all internally experience basically the same things. Even though philosophically, the subjective aroma of coffee is private, by presumption we can talk about it as if everyone is talking about the same thing, everyone experiences what I experience. Moreover, that which prompts the experience is public. And so the discourse can function, even if its philosophical presuppositions are suspect.

Even if naive intersubjectivism is abandoned, we can still discuss qualia. We just abandon the idea that we can understand concretely what others experience. "The aroma of coffee" becomes relative, that which the sniffer experiences when smelling coffee. There is no singular, concrete content, but rather a conceptual structure: that particular experience which each individual undergoes.

I think I agree with everything here.

Depression is a 'mental illness' but it is neurotic, rather than psychotic. I think it better to view neurotic 'mental illnesses' as skewing or limiting perspectives on reality, rather than breaking from reality, as with psychosis. — Jeremy Murray

Maybe not a break with a reality. But certainly a break with objectivity is assessments of one's life circumstance. How can a depressive evaluate this with any objectivity?

Like you, I wouldn't be here suicide were an easy option.

For depression, I've wants to say, "but there is always hope". But can we say this with confidence? Despite having crawled out of our own black holes? How do we know that others aren't much, much deeper, so deep they are doomed never to emerge?

I was haunted reading case reports from NL of assisted suicide granted to the depressed. Here is one example:

https://www.theguardian.com/society/article/2024/may/16/dutch-woman-euthanasia-approval-grounds-of-mental-suffering

If there was memory of the qualia, then its abrupt absence would be noticed. — noAxioms

I think what you have in mind is an incomplete absence of qualia. For instance, the idea of someone losing all five senses at once. Yet, they are blindsighted in all five senses, so they can still navigate the world as before, just without conscious awareness.

But keep two things in mind:

1. Memory is also qualitative. When we remember, we remember images, sounds, feelings. These are just as much qualia as external sensations. It is just that the brain is able to bookkeep these, marking them as internal (schizophrenia might be the failure of this bookkeeping mechanism).

Someone who lost all qualitative awareness would lose the qualitative aspect of memory as well. So, there would be no mismatch, memory (no qualia) would match current situation (no qualia).

2. Feelings are also qualitative. It is not just distress that would be lost, all feelingds would be lost.

No sensations, no feelings, no memory of either of these. If the sim lost qualia, it wouldn't notice a thing.

I am currently away visiting family for holidays, which is why replies are not always prompt. — noAxioms

No worries, happy holidays!

But why does the brain present what it already understands to itself in a different form? — Patterner

Think division of responsibility. Different parts of the brain are responsible for different functions. When receiving information from the world, one part of the brain translates that information into a form that can be easily processed and acted upon. Then the executive, the conscious part, uses that translated information to learn and to act.

we need to know why there's something it is like for anybody to see red — Patterner

FWIW, my take:

We, as conscious beings, live in the perspective of the brain's executive decision maker. All qualia are informational, they tell us about the world and about ourselves. Qualia are the way that the brain presents information to itself, in a form it can efficiently process and act upon. Sensory data, bodily sensations, feelings, all just information that guide us in making decisions and ultimately acting.

Qualia exist only in the context of the brain that produces them. We are, each of us, a machine within a machine. The brain creates for us a virtual world, and then lets us executive decision makers use and act on this information.

Qualia are as real as a computer animation. They exist, but only in terms of the larger framework which supports them. There is no exotic physics, nothing mystical. Just a system organizing information in a way it is able to effectively process and act on.

Form our perspective, qualia are elemental, mysterious, and apart from the material world. But that shouldn't be surprising for virtual machines who experience everything only through qualia.

If qualia are private, then how is it that you and these others agree about them? How do you know that, when you use the term "qualia", you are all talking about the same thing? — Banno

We don't know, and can never know, that the content of our qualia agree. What most of us do agree is that there is something that it is like to see an apple and smell ammonia. This shared fact structures our collective experience, and the concept can be communicated with language. While qualitative content can never be.

The concept is public, in that it refers abstractly to universal human features most of us understand. But a part of the concept is that its concrete instantiations as qualia we individually undergo are private.

In so far as they are private sensations, they are irrelevant — Banno

You may think the core feature of conscious experience is irrelevant. Others disagree.

in so far as they are public, we already have 'red" and "sour" to cover that use — Banno

These don't generally refer to qualia. Rather, to public features. We just happen to identify these features by a internal coding system, qualia. How each of our coding systems presents to us is not communicable by language or any other means, as there is no stable referent language can latch onto.

The logical or public irreducibility of first-person ascriptions is linguistic. Stop trying to explain them by positing private inner objects such as qualia. — Banno

I'm not. I think one has nothing to do with the other. You are the one trying to shoehorn your language games into a topic far afield from them.

quote="Banno;1026883"]Folk are using “What-it-is-like” accounts, which misunderstand the source of first-person irreducibility. They treat it as arising from private inner objects along the lines of qualia, but the actual source is grammatical: the first-person pronoun designates a role within communal language-games, not a metaphysical subject of experience.[/quote]


This feels silly. How on earth do you get first person perspective from mere grammar? That is quite the trick. You point out that people conflate subject-as-language-role and subject-as-experiencer, only to then somehow reduce one to the other?

Anything with the right cognitive skillset can play communal language games. ChatGpt, for instance. But this does not track at all with whether ChatGpt is an irreducible subject. It can be the (unlikely) case that it is, and the (likely) case that it isn't. Similarly, a dog, while communicative, lacks language entirely. Certainly they have no notion of indexicals. Yet, there is something it is like to be a dog, just as much as there is for me and you.

If the matrix product of these two concepts results in a 2x2 grid, where each cell is perfectly possible, how can one have their origin in the other?

Subject, Language User: Human
Subject, Non-Language User: Dog
Non-Subject, Language User: LLM
Non-Subject, Non-Language User: Tree


I honestly don't see how anyone can conflate these. I remembered and found this quote of yours (I remembered the thread title somehow).

Going over my own notes, I found an admission that I did not understand qualia - from 2012. In 2013, I said I do not think that there is worth in giving a name to the subjective experience of a colour or a smell. In 2014, I doubted the usefulness of differentiating a smell from the experience-of-that-smell. Never understood qualia. I still don't see their purpose. — Banno

Has your understanding improved in the intervening decade plus? Is it possible that you, and maybe some others here, have a cognitive architecture that makes it difficult to fix on qualia as a distinct concept? Or, is this just another philosophical difference?

An aside - the dependence here is on context, not on subjectivity. It's not that first-person statements are subjective - whatever that might mean - that is at issue, but how we account for the place of the context in first person statements and indexicals.

That's why the guff here about qualia is irrelevant. — Banno

To me the natural conclusion is that the guff here about indexicals is irrelevant.

I reject this fantasy. If my qualia valished abruptly, I would 1) notice, 2) not feel obligated to pretend otherwise as you imply, and 3) probably not even be able to express my distress since qualia is required for a human to do almost any voluntary thing like communicate coherently. — noAxioms

You say you will notice, but this already presumes that you have the capacity to notice. If the simulation is just state and processing, there will be no distress. A faithful simulation of the human brain will, somewhere in its workings, faithfully process all the state associated with a full qualitative experience. The agent will "experience" it's qualia, and report nothing unusual. There just may not be any actual qualia.

In the same way, your chip sim faithfully processes all the state associated with electrical flow. There just isn't any actual electricity.

Answers to the negative would break the simulation.
Why? The simulation just makes the chemicals and momentums do their things. It has no high level information that it's a human being simulated. It's just a bounded box with state, suitable for simulating a heap of decaying leaves as much as anything else without any change of code. — noAxioms

If you show a human an apple and ask them what color they are experiencing, they will say 'red'. This is a behavioral fact. And so, a simulated human agent should respond in the same way. If they do not, something is wrong with the simulation. But this says nothing about whether the agent is actually experiencing any qualia at all.

hat any of the values (the velocity of the moon relative to Earth say) is discreet, meaning it is impossible to express a typical real number. — noAxioms

Computers can't process infinite precision reals, but they can process numbers precise to an arbitrary degree. At some point the result will converge so that it is not measurably different.

Disagree with this one. Computation is used, sure, but most often the purpose is not to reproduce computational features. They simulate the weather a lot, but not the computational features of the weather at all. — noAxioms

I mean 'computational' in the broad scene, where one state of a weather system physically "computes" the next. The state and only the state is what is transformed, not the substance. And if you think about it, there must be a homology between this physical "computation" and the sort of computation a computer does, otherwise the computer wouldn't have the causal power to simulate it.

You're thinking like a model ship or something, not a model of physics, the latter of which does not reproduce physical features. — noAxioms

Right. Just trying to make my little taxonomy more complete.

Well, you ask the guy if his qualia is still there. I — noAxioms

But remember, this is a simulated human. Part of a human's behavior is to respond to questions about their qualia as if they had them. Answers to the negative would break the simulation.

Just as in your circuit example. The sim circuit faithfully reports so many amps at each point. Yet, there is no actual current flowing, so in a certain sense the sim circuit is lying, as is the sim human.

he zombie behaving identically without the qualia is either inconceivable or an assertion of epiphenomenal, which is identical to fiction. — noAxioms

Why? Can you quote or restate your argument?

It very much does simulate the current, at all points. — noAxioms

You are missing the point. It simulates the current. But there is no current, just numerical values representing current. That is what separates the simulation of a circuit from the circuit. The simulation reproduces computational features of the circuit, without reproducing the circuit.

Simulation: reproduces computational features
Model: reproduces (some) physical features
Imitation: reproduces behavioral features
Reproduction: reproduces all features

And so, Does the simulated guy have qualia? It would seem this can only be true if qualia were computational. And if so, you can't build a qualia detector, as you can't build a computation detector. A computation can be performed in a vast variety of physical media, in a vast variety of ways. No physical detector can operate at that level, and detect the computation no matter how it is instantiated. It would have to be a physical property for it to be detectable.

They can be, though. Elements aren't elemental, they can be further broken down into more basic particles. But discovering this more basic structure required tremendous intellectual work.

This is the same kind of work metaphysical philosophy attempts. But, as there is no standard of success, there is no real progress, unlike the sciences. We are more or less stuck with the same basic concepts we've used for millennia.

I seen no distinction here. The sim of the chip simulates a physical chip, and thus it exhibits all the relevant physical properties. If it didn't, it would be an invalid simulation. The chip cannot tell if it's simulated or not. — noAxioms

You are missing the distinction. The sim simulates a physical chip, simulating it's physical properties. But, it exhibits none of the physical properties of the chip: not the mass, not the current at any point, nothing. At best it can report values representing these physical quantities. Of course, any simulation simulates only a narrow subset of the physical properties deemed relevant.

If the simulation was aware, it suggests the awareness is a property of information/competition, not physics.

It isn't the Turing machine that's going to have feelings, it will be the simulated person. I said as much in the OP. So its that simulated guy that has the capacity, not the Turing machine. Neither the Turning machine nor the people running it will know what it's like to be the thing simulated. — noAxioms

How could this be compatible with physicalism? There is nothing physical about the simulated person outside of the Turing machine.

Simulations reproduce the informational, but not the physical, aspects of a system. If you are right, this implies that the 'what it's like' is informational, not physical (which I happen to believe).

But even if that were true, this still doesn't mean the simulation has qualia. It might be that only a certain type of informational processing manifest qualia. Ours have it, but the simulation lacks it. Would that imply qualia are epiphenomenal? Not necessarily. With the way our brains process information, qualia do work. The simulation might process in a completely different way that doesn't require qualia. The only requirement in a simulation is the informational behavior is reproduced. How it is reproduced is up to the simulation's designer.

I think you'd notice if your qualia suddenly vanished. — noAxioms

The zombie isn't aware, in the subjective sense, so it wouldn't notice anything.

Great, nice compromise.

Please don't remove them, @Jamal! I like that there is a permanent repository for the stories on the web. I might lose my copies someday, then they will be gone forever. I don't know if you still care, but I actually prefer that they are publicly available at this point. Easier to share with people.

That said, I'm personally pro euthanasia, and I do believe we should have the freedom to check out if that's the decision we come to. — Mijin

Euthanasia for the terminally Ill is one thing. For someone who is really depressed, or shaken by a loss that seems irrecoverable, that is quite another. I don't think it is ethical to make suicide a safe, available option for the depressed. If depression is a mental illness, then the person is out of their right mind, and does not have the competency to judge such a momentous decision for themselves.

My argument was that suicide harms everyone that valued the suicidal, including the suicidal's own future selves.

That suicide harms everyone who cared, sometimes devastatingly so, is obvious. What is less obvious is the future self argument, but I think a strong case can be made. In most contexts we treat future selves as moral agents, both unified with, and distinct from, present selves. If factory work causes you cancer that will kill you in 5 years, that is a terminal blow to your future self. Which is a blow your present self, as self-identity unifies past, present, and future selves. But I am quite different from my past selves, I have different beliefs, different motives, different goals, different abilities. Were I able to, I would bitterly resent a past self that killed me.

My rights as a present self are undisputable. But every present self is the future self of a past self. And so, if present selves have rights, future selves of present selves must have those same rights.

the branch of philosophy that deals with the first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space.

So how can something be a "first principal"? Do you agree with google or not? — ProtagoranSocratist

First principle, in that these are concepts that are not simply compounds of other concepts. Diamond is a hard sparkly carbon substance, but substance itself, is just substance. We might look up diamond in a dictionary if we were unfamiliar with them, but we cannot look up substance. The definition only tries to codify our pre-existing intuitions of what substance is. If we lacked that intuition somehow, the definition would be meaningless to us.

This is what I take 'first principal' to mean. Not something that is necessarily ontologically basic. But something that is conceptually basic, the mental building blocks from which we build more complex conceptual structures, such as "wedding ring". Trivial seeming, but an intricate compound of the concepts 'marriage', 'diamond', 'ring', 'wealth', 'commitment', etc. And each of these are themselves compound. Because it is compound, discussion of "wedding ring" is not metaphysical, it is definitional, practical, cultural. Whereas, if you break these concepts down, you hit a kind of bedrock, where you find concepts like being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space.

These concepts cannot be broken down definitionally. They can only be philosophized, by creatively, artfully constructing a definition, which involves creating a deeper conceptual space into which these seemingly primordial concepts are placed. This is metaphysics.