So a Marxist historian would say, or a sociological theorist. But I don't believe it is, and I don't think it is an empirical question in the sense that is nowadays intended. — Wayfarer

It is not controversial that evangelicals report their experiences as encounters with Jesus, God, angels, demons; Catholics as encounters with God, Jesus, Mary, demons and various saints and angels; Hindus as encounters with Ganesh, Krishna, Indra, etc.; Sufis as encounters with their saints; folk religion believers as encounters with their various supernatural beings ... You get the point.

The testimony of sages is significant in the context of arguing 'from religious experience', because it is they who are able to speak from such experiences. Sure, one guy turning up on a forum and saying 'hey I've seen the light' adds up to nothing. But if you look at the records from across cultures and across history, of many individuals who claim such insights, then that is a source of information about what is being claimed. That situates such claims within a domain of discourse, and gives you some way of corroborating them against some kind of criteria. But none of those claims will still amount to what many current thinkers would regard as 'empirical' insofar as they don't propose matters of fact which can be measured mathematically and assessed in the third person. — Wayfarer

If we consider the many, many testimonies of those across the world presently and throughout history who've had what the understand to be a religious experience, the most obvious observation we make is, as I've said, that the content is a function of the particular historical and social context.

But it depends on what is being proposed. Obviously for empiricial questions - the nature of blackbody radiation, how metal fatigue can cause aircraft structures to fail - then someone with expertise in the relevant subject matter is required. What about the question, 'is the Universe an intentional creation, or is it the product of unconscious processes?' Who is an 'expert' on that question? Who would you approach for 'expertise' on that matter? There's are many issues closer to home which involve 'life questions' - questions of the foundation of meaning and value. Who are the experts on those? You might say, moral philosophers. Well, what is the basis of their 'moral philosophy?' Is it Christian? Marxist? Evolutionary naturalism? — Wayfarer

Sure, our judgment about whether there is or is not sufficient reason to subscribe to a proposition depends on what is being proposed. I wasn't the one to invoke the sages--who allegedly have some kind of special access to some reality beyond the limits of the rest of us, and whose say-so is taken to be sufficient for us to sign on.

It's epistemic judgment all the way down. When we decide for ourselves, we do so based on whether or not we just there to be sufficient reason and evidence, When we accept the opinion of tradition or experts or sages, we do so only if we at least implicitly judge their expertise or sagacity to be sufficient. But regarding the theistic claim of the OP, we have learned long ago that uncorroborated testimony alone about such claims is not sufficient to warrant our subscription to the claim.

n any case these books by those pop-science superstars are not very well accepted in the philosophical community at large. Krauss's "nothing" is actually "something", despite his pretentious douchebaggery. Hitchens and Harris attack straw-men. None of them seem capable, or willing, to understand religious belief, or theist belief for that matter. It's just a publicity stunt. — darthbarracuda

There are tens of millions of fundamentalist religious believers in the world whose behavior is informed by their beliefs. Simple, straightforward readings of their various texts promote and justify violence toward others, even death to the unbeliever.

Harris asserts that such beliefs need to be challenged, rather than given a free pass as off limits just because they're "religious." It is such beliefs and their implications, epistemic warrant, and consequences that he typically addresses.

Why not, since the "one and only God" is one and only in the sense that He is thought to be in all things or all things are thought to be in Him. Zeus is a relatively minor deity compared to this. The claim is never that Zeus is all things, in that he is in all things or that all things are in him; Zeus is more like a human personality with all its foibles writ large. In Christianity there are Archangels and Angels, and they are minor deities of sorts, deities at least compared to human beings, so there is no reason to say that the monotheistic idea of.God logically excludes the possibility of lesser deities. — John

It is simply logically inconsistent to assert that there exists only one instantiation of the kind of being we call a deity, AND there exist lots of other instantiations of the kind of being we call a deity.

But this is misunderstanding the argument. The argument is that God is simple, out of necessity. Complexity does not explain complexity. Indeed, if there was a person who designed the universe as it is, then it would also need an explanation. But this doesn't lead to atheism immediately; it merely pushes the explanation back more. It's a caricature to see the classical theistic God as akin to a mega-human with a personality, likes and dislikes, etc. God is theorized out of necessity, a byproduct of the PSR and a certain view of causality.

Reject the PSR and you're left with an irrational universe. We can bite this bullet, for sure. But if we don't bite this bullet, then God becomes a plausible explanation for why things exist. — darthbarracuda

But I am not arguing that there is no God.

The argument I am addressing is simply Dawkins' challenge to the theist assertion that complexity entails a designer. Whether jesuitical contortionists want to characterize their God as Simple or complex is irrelevant here. The intentions, understanding, and capabilities of an entity capable of intending, understanding, and implementing its design of the universe surely are far more complex than the complexity apprehended by the theists, and on which they base their claim that complexity entails a designer. Thus either an infinite regress of designers of designers, or the complexity does not entail a designer. Thus, the theist assertion that complexity entails a designer fails.

o, that would make it merely conventionally inconsistent. — John

If there is equal justification for the existence of the monotheistic deity, and Zeus, and Lord Krishna, ... etc., and the existence of the monotheistic deity is accepted based on such justification, then it is inconsistent to reject Zeus etc. (because there's just as much justification for them as for the monotheistic deity), but it is also inconsistent to accept Zeus etc., because if there exists the one and only deity, then the deity Zeus can't exist.

And contrariwise, the complex design such as that of the universe entails prior causes (as opposed to designers) leading to its existence. So either this leads to an infinite regress, or complexity does NOT entail a cause at all. That the current universe can rest its existence upon an uncaused cause refutes the basic scientific principle that every event has a cause. What else is God than an uncaused cause? — Hanover

If your explanation for the existence of the universe allows for the possibility and intelligibility of an "uncaused cause," then the universe itself can be an uncaused cause, and adding something else, such as God is not required.

Contrary to this, the fact that every event must have a cause necessitates the existence of an uncaused Prime Mover of pure actuality. The trouble with asking "who created God" is that it applies an intra-wordly phenomenon to something that is, by definition, outside of this phenomenon. And the hypothesis that there is something "outside" of this cause and effect chain put forward out of metaphysical necessity. Indeed, infinite regresses and spontaneous creation acts do not seem to make sense, so it is conceptually necessary to postulate the existence of something that is not affected by the normal cause and effect we see every day.

Additionally, God is typically not seen as "complex", but rather necessarily "simple". The Neo-Platonists and their neighbors taught that complexity cannot explain complexity. Simplicity is what does all the explanatory work, for all complex structures can be reduced to their components.

So it is not that every complex entity has a complex designer, but rather every complex entity has a prior simplicity. — darthbarracuda

Been expecting the "God is simple" retort.

Dawkins is challenging the claim that complexity entails a designer.

IF the complexity of the universe entails a designer, as the theist asserts, then the designer's understanding, intentions, and abilities to actually implement his design surely are more complex than the level of complexity apprehended by the theist who asserts that such complexity entails a designer.

How does this impact my conclusion that neither the atheists nor the theists have any inkling of the answer? — Hanover

Dawkins unanswerable objection against the intelligent designer is precisely the unanswerable argument made by theists against atheists, just phrased teleologically instead of causatively.

That is, asking where matter came from to begin this long chain of causative events is no more answerable than asking who designed this infinitely complex designer. If every event has a cause, it's impossible to have had a first cause just by definition. If every complex entity had a more complex designer, then it's impossible for there to have been a first designer by definition. — Hanover

But the argument Dawkins is challenging is the theist argument that complexity entails a designer.

Thus, a complex design such as that of the universe entails an even more complex designer. So either this leads to an infinite regress, or complexity does NOT entail a designer.

I completely agree that there's a difference between an experience and one's interpretation of that experience.

It is well-documented that a person's interpretation of unusual experiences is a function of their particular historical and social setting. Our evolved brains have an irrepressible tendency to generate some kind of explanation for our experiences, but we have very low default standards for what we're willing to accept as an adequate explanation. It is no more surprising that someone enmeshed in our present culture would interpret certain experiences as experience of God more or less as he is conceived in the culture, than it is that Achilles experiences visitations from Athena, Arjuna encounters Lord Krishna, Moses encounters Yahweh, and various Catholic saints encounter Mary.

This is not true. There is a long history of "natural theology" which purports to explain the complexity of nature (especially its biological complexity) by appeals to a designing entity. William Paley's Natural Theology (written in the early 19th century) is just such an example of this, now presented in a more technically savvy form by intelligent design creationists (e.g. Stephen Meyer's Signature in the Cell). You may not agree with these authors' conceptions of God, but they're out there nonetheless. So it's disingenous to claim that Dawkins and company are just strawmanning their opponents. — Arkady

I agree, Arkady.

If the alleged Creator wasn't sufficiently complex enough, as Dawkins infers, to intend, understand, and possess the ability to create the universe just as he wanted it to be, then the non-complex Creator just created a universe he didn't understand and didn't intend via his Special God Magic.

Reasonable points and well expressed. But another thing to consider is that in today's culture, there is an implicit attitude as to what might be considered as 'evidence' at all. Empricism, for instance, insists that evidence consist of data that can be replicated by others and in that sense, is not something that is dependent on the first-person perspective. I suppose you could say that empiricism attempts as far as possible to bracket out the first-person perspective so as to discover facts that are able to be quantified and replicated in the third person. (This is the basis of the title of Thomas Nagel's book The View from Nowhere).

However, an element which this excludes is the testimony of sages. I suppose that very phrase is redolent of an earlier ages and times. Nevertheless, in the sapiential (i.e. wisdom) traditions, there is an understanding that the wise are able to understand truths which the untrained do not; that is practically a definition of wisdom. Think for example of the lectures of Plotinus, although there are many other examples, such as the dialogues of Plato, and the early Buddhist texts; but this manner of discourse is something found in many schools of traditional philosophy as well as religion ( as discussed by Pierre Hadot.)

Now the point is, much of that kind of testimony is also excluded by modern atheism, regardless of its potential veracity, because it requires and involves a first-person perspective and commitment. So it is excluded as a matter of principle. That is because religious knowledge (if indeed there is such) doesn't concern mathematically-quantifiable objects, forces and relations - which, according to the prevailing scientific worldview, are the only real sources of knowledge. What it does consist of may indeed involve encounters with legendary or archetypal figures.

(Now some of this kind of argument might have been put by Colin, but so far it seems like he might be a 'drive by contributor'.) — Wayfarer

Yes, I agree that what can be considered to be "evidence" at all, as well as whether or not such evidence is sufficient to warrant subscription to the proposition at issue, is at the heart of the matter.

When we ignore the often hostile and confrontational rhetoric, and attend to the substantive content, the atheist challenge to theist propositions (not to mention disputes among theist theologians) is about the kind and sufficiency of the evidence offered. In general, humans have learned over the millennia that propositions that can satisfy rigorous standards of logical analysis and independently observable empirical evidence are the propositions that are far more likely to provide us with predictive reliability.

To be sure, in all kinds of everyday situations, we routinely and automatically count the testimony of others as evidence, often sufficient evidence. Evolution has probably hard-wired us with a tendency to accept the word of others at face value. This is a major way children learn about how the world works from infancy on. And it is how most formal instruction even through grad school works. But we also know that propositions that are supported by testimony alone, and cannot satisfy rigorous standards of logical coherence and independent empirical evidence, are far less likely to prove to be reliably predictive, whether they are from alleged "sages" or not.

So testimony (of alleged "sages" or not) is not excluded as a matter of principle--it is simply judged, implicitly or explicitly, to be insufficient to warrant acceptance of the proposition at issue. A current analogue of the sage, perhaps, is the modern "expert." As with the sages, we still have to judge whether or not their testimony is sufficient to warrant our subscription. In the case of the modern expert. though, we typically assume that the person is somehow vetted by others whose judgment we'd trust, and that the expert opinion is based on the prevailing epistemic standards in his/her field of expertise.

Why do you say the existence of God is "logically inconsistent" with the existence of "Ganesh, Horus and Athena"? — John

Because the prevailing notion of God is monotheistic--the one and only actually existing deity. So, the mutual existence of the one and only God AND other gods (justified by essentially the same reasoning) is logically inconsistent.

Argument is simply providing reason that rational others should accept or reject some proposition. Persuasive reason normally consists in coherent logical analysis and empirical evidence.

First-hand experiences and interpretation of their meaning on the order of "I had profound religious experiences" are notoriously convincing and intractable for the person who actually experiences them, but personal conviction does not constitute sufficient reason that rational others should subscribe to your proposition. Such testimony counts as empirical evidence, but of the weakest, most unreliable kind, and is exactly the same evidence used by others in support of propositions (Ganesh, Horus, Athena ...) that are logically inconsistent with your proposition. If logically inconsistent propositions are based on essentially the same evidence, then such evidence does not provide reason to accept the proposition, and the "argument" fails. This does not demonstrate that the proposition is false, merely that the argument presented in support of it fails to demonstrate that the proposition is true.

Atheist arguments simply are challenges to the logic and evidence offered in theistic arguments.

What is the underlying message here? The basic dichotomy between human experience and the "thing-in-itself"? That truth cannot be conveyed in language, but only human-biased expression that makes sense to us because it is how our minds are structured?
It works us, so it works.

Pretty much.

What we convey via language such as you've listed are human-brain constructs. The notion of a thing-in-itself is itself such a construct, a way of conceiving and speaking about some aspect of an assumed external reality.

I don't do "truth" in any sense other than as conditional epistemic judgment about propositional statements. So, for me to say that a given statement is true is to say only that it satisfies whatever epistemic standards I deem appropriate for that particular statement in the given context.

... but we are simply self-contained conceptual machines that are not beyond our own linguistic programming?

This way I see it is that we are not self-contained, but rather we generate concepts from our interactions with the world, but these concepts are constrained by our particular humansystem kinds of interactions. We cannot really even conceive of what it is like to be a bat, or a lion, precisely because what it is like to be a certain creature requires experiencing the same kinds of interactions with the world that that creature experiences, in just the way that creature experiences them.

I see language not only as expressing, but alao as informing and contributing to the construction of, our conceptualizations.

How about: they are all human-brain-generated conceptualizations, that is, human-brain ways of seeing things, of understanding our interactions with the world by separating out certain features and organizing them into thought-units?

Or maybe just last night's Jeopardy categories?