what is needed is an account of falsehood, which is parasitic on a community of truth tellers. — unenlightened

I like this notion.

But is it not also possible to wesponise the value of truth to no less a degree?

Your talk of eagles and snakes is spot on. If I say "we've run out of cake" just to keep more for myself I'm being 'parasitic' on the generally truth-telling community.

But most claims we could attach to this social necessity to are not of that nature.

We're rarely talking to each other about hidden cakes. Mostly we're exchanging beliefs about way more complex propositions. Russia, Covid, Trump, Brexit, Global Warming...
Here we're clearly not using 'true' the same way. We're using it closer to the lying monkey. We really, really want others to adhere to our solutions.

The simple (eagles and snakes) version of 'truth' is secondary because we don't believe what we believe about those matters because we've done the equivalent of looking in the fridge, we do so because of who we trust, our faith in statistics, beliefs about the intentions of institutions...

So whilst I agree with you, I'm not sure how far it applies socially. Lying is parasitic on truth, that's for sure, but for me to get to the idea that lying is...

destructive of meaning of society and of our world. — unenlightened

...I'd have to see a stronger argument that matters of eagles and snakes, of cake in the fridge, actually impact all that much on meaning on society, because it seems to me at first glance, that the vast majority of societal functions and meanings depend overwhelmingly on concepts and belief so complex that 'truth' and 'lie' just don't really apply.

If you or I armed ourselves and forced our way into someone’s home, or pointed our weapons at someone, or cuffed someone and threw them in the back of our car, we’d be criminally charged. — NOS4A2

That's a consequence of violence. The question was how states had the monopoly on violence.

At the moment all you've shown is that they're better at it.

So do Amazon have the monopoly on internet sales?

I understand quite well enough. I agree that...

A deontologist would say something like.. "It is always WRONG to burden people unnecessarily (and what that means)" — schopenhauer1

Who are prospective parents burdening unnecessarily with the necessary conditions of existence?

The gamete already has that requirement, so does the embryo, so does the child. Nothing has been burdened by the parents. The whole point of necessary conditions of existence is that they're necessary, not something I have in my power to bestow or remove.

Not relevant to the question at hand, we are now talking about the parent's intention. — Tzeentch

Their intention to what? I thought we were talking about their intention to force a gamete to become a person. Now you're saying they intend to force a child in some way. What child? The child they're going to have? What do they intend to force on this child?

Then you accept what I said here as part of this exchange: — Michael

No. In my example, John is not the solipsist. John is a person in the possible world the solipsist is entertaining.

But the child they wish to have doesn't exist, so how can they force it to be anything?

The intention of the parent is to force another being to exist. — Tzeentch

What other being?

So

1. I believe that ontological solipsism is true and it is possible that ontological solipsism is not true
2. I believe that ontological solipsism is true and ontological solipsism is necessarily true
3. I don't believe that ontological solipsism is true and it is possible that ontological solipsism is not true
4. I don't believe that ontological solipsism is true and ontological solipsism is necessarily true

...?

1. I think.

Why are you asking?

One of these is true:

1. Bp ∧ ◇¬p
2. Bp ∧ □p
3. ¬Bp ∧ ◇¬p
4. ¬Bp ∧ □p

Which of these is true if ontological solipsism is true? — Michael

You haven't specified your terms. I can look up the notation, but I can't look up what you mean by Bp or p.

That's what a future parent intends - to create a new living being. — Tzeentch

You didn't say 'create a human being' you said 'force a human being'. Two completely different verbs.

Creating brings something into existence.

Forcing imposes your will on something already in existence.

They are two totally different actions.

Yet they work for Amazon, so apparently however unsatisfying the conditions its better than the alternative. — Tzeentch

So? Amazon constrain what the alternatives are.

Or we could just suggest that if you don't like your government, you just seek an alternative country.

Likely those people would be worse off is Amazon disappeared. — Tzeentch

I can't take this argument seriously.

I can be violent if I want. How do they 'hold a monopoly'? — Isaac


I can't take this argument seriously. — Tzeentch

It's not an argument, it's a question. How do governments monopolise violence? I seem quite capable of being violent.

How many people do you think would continue to pay taxes if they weren't threatened with jail (which is a threat of violence) for not doing so? — Tzeentch

Loads. This may come as a shock to you, but we're not all sociopaths.

Governments function through violence, the free market does not. — Tzeentch

I can't take this argument seriously.

If that's how you want to mischaracterize my position, we will soon be done here. — Tzeentch

Oh, OK. Give me a few examples of laws which benefit others at your expense that you agree with.

In an anarchy or corrupt system perhaps, which is not what I am advocating at all. — Tzeentch

Yes, so I gather. Laws you like but not the ones you don't.

It threatens me with violence every day. — Tzeentch

Then you need to take your case to the ECHR. It's illegal for your government to arbitrarily threaten you with violence.

For one, the intention to force a human being to live. — Tzeentch

A human being is already alive by definition, how can I intend to force one to be?

You can only avoid the conclusion by rejecting one of the two premises. Either I don’t believe that ontological solipsism is true or ontological solipsism is necessarily true. — Michael

Nonsense. You writing only two premises doesn't confer some kind of magical power. You've not listed all the premises which are being assumed by the argument.

Let’s assume that only my mind and your mind exist. I have been in pain for 30 minutes. — Michael

30 minutes has no meaning at all if only your mind and my mind exist. 30 of your minutes, or 30 of my minutes?

I don’t understand what’s difficult to understand about this. Stuff that will happen in the future isn’t a “property” of things that exist in the present. — Michael

It's not difficult to understand. I disagree. What's difficult to understand is why you can only seem to make sense of disagreements in terms of your interlocutors failing to understand something.

If only a material universe of superstrings exist it doesn’t follow that the future state of that universe is a property of that universe in the present. — Michael

Then what causes that future state?

I wouldn’t say that that the vase will fall off the table tomorrow and break is a property of the vase, or of the table, or of the floor, or of whatever. — Michael

Then why did the vase fall off the table, if not because of some property of the world prior?

it is possible for me to not know that I have been in pain for 30 minutes. And this is true even if only my mental phenomena exists. I don't need for something other than my mind (e.g. another mind or a material universe) to exist for me to have been in pain for 30 minutes, or for me to not know that I have been in pain for 30 minutes. — Michael

I don't see how. What you say is true in our world because timekeeping is external and your memory is not always accessible to you. Two external features. I don't see how it would be the case in a world where all there was was your consciously aware mind.

He can possibly be wrong. I provided the argument several times:

Bp
¬□p
Bp ∧ ◇¬p — Michael

That's ignoring the implication of the entire world being in John's mind.

Only X, Y, and Z exist and they are all features of John's mind. He knows that X, Y, and Z exist but he doesn't know that only X, Y, and Z exist. He doesn't know what will exist in the future, or how X, Y, or Z will change. He might not know what existed in the past, given the limitations of memory. He might not know whether or not the Reimann hypothesis is true. He doesn't know what could have happened had he chosen a different course of action. — Michael

Those are the matters we're disagreeing over

So if we attempted complete lists of our beliefs, our lists would be tediously similar, but include a small number of much more interesting exceptions. — Banno

Without question, yes. Not an insignificant point either, but I'm not sure that the volume of agreements caries any semantic weight...?

T-sentences show pretty much all there is to say about truth. — Banno

Do they though?

I think we use 'true' and 'truth' to carry an awful lot more meaning that T-sentences encompass.

If I say "you must believe me...It's true, I tell you!" I'm not using 'true' just to mean that the state of affairs is as I describe them. I added 'true' to implore, to add weight. It's indicating the strength of my belief, or the urgency with which I need you to agree. It has nothing to do with (on this occasion) the correspondence of the phrase to the state of affairs.

"Everything John says is true" is about my faith in John.

"True love" is just really, really intense love.

And so on...

No, not if it is taken as a theory of truth. As a way of deciding what we might do well to believe, it's fine. As a theory of truth, it sucks. — Banno

I can see what you mean. There's something amiss in seeing truth as success in that we understand the concept of a coincidence. I don't think it 'sucks', but I can see the flaws. I'm more of an 'iron them out' person.

It would seem that neural nets are the experts on expediency. Truth doesn't matter to them, I guess. — Banno

Well, I've often been found to say so, yes. But when doing so, I'm talking about a correspondence theory of truth. It matters not one jot to our inference system if it's model of hidden states is how the hodden states are, only that it allows an accurate prediction of the force needed to be applied to them to resist entropic decay.

Where I struggle with that notion is that it imports an idea of 'the way things 'really' are, and as you'll know, I'm allergic to the notion of there being a way things 'really' are.

If we say that the brain's inferences need not be 'true' (ie there's some actual state that the external world is in, which my brain does not care about) then I may come out in hives.

I prefer to see the external world as constraints. Something about it constrains our models of how it is such that they won't work if they're not within those constraints. This is where I have problems with the asymptomatic notion of truth (and also where I think Ramsey diverges from Peirce - but not sure). I don't think of hidden states as have a single 'way they are' at all, only several ways they aren't.

As for 'truth' though, I wouldn't say it referred to any of that. I think it's far more likely to be a socially functional word. It's used to persuade, not identify.

It seems to me imposing on someone and forcing someone to undergo consequences is the same thing. — Tzeentch

Yep. I'd agree.

I think what ↪schopenhauer1
argues is that impositions are immoral based on the intention to impose, thereby the intention is all that is needed, and it doesn't depend on the consequences. — Tzeentch

Right. But what's immoral about imposing on a gamete?

I see people are back to arguing the equivalent of "water causes itself to be wet". Whatever floats your boat I guess. Carry on. :yawn: — Benkei

One takes what one can get.

What concrete example do you have of either of those companies making people destitute? — Tzeentch

I've given examples, I'm not sure what more I can provide. Amazon's pricing policy means that it's suppliers are kept destitute. It doesn't pay them enough to live off.

Governments are essentially bodies that hold monopolies on violence. — Tzeentch

I can be violent if I want. How do they 'hold a monopoly'?

On the whole I am highly critical of government interventions, but I'm not categorically against it. — Tzeentch

Yeah. Didn't think it would take long before this deteriorated into "the government ought to make the laws I benefit from, but not the ones where others benefit"

What you wrote makes no sense, equating a body that protects its monopoly on violence with violence to a body that protects its market position through the free will of its customers. — Tzeentch

Government doesn't protect its position with violence. It could. But it doesn't. Most people allow it willingly to do what it does, some even work for it. Occasionally it will take money, or force people to to do stuff, but that's right at the very extreme. It's hardly as if half the population are prisoners or political refugees.

Government does what it does the same way corporations do, control of capital.

Democracy does not mean a government depends on the free will of its people. It means it seeks to gain some form of legitimacy by seeking approval for its coercive practices among a section of its citizens. — Tzeentch

Same for a corporation then. It's not like Amazon gained it's right to pollute my environment by my consent. I've never shopped there. It gained that right by enough other people shopping there to become big enough to control that much of the ecosystem. I never gave my consent.

Same with Facebook, Google, Tesla... I didn't give my consent for them to have the influence over my environment, my community, my children... that they do. they gained that by getting the support of enough other people. Just like governments. As you prove with...

Companies do not need to be overthrown. If people are fed up, they stop buying products and the company will go out of business or offer its services some place else. — Tzeentch

...enough people. Just like governments.

Your purile notion of how businesses work is bordering on the absurd. They don't just freely offer products to people who freely buy them if they want. They monopolise, cheat, steal, coerce, occasionally outright kill or violently oppress to make sure that you can only buy their product, that you have anything but a free choice.

I'm judging governments for threatening me with violence to comply with its wishes - something it does every day, by its very nature. That is what law is.

I'm not judging companies for the same, because I've never been threatened by one. — Tzeentch

Again, no government threatens you with violence. They just could.

What is the difference between imposing on someone and forcing a consequent someone to undergo consequences? — Tzeentch

One is about impositions, the other about consequences. @schopenhauer1 said his ethics doesn't judge consequences, so we're left with the imposition on its own, absent of consequences, being morally bad. Since the imposition is on a mindless cell, I'm struggling to see how it has any moral component to it at all.

If we allow a judgement of consequences, then it all makes sense. The consequence of birthing a baby into a lava pit. The consequence of making a gamete into a person. The consequence of turning a civilian into a soldier, the consequence of pulling the trigger...

Theoretically, perhaps. I don't think we see that in practice. Are Amazon or Pfizer making people destitute? — Tzeentch

Yes. Their employment practices, pricing policies, procurement policies, supply chain decisions, environmental policies... all contribution to the destitution of those suffering from their decisions.

In a situation where a company is able to force me to buy their products through violence or threats thereof, they're no longer a company - they've become a de-facto government. — Tzeentch

Nice. so you just make your argument true by redefining 'government' to 'anything which forces' Your argument 'governments are worse than corporations' then becomes just a tautology.

I'm not advocating anarchy anyway, so I don't see why it matters. — Tzeentch

It matters because the opposite of anarchy is government intervention. the one thing you're arguing against.

Companies depend on the free will of people to buy their products. If people are fed up with Black Rock they can stop buying their products — Tzeentch

We've just been through this. This isn't going to work if you're just going to ignore what I write an repeat the same thing over again.

With governments and armies it is clearly different. It doesn't depend on people's free will, — Tzeentch

Of course it does. Government's are elected. Governments can be overthrown.

That's a pretty common way to deal with threats of violence.

If I threaten you, I will be sent to court for it. — Tzeentch

The normalcy is not the issue. It's that you're judging governments on what they would do, but corporations only on what they do do. You're not comparing like with like.

The action is imposing on someone. — schopenhauer1

No the action is imposing on a non-person. You said so here...

The forcing from not-person to person is the force. — schopenhauer1

It is never good to impose significant burdens on others when it is unnecessary to do so (not ameliorating a greater with lesser harm)... Procreation imposes burdens.. It is thus never good to do so... — schopenhauer1

Procreation imposes burdens on gametes. You admitted as much here...

The forcing from not-person to person is the force. — schopenhauer1

So either you're arguing from a deontological position that we ought not impose our will on mindless cells, or you're arguing that the consequences of doing so on the consequent person are to be avoided for some reason.

Why does this matter? — schopenhauer1

Because you said your ethics were not consequentialist. So I'm asking what the moral issue is with forcing my will on a mindless gamete , if not the consequences.

At the time the person becomes a person THAT is the imposition — schopenhauer1

No, there's no imposition at that time, the imposition was before. There's consequences at that time.

Antinatalists say the lava pit is the necessary conditions of the world. — schopenhauer1

Yes, that sounds about right. The world is just one giant bubbling lava pit - and you don't see how that assessment is just your own mental neuroses? No one else thinks the world is just a bubbling lava pit

at some point X a person IS born, and THAT is the thing we are discussing. — schopenhauer1

Then we are discussing consequences. Not impositions. I impose my will on a gamete. The consequence is a person (with all the suffering and joy that entails)

Do you believe that a person can be caused to exist in the world just like the soldier is caused? I'm sure you would say yes.. THAT is the imposition.. The forcing of the civilian to soldier is the force. The forcing from not-person to person is the force. — schopenhauer1

Yep. agree with all that. Conscription forces civilians to be soldiers. Procreation forces gametes to be people.

So we're on the same page. Great. Now what's wrong with forcing a gamete (a mindless-cell) to do/be anything apart from the consequences? (you said your ethics were not consequentialist)

But it seems to me that at least some sentences are true or false, and that we sometimes even know which ones. — Banno

But the former half is the very problem I think Peirce is addressing (my knowledge of Peirce coming via a very roundabout route - Ramsey-> Cheryl Misak's work on his Pragmatism -> Peirce so forgive my ignorance of the primary source).

It seems to you that at least some sentences are true. It seems that way to me too, but I'd bet my hat we don't have the same list of sentences. So what do we say about this 'seeing to us'? What is it that 'seems' and what do we say about the differences?

Ramsey puts it down to our experience and our rules (or habits) of thought. But this is pragmatism (which I take it is not up your street). So what do you make of the differences in our list? What, for you, is the 'seeming to you' about the truth of sentences - what's happening when a sentence 'seems to you' to be true?

It forces something to happen to someone and what is forced is significant, etc. etc.. That's all that matters in this argument. — schopenhauer1

Does it force something to happen to soldiers? is conscription a force which imposes on soldiers?

They can refuse to serve you, which can be problematic. They cannot take your lunch money, or throw you in jail, or send you off to war to kill people for them. — Tzeentch

They can basically make you destitute.

That isn't to say monopolistic or extremely large corporations aren't a problem. The question is whether more powerful governments are the solution to that problem. Governments seem more likely to jump in bed with powerful corporations than they are to curb their power.

Pfizer couldn't force me to buy their vaccine. The government could. — Tzeentch

Yes, this is the question. One you're not even addressing, let alone providing any evidence for a conclusion regarding.

The reason Pfizer couldn't force me to buy their vaccine is because the government have made such actions illegal. Otherwise you can be damn sure they'd think of a hundred ways to force you to buy their products within days of any relaxation of those laws.

Of course there's a restriction for that. Governments have a monopoly on the use of force, and laws against its use. — Tzeentch

So try harder, get a bigger army. That's the advice given to would-be entrepreneurs going up against the likes of Black Rock. If they say, "it's impossible, Black Rock just have too big a percentage of all the available assets" - try harder, be the American Dream! Gather your own army!

...Or you could just set up a political party and try to attract votes, I suppose.

Either way, what's stopping you! Where that entrepreneurial spirit!

it will do all those things if its threats are ignored. — Tzeentch

Right. So how do you know that corporations wouldn't also do those things if their coercions are ignored? Seems now you're condemning institutions for future crimes they've not yet committed.

even here the government uses overt violence against law-abiding citizens with frightening regularity. — Tzeentch

Like...?

Even if X is a property of something that exists in my mind it doesn't follow that I know that it will cause Y. You're just asserting that the solipsist will have knowledge of the future without explaining how you came to that conclusion. — Michael

Nope, I explained my reasoning for that conclusion a while back too, but it too went by unremarked on.

If all that exists is one's mind, and if this is asserted or entertained on the grounds of scepticism of indirect inference, then there cannot be any hidden states in the mind. That means that the full properties of any entity must be known. 'All things it will cause' is a property of an entity.

it isn't a given that ontological solipsism entails hard determinism. It could be that probabilities/randomness is involved in mental phenomena. — Michael

It is, because, as above, if a part of the mind is not presented directly to our awareness (there's a source of uncertainty, then that source must (consistently) be doubted in the same way as the external world is. If some aspects of my world seem random I'm not directly aware of the forces involved, therefore I must doubt the existence fo the forces involved.

Same with this. It doesn't follow from X being a property of something that exists in my mind that I know that it cannot lead to Y. — Michael

It follows from all possible causes of all possible events being in your mind.

You don't find the decimal notation of pi, or the truth of the Reimann hypothesis, written onto atoms or whatever, or on sense data, and mathematical realism is false. — Michael

Whether mathematical realism is false is another discussion, I put in all the possible explanations for any given approach to mathematics.

They'd be wrong.

1. John knows that Joe Biden is President
2. Joe Biden is 79 years old
3. Therefore, John knows that Joe Biden is 79 years old

Obviously the conclusion doesn't follow. The same with:

1. John knows that X, Y, and Z exist
2. Only X, Y, and Z exist
3. Therefore, John knows that only X, Y, and Z exist

The conclusion doesn't follow. — Michael

Of course it doesn't because none of those premises are the premises I used in my argument. For fuck's sake will you please stop wasting everyone's time refuting arguments I'm not even making just because they have the same conclusions.

And your versions are not even representing what we're arguing about. They should go...

1. John knows that Joe Biden is President (and Joe Biden is a figment of John's mind)
2. Joe Biden is 79 years old (and being 79 years old is a figment of John's mind)
3. Therefore, John knows that Joe Biden is 79 years old (and 'knowing' anything is figment of John's mind, the 'truth' of anything means whatever john thinks is means because it's also a figment of John's mind)

or..

1a. X, Y and Z, all their properties, all their effects and all laws governing them are properties of John's mind because all there is is John's mind
1. John knows that X, Y, and Z exist and all other things that exist
2a. Jim (who is entertaining the possibility of such a world) knows that therefore...
2. If John claims "Only X, Y, and Z exist" - John cannot possibly be wrong because (unbeknownst to John), if John can't sense it, it doesn't exist. He only needs to check all he can sense to answer this question correctly, even if he doesn't know that's all he need do
3. Therefore, John knows that only X, Y, and Z exist (incorrect) but Jim knows such a world where John might exist is nonsense.

The future is not a property of things that exist in the present. — Michael

Of course it is. X is such that it causes Y. Some collection of states in the world are such that Z will happen in ten minutes. Those are properties of X and {those states} respectively.

Neither are counterfactuals. — Michael

X is such that it cannot lead to Y. Z, X, and C are such that if C were removed they would no longer lead to Y.

Neither is the decimal notation of pi. — Michael

Mathematics is such that pi is 3.14... People are such that they consider pi to be 3.14... Mathematical equations are written such that... And so on.

You can't go from "nothing I know of is God" to "I know that God doesn't exist". — Michael

A third party can say it of you under the assumption that all that exists is your mind.

Given 1 and 2 it just refers to what exists — Michael

No, I specifically included the properties of what exists. And I've been through all this. You even asked me what it would mean and I replied that I consider God's nonexistence to be a property of the world (which exists). It is such that there's no thing in it matching the description of god. You ignored my reply completely and are now acting as if I hadn't said anything on the matter.

However, Black Rock cannot force you to buy its products, ... — Tzeentch

No, but they can make your life extremely difficult if you don't. Just like governments can.

...or stop you from getting together with other people who are fed up with their business practices and start something new. — Tzeentch

Indeed, just like there's no restriction on you setting up your own government and vying for power.

The Thai government forces me through threat of violence to comply with its wishes and buy its services. Black Rock doesn't. — Tzeentch

OK, so if the Thai government used other means - theft, coercion, bullying, grooming, punitive treatment... You'd be OK.

When was the last time you know of that the Thai government used violence to enforce its laws? What about the UK government?

You're saying that if ontological solipsism is true then I know that God doesn't exist. — Michael

No.

Here's my argument...

1. render all that is the case as the set {Y,Y,Y,Y....} for all Ys
2. if Y exists then X knows all properties of Y (a consequence of all Ys being in X's mind)
3. X therefore cannot ever be wrong about what is the case (since what is the case is entirely constituted of all the Ys)
4. Z (our epistemic solipsist) entertains a possible world in which 2 is true.
5. Z then has to admit that in that possible world X cannot be wrong about what is the case (whether X knows this or not is irrelevant)
6. no X is ever in a situation where they cannot be wrong about what is the case.

5 and 6 are a contradiction. Z has to either reject 5 or reject 6.

Maintaining 6, Z rejects 5.

If Z rejects 5, they cannot also coherently claim scepticism about whether 5 is the case or not. — Isaac

If you've no interest in it, that's fine, but it's pointless ignoring it and refuting something else.

There is no rule of inference that lets you derive 2 from 1. — Michael

We're going round in circles. Nowhere in my argument do I claim, imply, or require deriving 2 from 1.

In Thailand it is now impossible to get insurance without your provider being ultimately Black Rock. They own every single insurance provider in Thailand.

If you don't like the Thai government's laws, your only choice is vote or move.

If you don't like the Thai 'free market' insurance deals, your only choice is move.

Explain to me the difference.

Come on. We're talking about matters of life and death. Guessing isn't good enough. — baker

It's all we've got. What's your alternative?

I either guess which course of action/inaction will cause least suffering or I just act randomly. I prefer the guess.

one is the result of the voluntary exchange and association, the other of coercion. — Tzeentch

No it isn't. The free market is not voluntary because agents can abuse monopolies and governments are not coercive because agents can either vote or move.

these are all invalid inferences. — Michael

Just saying it over and over is pointless. You're not my teacher. We're equals here, having a discussion (or supposed to be). I've tried to explain why I think they are valid inferences. I've even referenced that explanation twice now. You've not even acknowledged it, let alone addressed it. If you're just here to lecture me I'm not interested.

You can't go from:

1. If Y exists then X knows that Y exists

to:

2. If Y does not exist then X knows that Y does not exist — Michael

Seeing as I haven't, I'm not sure why you're mentioning this.

Here's my argument...

1. render all that is the case as the set {Y,Y,Y,Y....} for all Ys
2. if Y exists then X knows all properties of Y (a consequence of all Ys being in X's mind)
3. X therefore cannot ever be wrong about what is the case (since what is the case is entirely constituted of all the Ys)
4. Z (our epistemic solipsist) entertains a possible world in which 2 is true.
5. Z then has to admit that in that possible world X cannot be wrong about what is the case (whether X knows this or not is irrelevant)
6. no X is ever in a situation where they cannot be wrong about what is the case.

5 and 6 are a contradiction. Z has to either reject 5 or reject 6.

Maintaining 6, Z rejects 5.

If Z rejects 5, they cannot also coherently claim scepticism about whether 5 is the case or not. — Isaac

It mentions neither of the propositions you used.

the free exchange of goods and ideas has done more to improve the lot of the common man than any attempt by governments. — Tzeentch

For a lot of those it is debatable whether they were achieved by government meddling the free exchange of goods and ideas, or whether their results were at all desirable.

How do you quantify suffering? — baker

Guess.

you don't get to impose on someone because you are sad otherwise. — schopenhauer1

There you go again. No one is imposing on someone. There is no someone.

At time "Z" (we'll" say), when a person "exists" (however you define person).. THAT is the entity that has NOW (time 1 started) been affected, thus.. How? By BEING in existence. Affected thus. — schopenhauer1

Does conscription make soldiers into soldiers?

God's non-existence, the Reimann hypothesis, and being happy tomorrow aren't one of the Ys defined in 1 and assumed to exist in 2 (what would it even mean to say that God's non-existence exists?). — Michael

I'm arguing, as per my premise about the sources of uncertainty, that...

2. if Y exists then X knows all properties of Y (a consequence of all Ys being in X's mind) — Isaac

As to...

what would it even mean to say that God's non-existence exists?

...it's a property of the entire world. The world is such that it contains nothing answering the description of god.