1. if Y exists then X knows that Y exists
2. X knows that if Y exists then X knows that Y exists

1 does not entail 2. — Michael

Indeed. It's not a rendering of my argument.

1. render all that is the case as the set {Y,Y,Y,Y....} for all Ys
2. if Y exists then X knows all properties of Y (a consequence of all Ys being in X's mind)
3. X therefore cannot ever be wrong about what is the case (since what is the case is entirely constituted of all the Ys)
4. Z (our epistemic solipsist) entertains a possible world in which 2 is true.
5. Z then has to admit that in that possible world X cannot be wrong about what is the case (whether X knows this or not is irrelevant)
6. no X is ever in a situation where they cannot be wrong about what is the case.

5 and 6 are a contradiction. Z has to either reject 5 or reject 6.

Maintaining 6, Z rejects 5.

If Z rejects 5, they cannot also coherently claim scepticism about whether 5 is the case or not.

Seems that Isaac see's a lot of difference. — ssu

Let him tell us what those differences are. — Olivier5

If you two want to embarrass yourselves by suggesting that the differences between Nazi Germany and 1940s England were about the same as those between modern Ukraine and Russia I'm happy to just leave you to it. I consider the argument already won when it reaches that level of utter stupidity.

You caused to occur someone to exist who didn’t previously. — schopenhauer1

Yes, we agree on that.

You equivocate this act of causing with not affecting someone because at some point that person didn’t exist because they were not fully formed, but then they did and so your points are moot. — schopenhauer1

Nope I'm quite in agreement with you about both causing and affecting someone. You cause events in the future which will affect a person in the future. No problem with that analysis.

I also think there's no moral problem with that because we're talking about consequences (things that you cause, effects you have on the future) and as far as consequences are concerned, having children reduces suffering more than it creates it.

You then turn to unjust impositions to try and wriggle out of that obvious assessment. You then start to claim that it's not fair to impose on someone without their consent. Not effects. Not causes. Impositions without consent..

I then point out that no unjust imposition without consent has taken place because that which was imposed on is a gamete and doesn't care.

You then have a hissy fit for a while before reverting to talk of effects and causes, which has already been refuted as above.

I'm not of that opinion.

In any event, I disagree that you can't debate varying epistemological theories just because you already have one you rely upon. That is, the fact that I use science to answer certain questions doesn't mean I'm closed minded to considering other epistemological methods. — Hanover

Then I puzzled as to why you're so confused as the nature of my enquiry. If you use some science to constrain theories about the mind, and not other science, then does it really seem odd that someone might ask why, and how you choose?

So, make your argument for why you believe in mind reading and establish how your method of knowing that is consistent with how you know other things, and if it's not, why such is a special class deserving of special rules. — Hanover

Hypothetically - I'm saying that if 'mind' is not a type of entity constrained by science (not the same as brain, or constrained by the way brains work), then when I feel like I know what my wife is thinking, I have absolutely no reason at all to think I don't.

The square root of two is mind-independent even if only my mind exists. — Michael

Just stating it doesn't help. Look...

The square root of two isn't mind-independent even if only my mind exists.

Did that help?

you admitted that if only X's mind exists then X doesn't know that only his mind exists. I don't know what else I can tell you; you just admitted to epistemological solipsism. — Michael

No, because the epistemic solipsists can further analyse what it would mean for X (that even if X didn't know they know, they would, in fact, know) and thereby need to reject the option. Having found they need to reject the option, they cannot coherently claim to also not know if it's true.

you refuted your own argument here. — Michael

My argument is about the version of us doing the assessment about the feasibility of those possible worlds.

I could say the same about your bare assertion that the square root of 2 and my future feelings would be directly available to my mind. — Michael

It's not a bare assertion. I followed it with the argument...

because it's available directly to your conscious mind...

There can be no source of uncertainty other than from some state external to the system carrying out the inference. — Isaac

Well. I'm sold. Super convincing argument. Well done. Have you considered a career in politics?

I deny it because I've never seen it done nor seen a study of it being done nor been made aware of a reliable account of when it's been done. — Hanover

That's the point. You deny it because of the science you know and understand.

If you're already of the opinion that science fully constrains our theories about minds then you're not in a position to answer my enquiry.

If you're going to argue in support of the paranormal, bigfoot, or the elusive white penguin, you need evidence. Your psychological evaluation that I'm just stubbornly committed to the status quo isn't evidence of anything, even if it were true.

And it's not like there isn't extensive literature attempting to prove the paranormal that I'm unaware of. I am very much aware of it, and it's extremely unpersuasive. — Hanover

You reslise I'm not actually proposing mind-reading. It's a hypothetical. My point is that doing so would be no less unreasonable than certain propositions arising from, say, phenomenology. The only difference being that the former is countered by a level of science most people know and understand, the latter by a level of science many don't.

If this isn't a phenomena you've encountered, then all this will probably seem quite bizarre to you.

In such a world I don't know the square root of two, I don't know what I would have seen had I chosen a different course of action, I don't know what I will feel tomorrow, etc. — Michael

I disagree. In a world where all there is is your mind, there's no uncertainty. You know exactly what the square root of two is, because it's available directly to your conscious mind. Same with what you'll feel tomorrow.

There can be no source of uncertainty other than from some state external to the system carrying out the inference.

Yes, because it explicitly says so. — Michael

Right. My argument is that "all there is is my mind" just as explicitly says so. It is impossible for you to not know everything if all there is is your mind. Therefore the claim "all there is is my mind" is equivalent to the claim "I know everything".

I don't want YOU to MISINTERPRET and MISREPRESENT my posts. — unenlightened

Then write more clearly.

I will endeavour to continue my conversations with careful readers and charitable interpreters — unenlightened

You seriously don't see the hipocrisy? You read my posts and decide the misunderstanding simply must be the result of a lack of care and charity. In the same breath as you accuse me of a lack of care and charity interpreting posts.

Can I ask where your care and charity are in interpreting our misunderstandings? Maybe it's your poor quality writing? Maybe it's our radically different worldviews and so the communication barrier is that much harder. Maybe it's a little bias on your part because you have such a passionate dislike for my field, not to mention my politics...

But no, apparently none of those, it's definitely my lack of care and charity. Your own care and charity be damned.

But this really just comes down to some straightforward logic:

p ≔ only my mind exists
Bp ≔ I believe that p

1. Bp (premise)
2. ¬□p (premise)
3. Bp ∧ ◇¬p (from 1 and 2)

3 is just what it means to possibly be wrong. — Michael

Perhaps you'd indulge me by putting this into logical form for comparison.

1. The world is such that I know everything.
2. The world is not such that I know everything.

Either 1 or 2 is correct, but I don't know which.

Under 1, do I know everything?

I'm just asking how this goes with your line of thinking on this thread. — ssu

So, the last time your own country faced a possible threat of invasion, that time conscription was OK. :roll: — ssu

...is not 'just asking'.

I've already made it fairly clear. My argument is that the balance between autonomy and civil duties ought be weighed by factors such as the degree of imposition and the reasonableness of disagreement over means.

In most cases of war, there is a very reasonable disagreement over means.

In the case of Nazi ideology attempting to dominate Europe, there is far less reasonable disagreement over means.

There's nothing complicated about that except for the dogmatist desperately trying to warp the facts to avoid having to even contemplate the possibility that Ukraine might be anything other than a nation of saints and angels.

I ask you, again, not to talk about me, as you do "misinterpret" me rather too often. I hope that, at least, is clear and understandable. — unenlightened

This is a public discussion forum. If you don't want the members of it to interpret and respond to your posts then I suggest you stop posting them.

If you want a private club wherein you can exclude those whose views you don't like, then there are plenty of means by which you can achieve that.

Using a public forum and excluding people one by one is neither civil, nor efficient.

You don't seem to know the difference between a theory and an analogy, which i used to try and make sense of what other people have been saying. So I'd prefer that you just leave me out of your discussions altogether. — unenlightened

You don't seem to know the difference between being mentioned as a courtesy and being 'involved in my discussion' so I'd prefer you leave me out of your tribal border disputes altogether.

I was discussing the nature of my enquiry with @Hanover, that enquiry derived from my interpretation of something you said, and I don't think it polite to talk about other people without involving them.

If I've misinterpreted what you said, you could just say so. You know, like normal people having a civil discussion would. But hey, then you'd miss out on the chance to waive your little flag so...

Wouldn't then making peace with Germany have been then reasonable, Isaac? — ssu

If you're suggesting that the difference between the Nazi regime and 1940s England is much the same as the difference between modern Russia and modern Ukraine then there's nothing more to say. If you're seriously prepared to sink that low, no arguments are going to have any impact.

Where, in 1940s England, were the plans to exterminate an entire fucking race?

They can argue that only their own mind is immediately present to them, and therefore either that it is certain that there are no other minds, or that it is at least more plausible that there are no other minds, or minimally that they cannot know there are other minds — Janus

My question is what could they possibly mean by "other minds", or even the expression "... there are", if all there is is their own mind. If we're to ask "is there an external world?" I'm not sure what to make of the question. To me asking the question "is there...?" assumes there's an external world and I'm enquiring as to its contents. If we're to remove that assumption, I don't know what "is there...?" could mean. Of whom/what would we be asking the question? From where would an answer come?

the safest thing is to live with that conclusion; which of course they will fail to do. — Janus

Ha! Yes. By far the most compelling argument against solipsism.

The epistemological solipsist could retort that what I experience could be explained by either the existence of an external world or unconscious dimensions of my mind, which could be thought to place both hypotheses on equal footing. — Janus

Yes, I think that makes sense. One way or another, in order to retain talk of 'knowledge', or 'truth', or 'wrongness' at all, the way we understand it, the would be solipsist has to have something external to the system doing the inferring, in order that some of those inferences could be wrong.

The question then is why reject the external world?

you know this, so what is the real question here? — Hanover

I've obviously not made myself very clear, my apologies.

You say we only have five senses and that we get our information from those senses. You say " If you were hungry and that emitted electrical activity from your brain into my brain, then I could read your mind, but that would require my having the sense to read electrical brain activity, which, alas, I don't."

Where did you get this information from? Presumably school biology? I don't know how far your human sciences instruction has gone, so we'll plump for the middle (college level) and you can correct me if I'm wrong.

I have a theory about the mind. My theory is that minds can communicate to other minds. You say no - that theory cannot be true because... "If you were hungry and that emitted electrical activity from your brain into my brain, then I could read your mind, but that would require my having the sense to read electrical brain activity, which, alas, I don't."

In other words, my theory, about minds, cannot be true because your college science says that brain don't work that way.

Now @unenlightened has a theory about minds, that minds might all be part of a sea of minds to which they return. Can we similarly use our college science to say - that theory can't be true, brains don't work that way?

Now the phenomenologist has a theory about minds, they say that because it seems like they experience the colour yellow, they do, in fact, experience the colour yellow. I say, that theory can't be true because my post-graduate science says brains don't work that way. The response is invariably a diatribe about how minds are not brains, how brain sciences are only speculative, how it's all about interpretation, a couple of mentions of Kuhn, and usually more than one accusation of scientism thrown in for good measure.

The person suggesting minds can do something (mind-read) which is denied by college science is a crackpot. A lunatic, not to be taken seriously. A woo-merchant.

The person suggesting minds can do something (say, gain knowledge of certain thought processes by introspection) which is denied by post-graduate level science is a philosopher, wiser and more open-minded than the overly scientistic post-grad.

I'm enquiring about the reasons for the difference of approach. What is it about college-level science about brains which gets a free pass, while post-graduate level science is rejected as not applying to minds?

You are now trying to refute that a parent causes a gamete to become a human by the steps related to procreation. — schopenhauer1

Never even mentioned cause.

The argument is over on whom or what imposition is forced, not what it results in. I agree with what it results in - a person who has necessary needs.

It's you who keep drawing the argument back to the deontological question of imposition, having lost the arguments about consequence.

The gamete doesn't just "become" a human. — schopenhauer1

I never said it did. Read what I've written. We force the gamete to become a human. Impose our will on it. No-one give s a shit (quite rightly) because gametes don't care.

Get to the argument at hand.. Should parents procreate a person with X conditions? — schopenhauer1

Yes. Absolutely. The benefits to society outweigh the risks of harm. We've had this one already.

Then you say "It's unfair to impose that on someone"

Hence we're back here - arguing about whether you do, in fact, impose that on someone.

Oh, and if you mention "FORCE" or anything else that you think can't be used... Then just replace it with caused to occur — schopenhauer1

OK. I will. So your argument that it is unjust to 'force' someone into the game of life can be completely ignored then. since "It is unjust to have caused to occur a person in the game of life" is not true. There's nothing unjust in general about causing things to occur. It depends entirely on the merits of the thing you caused.

You can't compare apples and oranges. — Olivier5

I was comparing deaths per thousand population with...deaths per thousand population.

But I'll bear your excellent advice in mind in future should I ever be tempted into juxtaposing fruit.

If only your mind exists then you know of everything that exists. But it doesn't follow that you know that no other stuff exists. — Michael

You don't seem to be responding to anything I've said.

Assume your mind is all that exists.

Imagine that world (the one where your mind is all that exists). You know everything. You must do since all that exists in that world is your mind. You, in that world, might not know, in that world, that all that exists is your mind, but we, in this world can logically see that you in that world would know everything there is to know.

Thus we, in this world (the would be solipsist) reject the possibility of that world as implausible.

Having rejected it as implausible, we can't then coherently also claim not to know if it's the case.

Remember the examples of the coins. If only 10 coins exist and if I know that 10 coins exist then I know of all the coins that exist. But it doesn't follow that I know that there aren't more coins. — Michael

Yep. Because you've changed minds to coins. Coins don't contain all that is thought of.

The contingency "If only 10 coins exist..." has no implication for knowledge (we might not know as much in the possible world we're imagining). So when you use coins, your example is correct. The possible world in which there are only 10 coins is almost identical to ours in terms of knowledge, truth and wrongness. It just contains fewer coins.

The contingency "If only minds exist..." does have implications for knowledge because knowledge is about the external world. In the possible world where only minds exist we have to change the whole definition of what it means to know something, we have to change the whole game of having justifications, the whole meaning of 'truth', the whole matter of what it is to be 'wrong'. In that world (with us assuming that world is true), all of that has to change.

I'm trying to cash out some of those changes. There might well be better ways, but what you can't do is ignore those changes and treat the language around knowledge, truth, and wrongness as if they were unaltered by the new fact of your possible world, as if they applied in the same way with the same meanings.

It doesn't imply what you're saying. You can't get from "only my mind exists" to "I cannot be wrong". — Michael

Of course you can. If only your mind exists then you must know everything, therefore you cannot be wrong about anything.

You're ignoring what p implies. Why?

I believe that something other than my mind does not exist
I am wrong if something other than my mind exists
Therefore either something other than my mind exists or I cannot be wrong

The conclusion doesn't follow. — Michael

It does.

1. I believe that something other than my mind does not exist

2. I am wrong if something other than my mind exists

If 1. is the case I cannot be wrong about anything (else).

What is the case is either 1 or 2

Therefore what is the case is either something other than my mind exists (2) or I cannot be wrong (implication of 1)

So why count only direct bombing casualties vastly undercounted on one hand, and all possible estimated indirect "excess deaths" on the other? If in both cases we are talking of 'harm', it ought to be compared through similar harm metrics. — Olivier5

What?

We're either measuring 'harm' or 'death'. I measured 'death' - deaths from bombings etc, vs deaths from profiteering. Same measure.

We could measure harms, but I don't see any reason why the result would be any different. If anything war is more likely to have a higher kill/harm ratio simply because the purpose is to kill. That would make a harm to harm comparison even more unbalanced.

The conclusion doesn't follow for exactly the reason I explained in that post. "I cannot be wrong" doesn't follow from "I am not wrong". — Michael

The conclusion "I cannot be wrong" doesn't follow from "I'm not wrong" in my argument either. It follows from the logical consequence of all that exists being in one's mind. If all that exists is in one's mind one cannot be wrong about anything.

a gamete isn't a living, conscious thing with emotions that can feel pain? — Jerry

That's the point. The thing we impose our will on is a gamete. It doesn't care.

'Harm' is a much wider concept that 'death'. — Olivier5

So?

1. it is raining
2. it is not raining

If I entertain 1 I will find that if I were to believe it true I would not be wrong about it raining. Therefore, if I can be wrong about it raining 1 must be false and so 2 must be true. — Michael

This (and the other) are not examples of the same sort because the neither the assumption that it's raining, nor the assumption that God exists have any bearing on knowledge.

The assumption that only my mind exists has a bearing on knowledge (I must know everything there is to know if all that exists is my own mind). It is that assumption which changes the options. Neither rain, nor god do that.

No. The claim in question was...

you'll probably suffer more harm from capitalists and mean neighbors in peace time than you'd do in a war from an invading force. — baker

...so the only account needed is of deaths from invading forces.

And more importantly, @baker used the word 'probably'. So to dismiss those comments as "crass" you'd have to show it's not even probable. Your current argument that we can't know either way falls massively short of that requirement.

But for the sake of argument. Is it your claim that the resulting figure would be 30 times larger?

If you want to include all the knock on effects of war, then we'd need to include the knock on effects of profiteering too, yes? All the social issues, the food crises in other countries, the environmental damage - pollution, global warming... Do you want to go there? Is your claim seriously going to be that war outstrips the death toll from all that?

I'd love to see the figures you'd use.

The epistemological solipsist isn't assuming 1. It's the ontological solipsist that assumes 1. — Michael

I'm assuming you're referring now to your previous 1&2? Otherwise I can't make much sense of this.

He is assuming 1, when he entertains 1.

He entertains 1 and finds that if he were to believe it true he would not be wrong about anything (bar that initial assumption)

From this he can deduce that he could not plausibly believe 1.

Thus his claim that he doesn't know whether either 1or 2 are true is false.

He's just established that he cannot plausibly believe 1, so 1 cannot be true.

Your reasoning is that if 1 is true then nobody can believe that God exists. — Michael

Nobody who is assuming 1 is true can, yes.

Assuming 1 is true, is the same thing as assuming god doesn't exist (the use of 'only').

One cannot coherently assume god doesn't exist and believe god does exist.

Of course they can. Why wouldn't they? — Michael

Because if 1 is true, then nothing else exists other than their mind. It follows from that, that if a thing is not in their mind it doesn't exist. Therefore they already know (under the assumption of 1), that no other things exist.

They might be wrong about 1, but they obviously cannot be wrong about 1, assuming 1 is true.

By willfully rolling that rock downhill, one caused an entity to come to be, whose will was disregarded — Tzeentch

Just saying it again doesn't refute the counterargument.

You've admitted an embryo has been forced. The next step is admitting that by forcing the embryo, one also willfully forces the person that the embryo develops into. — Tzeentch

Nonsense. It's just garbage.

One does not force a soldier to become a soldier.

Your claim that if 1 is true then the solipsist knows that 1 is true is false. — Michael

I don't see how.

even if 1 is true they are wrong if they believe that 2 is true. — Michael

If 1 is true, they cannot believe 2 is true.

It seems to me that if the solipsism is correct, then how is it that there is a language (PLA)? There would be no argument about other minds, language is logically dependent on other minds, if W. is correct, and I believe he is. — Sam26

Yes, I agree. I think the notion that one could even consider whether there's an external world or not is nonsense. The very grammar of '... or not' implies some external measure of 'rightness'. I think (though I defer to your expertise on Wittgenstein) that his rule-following paradox applies here. Being 'right' is about following the rule, but (McDowell's version) we must use the rule to understand it. Here I take successful use to be distinguished form unsuccessful use necesarily by an external arbiter (otherwise we're back in the paradox again). So we cannot understand s rule without external arbitration.

the point is not whether or not the good outweighs the bad, at least not with this particular argument, but rather that the good has to outweigh the bad in the first place. And not only that, but the bad has to constantly be outweighed, that it's a fact of life that we have to fight for life. Should we bring people into being, forcing them to fight that fight? — Jerry

They already have to fight that fight. No entity in existence doesn't. Any entity, to exist, must resist entropic decay. And since matter/energy is neither created nor destroyed, it follows that everything in in this state. If we (by an act of procreation) force a gamete, or an embryo, to become a person we're doing nothing at all about the state of necessary conditions. The gamete has to do what is necessary to resist entropic decay, so does the person. Nothing has changed there.

If nothing exists other than my mind, and I am not conscious of all its contents, then I could be wrong about some things. — Janus

Absolutely. But if there's a part of your mind that you're not consciously aware of then it suffers from exactly the same problem that the external world suffers from, for the solipsist. It can't be proven to exist. So it's inconsistent for the solipsist to use it's existence in a theory explaining how the external world might not exist (and yet they can still be wrong). If the external world is doubted because it can't be proven, then so must the unconscious mind be.