If I have a corrupt mind, I will have corrupt ethics and make corrupt calculations. — unenlightened

Well, that's kind of what I (and @Galuchat) have been saying, I don't think the evidence is on your side there. It's doubtful that anyone has such a thing as 'corrupt ethics' or a 'corrupt mind'. Their decision-making methods may be flawed, either by our own or by their standards. Nothing prevents a well-functioning decision-making method in one context from noticing a poor ("corrupt', if you like) decision-making method.

I'm not saying this is always going to happen, the case you alude to is clearly one such exception. I'm just saying that there's nothing in the psychological system which prevents it from reflecting on itself.

theory cannot conceive that it is itself corrupt, and the calculation cannot calculate the consequences of calculating. — unenlightened

Not sure I follow you. If I hold a theory that it is morally good to murder my wife on the basis of the perceived consequences, then I am making two choices;

1) that the 'right' course of action in this instance is best worked out by estimating the total 'good' the action will bring about (where here 'good' is secondarily judged by imagining each outcome, so one outcome might be to satisfy a duty, another might be correspondence with a virtue, another might just be a picture associated with the idea of good)

and

2) that the result of this procedure is to murder my wife.

I don't see what's preventing me from later seeing choice (1) as immoral, by some other method (say, concluding that it is not very virtuous to be 'calculating' those sorts of things), or by using the same technique as (2) to estimate the consequences of repeating the decision at (1).

Yes. The idea that moral decision-making is anything other than a fairly tangled mess of highly context-specific techniques is just wishful thinking.

I'd go even further than you though. I think time is not the only factor determining method. I think confidence in available data also plays a role, particularly between virtue (low confidence) and consequentialism (high confidence). Also position and confidence in social heirachy plays a strong role between deontology (high confidence) and consequntialism (low confidence).

I think 'moral' is just a term we apply to actions (or decisions) of a vaguely related kind. So it's not the decision-making algorithm or heuristic which defines 'moral' and therefore there's no single answer to how moral decisions are made.

All that being said, I don't think anything there excludes the possibility of moral theories being wildly wrong. The mere existence of a wide range of decision-making techniques does not in of itself mean that all the current canon of theories must be accommodated somewhere in that range.

That’s where we’ll never agree. — Brett

You don't think chimpanzees have a culture?

Those are actions of free will, maybe imbedded in culture over time but not inherent in us, they’re learned. You can break those civilities any time you want. — Brett

But all creatures like us are embedded in a culture, so how would you know that angry behaviour isn't also the product of culture, learned during childhood? You can break anger responses any time you want too.

What else could it be? Unless you want to say it’s cultural. Hence my reference to primates that also behave this way. It wasn’t our culture that influenced their actions of aggression. — Brett

But primates spend the vast majority of their time not-angry too, so why make anything other than the presumption that they too suppress one potential emotional response to favour another?

We have several incentives and potential emotional states on the go at once and we select the behaviour we think is most conducive to the circumstances. As do primates. I'm not seeing the difference between anger something which both we and chimps exhibit from time to time (you're calling a natural tendency) and social civility something which both we and chimps exhibit far more often (but which you're not calling a natural tendency).

We've got two modes of behaviour, both are exhibited by us and other animals, both serve a purpose, both are mediated by brain activities,, yet one is natural tendency, the other is and wilful act of suppression. I'm just trying to get at how you've reached that distinction.

I was making the point that just because we have “tendencies” doesn’t mean we are owned by them or that we lack free will. — Brett

I see. Wouldn't you say that seeing as acting civilly despite our emotional state is the thing which we do most often, that has most prima facae justification to be called our natural 'tendency'? Why would we call something which we exhibit least often a natural tendency?

No. We get angry at particular things. It’s a response. — Brett

Sure. I was trying to clarify your use of 'tendency'. I've always used it to mean 'a typical or repeated habit, action or belief' so to have it associated with 'us' and 'anger' seemed excessive, a anger is hardly typical. If you just mean "sometimes we get angry, but we act civilly nonetheless" then it makes more sense. I'm not sure I understand the point you're making there though.

Why would you think that? I’m talking about a tendency — Brett

Well, if we have a tendency to anger then we'd be angry most of the time. That's what tendency means. Otherwise we'd have a tendency to non-anger wouldn't we?

We have the tendency to be angry but we can chose to override it. — Brett

Are you saying most people are angry most of the time? That seems a stretch. Most people I meet aren't angry most of the time.

@csalisbury

Just wanted to say thanks for posting these. I haven't got anything insightful to say about them, I just don't have an artistic bone in my body unfortunately, but I do love poetry. I know I could just go and read something new in any bookstore, but it's nice to just have something launched on you now and again. Please do another when this one's finished.

Outside of sociopathy, all humans seek to please some authority (but a better word than 'please' is needed here.) & not just any authority - an authority that is legitimate. This fuzzy idea of legitimacy (which begins in childhood) brings with it all kind of ideas of what makes someone legitimate. — csalisbury

And this is exactly why we need psychology if morality is going to be discussed in these terms. This is pseudo-scientific myth-making. I'm not saying you're wrong necessarily, but do you not see a problem at all with continuing past this point in your thoughts? Maybe it's just me, being weird about it, but I hit a point like that in my thinking and I immediately stop and say "well is it though? I mean, we can actually check that".

Yes, it has a lot of implications. Politically it means we are not really "for" ourselves as the only choice we can make is moving up or down a spectrum of (for the pessimist) unwanted realities. — schopenhauer1

What would ""for" ourselves" even mean in this context? Being 'for' something is about objectives, but you're not talking about objectives here (you are discontent, so becoming content would be a perfectly accurate objective). What you're talking about here is mean. Your objective is to remove discontent. That in itself isn't a problem. The problem is that you refuse any means by which to do that.

Why do you think we can’t describe the limits— it seems to me they can be describable, as I gave examples of in the earlier post with duck rabbit and Orion. — aporiap

True, but with the Orion and duck/rabbit examples we are able to talk in the meta-language about the matter from which they're constructed. That's what enables us to 'know' the boundaries. What would happen if, for example, we became able to see in infra-red and ultra-violet. We see those wavelengths just as we do normal colours. We then look at the duck/rabbit and see a pig also, but one drawn cunningly in only ultra-violet and infra-red. Now where's our certainty that only a duck or a rabbit are possible?

What is your take on structural realism? — aporiap

I can get on board with Ramsey style epistemic structural realism, but not the traditional version. There are a number of objections to structural realism of the more traditional kind and I admit that some of them are over my head, I'm no mathematician, but the one I think I do get is that we have not been able to demonstrate that - even if the mathematical relations of a previous theory acted as bounds to all subsequent ones - the mathematical language we're using is actually responsible for (rather than incidental to) the theory's success. This is the point Stathis Psillos makes, I think.

As a means of focussing new theories, I think it's a great way of looking at realism. As an actual answer to redeeming scientific realism unscathed, I'm not so sure.

When electrons were first thought to be particle like, and then recognized to have wave properties when isolated, the new wave-particle theory didn't completely do away with the previous laws describing their motion and properties, it subsumed them. Newtonian laws which describe motion, while originally thought to be universally applicable to objects of all sizes moving at all speeds, is not done away with but subsumed by Einstein's relativity theory, and considered consistent with it given specified conditions. And so on. — aporiap

And so on indeed, but only for theories expressed in mathematical terms already. Note you've not included any theories of biology, psychology, even chemistry there. Mathematical structure may be preserved in theories which are expressed in that form, but there's no evidence it is in theories not expressed that way and so it still remains that structural consistency might be an artefact of the means by which we describe, not that which we describe.

Philosophy is a sieve for ideas and generator of possible explanations but not of plausibly definitive answers. — aporiap

Yes, I'd agree with you there.

I wish I knew enough to say. — aporiap

A feeling I have most often.

What you have shown here is that sometimes folk use "that's true" for "I agree with you". — Banno

And sometimes for "that has been checked by methods we both approve of", and sometimes for "I really, really believe that", and sometimes for "I really, really want you to believe that"...But never, in my experience, for "that is what people in the future will come to think when science has advanced sufficiently far". As I said

You trying to claim that what is 'true' (even for the people at the time) is what we currently think is the case is just not how 'true' is used. If you're not defining 'true' by how it is used, then I'm not interested in going any further because I don't hold with trying to define what things should mean, only what they do mean. — Isaac

Can you provide your thoughts about the specific type of change that would allow those with mental disorders or issues to lead a more fulfilling life? — Wallows

1. Schools are little better than Stalinist boot camps and all of them should be abolished immediately. Children neither need nor benefit from a formal education. The stress levels children are put under in schools would qualify as child abuse if the effects on their bodies were caused by an physical agent.

2. The working day should be reduced to a maximum of five hours and probably a three day week as well. Employers who make you sit for long periods or who demand stressful workloads should be prosecuted in the same way they would be if they allowed toxic chemicals into the workplace. Way more people die from sedentary lifestyles and stressful working conditions than all of the well-known workplace toxins put together, and yet we still don't regulate it.

3. A house, garden, fuel and food should never be something the possession of which is linked to a job from which you could be fired. Allotments should be free and available to everyone. I don't object to people having to work to earn their keep, but working with the threat of losing your vital needs if you put a foot wrong is tantamount to criminal harm.

4. Everyone should have easy access to good food and outdoor exercise - excessive unhealthy foods should be regulated no less than tobacco, and sports facilities should be free. It's moronic that we spend billions on curing people once they've got sick and barely anything on preventing them from getting that way in the first place.

5. Local services should be encouraged with significant tax breaks or incentives, you should know the actual human person who provides at least a majority of your services.

6. Social media platforms should be banned and the current CEOs prosecuted (if not shot) as a warning.



Well, after decades of writing sensible, achievable, recommendations, that was really cathartic.

Failing the revolution that would be required to bring those things about, the less crazy version...

1. Formal school education should not start until at least 10. I meant what I said above, there is literally no evidence that children need or benefit from formal education. Any institutions that are required for child care should do nothing more than facilitate a diverse range of free play. Punishments like isolation rooms should definitely be banned immediately and those responsible prosecuted (if not shot), and I mean that one.
2. I think we could achieve a five hour working day (or a three day weekend), these have been seriously considered), as have non-sitting work environments. The link between lack of exercise and mental health problems is strong. Mental health needs can be accommodated in the work environment - quiet rooms for autistic employees, for example, are already in place in a number of tech firms.
3. Maybe just an effective and stress-free welfare system so that losing a job is not as stressful, it's one of the 'big three' triggers of mental health problems.
4. I don't think my original (4) is actually that difficult.
5. As with my original (5), definitely could be done.
6. Prosecuted and shot, maybe? Heads on a pole?

Play with it a bit, and you may find that T-sentences exactly capture what you are saying here. — Banno

I'm not getting anything out of the Tarski I'm reading, I'm afraid. All I'm coming across is that chasm between formal languages that Tarski was talking about and the semantically closed natural languages. He even says that

"A thorough analysis of the meaning current in everyday life of the term ‘true’ is not intended here"

And he seems, if anything, to agree with my analysis of the natural language meaning of 'true' being something of an incompletely definable set {things which are true}

"We should reconcile ourselves with the fact that we are confronted, not with one concept, but with several different concepts which are denoted by one word"

Is there something else you think I'd benefit from reading to better understand how you're crossing that chasm? More Davidson perhaps (I ask, teeth clenched!)?

I am pretty sure it would be false if the logic has excluded middle. — fdrake

Yeah, I trust your logic. I obviously can't accept the excluded middle though, following any language-based analysis of 'true' and 'false'. Not(true) is just not(true), false is something else.

"Mozart is a better composer than Beethoven" us not(true), but it's not(false) either.

So "there are dinosaurs" at the beginning of the earth would be like "Mozart is a better composer than Beethoven", neither true nor false (at the time) because they'd be no language community (at that time) using the terms 'true' and 'false' from which to derive their meaning.

"There are dinosaurs" would be false before the advent of humanity because there would be no verification procedures or justifications. — fdrake

There'd be no one to say anything of "there are dinosaurs", so I don't think it would be false. It just wouldn't be labelled either way.

To say "the cat is on the mat" is true IFF the cat is on the mat makes 'true' something which acts like a property of propositions. But if you want it to have an opposite, then it acts like a set, the membership of which is according to some 'family resemblance' type of criteria, much like Wittgenstein's 'game', or at least, that's how I understand it at the moment.

So to answer the "what are games?" we answer the question which activities are 'games'? You have to defer to convention "cards is usually called a game, football is... Carpentry isn't...". You could try to summarise a few common features, and that would be very useful (despite the inevitable loss of accuracy).

I see it exactly the same answering the question "what is truth". There's no better answer than to list all of the propositions which are considered members of the set 'truth'. Like with 'games' though, we can provide a useful (if slightly less accurate) summary. "Propositions which, when treated as though they were the case, work as expected" would be one such non-exhaustive, but pragmatic summary.

What I can't get to is some definition of truth which holds outside of convention. It's just a word after all, no magic force.

So when we say "the earth is flat" was not true, even for the people 1000years ago, we're saying that their category {true propositions} did not contain "the earth is flat". But it almost certainly did.

If we we take the opposite view, that their category {true propositions} did contain "the earth is flat", but they were wrong to put it there, then we're saying that language comes before the people using it. That it's not the case that a culture evolves some use of a word, but rather the categories are all pre-ordained somehow, and there's a right and wrong about what goes in them.

This is why Ramsey ends up analysing beliefs, not truths. 'True' can only (like any other word) be understood in terms of what people do with it, which a) requires people, and b) requires beliefs about the objects/actions being referred to by it.

Having said all that, I will re-read Tarski, as advised and try to take on board what you've said whilst doing so. Maybe I can get a better perspective on this.

I am just an utmost humble servant of our Master, Lord of both worlds — alcontali

I asked you why you chose to err on the side of doing as little as you can get away with. — Isaac


Because I can. — alcontali

So doing as little as you can possibly get away with is your definition of an utmost humble servant?

Play with it a bit, and you may find that T-sentences exactly capture what you are saying here. — Banno

OK. I have had a look at T-sentence stuff before and couldn't make the jump from formal languages to real languages, but I'm prepared give it another try, I've got a few papers on Tarski, I'll give them another look through and see if I can see what you're seeing.

It was Cambodia, not Vietnam, and the man already had land (the most expensive bit of that whole system in our country) without which the whole intervention would have failed. Nice story, but one trotted out to try and blame the practitioners rather than the institutions they work in. It's like when people show how effective just talking through your patient's symptoms is to getting good treatment - just before cutting funding to the bone so that GPs have barely five minutes to get them in and out if they've any hope of getting home at all that day.

Yes, if we changed many aspects of society things would be better for those who have mental health issues. My entire academic career has been about the link between society and individual mental functions. I advise institutions on better ways to manage that. My wife advises schools and parents about better ways to deal with children who have psychological difficulties.

We (psychologists in general) do plenty, and I can honestly say, in my whole career, I've not even met a psychologist who doesn't campaign in one way or another to get various aspects of society to change such that people's psychological issues are less severe (even if I disagreed quite strongly with some of their proposals).

We work out what might help, we suggest it to the institutions who interact with these people, they suggest it to government, and government says "no" becasue their electorate are too fucking greedy to pay for it. So don't blame the psychologists for not handing out cows.

Right. We're probably approaching this problem differently then. I'm quite a strong "meaning is use" person. I gathered from some of your previous posts that you were too - but that may have just been an poor summary.

To me, if someone asks "what is truth?" the only coherent answer to that is the answer to "what do we use the word 'truth' for, what circumstances is it useful in?"

So "the cat is in the mat is 'true' IFF...?" just means "what circumstances do people say, of "the cat is on the mat", that it is true, and what are they trying to get done by using the word.

In the case of 'true' those circumstances always involve verification of some sort.

Person A "The cat is on the roof"- Person B goes out to check.
Person B "the cat is on the roof, it's true"

Person A "is it true, today's your birthday?"
Person B (checks his calendar and personal memory) "yes"

Person A "is all the evidence given here true?"
Person B (checks, corroborates, asks experts) "yes , all the evidence given here is true"

etc...

You trying to claim that what is 'true' (even for the people at the time) is what we currently think is the case is just not how 'true' is used. If you're not defining 'true' by how it is used, then I'm not interested in going any further because I don't hold with trying to define what things should mean, only what they do mean.

Are you really a psychologist, Isaac? That's cool, what area do you work in? — BitconnectCarlos

I'm (semi-)retired now, but I used to do research in social psychology. My wife's a child psychologist though, which is where my annoyance came from at the bland misrepresentation of psychology. There is an idea that psychology just treats all mental problems as those of the individual and it's grossly unfair. Yes, they talk about solutions the individual can enact, but what else are they supposed to do? If someone comes to a psychologist with, say depression, they can hardly say "Oh, that's because you don't have any meaningful employment, let me just pop off and get you a really rewarding job, back in a minute".

But it sounds like the OP is just confusing psychology with psychiatry, so my initial response was probably unnecessary - quite frankly, I'd join the line of people complaining that psychiatrists over prescribe medication and hospital treatment.

Voluntary charity ("sadaqah") is not mandatory. Therefore, according to Islamic law, it is perfectly legitimate to limit one's charitable contribution to mandatory charity only ("zakaat").

It is not me who made the rules. — alcontali

Did I once ask you what the rules say?

I asked you why you chose to err on the side of doing as little as you can get away with. I didn't ask you how little you can get away with. I asked you why you do not advise doing more, contrary to the advice of your religion.

(Let him who has 'ilm give sadaqah from his 'ilm. Let him who has wealth give sadaqah from his wealth.) [Ibn Sunni]

(Charity increases one’s life span. Sadaqah wipes out sins and protects one against awful death.) [Tabarani]

(Sadaqah wipes out arrogance.) [Tirmidhi]

(The rizq of a giver of sadaqah increases, and his du’a is accepted.) [Ibn Majah]

(Curse be upon him who prevents one from giving sadaqah.) [Isfahani]

(Sadaqah protects one from the torment in the grave. It takes one under protection on the Day of Resurrection.) [Bayhaqi]

(Avert your troubles with sadaqah.) [Daylami]

(Sadaqah wipes out sins just as water extinguishes fire.) [Tirmidhi]
(By Allah, giving sadaqah does not decrease wealth. Then give sadaqah.) [Imam-i Ahmad]

(Sadaqah increases wealth. Then give sadaqah.) [Ibn Abiddunya]

(Sadaqah averts 70 types of problems, the least of which is
leprosy and alphos.) [Hatib]

(Sadaqah cripples Shaitan.) [Daylami]

(Sadaqah given in secret extinguishes the wrath of Allah.) [Bayhaqi]

(Whoever gives sadaqah purely in pursuit of Allah’s pleasure, Allahu ta’ala will say to him on the Day of Resurrection, “O My slave, you pursued My pleasure, so I will not make you despicable, and I will make your body haram for Hell. Enter Paradise from any door you like.”) [Daylami]

(Give sadaqah even if it is little. Allah stops His favors on someone who conceals his money and does not give it.) [Muslim]

(Whoever wants abundant rizq, let him give sadaqah.) [Daylami]

(Make your rizq abundant by giving sadaqah.) [Bayhaqi]

(Sadaqah increases wealth.) [Ibn Adiy]

(Hurry to give sadaqah because trouble cannot pass before sadaqah.) [Tabarani, Bayhaqi]

(Give sadaqah because it is a means for your salvation from Hell.) [Tabarani]

(Give sadaqah even if it is a single date because it, though little, satisfies hunger and wipes out sins just as water extinguishes fire.) [Ibn Mubarak]

(Giving sadaqah in the beginning of a day averts calamities.) [Daylami]

(Sadaqah is more virtuous than observing a voluntary fast.) [Bayhaqi]

(If one gives sadaqah by intending its thawab for one’s Muslim parents, its thawab goes to them. There will be no decrease in one’s own thawab.) [Tabarani]

(A piece of bread given as sadaqah grows like the size of Mount Uhud in the sight of Allah.) [Tabarani]

Question: I have heard that we should give sadaqah every day. What should one do if one does not have any money?
ANSWER
Our Master the Messenger of Allah and the Blessed Companions had the following talk. Our Master the Messenger of Allah said:

- Every Muslim has to give sadaqah.
- O the Messenger of Allah, if someone cannot find anything to give, what should one do?
- One should work, earn, and give sadaqah.
- If one cannot find work?
- One should help someone in need in any way possible.
- If one cannot find anyone to help?
- One’s doing any beneficial deed is a sadaqah for one [for example, one’s saying “If I had money, I would give it in charity,” giving directions, removing something harmful from a pathway, remembering death, avoiding harming others, learning and teaching 'ilm]. (Bukhari, Muslim, Nasai)

Therefore, any conclusion is obviously premature at this point. — alcontali

So, if any conclusion is premature at this point, why have you opted to err on the side of doing as little as possible for your fellow man? Is that what you take to be the general gist of the Quran? "Do as little as possible for others, keep as much of your own wealth as you can get away with". How many clerics do you think would agree with that summary?

If it is premature at this point to conclude that "do good to" means "give 2.5% of your wealth to" and nothing more, then why on earth is that what you have concluded? I mean, I doubt a single person would presume, without cause, that that's what "do good to" means.

Still not answering the question then. I'm not going to ask again, I think it's now quite clear to all that you're just using your religion as post hoc justification for your own selfishness. Doesn't surprise me, religion is mostly post hoc justification for something.

Why would I forward the question to someone who is used to working on jurisprudential advisories? I'm not remotely interested in the answer. As I've stated probably a dozen times now I'm interested in your personal justification for your personal belief, not whatever some cleric has to say.

You've made it abundantly clear that you do not do "systemless bullshit" so it follows that you have derived your opinion that "do good" is covered by "pay money to", on the basis of some system.

So either;

You're trying to make the utterly ludicrous claim that "do good" just means "pay money to" semantically and no further ruling is needed. I don't think I even need to bother writing out the argument against that option.

Or

You personally found out from your scripture that "do good" here just means "pay money to", in which case I don't need to ask for a ruling because you have already done so, just let me know what it was.

Or

You haven't found out that "do good" here means "pay money to" you've just made that up off the top of your head, and you do, in fact, do systemless bullshit, you just do it to further your own selfish interests.

There is no endless list of mandatory unilateral contributions to non-kin third parties that rest as a burden on the believer in Islam, if only, because the scripture is not endless. If you want verify the complete enumeration, as I pointed out in an earlier comment, it would be safer to ask a religious scholar ("mufti") for a jurisprudential advisory on the matter. — alcontali

I didn't ask for a list (endless or not), and I didn't ask what Islam actually has to say on the matter.

I'm asking about your personal justification for your claim that no other obligation existed. Note a claim that no other obligation exists towards the needy (particularly in the light of a clear statement that one must "do good" to them) cannot be supported by saying there is no 'endless' list. Your claim is that there is no list at all, that the sum total of "do good" is exactly synonymous with and completely encompassed by" pay 2.5% of your income to"

Where is your textual support for that equivalence? You have presumed that "do good" is covered by "pay money to". If you're not just making that up off the top of your head, then you should easily be able to point me in the direction of the scripture which has that equivalence written clearly in it.

As I wrote before, Islamic law limits unilateral individual obligations to wider society beyond the extended family to a very reasonable burden. — alcontali

Right. I'm just asking for the scriptual support for that statement. That's all. You keep saying how you follow written systems where you don't just make up stuff, but instead have it written down. So where is it written down that a person need do no more than pay their 2.5% alms? You can't support that statement with "I don't know, if you ask a scholar they'll give a ruling". If you don't know, then you're not obtaining your knowledge from a written source are you, you just made it up.

I think that is exactly what Isaac was looking for :grimace: (not explain the workings of Islam, but why he felt that specific point was correct) — ZhouBoTong

Exactly. I sometimes wonder if I'm talking in a different language, but then someone sane will come along and state the obvious - reassuring me. Thanks.

I'm asking for some justification for the statement "there is no other obligation to contribute anything else to society". @alcontali has written repeatedly, and very strongly, that he (let's not kid ourselves about his likely gender) does not follow any rules which are not part of a clearly written system. He does not simply make up "system less bullshit".

"Islamic scholars might say... if you asked them, I don't know" isn't a justification.

He's respected because he's put so much energy and time into putting himself into a position to comment on the Quran in the traditional way — frank

Bullshit. I could spend five minutes on the internet and find you a Muslim scholar who interprets the Quran in just about any possible combination of ways you can think of. There are scholars who think all non-believers are enemies in war, women should remain completely covered, girls should not be educated on pain of death etc. Equally there are scholars who think that Muslims should live in peace with non-Muslims, women should have equal status to men and that education is fine. The idea that there's some 'way' of interpreting these writings which can be acquired through study is utter garbage.

I didn't just pick those citations out of thin air. I looked up a few Islamic scholar websites which talked about the obligations Muslims had to wider society. Those passages were quoted in support of the scholar's view that Muslims had one of the most stringent and wide-reaching range of obligations of any religion. Completely contrary to @alcontali's view that there were no obligations at all beyond paying a bit of money.

So explain to me the logic of your argument from the disputed post. You said

“If you’re really open minded you might consider the idea that though traditional tribal societies were collectives and socialist they still had a chief who called the shots. Try and balance that in your over heated mind”. — Brett

Clearly implying that I didn't already have it in my 'overheated mind'.

You're writing a piece about how pampering to consensus waters down progress. I'm disputing that proposition by suggesting that 'progress' to you just means 'things I want to be the case' - so pampering to consensus doesn't water down progress, it just means the more extreme preferences don't get met.

You retort to that with the above quote. That even socialist or collective societies had a leader who called the shots.

I can't take that to mean that you agree with me - that progress is indeed made with consensus, it's just progress in socialist or collective societies (not what you want, but progress nonetheless) that would just prove my point, that it's about your personal preferences, not 'progress' in general. Since you implied that I didn't already know this, I must presume you raise this point in opposition to my view.

So you must be say either;

a) "Look at past societies who made progress - they had strong leaders who ignored consensus" (thus proving your point that progress is only made my strong leaders who ignore consensus).

or

b) "Look at past societies who had leaders who sought consensus, they all failed to make any progress at all" (thus proving your point that no progress is made by leaders who seek consensus).

or

c) "Look at past societies who had leaders who sought consensus, they all failed to make the kind of progress I'd like to see" (thus proving my point that 'progress' is just 'stuff you want').

Since (b) is ridiculous, and you're claiming (c) isn't the case, I presumed you meant (a) and thus I presented evidence to the contrary - these leaders did not ignore consensus, the relied on it even more heavily that our do nowadays.

Now you're saying that you knew that all along. My apologies for mistaking your position. You must, then, have meant either (b) - that tribal, socialist and collective societies made no progress because their leaders sought consensus, or (c) that these societies just didn't make the kind of progress you want to see, but that just supports my original argument - that 'progress' to you is just 'stuff you want to be the case'. Otherwise, how are you supporting an argument that these societies made 'no progress'?

Either your central thesis is wrong because tribal societies did make progress despite having leaders who sought consensus, or you need to make an argument that these societies did not progress even by their own definition of 'progress', or you have to concede that we're not talking about objective 'progress' at all, but just the direction you'd like society to go in.

Which is it?

So we have "A" is true IFF A" iff "A" is true IFF A" — Banno

You're missing the quotations marks (the issue which I stated with. I probably should be putting this in some sort of notation which will make it clearer, but I don't know how to use it so I'll just end up making matter's worse. I'll try one more time with.

1. "The cat is on the mat" is true iff the cat is on the mat. -> "A" (in quotation marks) is true iff A (no quotation marks. That much is what you've stated, is that right?

2. The second A can be replaced with some justificatory action - procedure X - so "the cat is on the mat" is true iff procedure X produces the expected results (we go to pick up the cat and it is indeed there)

3. The problem with this as a truth theory is that procedure X is not the same for all propositions. It's a 'family resemblance' type collection of procedures. The procedure for verifying that the cat is on the mat might be to look, ask someone, feel for it etc.

4. Ramsey gets round this by unifying all types of procedure, adding a pinch of watered-down Cambridge Pragmatism, by saying they'll all some version of 'act as if A was true, and if everything works, then A is true' - Ramsey avoids 'true', he uses 'is the case'.

5. Now you have a proposition which you'd like us to consider is the case - that proposition is that {""the cat is on the mat" is true iff the cat is on the mat"}. The whole proposition is the one contained in the curly braces, I've put quotation marks around the whole thing (they're double at the beginning because the proposition starts with reference to another proposition). We'll call your proposition B (the whole thing - all that is contained in the curly braces. "B" is true iff B, right?

6. So you've given us the conditions under which your proposition would be the case - {""the cat is on the mat" is true iff the cat is on the mat"} would itself, as a whole proposition, be true iff were the case that "the cat is on the mat" is true iff the cat is on the mat.

7. Now, recall the collection of acceptable verification procedures to establish if the cat was indeed on the mat - look, ask someone, feel for it etc.

8. Now replace 'the cat is on the mat' in all propositions above with 'the earth is flat' and work backwards, imagining you're 1000 years ago

First we verify if the earth is indeed flat - we look, we ask others, we feel it - yep the earth is indeed flat. Then we check your second proposition - the one about when a proposition is true. It says that {""the earth is flat" is true iff the earth is flat"}. Now we can check that too, against language use. Just like we checked the first proposition (about the shape of the earth). That too seems to be the case (1000 years ago) people are indeed using the word 'true' about the proposition "the earth is flat" in cases where (according to their verification procedures) the earth is flat. All good...

...Until you want to say those people were wrong. What they said was untrue. They didn't do the verification procedure as well as we can now, they made a mistake. Fine. But what about your proposition (the one about when propositions are true). Well, our 1000 year old scholar doesn't seem to have made any error there. People were indeed using the word 'true' about the proposition "the earth is flat" on the basis that their verification procedures showed the earth to be flat. After all, your proposition was not {""the cat is on the mat is true iff (all verification procedures ever invented show that) the cat is on the mat"}.

But when you say they were wrong, "it not only isn't true, but it wasn't 'true' that the earth is flat", you're missing a verification procedure for proposition (the equivalent of checking to see if the cat is on the mat), because if we use the procedure [check to see if people are using the word 'true' about "the earth is flat" iff the earth is flat], then we get a sound "No". If we ignore their verification procedures, but use ours instead, then people are using the word 'true' about the proposition "the earth is flat" in cases when the earth isn't flat. So what now? Were they all using the word wrongly? Are we saying the entire community of language users 1000 years ago did not know the meaning of the word 'true'?

IT was false for them, too. They were what We In The Trade call wrong. — Banno

We would say it was false for them, they wouldn't. Its what "we in the trade" call wrong, not what "they at the time" call wrong. Note, I'm not going for relativism here, I'm a solid redundancy theorist (Ramsey variety) when it comes to truth. I'm just interested in the epistemic implications. You can't have your cake and eat it here. If the statement "the cat is on the mat" is only contingently 'true' (upon whether the cat is indeed on the mat) then the statement ""A" is true IFF A" is itself only contingently true (upon it being the case that "A" is true if A). You've only done half the job of making your case.

So the second half shows your statement to actually be true (not just true IFF). It's the looking for the cat. Ramsey would say "the cat is on the mat" is true if when we look at the mat we see the cat there. The addition of the behaviour consistent with the state of affairs is important because it encompasses what we're doing with the term 'true'. It's why the Tarskian version alone is unsatisfying.

Twas once commonly asserted that the sun is the centre of the cosmos. — Banno

Yes, but not by us, nit by the ones for whom "the sun is the centre of the cosmos" is false. We would never say that (and mean it), and it is us for whom it is false (now or then).

Well... it's simpler than any other? I don't see any substance in your reply. — Banno

"The cat is on the mat" is true iff the cat is on the mat, right? That remains contingent, we can't say if the statement "the cat is on the mat" is true or not, only the circumstances under which it is true - the cat is on the mat. "A" is true IFF A.

So now take your statement "" the cat is on the mat" is true IFF the cat is on the mat". That statement (the whole thing in the quotation marks, with another statement referenced inside it), we'll call it "B". At the moment, it's not actually the case, it's only contingent. It's contingent on B - "the cat is on the mat" is true IFF the cat is on the mat.

So all you've offered is something which could be the case. I'm asking how we establish if it is.

With "the cat is on the mat" we just look at the mat and see if there's a cat on it. What do we do with your statement B to see if it is, in fact, the case?

So you don't even know what the instruction means? How do you know how to treat your neighbours, the needy etc if you don't even know what "do good" means? And why are you advising people on what their obligations are in society when you don't have sufficient expertise, I thought people just making stuff up based on what they reckon was all "systemless bullshit" to you? Is that what you're engaged in now?

That is covered by zakaat and sadaqah. — alcontali

Charity to non-muslims is covered by sadaqah, and according to some interpretations also by zakaat — alcontali

I didn't ask you about charity. I asked you about the clear instruction to "do good". Are you saying that the sum total of what the Quran considers covered by all that is "good" is a proportional financial payment? If so, I want to see your scriptural support for that assertion, that "do good" according to the Quran, is synonymous exactly with "pay money to" and nothing more.

it is not a one-sided thing. You reciprocate by not being "cruel nor hard" to others because they are not "cruel nor hard" to you. — alcontali

Where's you're scriptural support for opposing the general instruction to "do good" which is not so curtailed in that section?

I do not believe that the Quran mentions other unconditional contributions to wider society. — alcontali

I've literally just cited them. You must "do good" top parents, relatives, orphans, the needy and neighbours. You must not be cruel or hard, you must protect other's rights, not burden them with more than they can bear...

And that's just the general proscription to non-muslims (apart from the fact that you have to shelter them if they seek refuge, take them safely to their destination, treat them with dignity and respect...). Duties to fellow Muslims are even more strict.

As far as I know, there is no other obligation to contribute anything else to society. — alcontali

Allah (SWT) says in the Quran: “ do good to parents, and to relatives and orphans, and the needy, and the near neighbour and the distant neighbour and the companion of your side and the wayfarer and to your male and female servants." Surah Nisaa Verse 36

"Whoever is cruel and hard on a non-Muslim minority, curtails their rights, burdens them with more than they can bear, or takes anything from them against their free will; I (Prophet Muhammad) will complain against the person on the Day of Judgment." (Abu Dawud)

So where in your scripture does it say that the sum total of all that is encompassed by the terms "do good", and a lack of cruelty, defence of rights, burdens more than they can bear... all that, is covered by a 2.5% alms, and nothing else?

Or am I quoting from the 'wrong' scripture? Should I track down the Selfish Bastard version of the Quran?

1. Anthropologists Paul Aspelin and David Price tried to replicate Lévi-Strauss's findings on the Nabikwara and found that he hadn't identified their subsistence ecology correctly, so they may not have been nomadic, certainly aren't now.

2. Literally on the page before, Lévi-Strauss talks about how fragile the chief's position is, how if if takes too much or fails in any of his tasks his authority is taken away.

3. The page after he talks about how the chief's decision on a successor, like all his other decisions, are ultimately held to account by the tribe. "consent lies at the origin of power and consent is what confers legitimacy on that power" later "the chief has no powers of coercion"

All this egalitarianism is corroborated by a number subsequent anthropologists such as Price.

But by all means do continue to cherry-pick paragraphs from 60 year old texts to support your preconceptions, I can see actual investigation is not going get in the way.

Cheers. I thought that was the case. I knew she was responsible for my copy of Philosophical Investigations and so must have had some close ties, but I didn't know she was actually taught by him.

It shows in the approach though, I think.