I don’t derive my opinions solely from myself. Some of those who informed my thinking probably deserve a prize.

That would actually be a good one if I’d described something resembling a conspiracy theory.

Yes, and those questions have been answered, numerous times. If you're unaware of them, it's because you're unwilling to find them -- nothing more. — Xtrix

Before I posted searched and watched the video here: https://www.immunology.org/coronavirus/connect-coronavirus-public-engagement-resources/covid-19-vaccines-young-healthy

No answers. I searched for an answer to the second question in particular and got this:

Vaccination is likely to substantially reduce virus transmission by reducing the pool of people who become infected, and reducing virus levels in people who get infected.

But there’s no clarity as to why a natural, healthy immune response won’t do the same thing. In fact, to my knowledge an asymptomatic infection is such precisely because of a reduced viral load and is common in young, healthy people.

True, there could be a vast global conspiracy involved. — Xtrix

In my above post I gave what I would describe as the opposite of a conspiracy theory.

QED

Really I think this whole affair has been a catastrophic mistake in proportionality causing untold amounts of unnecessary harm to people, and everything that has followed the first lockdowns - including fanatical views on vaccine mandates - has been a doubling down on a mistake which those who have participated in it find themselves unable to admit to—principally governments and media but the general population included.

It seems to me that declining to get the vaccine is entirely reasonable since the official line is so open to questioning:

“The vaccine will protect you.” Why should we expect it to do more than a natural, healthy immune response?

“It will protect others by reducing transmission.” By what mechanism does it reduce transmission compared to a normal immune response that itself suppresses symptoms?

“It will contribute to herd immunity.” In what way does it do this better than natural immunity?

The fact that the JCVI does not at this time recommend universal vaccination for 12-15 year olds shows that there is that balance to consider between the vaccine’s benefits and costs. The official line hasn’t to my awareness demonstrated the benefits well enough to justify those costs (regarding the healthy).

1) This is official advice, not going against it

The meaningful element of your question seems to me to be whether there are scientists who question the use of the vaccine. The word is that Chris Whitty is going to green-light vaccinations for 12-15 year olds, in which case the JCVI advice will be in opposition to that.

I was offering a reply to your post above mine, asking for examples of scientists questioning the use of the vaccine and the reasons for this.

(Posted before you had edited)

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/jcvi-issues-updated-advice-on-covid-19-vaccination-of-children-aged-12-to-15

The assessment by the Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation (JCVI) is that the health benefits from vaccination are marginally greater than the potential known harms. However, the margin of benefit is considered too small to support universal vaccination of healthy 12 to 15 year olds at this time.

Apparently this changes as soon as a person turns 16. The reasoning behind not giving the vaccine to healthy 12-15 year olds seems to me to apply to all healthy people.

The answer to this seems to be that this pandemic isn’t really like the ones you mention and is more akin to the 1968 flu outbreak. No measures then of the sort we’ve seen this time around were implemented, presumably because they were seen as being out of proportion to the problem. People don’t like being confined to their homes or coerced into receiving medical treatments; so if the basis upon which these things are enforced seems questionable then it’s understandable if they become inclined to deny it fully.

No problem :up:

As established, they cannot. — Shamshir

Well there you go.

But I wish to ask, do you mean as in if there are conceived possibilities it follows that there are unconceived ones as well? — Shamshir

As in possibilities that no one has thought of, yeah,
I figure there must be. I think perhaps we’re talking past each other here - the OP sums up where I’m coming from with all this.

It strikes me that you’re making a rather nebulous point which doesn’t address what I’ve been saying. Nominalism and conceptualism can accept possibilities all they want, but they don’t to my knowledge give adequate accounts of them. I don’t think we need to know every possibility, past and future, in order to do that - to account for conceived possibilities is to account for those we haven’t conceived as well, i.e. they’re being accounted for in general, not case by case.

I’d say we do have experience of possibility, of an indirect sort: the sense that things could have been different and the often unpredictable nature of events. The only problem I see is nominalism and conceptualism’s account of these apparent possibilities; I have no other problem to get it backwards with.

Perhaps the myopia is mine since I don’t actually know what point you’re making that I haven’t answered already. Naming and explaining things we have no direct experience of doesn’t seem problematic to me, but insisting something exists without giving a proper account of precisely how does.

It seems to me that the content of a possible world is the potential state of things it amounts to. I don’t see a problem with naming all the potential ways things could have been “possible worlds” or saying they exist in the abstract.

If nominalism and conceptualism want to sit inside realism saying we all believe in the same possibilities but disagree about the nature of them then I still say they owe an explanation of how those possibilities can be called real on their terms, as opposed to some or other description of the present world or something imagined.

That wouldn’t fit my understanding of each view in this context. Nominalism denies possible worlds exist apart from the world, conceptualism denies they exist independently of contingent minds and realism claims they exist objectively in the abstract. Beyond thinking about them it seems possible worlds that remain only potential are inaccessible on each view.

Is that an explanation? It only seems to me like a representation of expanding possibilities as the dolls grow in size, or of how much each view is willing to posit.

When a change occurs, the same defines it. — TheWillowOfDarkness

That to my understanding is the use of positing substantial properties and accidental properties. Something remains the same by virtue of its substantial properties while changes occur in its accidental ones.

You could say despite not being able to perceive or establish how possible worlds exist on a nominalist view that they do anyway, sure. But that seems to me to be an assertion of a brute fact, which I don’t think is an adequate way of explaining anything.

Oh, well yeah. Physical change if you’ve already assumed it to be potentials becoming actuals merely requires space, I agree.

Potentials and actuals.

Perhaps I’ll just leave you with an example of your exemplary skill in reasoned argument:

Aristotle and Parmenides? No wonder you're in such a mess here. — Terrapin Station

This is turning into spam now, so perhaps we should draw a line under this instead of going round the same circle again.

And instead of addressing what I said you made what appears to be a simple assertion of what you think intended as a refutation.

I am being serious.

Properties are characteristics of matter and matter's dynamic relations (always-changing structures) with other matter. — Terrapin Station

You said the above in reply to points that weren’t even about properties. It appears to be a simple assertion of what you think intended as a refutation.

You don't understand what question-begging is, really. — Terrapin Station

Here’s the definition you get when you Google question-begging fallacy: “begging the question is an informal fallacy that occurs when an argument's premises assume the truth of the conclusion, instead of supporting it.”

It seems to me that in essence your arguments take this form:

Premise: You’re wrong.
Conclusion: I’m right.

Where you support the premise simply by stating the conclusion.

OK. But I consider those question-begging statements and so not valid objections to what I’ve been relating.

That 'becoming' still entails space. — Shamshir

I agree - but your contention was that it is “merely” space that enables physical change, which is what I disagreed with.

An existent non-actual is incoherent. — Terrapin Station

Only if you assume a univocal use of the word “existent”. Words can be used analogically, so a potential doesn’t need to be said to have being in precisely the same way something actual does.

Well if there's no space for motion, there's no space for change. — Shamshir

Sure, physical change seems always to require spatial movement. But that alone wouldn’t account for change, which seems to require there be potentials becoming actuals.

Why would anything need to allow or "enable" change? That's what you need to explain. Why you'd think that. — Terrapin Station

Because on the face of things the brownness of a banana doesn’t exist while the banana is yellow. So the change on first consideration seems a case of something (the brownness) appearing out of nothing, which isn’t logically possible so change must be an illusion (Parmenides). But change isn’t an illusion - it’s obvious. So how does it occur? Aristotle seems to have given a very good answer to that.

How would space alone enable change?

Not changing isn't a default. — Terrapin Station

I agree. Change is the default, so we start by explaining it. You don’t need to explain it if you don’t want to, but it can be and has been explained in at least one way, as described above.

as if not changing would be the default that we need permission to depart from? — Terrapin Station

I don’t know what you mean by this.

That things change is obvious, but what allows them to is less so. Parmenides thought change was an illusion, then Aristotle managed to give that explanation above of why it isn’t. You say it’s incoherent, but since you haven’t explained in what way I have nothing to argue against, so I simply reject your objection.

It would be like arguing that it's a fact that brown or yellow bananas are colorless, only not in the actual world, but rather in the "esoteric realm." — Terrapin Station

I disagree. The positing of potentials is a way of explaining change - a yellow banana can become brown because it has that potential. The potential can’t be actual, because then the banana would be brown, so rather it has to be potential and exist in a different way to what is actual.

I disagree. What makes it incoherent?

They exist potentially, in the way the brownness of a yellow banana exists potentially. It isn’t actual, because the banana is yellow, but it obviously can be.