There is no clear distinction between them. What so and so said and thought is an interpretation of what so and so said and thought, unless one simply points to the work of so and so in her own words. But even here there is interpretation involved. — Fooloso4

You say that, but then I think you illustrate the distinction I described when you say:

In any case you are not discussing Aristotle but the scholastic interpretation of Aristotle. — Fooloso4

———

It is not that the concept is hard to grasp but rather that the concept shows itself to be problematic. If the school men interpreted it in such a way that there is no problem then perhaps they miss something or add something. — Fooloso4

Or perhaps their interpretation lends the clearest insight. I guess they thought so, and it sounds good to me.

From what I understand there’s a distinction to be drawn between philosophical scholarship (what so-and-so actually said and thought) and interpretation (which understanding gives us the best insight into something). The objection being made was that the concept of prime matter is hard to grasp, when on the Scholastic interpretation it isn’t, really.

Are Forms and forms thought to be incompatible?
— AJJ

I think Aquinas demonstrated that the two conceptions are compatible. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ah OK, well there you go. Do you know where in particular I could read about that?

Then allow me to ask you, since you seem to know. What, in Aristotle, is matter? If a "component" is difficult to know, then so will be what it's a component of. We can leave this, if you like. I'm only on about the difficulty of the concepts, which neither the questions nor the references - except the Stanford.edu, - hint at. — tim wood

This was discussed in Dfpolis’s thread on realism, and Feser talks of it in his book (matter per se is termed “prime matter”):

“since all cognition and every definition are through form, it follows that prime matter can be known or defined, not of itself, but through the composite” (DPN 2.14). The notion of prime matter is just the notion of something in pure potentiality with respect to having any kind of form, and thus with respect to being any kind of thing at all. And as noted above, what is purely potential has no actuality at all, and thus does not exist at all.

So matter is simply the potential for there to be a form instantiated in the world, as opposed to being a mere abstraction.

Perhaps you have a point, though I think what you’ve quoted there may be misleading. Here’s something else from the pages you linked to:

Philoponus (490-570), a Christian and largely a critic of neo-Platonism, seems in essential agreement with all of the preceding commentators:

“Now, [Aristotle] practiced obscurity on account of his readers, so as to make those who were naturally suited eager to hear the argument, but to turn those who were uninterested away right from the beginning. For the genuine listeners, to the degree that the arguments are obscure, by so much are they eager to struggle and to arrive at the depth.”

The doctrine doesn’t refer to matter per se; it refers to material objects, of which matter is a component along with form.

I’ve quoted Feser referring to the doctrine already. Material objects are a composite of matter and form.

Go to the section on hylomorphic compounds:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/#SubsHyloComp

Hard to have material objects absent matter. Oh, wait - that's part of the problem! — tim wood

Yes, on the Aristotelian doctrine material objects are composites of matter and form. So you can’t in a material object have one without the other - I was referring to them as “inseparable” for that reason.

This is the problem: Feser's take on Aquinas' take on Plato and Aristotle. — Fooloso4

The quote refers directly to an Aristotelian doctrine. It doesn’t refer to Plato.

And you've been delivered to the entrance to a rabbit-hole. I submit to you that what matter is, to Aristotle, is no simple question. — tim wood

The quote refers to material objects, not matter per se. Material objects is what I’m referring to as well.

I take these are your questions:
1) Are Forms and forms thought to be incompatible? 2) Can’t material objects be manifestations of Plato’s Forms, while also having form as an essential metaphysical component as conceived by Aristotle?
— AJJ

1) By whom? As in some applications - those in use here - they are terms of art. The the question then is unanswerable until and unless the terms are understood. But a hint and a clue suggests that as different terms, they mean different things, and as different things should be at least at first supposed incompatible. — tim wood

So to answer the question someone could enlighten me to certain definitions that make the two views in contention incompatible.

2) You can if you want. The question becomes, how much violence you do to both to establish between them a mediating equals sign? — tim wood

An explanation of any detrimental changes you’d have to make to reconcile them would be an interesting answer also.

Ok. Until and unless you offer the Greek term for our consideration, we must understand that by "divine" you do not mean divine. — tim wood

It means “intellect independent of the world”. In the book I quoted from it’s referred to often as “the divine intellect”.

There are lots of problems with this - and I'm sure they've been exhaustively covered over 2,000+ years. What is the accepted wisdom on this out-of-the-world intellect? — tim wood

It’s part of Plato and Aristotle’s metaphysics. I’m not arguing for either, that’s not what my OP is about.

my considerations being that in material objects matter and form are inseparable,
— AJJ
And I am pretty sure that this is exactly not Aristotle's view. — tim wood

This is from Edward Feser’s book on Aquinas (emphasis mine):

Perhaps slightly better known to modern readers is a related Aristotelian doctrine to the effect that the ordinary objects of our experience are composites of form and matter

“Intellect independent of the world” is what I mean by “divine intellect”.

But if you take Aristotle’s metaphysics to be true then you believe in the divine intellect, which is where the forms matter has come from, right? On Plato’s view, as interpreted by Plotinus anyway, the Forms exist within the divine intellect. To my limited understanding the difference appears to be a matter of emphasis.

What I know about Aristotle I’ve learned from Edward Feser’s books, and about Plato from Dominic O’Meara’s introduction to Plotinus. Here’s something from the latter:

Given the existence of an intellect independent of the world (a position common to all Aristotelians and Platonists), this intellect must have itself as the object of its thinking. The point had already been made by Aristotle (Metaphysics, 12. 9)... Plotinus separates himself however from Aristotle when he claims that this self-thought in divine intellect is a thinking of the Forms.

But I don’t see the important difference if forms come from the divine intellect regardless.

Yeah, my OP is all within the context of their thought. There are Platonic and Aristotelian arguments for the divine intellect though; it’s not just an assertion.

Because the forms exist within the divine intellect, which is eternal. From what I understand this is the case with both Platonism and Aristotelianism, but there might be an important distinction I’m not aware of.

You also very comically were unable to grasp the Euthyphro idea in that other thread.

Are the reasonable approved by Terrapin because they are reasonable, or are they reasonable because approved by Terrapin?

Fair.

Feser, following Aquinas, does not pay enough attention to the difference between artifacts (which have their form imposed from without), and natural objects (which have their form as a result of internal principles of motion). Matter can be passive in the reception of an imposed form, but it has to be active to generate a new natural form. That is the point of my hyle article, — Dfpolis

Is this not the same or very similar to noting the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic final causes? Because I have heard/read him make mention of that.

Here’s something from Edward Feser’s book on Aquinas. It clarifies the distinction between matter and form (substance and properties) very well I’d say:

For instance, the rubber ball of our example is composed of a certain kind of matter (namely rubber) and a certain kind of form (namely the form of a red, round, bouncy object). The matter by itself isn’t the ball, for the rubber could take on the form of a doorstop, an eraser, or any number of other things. The form by itself isn’t the ball either, for you can’t bounce redness, roundness, or even bounciness down the hallway, these being mere abstractions. It is only the form and matter together that constitute the ball.

The idea that as we abstract properties from wholes we remove them, like picking the raisins out of a pudding, leaving behind an empty, unintelligible matrix which is substance, is an absurd misunderstanding of the Aristotelian doctrine. — Dfpolis

So there appears to be an irony in that the objection being made against Aristotelian metaphysics here is actually the justification for Aristotelian metaphysics.

And I was referring to the notion of substance sans properties. Aristotle never speaks of it. — Dfpolis

My understanding is that the notion of a substance without properties serves to demonstrate that such a thing cannot exist, and it’s that which makes it necessary to have properties (form) as part of the metaphysical picture together with substance (prime matter). I think Aquinas presents it that way; perhaps Aristotle does also.

I haven’t read any Plato directly, but here’s something from a book I have on Plotinus (a neoplatonist):

Plato also analyses the reaction of the soul to the presence of beauty, in particular the reaction of the lover to the beauty of his love. He sees this reaction as a recollection of the Form of beauty seen by the soul of the lover in a previous existence. Through their participation in the Form of beauty, beautiful objects remind us of our former blissful vision of the higher world of forms.

From what I understand the soul is diverted from its natural end by matter, which is evil by nature. So by learning what the natural end for the soul is you can give it its proper orientation, allowing it to recognise beauty where before, being off-track, it wouldn’t have.

So implicitly your answer is “no”. And therefore as long as religion has no input on scientific questions (how old is the earth?), and science has no input on questions of natural theology/philosophy (does God exist?), then there will be no contradiction.
— AJJ

No, that's not what I'm suggesting at all. — S

I didn’t say you were. It’s what follows from you implicitly answering ‘no’ to my previous question.

There are extremely prevalent religious beliefs, the content of which is in conflict with science — S

Yes. When religious beliefs conflict with science, they do indeed conflict with science. Thank you.

and also the respective methods of arriving at belief are opposed and incompatible for any given belief. — S

What is the scientific method for arriving at the belief in a transcendent God, and why is it incompatible with the Kalam Cosmological Argument’s method, say?

Providing mathematics has no input on fashion trends (and vice versa), could there be a contradiction?
— AJJ

But as I've said many times now, religion does, in at least some cases, have an input on worldly matters open to science, so you're breaking down the analogy. That's why the notion of two entirely separate and non-overlapping domains is bullshit propaganda. — S

So implicitly your answer is “no”. And therefore as long as religion has no input on scientific questions (how old is the earth?), and science has no input on questions of natural theology/philosophy (does God exist?), then there will be no contradiction. But from your post you seem to be saying they conflict only when they encroach on each other’s territory; not that they do in principle.

Would you say fashion trends are therefore incompatible with mathematics?
— AJJ

If they lead to contradiction, then in that respect, yes. — S

Providing mathematics has no input on fashion trends (and vice versa), could there be a contradiction?

I understand your criticism, and it is no more a valid criticism of science than criticising mathematics for not having any input on the latest fashion trends. — S

Would you say fashion trends are therefore incompatible with mathematics?

Lol. — S

Witty and insightful, thank you.

They're inconsistent in the sense which matters most, which is the logical sense. — S

I’ve brought up the Kalam Cosmological Argument before with you. WLC uses scientific evidence to back up its second premise, the first premise is backed up by straightforward logic, and the conclusion is a logical deduction. Science and God complement each other very well in the context of that particular argument.

But then there doesn’t appear to be anything about negatives qua negatives that makes them impossible to prove
— AJJ

Well, this would seem to apply to negatives with unconstrained contexts. Specifically, it applies to statements for which empirical verification (or falsification) is impossible in practice (even if it might be verifiable in principle). — Pattern-chaser

I agree, but that’s also the case with positive statements: “The cat is on the mat” is impossible to prove in practice in the same way the negative statement is, if the mat is large enough. You appeared to be saying this problem is specific to negatives.

“The cat is not on the mat” - why is that statement impossible to prove?
— AJJ

I don't think it is ... because it is clarified and focussed by the context you provide. "The mat" is a small thing, small enough to be examined in sufficient detail that we can positively confirm the absence of a cat on the mat. A (much) bigger mat would make our lives more difficult, making proof much more difficult. A wholly unconstrained description might render it impossible. — Pattern-chaser

I agree. But then there doesn’t appear to be anything about negatives qua negatives that makes them impossible to prove; but you seem to have acknowledged as much already, so there you go.

The specific thing about negatives is that they are framed in such a way that proof becomes impossible because of the way they're framed. — Pattern-chaser

I don’t see how that’s the case. “The cat is not on the mat” - why is that statement impossible to prove? Surely it’s just a matter of observing that the mat doesn’t have the cat on it.

I think it can teach more than it’s typically given credit for, but either way I’m fine keeping that particular proclivity.

I don’t believe our minds (immaterial in my view) are part only of the phenomenal world. At least I think the reasoning is something along those lines; I’m not very familiar with it, so there’s my current prejudice I guess.

Agreed. Judgements are not described as truth. A state of affairs empirically, or analytic propositions a priori, are described as truths. — Mww

I accept those are truths, yeah. I just think their truth is based on their participation in the transcendental truth.

I guess I think all definitions of truth are ultimately arbitrary unless it’s grounded in the transcendent, and unless we take the final cause of reason to be the discovery of it. But yeah, we believe what we want.

Bloody hell mate. Well being threatened is quite unpleasant, even anonymously across the internet, so I will leave you alone now and ask you do the same for me.

All of this is in your mind, not mine. — leo

Is it?

You're the epitome of the problem I see with objective truth. — leo

Am I?

You believe your idea of what I think and what I feel is objective truth, rather than your own projections and your own misconceptions. — leo

Do I?

You don't know my intentions. You know nothing about me, you just have what you believe. — leo

Don’t I? Do I?

And I think self-righteous narrow-minded people like you are responsible for making the world I see a worst place to live in, so I won't stop pointing out that your beliefs are not objective truth, they are your point of view. — leo

Do you? Won’t you? Are they?

And regarding what you say about me, your point of view is pure crap, because even if I don't know objective truth, I at least know what I think, whereas you don't. — leo

Is it? Don’t you? Don’t I?

Perhaps the meanings of my words are totally different to your own interpretation. Why believe I said what you think I said?

Very well, but are you not then left with the need to show how it is true that something has participated in it? — Mww

Yes, but our judgements in my view cannot coherently be described as “truth”, but only true or false.

Truth can be properly defined, but I’m not sure that’s the same as an explanation of it. I’m not sure truth being something we discover the participation in, as being any more so. To say truth is that a cognition conforms to its object is irreducible, and perhaps therefore sufficient for an explanation? — Mww

You’re always left with something to justify. Why judge truth on the basis of a cognition conforming to its object being irreducible?

Transcendental truth takes some explaining, sure, and I think Aquinas’s Fourth Way deals with that. But perhaps that leads to a deficient explanation also.

It’s not that I like my objective truth (although I do); it’s that you’re left without an explanation of truth unless it is objective. You end up asserting reason allows us to judge what is true, just because it does. I, however, can posit discoverable, transcendental truth, which isn’t a property of anything but is rather something that everything participates in. Our role is to discover what does and does not participate.

No need to match because facts are always already in propositional form. If you disagree then give me an example of a fact that is not in propositional form. — Janus

And this would mean so long as the fact is objective, the proposition is objectively true?