There are at least two ways of being certain for Wittgenstein. There is the subjectively certain, which expresses an inner conviction, often we use this expression to convey our feelings toward what we believe to others. One may use it to express one's faith for example. Wittgenstein often refers to what Moore claims to know as an inner certainty, "I know this is a hand." This was done through Moore's gestures and tone of voice, it reveals a particular state-of-mind. Moore thought he was expressing what was objective certainty, but Wittgenstein demonstrates throughout OC that Moore's propositions were not ordinary propositions. They were not the kind of propositions that one could claim to know in the ordinary sense. Wittgenstein calls them hinge-propositions or bedrock propositions.

Wittgenstein also demonstrates that not only is there certainty which is subjective, but there is objective certainty, which is akin to knowing. Objective certainty is backed up with facts, evidence, or good reasons.

When Wittgenstein talks about certainty in connection with the "spirit" he's referring to the idea that there is some transcendent certainty or knowing. As if we can know apart from some language-game - it's an internal metaphysical knowing that he was criticizing or pointing out. This can be seen in religious contexts. It's more than pointing to something internal, it's like pointing to something ethereal.

As a matter of fact, Wittgenstein plays an important part in my epistemology. Consider where I talk about the many uses of the word know, which is taken from the PI and especially OC.

Robert Kuhn and Sam Parnia have a short talk about consciousness and the death of the body. The following is my response to the talk.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hz_4FGdWVF8

As some of you know I'm not religious, but I do think there is evidence or good reasons to suppose that consciousness survives death (I go further than Sam Parnia). Also, some of you know that my two areas of interest are epistemology and near death experiences (NDEs), which I've been studying for many years. My views on epistemology inform my views on NDEs; and one of the most common mistakes made when I hear people (educated or not) talk about NDEs is the place or priority they give to scientific evidence (sometimes justified, sometimes not) as opposed to other kinds of evidence. The mistaken idea is that if science hasn't answered the question, then we don't have knowledge of the question at hand. This is the mistake that Kuhn makes all the time, and Parnia is making when he talks about the evidence for consciousness surviving death.

It only takes a cursory look at the way we use the word know to understand that knowledge is arrived at in at least several ways besides experimentation. I surely don't need science to inform me that there is an apple tree in my back yard, or that the orange juice I'm currently drinking is sweet. I also don't need some experiment to inform me that I know algebra, or that German and French are languages. Correct reasoning (logic) also informs what I claim to know, i.e. inductive and deductive reasoning. Finally, one of the most pervasive ways of gaining knowledge is through testimonial evidence, i.e., much of what we know is handed down to us from scientists, historians, mathematicians, and physicists, to name a few, so, there are at several ways of attaining knowledge apart from science. If this is true, and I believe it is, then appealing to science all the time for our fund of knowledge is a fallacy. I'm not saying that science doesn't have an important place in what we claim to know, I'm simply saying that science is not the end-all and be-all of what we claim to know.

Much of what Sam Parnia claims about consciousness relies on the testimonial evidence of NDEers. If this is true, then I believe that he's either ignoring some of the testimonial evidence, or he doesn't think it's strong enough for some reason he hasn't enumerated. For example, there is plenty of testimonial evidence that supports the idea that consciousness survives for much longer than he concludes. Many people who have NDEs report seeing their deceased relatives, which by definition means that they have survived, in many cases, for many decades after their bodies have decomposed. Moreover, there is other firsthand testimonial evidence that suggests we've been around for many lifetimes.

The following was taken from page 14 of this thread. I want to reiterate what makes a strong inductive argument based on testimonial evidence. Or, one could ask, what makes strong testimonial evidence?

As many of you know, the criteria for a good inductive (in this case an inductive argument based on testimonial evidence) argument is much different than the criteria of a good deductive argument. The criteria of a good inductive argument are as follows:

(1) number
(2) variety
(3) scope of the conclusion
(4) truth of the premises
(5) cogency

First, number. It seems rather obvious that if you have a greater number of testimonials that say X happened, then the stronger the argument. This does not mean that the conclusion relies solely on numbers, because numbers in themselves are not sufficient.

Second, variety. The greater the variety of cases cited the stronger the conclusion. When examining the conclusion of an inductive argument the conclusion is either strong or weak, which is much different from a good deductive argument, where the conclusion follows with absolute necessity. The difference being what is probably or likely the case (inductive arguments), verses what necessarily follows (deductive arguments).

Third, scope of the conclusion. This has already been covered briefly in the opening paragraph. It means that the less the conclusion claims the stronger the argument. In other words, conclusions that are broad in scope are more difficult to defend. A conclusion that is limited in scope is easier to defend.

Fourth, truth of the premises. Clearly this means that the premises must be true, which by the way, is the same criteria that makes a good deductive argument, i.e., a good deductive argument must be sound (soundness means the argument is valid and the premises are true).

(a) Also, since we are dealing with testimonial evidence, in order to know if the testimonial evidence is true we need corroboration, i.e., we need an objective way to verify some of the testimonial evidence. This helps to establish the truth of the testimonial evidence, and since the evidence is testimonial evidence, it helps to establish the fourth criteria of a good inductive argument, viz., the truth of the premises.

(b) Another important factor in determining the truth of testimonial evidence is firsthand testimony, as opposed to hearsay or second-hand testimony. Firsthand testimony is stronger than hearsay or second-hand testimony, all things being equal.

(c) Consistency of the reports is another important criterion in terms of getting to the truth. However, testimonial evidence does not have to be perfectly consistent to be credible. When dealing with a large number of reports you will inevitably find some inconsistency. So, inconsistency itself is not enough to rule out the reports unless the inconsistency is widespread, and of such a number that it affects the quality and number of consistent reports. So, although consistency is important, it must be looked at in terms of the overall picture.

Fifth is cogency. You rarely hear this criteria, but it's very important in terms of effectiveness. Any argument's (deductive or inductive) effectiveness is going to be based on whether the person to whom the argument is given, knows the premises are true. For example, if I give the following argument:

The base of a souffle is a roux.
This salmon dish is a souffle.
Hence, the base of this salmon dish is a roux.

If you do not know what a souffle or a roux is, then you do not know if the premises are true, so how would you know if the conclusion is true. You may know that the argument is valid based on its form, but you would not know if the premises are true. Thus, you would not know if it is sound. For any argument to be effective, you have to know if the premises are true; and since knowledge varies from person to person, an arguments effectiveness is going to vary from person to person.

Finally, the main point of this post is to point out that we can know many things apart from what science tells us, and I think this is where Kuhn and Parnia go astray.

Our consciousness seems to access this reality through the brain. My best guess is that experiments must be done with DMT, and more studies need to be done on NDEs.

If I was to speculate about consciousness, I would say that consciousness unites everything. It's at the bottom of all reality. It creates all that we experience. There is nothing more fundamental than consciousness.

Consciousness reveals itself not only in our subjective experiences, but it also reveals itself in others, which makes it objective too. So, it has both a subjective component and an objective component. We see and hear from others those same subjective experiences that we experience; and in so far as they are separate from our experiences they are not only subjective, but objective too.

No matter how much information you get there will always be something unprovable within your system.

There are limits to reason/logic, so not everything can be proven via a chain of reasoning. Knowledge by inference or proof comes to an end, i.e., not every premise can be shown by inference to be true. Inference and proof is parasitic; it requires knowledge by some other means so that it can extend what is known, for example, knowledge by experience or linguistic training.

I would go a bit further, i.e., if grounds for doubt are lacking, then it's not only a matter of not being able to sensibly doubt, one couldn't sensibly know either. There are certain bedrock beliefs that are so fundamental, that without them there would be no knowing or doubting. In other words, the language of knowing and doubting wouldn't get off the ground without such basic/background beliefs. "I exist," is one such belief.

By doubting your existence, you affirm your existence.

Dr. Sam Parnia

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gkTh6wNlYao&t=995s

In trying to revisit some theories relative to EM fields of consciousness : — 3017amen

It's a very interesting topic, but this thread isn't about theories of consciousness. I don't think we have enough information to come up with a good theory. It's fun to speculate, and I do some of that when talking about NDEs. I don't consider my argument to be speculation, but there are some areas of NDEs where we can speculate because there isn't enough evidence to make a good inference.

An important epistemological point is that one of the main ways we justify a belief is through testimony, i.e., we learn things from people who are in a position to know. How do we know that Mary was at the party? Because several of our friends, who were at the party, told us. How do we know that Mr. Smith robbed the bank? Because several witnesses saw him rob the bank. How do we know that quantum physics is a reality? Because scientists have told us that countless experiments have yielded the same results over-and-over again (e.g., the many 2-slit experiments). Most of us are not involved with these experiments, i.e., we take the word of others (testimony).

The amount of information we learn from others is massive, and much of it is conveyed by testimony. Moreover, we don't doubt most of it, because if we did, we would be reduced to silence. Even our concepts and words are learned from others. Our culture would fall apart if we doubted the truthfulness of all such testimony.

However, this doesn't mean that everything that is conveyed to us is true. Thus, the need to question testimonial evidence. For example, is the person in a position to know? Were they there? Second, is the person skilled in the area in question? Third, is the person trustworthy? Fourth, does the testimony harmonize with other known truths?

and yet I still fail to see the relevance of NDEs in relation to the question of mortality — sime

Because a large percentage of NDEs and pre-death or death-bed visions are interactions with the deceased. Therefore, one can conclude based not only on this, but given all the other points that have been made, that we are much more than simply this body (the brain, etc).

it was simply assumed for the vast majority of the show that consciousness was a factor of brain function. — Terrapin Station

Ya, that's the common view, viz, that consciousness is a function of the brain. My view is that consciousness is what unites everything, it's what connects all of us. It's the underlying mechanism of reality itself.

My question relates to corroberation. I'm sorry if you've already gone over this, but how were these experiences corroberated? For instance, was there any testimony from third persons who may have felt some sort of ' phenomenon ' happening during that other person's NDE? — 3017amen

The testimonials were corroborated by doctors, nurses, family members, friends, and others who were at the scene. The person having the OBE usually can describe the people, conversations, and instruments used in their revival - this is later verified by the people who were there. A good example of this is Pam's NDE out of Atlanta, GA, which can be seen on Youtube. There are just too many of these accounts to rule them out as hallucinations.

This is how any piece of testimony is validated, i.e., how accurate is their testimony when compared with others who were there?

However, neither that legal standard nor your species of testimonial evidence obtains the truth of a conclusion. Both approaches just make the argument(s) a little more convincing. — Reshuffle

The argument is not like a deductive argument in that it establishes the truth of the conclusion, i.e., if the premises are true, then the conclusion follows necessarily. Inductive arguments are either strong or weak based on the evidence; and based on the aforementioned criteria, the argument is very strong. Moreover, there is more than enough evidence (to say the least) for a reasonable person to infer the conclusion.

Please read my argument, then respond, I answer the questions that have been asked. For example, I answer the question of whether these testimonials are simply subjective. I use the same criteria used in any logic book on what is a good inductive argument.

I would suggest reading over what I said would make testimonial evidence strong. Testimonial evidence can be notoriously weak, but it can be strong if it contains all the criteria I set forth earlier in the thread.

The following is why I believe the inductive argument is strong:

My claim is that there is sufficient testimonial evidence to reasonably conclude that consciousness survives the death of the body. In other words, I'm making the claim that I know the conclusion is true. And although I believe that I could make other claims based on the evidence, i.e., claims of knowledge, I'm limiting the scope of the conclusion. By limited, I mean I'm not trying to give evidence of a god, heaven, that we are eternal beings, or any other spiritual or religious idea; nor am I trying to give evidence of many of the other claims people are making while having such an experience. Although I do believe there is strong evidence to support other conclusions, and these conclusions have varying degrees of certainty, just as many of our everyday rational conclusions have varying degrees of certainty.

The first question is, what makes a strong inductive argument? As many of you know, the criteria for a good inductive argument is much different than the criteria of a good deductive argument. The criteria of a good inductive argument are as follows:

(1) number
(2) variety
(3) scope of the conclusion
(4) truth of the premises
(5) cogency

First, number. It seems rather obvious that if you have a greater number of testimonials that say X happened, then the stronger the argument. This does not mean that the conclusion relies solely on numbers, because numbers in themselves are not sufficient.

Second, variety. The greater the variety of cases cited the stronger the conclusion. Remember that when examining the conclusion of an inductive argument, the conclusion is either strong or weak, which is much different from a good deductive argument, where the conclusion follows with absolute necessity. The difference being what is probably or likely the case (inductive arguments), verses what necessarily follows (deductive arguments).

Third, scope of the conclusion. This has already been covered briefly in the opening paragraph. It means that the less the conclusion claims the stronger the argument. In other words, conclusions that are broad in scope are much harder to defend. A conclusion that is limited in scope is easier to defend.

Fourth, truth of the premises. Clearly this means that the premises must be true, which by the way, is the same criteria that makes a good deductive argument, i.e., a good deductive argument must be sound (soundness has to do with whether the deductive argument is valid, plus the premises must be true).

(a) Also, since we are dealing with testimonial evidence, in order to know if the testimonial evidence is true we need corroboration, i.e., we need an objective way to verify some of the testimonial evidence. This helps to establish the truth of the testimonial evidence, and since the evidence is testimonial evidence, it helps to establish the fourth criteria of a good inductive argument, viz., the truth of the premises.

(b) Another important factor in determining the truth of testimonial evidence is firsthand testimony, as opposed to hearsay or secondhand testimony. Firsthand testimony is stronger than hearsay or second-hand testimony, all things being equal.

(c) Consistency of the reports is another important criterion in terms of getting to the truth. However, testimonial evidence does not have to be perfectly consistent to be credible. When dealing with a large number of reports you will inevitably find some inconsistency. So, inconsistency itself is not enough to rule out the reports unless the inconsistency is widespread, and of such a number that it affects the quality and number of consistent reports. So although consistency is important, it must be looked at in terms of the overall picture.

Fifth is cogency. You rarely here this criteria, but it's very important in terms of effectiveness. Any argument's (deductive or inductive) effectiveness is going to be based on whether the person to whom the argument is given, knows the premises are true. For example, if I give the following argument:

The base of a souffle is a roux.
This salmon dish is a souffle.
Hence, the base of this salmon dish is a roux (Dr. Byron Bitar).

If you do not know what a souffle or a roux is, then you do not know if the premises are true, so how would you know if the conclusion is true. You may know that the argument is valid based on its form, but you would not know if the premises are true. Thus, you would not know if it is sound. For any argument to be effective, you have to know if the premises are true; and since knowledge varies from person to person, an arguments effectiveness is going to vary from person to person.

I'm not familiar with EM field theories of consciousness.

Thanks.

My opinion is that Peterson has some interesting things to say, but goes over a cliff on other things, which is probably true of most of us.

Jordan Peterson talks about that doesn't he?

Yes, if you compare NDEs from different cultures, you'll find that many times they'll interpret different beings they see in terms of their cultural beliefs. Not always though, sometimes they change their religious beliefs.

I've been fascinated with the similarities between NDEs and DMT.

An interesting DMT trip.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJic9adBquY

Do you, Sam26, find it curious that so many here remain convinced that one does know that this is a picture of N., and rush to provide the justification that appears to be missing? — Banno

It does seem curious doesn't it? However, I'm finding that beliefs have more to do with psychology than good arguments. The psychology of belief is much more powerful than any argument, and this is true no matter what educational level you're dealing with. One can see this especially when we consider religion and politics. People like to follow their particular group, be it a large group or small group, it's comforting to think that others think like you. What we need are more independent thinkers, those who can think outside the box, those who are non-conformists. The other problem is that sometimes you can get to far outside the box. Why people believe what they do is very complicated.

I'm also interested in contrasting the note to the critique of Moore's argument. What are the difference between "Here is a hand" and "that's N."?

The wording is interesting, I think: "Suddenly I had to think of him."(my italics). There is no choice or volition or logical space of any sort between seeing the picture and seeing N.

(unfinished. contrast with knowing how to ride a bike or knowing that Canberra is the capital of Australia...) — Banno

I'm not sure what else to say. I guess you could say that one is perceived directly "the hand," and one indirectly by looking at a picture, but generally both are hinge or bedrock beliefs. I would suggest the book Sense and Sensibilia, which is a book that G. J. Warnock's constructs from J. L. Austin's notes.

Where your statements aren't hinges, i.e., where it makes sense to doubt them, then, they can be justified in various ways. One way of justifying them is through linguistic training. In other words, when teaching a child the correct names of things or persons, or when teaching someone a new language. There is no significant difference between showing a child a picture of "N," and pointing them out in a crowd, we learn how to name things using both methods.

When teaching a child to use the word hand there is no issue of doubt. Learning to doubt is a language-game that comes much later. We seem to swallow down certain basic beliefs as part of the reality we live in. Something has to stand fast for us in order to learn anything.

Both of these propositions need a context in order for them mean anything. There is no intrinsic meaning to these sentences apart from some context (not that you suggested otherwise).

The logic behind the use of these sentences seems very similar.

There is knowing as a skill, i.e., learning to ride a bike, or learning to count is a skill. Knowing that bikes have wheels is a belief, and knowing that 1+1=2 is also a belief. As philosophers we are mainly interested in beliefs.

I'm not sure if any of this is what you're looking for, so take it for what its worth.

If to know is to hold a justified true belief, then what is the justification here? I know it is a picture of him because I recognise it as such? But that is to say just that I know it is a picture of him because I know it is a picture of him...

And if there is no justification, then do we not know that it is a picture of him? — Banno

Banno, the answer to your question is similar to the answer given in On Certainty to Moore's propositions. So, I might ask the same question of Moore's proposition, namely, "How do I know this is a hand?" As Wittgenstein pointed out, in Moore's context the use of the word know is senseless. The context in which Moore makes the assertion is before an audience (he holds up his hand and says, "This is one hand.) as a rebuttal against the skeptics about whether there exists an external world. He claims to know this is his hand, or a hand. Wittgenstein immediately points out how unclear the statement is by considering its negation, namely, "I don't know this is a hand." This tells us something about the use of the word know in reference to a doubt, and the logic behind the correct use of these words. It's very similar to following a rule and making a mistake, they are logically linked.

Wittgenstein also points out that there are situations where one could doubt that that is my hand or a hand. For example, waking from an operation with bandages around my hand and not knowing if my hand was amputated or not. So, in one context it may be correct to use know, and in another incorrect. One might ask, "Does it make sense to doubt in a given context?"

So, do I know it's a hand because I know it's a hand, just like the question you asked about the picture. No, it's not a matter of knowing, it's simply the way we act. In another situation we may be presented with two pictures that closely resemble each other, in this situation it makes sense to doubt whether they are one and the same person. In such a context it makes sense to ask what is your justification (the doubt makes sense)? In one context the proposition is hinge or bedrock, in another it is not. The example you gave is an example of a hinge-proposition.

Keep in mind there are many statements/beliefs that fall into this category, namely, they are hinge-propositions, or as I call them bedrock beliefs that fall outside the epistemological language-game.

"Why do I not satisfy myself that I have two feet when I want to get up from a chair? There is no why. I simply don't. This is how I act (OC 148)."

"Is there a why? Must I not begin to trust somewhere? That is to say: somewhere I must begin with not-doubting; and that is not, so to speak, hasty but excusable: it is part of judging (OC 150)."

"Doubt comes after belief (OC 160)."

"I have a world-picture. Is it true or false? Above all it is the substratum of all my enquiring and asserting. The propositions describing it are not all equally subject to testing (OC 162)."

All of these quotes fit the kind of question your asking. Again, it gets back to certain propositions/beliefs that are so basic that they are outside epistemological questions.

There, I deleted all my posts. Oh, I left a few undeleted, so I must be wrong. Goodbye to all. This was a waste of my time.

I can solve this problem.

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Well, you got me on that one, I did say "all."

I hate to get picky, but one use of the word 'all' is to speak generally. So, if I say "all of you are sinners" does that mean the babies in the audience too? Does 'all' always have the force of necessarily each and every?

What!? There's a big difference between propositions being beliefs, and propositions necessarily being beliefs, which is what you seem to suggest I was saying.

"I believe in freedom, justice, and equality." Is that proposition true or false? — Fooloso4

It's true that you believe in those things. Is it not?

I don't believe it, I know it. I know how to calculate and I've done the calculations. Others have done so as well. — Fooloso4

You're saying what Moore is saying, that is, it is on par with his claim to know he has hands. This is what Wittgenstein is arguing against. What would it mean to doubt that 12x12=144? If it does not make sense to doubt it, it does make sense to claim to know it. This is what OC is all about. Hinges are not epistemological.

The state of mind or belief regarding the calculation is unimportant. — Fooloso4

I'm not sure what this has to do with what we're talking about. In terms of meaning this is true, meaning has nothing to do with your state-of-mind.

You are equivocating. Moore does not say: "I have hands", he says, "I know I have hands" which is not the same as saying "I believe I have hands". — Fooloso4

Don't talk to me like I no nothing about the subject, as if I haven't read Moore's papers. He actually says, "Here is one hand." But these are things he claims to know, as he argues with the skeptics.

As I said, there are examples of propositions that aren't beliefs, but in terms of OC we're talking about Moore's propositions, and those are beliefs, Moore's beliefs. I don't disagree with what you're saying, but I don't think I ever said that propositions are necessarily beliefs.

Here is an NDE of a blind person. The only thing I disagree with is the ending, namely, "Jesus is the key." If anything my research on NDEs shows that religion has it wrong. However, religious people love cherry-picking those NDEs that support their views. Anyway, I found this NDE interesting.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3rFW2lc3344

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Propositions are beliefs, they are statements that are true or false. The only time they wouldn't be beliefs is if you're giving one as an example or something where they're not attached to someone.

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