Let me explain it one more time why hinges aren’t propositionally true.

1. They’re not open to judgment – typical propositions like “It is raining,” are moves subject to true or false on evidence (OC 243 “compelling grounds”). Hinges are the board itself without the hinges no moves happen. Their truth is accepted as a precondition that makes testing possible. They’re true because we live them – e.g. grabbing a cup, not proving hands exist. They’re simply not candidates for truth/falsity. They set the stage for the testing of true and false.

2. Typical propositions can be doubted (this is key) – “Is it really raining?” If you doubt that you have hands you are not refining the truth; you’re opting out. The truth of hinges is a kind of immunity, not a verdict reached by evidence or reasons.

3. Hinges aren't true because they’re factual, but because they’re the frame facts rest on. The hinge “The Earth exists” isn’t a discovery, it’s the ground for discovering rain (OC 99 “riverbed”).

Sure, hinges look like typical propositions, i.e., they have a subject and predicate, but the job of a hinge is not the same. You don’t come to know its truth by investigation. It’s the rule that allows the game to move forward. Treating hinges like typical propositions is like trying to prove to someone that it's true after explaining the rule in chess that stipulates how bishops move. It’s not a move that we judge in that way, it’s the condition or foundation of the game, just like the pieces and the board. Hinges enable truth talk, they’re a precondition. Their truth is a necessity, just as the rules of chess are a necessity that enables chess games.

Propositions can be true or false, but hinges are true as a condition of being a hinge, i.e., it's their foundational role. Moreover, it’s our acting that cements them in place, not any fact that establishes their truth.

Knowing how is knowledge as a skill, we're talking about knowledge as beliefs and so was Wittgenstein. To act, we have to believe that we have hands, and this belief is reflected in our actions. This is even before knowledge as a skill. Hinges are before any knowledge.

The propositions that set the game up are not typical. If, as Wittgenstein says, Moore's propositions are not known, then they are not epistemological, i.e., not justified or true. They are only true in that we accept them as true (like any conviction/belief) to support our system of beliefs. The propositions you're referring to are true because they refer to facts or states of affairs. In this sense they are justified, justification ends with hinges.

Propositional truth is dependent on language, i.e., the concept is linguistic. You seem to point to some truths as metaphysical that we access intuitively. Hinge propositions arise in our acts (I'm referring to pre-linguistic hinges). For e.g., my use of my hand shows my belief that I have hands. This is different from what you're saying. Your idea seems completely dependent on minds apart from language, thus the intellect aspect, but I'm not sure.

My point is trying to clarify different uses of truth in our language. And the difference in the roles of truth in our systems of belief. You are correct that there are different roles or layers of hinges. The rules of chess are hinges (foundational to the game), and "I have hands" is a foundational truth that stands outside of epistemological games. Again, they are arational, but can be used sometimes as typical propositions.

Wittgenstein's hinges are foundational convictions that have no justification. This seems much different from the intuition you're referring to. What's an e.g. of a self-justifying truth?

The way you can differentiate between hinges and other typical propositions is that doubting them is generally senseless. Wittgenstein's hinges apply to all epistemology and any system of belief. "I possess intellect" could indeed be counted as a hinge, similar to we all possess consciousness.

We accept them as true as part of a role. They're not true in the same sense that your typical proposition is. There is a difference between truth as a matter of fact or state of affairs, and truths that have a role that is arational and foundational. It's very much like accepting the rules of chess to play the game. Indeed, bishops move diagonally, but no state of affairs supports this rule. It's just foundational to the game of chess.

I've been trying to investigate whether anyone else has made the connection between Wittgenstein's hinges and Godel's unprovable statements. I think hinges provide a unique way of looking at Godel's theorems. They allow the system to work, just as they allow epistemology to work. They're unprovable, but system-sustaining. In other words, these are mathematical hinges. I think this idea of mine is original, as far as I can tell.

The difference between hinge propositions and typical propositions has to do with the role they play. Typical propositions are tied to states of affairs and assessed via justification. They’re players in the game, subject to the rules of truth and falsity (OC §243). Hinge propositions are foundational— truth is not a property they possess but a role in epistemological language games. They’re the rules or ground of the game, not subject to its moves (OC §204: “Our acting… lies at the bottom”). The idea of foundational convictions captures this idea.

Moore is claiming to know. In other words, he believes he's justified. He's arguing against the skeptics who are claiming that he doesn't know.

Moore's papers indicate the opposite. As for your last statement, hinges are not true or false in the propositional sense but are accepted as true or false as a matter of conviction or for purposes of utility.

How would I explain Wittgenstein’s hinges to someone who never heard of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty?

Imagine trying to answer some question – like what’s true or what’s real, or whether you’re really sitting in a room typing. You ask yourself, “How do I know this?” or “How do I know that?” You’re like the kid who keeps asking “Why?” to every possible answer but never concluding because you’re in an endless loop of whys. You can’t seem to get anywhere because you can’t prove everything, no one can.

A philosopher named Wittgenstein who wrote about this kind of stuff said that there is a way to avoid this endless loop. His solution was that we accept certain basic beliefs without proof. He called these hinges, like the hinges on a door that allows them to open and shut. Without the hinges, the door falls off; without basic beliefs, language, and our thinking would similarly fail.

So, what are hinges? They’re everyday basic beliefs that we don’t usually question. For example, “The Earth existed 10 minutes ago,” or “I have hands.” These are the kinds of basic beliefs that we accept as true without normally requiring proof. We take them for granted because they’re part of how we live and act in the world. Wittgenstein pointed out that we need these kinds of beliefs to even start to ask questions or to figure things out. For example, before you open a door you don’t start wondering if the door exists, you assume it exists, and that's a hinge. It’s not like it’s magically true; they’re what we rely on to do the things we need to do. They’re like the rules of a game that we agree to accept to play the game. You don’t ask, “Do bishops move diagonally?” – everyone accepts the rule who plays the game that bishops move diagonally.

Another guy named G.E. Moore tried to say, “I know I have hands,” as if it was a matter to be justified or a matter of proof. Wittgenstein disagreed, saying that it wasn’t a matter of proof. He said that these beliefs were so basic that a proof wouldn’t make sense. Such beliefs are where questions begin. They are the foundation that supports what we know and doubt. Without hinges we would be confused, unable to reason or doubt. It would be like having a chess board and pieces but no rules. You couldn’t play the game.

Is this not Utilitarianism? — Hanover

It's not utilitarianism.

What are you ultimately referencing to prove something is good. With law, you point to the law. With morality, what to you point to? — Hanover

You point out the harm done. Even in courts when accessing a lawsuit e.g., they focus on the harm, and if you show harm, then in many cases you win the case. It's not difficult in most cases to objectively demonstrate the harm done when lying (to relationships) murdering, stealing, and a host of other actions. To me, this seems rather obvious. How do we access the harm? We give the evidence or reasons to support the conclusion. The evidence usually comes in the form of testimony, reasoning, sensory experience, etc.

If you want to make the argument that morals are not relative to time, place, and the peculiarities of different cultures, you can, but you're going to have argue either some mystical creator of morality or you're going to have argue something inherent within the constitution of the human DNA that demands them. — Hanover

I think there is a place for the mystical, but I disagree that moral arguments depend on some mystical God/creator/lawgiver. I think a very strong argument can be made that there is an objectivity to much of moral reasoning even if you remove the mystical. This isn't to say that culture, history, emotion, empathy, etc. don't play a part, they're just not the foundation that supports the argument. The problem is that people seem to want clarity and precision, and it isn't going to be found. There will always be grey areas needing more clarity because our knowledge is limited.

Is it correct? I'm not sure. I'm mulling it over. — Tom Storm

I don't see why it would be considered a good theory, but that's my view. I see much of philosophy as useless or poor epistemology, and emotivism is just one such theory.

I don't think morality can be derived from any logical arguments. In fact, logic is as likely to be the ally of evil as much as good. — frank

Logic plays an important role, but it's not the only way we justify our beliefs, it's just one of many ways. Again, as I commented to @Tom Storm an overarching view of epistemology is extremely important and Wittgenstein's ideas go a long way in answering such questions. There are many different ways we justify beliefs (many different language games), and understanding these language games helps us get the fly out of the fly-bottle. I don't agree with Wittgenstein's metaphysics, but his linguistic analysis is still the best along with Austin.

I agree that logic doesn't differentiate between good and evil, but that doesn't mean it's not useful in these discussions. Part of the problem is that we rely too much on logic, as if it's the only source of our justifications. It reminds me of people who continually rely on science as if it's the only good source of knowledge. It may in some cases be more precise, but it depends on what we're trying to answer.

Doing the right thing is an extension of love. All of it is meaningless without the reasoning behind it. My metaphysical view is that consciousness/mind is at the core of everything, and that core is love. However, moral language is an extension of that love.

I’ll give a short reason or two that summarizes the failure of emotivism. Emotivism can’t explain how moral language functions in arguments or conditionals (e.g., “If stealing is wrong, then murder is wrong.”), as emotional content lacks propositional coherence, which undermines it as an account of ethical reasoning.

In other words, as already mentioned, expressions of emotions aren’t truth-bearing. These statements fail where they must function as propositions to maintain meaning and inferential coherence. (This was pointed out in the Frege-Geach Problem.) These kinds of statements (“Stealing is wrong” akin to “Boo to stealing,”) cannot account for the logical role moral statements play in our ethical reasoning. Emotional statements lack what’s needed for validity. Emotional statements, again, lack a truth value.

There have been various attempts to address this issue, but in my opinion, they fail.

:grin:

It's better than no waving at all. :grin:

The idea that emotion plays a primary role in determining which actions are immoral and which are not is a non-starter for me. I don't see this as a worthy moral theory. I think you agree. I agree with you that our actions are primary. I try to make such theories as simple as possible for people. I see right and wrong in terms of the harm done and mitigating the harm. Other issues play into morality like intentions, values, virtues, and mitigating circumstances.

When you say "morality is about harm done," it seems to me thsi is expressing an emotional reaction to harm. How does harm become objective? — Tom Storm

Emotional reactions will always be a part of moral and immoral actions, but it's not the guiding principle behind moral action. One could imagine a person not responding emotionally and yet able to recognize that a particular action is immoral. Why? Because most people recognize that certain actions are objectively immoral. The example that illustrates this point is the following: Imagine a person cutting off the arm of another without good reason. The harm done to the person is objective, viz., the blood loss, the arm on the ground, the screams, and the reactions of family and friends. All of these components are objective and clearly objective. This is true whether you respond emotionally or not. And where there is a question as to the harm done, which clearly happens, then we can debate whether or not there is harm. One can see the objective harm in stealing, lying, betrayal, etc. By the way each of these (stealing, lying, and betrayal) have nuances that people debate about, but that's just the nature of the subject. It's not always clear that harm has been done, so we shouldn't always be absolutist about these things. But generally speaking, we can say these actions are immoral.

We might also add that when confronted with two evils, choose to do the least amount of harm (the principle of harm) based on the facts available to you.

Bedrock for me refers to hinges that are more fixed than other hinges. Hinges are layered, some more fixed than others, but the riverbed works well too. Nowhere does Wittgenstein use the word absolute so I stay away from that in most cases. Some hinges are absolute. For example, we are a body separate from other bodies.

it usually means a starting-point for a ratiocination. "Bedrock" seems more like an absolute to me - unquestionable in all contexts. So I'm broadly with you and Sam26 on this. — Ludwig V

I don't hold to the view that Wittgensteinian hinges are necessarily absolute. In fact, most of them are not. For example, the rules of chess are hinges and they aren't absolute (absolute meaning they can't be other than they are). Most are contingent.

I don't see how a moral statement can be considered truth-apt. I believe morality is rooted in emotion (though I don't necessarily subscribe to emotivism or expressivism) and also involves intersubjective agreements - cultural values. — Tom Storm

I'm not a fan of the "truth-apt" language. I look at truth, and other concepts like knowledge in terms of their use (language games), so my take is very broad. I'm very much a Wittgensteinian in this sense. I don't think I would agree that morality is rooted in emotion. Although there is obviously an emotional component. I think generally morality is rooted in the harm done, i.e., X is immoral because of the harm it causes. However, this is not always the case I'm sure there are exceptions. I agree that it does involve "intersubjective agreements" and "cultural values," but I also think there is an objective component to moral values.

If it's something you're born with why do we have to teach children right from wrong? Moreover, what would it even mean to be born with that knowledge, i.e., moral knowledge?

One could say that it's a matter of convictions (personal and communal). However, most people do have negative feelings about the matter because they see the harm done.

I'm not necessarily disagreeing, but why are you saying that?

No, I wouldn't characterize it like that.

In this case immoral.

I agree that moral sensibility comes first, that's the point of it being foundational. And the commands do have use, but it's not the most meaningful thing. The command comes from the conviction or belief that kicking puppies is wrong.

My view is that the belief that kicking puppies is wrong isn't based on any justification, it's foundational like the rules of chess. It's a hinge.

One use is in teaching someone about right and wrong and how to treat other animals. I don't have to use the command when teaching. I can simply say it's wrong and I might even give reasons why. "Don't kick puppies" has other uses stemming from the belief that kicking puppies is wrong. It grows out of the basic belief that something is immoral or wrong.

It doesn't have to be formulated as a command. One of the bedrock statements of your moral theory could be something like, "It's generally morally wrong to kick puppies." There could be many foundational moral statements of this sort. That's a conviction you hold to that's bedrock, you accept it as true, a given. Like a rule of chess.

Ya, I think some moral statements can be counted as hinges. I was recently thinking about hinges and moral theories, but nothing definite. I think any system of belief relies on hinges otherwise you end up with an infinite regress. On the other hand, some beliefs that are counted as hinges aren't hinges in the Wittgensteinian sense. One of the important tests is that they can't be reasonably doubted. Some Christians are using the idea of hinges to support belief in God, but the concept of God can be reasonably doubted. It's not like "This is my hand."

I view faith in two ways: First, it can be simply a conviction (belief) that a statement is true, or it can be, as some claim, a belief that something is true based on evidence or good reasons. Some religious people view belief in God as a kind of Wittgensteinain hinge that's foundational to their belief system. To some, it's an arrational bedrock belief.

Wittgenstein's hinges tend to be more primal or universal (thinking of prelinguistic convictions). E.g., I have hands or I'm an object separate from other objects. Although there is a close connection related to action. That said, I haven't studied any of these writings, so I don't want to be dogmatic about any of this.

I've been tweaking my idea of bedrock beliefs as a replacement for Wittgenstein's notion of hinge proposition. Instead of bedrock beliefs which sound too personal and don't convey the shared nature of these beliefs, I've changed the wording to capture both the personal and their shared nature. A name that seems to fit this idea more appropriately is bedrock convictions, which capture their personal and shared nature. Personal in that all of us have these convictions and shared because all of us share these convictions as a necessary part of life and language. For example, as individuals and as part of a community we act with our hands is a conviction that stands as a necessary part of our background. I don't say "I have hands" before acting, I just act. So, our acting is at the bottom of the language game (OC 204).

Bedrock convictions (hinges) are also split into prelinguistic convictions and linguistic convictions. Prelinguistic convictions are shown in simple actions like picking up an object which reflects the conviction that I have hands. Our actions show these convictions apart from language, but they can also be expressed as part of language, however, language comes later. As language forms it will convey another layer to these convictions, viz., linguistic convictions, such as the rules of chess. Prelinguistic convictions are not subject to doubt because the use of the concept of doubt is a linguistic function (it's not necessarily a linguistic function, although the concept is) especially as part of Moore's argument and as part of the skeptic's argument. The prelinguistic props up the linguistic. It would be logically impossible for the latter (linguistic convictions) to exist without the former. This is why the skeptics' doubting is nonsense. We don't start with doubts, we start with subjective and collective certainty that enables the language games of JTB and the language games of doubting.

I'm further arguing that Wittgenstein's hinge propositions are probably a necessary function of Moore's reference to his statements as propositions and not so much that Wittgenstein thinks of them as traditional propositions. This seems obvious given Wittgenstein's reference to Moore's statements as hinges. But there is an important point that Wittgenstein's writing alludes to, viz., that hinges are not true in the traditional epistemological or propositional sense. In other words, they don't carry truth values in the same sense that traditional propositions do where they're open to verification or falsification. Bedrock convictions aren't subject to the justificatory machinery of JTB. They are the frame that stands fast for the machinery of JTB (JTB for me consists of different language games in the Wittgensteinian spirit). So, the truth of bedrock convictions is tied to the language game of conviction rather than justification. Normal propositions (true and false propositions) are subject to justification and doubt, but bedrock convictions are not. I have the conviction that I have hands (shown in my actions), and this conviction expresses another use (another language game) of the concept true that is foundational to our systems of epistemology and doubt. The truth of bedrock convictions is a pragmatic and necessary one. They are structural.

Can you read the title of the thread? Evidence of consciousness surviving death - that's what the thread has been about. It sure isn't about any religion if that's what you're inferring. The other sense of proselytize is to convert from one belief to another. I guess that's what any argument tries to accomplish, so I'm not sure what your point is.

Actually, you could ask the same question about my Wittgenstein threads.