Much of what we know is probabilistic, i.e., I know based on inductive reasoning. E.g., I know my car will start tomorrow morning, and I know I will probably wake up tomorrow morning. Much of science is probabilistic knowledge.

What I know absolutely or with absolute certainty are things that many people have already mentioned. For example, I know that I'm sitting here in my office typing with 100% certainty. A doubt here wouldn't even make sense. There are millions or even billions of conscious things we do that we know with absolute certainty. This is not to say that people don't express doubts about these things, it's just that certain doubts people express aren't reasonable or justifiable.

I'll answer some of this as I continue.

But the picture might be true or false. This cannot be determined by the proposition. The proposition might be a false picture of reality. — Fooloso4

Every proposition (true or false) presents a picture of a possible state of affairs. If the picture matches the facts (state of affairs) of reality, then it's true, if not it's false. Of course a proposition may be a false picture. I don't see the problem.

"When the sense of the proposition is completely expressed in the proposition itself, the proposition is always divided into its simple components-no further division is possible and an apparent one is
superfluous-and these are objects in the original sense (Nb. p. 63)."

I'd have to do a careful reading of the preceding pages but keep in mind that the Tractatus is the final arbiter of how to interpret propositions and facts. The Notebooks are not the complete story, the Tractatus is. That's not to say that it's not important, it's just that he's working through these ideas in the Notebooks. Besides I'm not sure I see your point.

I'm trying to give an accurate presentation for people to read. I don't want to get sidetracked with every little disagreement with you. I only say this so I can focus on my goal. If you want to present a different interpretation that's fine, but don't be surprised if I don't respond. I'm not always going to be correct with every nuanced word, but I think I can give an accurate overall interpretation.

If I understand you correctly, I agree.

Wittgenstein cannot mention a single simple object because he could not find one. He simply assumes them. They are a priori objects of human thought. His concern is with propositions are how they make sense. — Fooloso4

I don't disagree with these statements.

The analysis of language does not reveal simple names of simple objects — Fooloso4

I might argue over the wording of this, i.e., the analysis of language brings us to names, the smallest component of an elementary proposition. Names correspond to objects, which make up atomic facts. A proposition is a picture, according to Witt, its "...end-points [names]... actually touch the object (T. 2.1521), like a measure laid against reality (T. 2.1512). Another way to say it, is that the proposition mirrors or pictures reality.

The terminus of a proposition is that point at which the meaning of the proposition requires no further analysis. We do not need, and it would be counterproductive, to chop Plato up into simpler components for a proposition about him to make sense. He is in such cases a simple propositional object with the elementary name 'Plato'. — Fooloso4

I definitely wouldn't say that Plato is a "simple propositional object." I would say that Plato, as part of a proposition about the person, is either part of an atomic fact (simple fact) or a more complex fact. There are no simple propositional objects. There are simple propositional names, but not objects. Objects are connected specifically to atomic facts. Names point to objects, which again make up facts or reality.

Post 7

Wittgenstein wasn’t blind to the fact that he was unable to give examples of objects. He says for example, “Our difficulty was that we kept on speaking of simple objects and were unable to mention a single one (Nb. p. 68).” For whatever reason Wittgenstein suppresses his doubts and proceeds with his analysis.

I’ll try to define objects as I see them, i.e., based on, I believe, a reasonable interpretation. Let me say first that you don’t need to have a perfect understanding of names or objects to have a clear understanding of the general ideas of the Tractatus, this seems obvious. You can be wrong about this or that interpretation (within reason) and still have a clear picture of most of his ideas.

First, we know that Wittgenstienian objects are independent of human thought and perception, i.e., their existence persists regardless of what we claim. Their subsistence or their persistent nature is independent of thought and language.

Second, being subsistent in the case of objects, means their reality is not contingent on any observation or linguistic description. This implies that their existence is objective, which is the case with atomic and complex facts.

Third, objects are unchanging or unalterable.

Fourth, as we’ve already pointed out, objects form the substance of reality. They form this substance by combining into atomic facts or the structure of the world (reality).

Fifth, the implications of all this are closely related to the limits of language. Objects represent all that can be meaningfully said about reality. Why? Because combinations of objects represent every possible state of affairs. They are the building blocks of reality.

Thanks for the compliment. As for Russell being influenced by Mach, I agree. The physicist and philosopher Ernst Mack did influence Russell's work, especially his early work.

Post 6

Wittgenstein’s reasoning was that if I assert that “Plato was a philosopher,” I know what I mean. But who is Plato and what is a philosopher? If we try to answer the questions, the questions may be open to more questions. Therefore, the process of analysis might go on and on without resolution. Wittgenstein believed that the process of analysis must come to an end (Nb p. 46), but what is that end? The end for Wittgenstein, as stated in the Tractatus and the Notebooks, are elementary propositions made up of names, “…which will correspond to... simple objects (Nb p. 61).” The point is that even though Wittgenstein was unable to give examples of names and objects (names being simple signs, and simple objects being the basic substance of the world), he believed that logic dictated that this is how it must be. Wittgenstein believed that the idea of a simple is already contained in the idea of a complex and the idea of an analysis (Nb. p. 60). For us to say things about the world, our statements must come in direct contact with the world. This is accomplished via names. “A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign (T. 3.26).” And, although Wittgenstein was unable to carry out the analysis completely, he was sure that this is how it must be. Of course, we remember that Wittgenstein inherited many of these ideas from Frege and Russell, which provided the impetus for his logic.

Post 5

In the previous post we talked a little about the 2nd of the seven main propositions of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein spends about six pages on this topic.

We know based on 2.01 that a fact is made up of a combination of objects. Objects are the fundamental building blocks of reality; they make up the substance of the world. They cannot be further analyzed into simpler parts. Think of them as irreducible (T. 2.021). (They are sometimes referred to as “atomic objects.”) Objects have an independent existence (if you’re thinking of what we mean by ordinary objects, then you’re far from what Wittgenstein meant by objects in the Tractatus), free from the existence of other objects.

Wittgenstein uses the idea of objects as a necessary ingredient to his a priori analysis. He doesn’t just create objects out of thin air, i.e., at the time Frege and Russell were thinking along similar lines. This is most likely why Wittgenstein created both the name and the object. Names being the smallest component of an elementary proposition, and objects being the smallest component of an atomic fact. Names in propositions represent objects. This is a source of confusion for many who read the Tractatus for the first time. Also, objects have no material properties because propositions represent properties, “…and it’s only by the configuration of objects that they [material properties] are produced (T. 2.0231).”

Frege developed a system of logical notation to express logical relations in mathematics, and he played a significant role in the development of formal logic. Wittgenstein extended Frege’s ideas of logical notation to show the logic behind the proposition and its connection to a fact, so the Tractatus reflects Frege’s influence.

Russell’s influence is significant in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy (up to about 1929). Russell’s work on logical atomism, particularly in his book Our Knowledge of the External World (1914) is particularly impactful for Wittgenstein. Russell believed that thought and language could be reduced to atomic propositions that correspond with the basic elements of reality. So, the ideas of the Tractatus were extensions of both Frege’s and Russell’s ideas, but there are also important differences.

“It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have something--a form--in common with it (T. 2.022). Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form (T. 2.023).” You can think of form as the way things are arranged in a picture. So, if a proposition presents a picture of a possible fact, then it has a particular logical form, and that form either matches reality or it doesn’t. Its form is the arrangement of things in the picture. So, both the proposition and facts have forms, but whether a proposition is true depends on whether its form, the arrangement of names in the proposition, matches the arrangement of objects composing the atomic fact. Even space, time, and color are forms of objects (T. 2.0251). In other words, objects that have a particular arrangement, make up space, time, and color. Every fact of the world is composed of a certain arrangement of objects (again, objects make up the substance), including space, time, and color.

You don't seem to be thinking about Wittgensteinian objects, which are not objects in the traditional sense.

Post 4

It's important to understand that Wittgenstein is trying to answer the question of why it’s possible to make statements about the world. He answers this by doing an a priori investigation, which is very distinct from his later philosophy. Wittgenstein believes that it’s through purely logical analysis that we can come to understand how propositions connect to the world of facts. He assumes this from the beginning. It’s an a priori investigation that will provide the solution to philosophical problems. He also believed that even vague propositions (Nb p. 70), once logically understood, are not vague, but have a clear logical structure. Once you have a clear understanding of the logical structure of propositions, then you essentially have a clear understanding of all the propositions of philosophy. This is partly the reason why Wittgenstein believed after completing the Tractatus that he had solved the problems of philosophy. It’s his logical analysis of the proposition, and specifically how it connects to the world, that draws him to this conclusion.

“What is the case-a fact-is the existence of states of affairs (T. 2).” We use language, specifically propositions, to make statements of facts about the world. States of affairs are not the same as propositions, they are quite distinct. The world is made up of facts (states of affairs), viz, the totality of all the facts (T 1.11). You might not agree with Wittgenstein’s notion of facts being composed of objects (objects being the simplest component of an atomic fact), but his notion of facts as states of affairs existing in reality and quite separate from propositions, I believe, is a good one; and many philosophers, including myself, use it. States of affairs make up reality, but not as Wittgenstein envisioned it in the Tractatus, but I digress.

Much can be said about Frege’s influence on the Tractatus. In fact, some of Wittgenstein’s ideas reflect Frege’s ideas. For example, Wittgenstein and Frege are trying to break down propositions into their simplest form. Frege’s work marked the beginning of what became known as logical atomism. Frege also introduced the distinction between sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung) in linguistic expressions. There are other important ideas that Wittgenstein got from Frege, but it’s beyond the scope of these remarks.

For me it's important to distinguish between claims (statements/propositions) and facts, i.e., states of affairs. If a statement is true, then it represents a fact or facts in reality. The idea that there is an ontology connected with the truth has some merit, i.e., we're referring to the existence of particular states of affairs or the possible existence of a state of affairs. A statement is true if it mirrors a fact, but facts exist apart from the statements themselves (at least many facts). A statement can be true quite apart from any justification, which is to say, I may not know the justification, in which case I don't know it's true. I may claim it's true as a matter of opinion or mere belief, but it's not knowledge. All of us have opinions, some of which are true, and some are false. A claim is never knowledge in itself unless we're referring to statements like "All bachelors are unmarried men." Of course, one could claim that the statement refers to linguistic facts based on the meanings of the words. So, even in this e.g., we could use a linguistic justification.

Truth is always about claims, which come in the form of propositions. I can claim that X is true with little to no justification, but it's not knowledge unless it conforms to one of the many methods we use to justify a claim. I'm a Wittgensteinian when it comes to justification, i.e., we use several methods in our language-games to justify a claim—for example, testimony, reason (logic), linguistic training, sensory experience, and others. Justification is much broader in its scope than many people realize.

I think there is an ontology behind the truth of our statements, and it's in the form of facts, the facts of reality.

I agree, I wouldn't say you have a conviction that you have two hands either. What Moore is saying amounts to a conviction according to W.

My point is in the context of Moore's statements in his papers A Defense of Common Sense (1925), and Proof of an External World (1939) in which Moore lists several propositions that he claims to know with certainty, and Wittgenstein's responses. Moore claims that he knows that he has two hands, but Wittgenstein argues against this idea, although he sympathizes with Moore's claims.

The point here is to see Wittgenstein's connection between knowing and doubting, i.e., the logical connection between the two concepts. I don't think anyone has ever pointed this out in the way Wittgenstein has in OC. When someone claims to know, one of our natural responses is "How do you know?" This question introduces the doubt into our epistemology. We want to know how it is that you know, what's your justification; and when someone points to their inner feelings (their convictions), this is not the language-game of epistemology, although some argue otherwise. I think they're mistaken.

(Sometimes we forget that we often use the concept know as an expression of a conviction. It's not an epistemological use of the word know as JTB, it's just an expression of how strong our conviction is about the belief. These convictions are often expressed with great emphasis but have very little or no justification. They're mere beliefs or opinions.)

Wittgenstein sees statements like "I know I have hands." more akin to an expression of a conviction because he views these kinds of propositions as bedrock, i.e., they form the backdrop of reality that allows us to create epistemological language-games. One of the ways to identify these kinds of bedrock propositions is to ask if it makes sense to doubt them (in a particular context), which is an identifying mark of being bedrock or hinge. A difficulty arises because there are instances where these propositions can and are justified within a particular context and Wittgenstein points this out, but he believes that in Moore's context they are hinge propositions, not generally susceptible to doubt. They give life to our language-games of knowledge and doubt, just as the pieces, board, and rules of chess give life to the game of chess. Doubting hinges would be akin to doubting that a bishop moves diagonally.

You missed my acknowledgment of that mistake, you are correct about the things in 1.1 being objects, which he points out in 2.01.

Continuing with the summary...

Post 3

"A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things)." The things/objects are possible constituents of states of affairs (2.011). It's not a perfect example, but think of the points on a line, the points aren't much of anything by themselves, i.e., until they're combined to form a line or a circle. It's somewhat similar to Wittgenstein's objects (although we have no examples of objects), i.e., objects by themselves don't do much of anything, other than to provide the substance that makes up the possible world of facts. It's a kind of metaphysical reality that Wittgenstein believes is dictated by logic.

From what I've read and heard things in this statement are not objects. We're not at the object stage yet. However, that is a possible interpretation of this passage. And I know what objects are, namely that they're simples. I'll talk more about objects later.

Facts themselves are made up of things like tables and chairs. However, facts are then broken down into atomic facts, which are broken into objects. Objects being the smallest component part of an atomic fact. The atomic fact is what's broken into objects. He hasn't started down this line of thought yet.

He does explicitly state that things are objects in 2.01, so I stand corrected.

Post 2

The Tractatus is divided into seven major propositions, and these propositions are divided and further subdivided. The seven propositions are the following:

1. “The world is all that is the case (T. 1).”
2. “What is the case-a fact-is the existence of states of affairs (T. 2).”
3. “A logical picture of facts is a thought (T. 3).”
4. “A thought is a proposition with a sense (T. 4).”
5. “A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions (T. 5).”
6. “The general form of a truth-function is [p, ξ, N(ξ)]. This is the general form of a proposition (T. 6).”
7. “What cannot speak about we must pass over in silence (T. 7).”

I’m not going to give a detailed account of all of these propositions. I’m only going to give some of the highlights of the book. You don’t need to understand all of the details, nor do you need to understand the logic to understand the main ideas of the Tractatus.

The Tractatus begins with “The world is all that is the case.” For Wittgenstein, this is all reality or all that exists. “The world is the totality of facts, not of things (T. 1.1).” Facts for Wittgenstein are states of affairs which are not things (not a list of things like table, chairs, mountains, etc), but the arrangement of things (things are Wittgensteinian objects) and their relationship to each other.

“The world is determined by the facts, and their being all the facts (T. 1.11).” It’s all the facts in combination that make up the world, and thus define the world as Wittgenstein envisions it. Moreover, it’s “…the totality of facts [that] determines what is the case, and also whatever is not the case (T. 1.12).”

“The facts in logical space are the world (T. 1.13).” I’ll say more about this later.

“The world divides into facts (T. 1.2).” My interpretation of this is that when talking about what’s factual we are talking about a small part of the totality of facts. For example, the Earth has one moon is a fact, but it’s only one part of the larger whole. The larger whole being the totality of facts that make up the world.

Facts are separate from propositions, that is, a true proposition is a picture of a particular state of affairs. We'll talk more about this when we get to proposition 2 and 3.

edit: 3/11/24

I agree.

2/29/24
The Tractatus:

In light of some of the remarks made in the thread “Wittgenstein’s creative sublimation of Kant,” I will explain some parts of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus again. This will be done without regard to what has been said in the earlier parts of this current thread. In other words, I will be starting over from this point forward.

Wittgenstein covers a wide range of topics in the Tractatus, including, but certainly not limited to the nature of the world, the nature of language, logic, mathematics, and even mysticism. Wittgenstein did not think that many philosophers would understand his thinking in the Tractatus. However, today it is not as daunting as it was when it was first written because we have access to much more information about Wittgenstein and the backdrop of the times. The Tractatus is a difficult work to master, and there are many disagreements about what Wittgenstein meant by this or that remark.

We know what the Tractatus is about, namely, that many of the problems of philosophy are related to a misunderstanding of the logic of language. He states this in the preface. What Wittgenstein means by the logic of language is spelled out in his account of the nature of language and how language connects with the world. He believed that logic was key to this understanding. So, the three major subjects of the Tractatus are logic, language, and the world. For Wittgenstein philosophy was about logic and metaphysics (Nb. p. 93). Wittgenstein never changed his mind, even in his later philosophy, that logic revealed something important about language. Although in his later philosophy vis-à-vis the Philosophical Investigations logic is more expansive, that is, it is not restricted to an a priori investigation. His later philosophy gives logic a much wider role, which is revealed in the cultural uses of language.

There seems to be no doubt that Wittgenstein believed the world had an a priori structure, and it is logic that would reveal this structure. Specifically, logic would reveal how language connects to the world. “My work has extended from the foundations of logic to the nature of the world (Nb. p. 79).”

Right, but you never will have all true propositions. All that we say does not limit what there is. — Fooloso4

That's not the point. The point is that all true propositions according to W. would completely describe reality or the world, and that's all I was saying. Quit trying to put words in my mouth.

The picture does not depict a particular form. — Fooloso4

I'm using depict in reference to what the picture displays, i.e., the content of the picture. Wittgenstein is saying that a picture doesn't represent its form, it shows or displays it. I'm not disagreeing here.

So far nothing you've added does anything to falsify what I've said. If you want to say that I'm not using depict as W. did, fine, I agree.

When I say, “…there is a one-to-one correspondence between what can be said about the world, and the facts of the world…” I’m referring to true propositions. If you have all the true propositions, then you have completely described the world.

To describe the world accurately, in terms of the Tractatus, a proposition, which is a picture, must have the correct form (T. 2.2). The picture, and thus its form must correspond with a fact (an actual state of affairs) as opposed to a possible fact or possible state of affairs. Think of the form of the picture as the arrangement of things in the picture. If a proposition is true, then the picture, which depicts a particular form, correctly matches reality. If the proposition is false, then the picture, and thus its form, incorrectly matches reality. All propositions represent possible states of affairs. I’m not talking about true and false propositions (all propositions).

My point, again, is that if you have all the true propositions, then you have completely described the world. I’m sure it could have been said more clearly.

I don't take the picture theory of the Tractatus seriously. However, I do think there is something to the idea that some true propositions picture, correspond to, mirror, or reflect reality. In other words, I think the correspondence theory is generally better than other theories of truth, at least the theories I'm familiar with.

As long as we avoid private language and rule following I'm okay. — Antony Nickles

This is like saying when studying mathematics, I'm okay with the subject as long as we avoid multiplication and division. You can't be serious.

For now I'm just going to work on the other thread.

There's so much disagreement it's difficult to make headway. I'm having a hard enough time keeping up with the thread on On Certainty. The problem is that I'm not going to sit at the computer all damn day answering rebuttals. I'll answer some, but I'm not going to sit around for hours typing.

I disagree, if I understand you, that facts are truths.
— Sam26
I don't know what to make fo that. Are you claiming there are untrue facts? Or truths that are not facts? — Banno

If we go by the definition of a proposition in logic, then propositions/statements (which are not exactly the same, but close enough for our purposes) are either assertions that something is or is not the case. My e.g., "The Earth has one moon," is an assertion that something is the case. The assertion is making a claim about reality, viz., that there is a state of affairs that corresponds with the assertion. It mirrors reality. If it does mirror reality, then it's true, if not then it's false.

Facts are neither true or false in themselves. It's assertions in the form of propositions/statements that are true or false. To say a fact is true or false is a misunderstanding of the concept. Facts are what make statements true or false. We check our statements against the facts, against the empirical observation that the Earth indeed has one moon. So, no, I'm not claiming there are "untrue facts." there are only untrue or false statements.

And no, I would not say that there are truths cannot be put into propositional form. When we speak of true and false we are necessarily speaking about our claims (propositions/statements).

I will be responding to @Fooloso4 and @Janus soon.

This is an odd and questionable use of the term 'inherit'. While it is true that we live in a world with mountains, lakes, and clouds, they are not ours to be transferred from person to person. — Fooloso4

Who in the world said this? Where did I even imply that the inherited background can be transferred from person to person? My point is exactly the same as how Wittgenstein uses it in OC 94. The inherited background is the world we find ourselves in, i.e., a world of mountains, trees, hands, etc. All of us inherit this background in virtue of the fact that we live in the same reality. Also, the inherited background is how we get our picture of the world.

There's a pinch of truth in saying language games do not reflect the facts, since the facts, being truths, are a part of the language games around truth. Better perhaps to say that the games are embedded in the world – so the builder's game inherently involves slabs and blocks and cannot be played without them. — Banno

I disagree, if I understand you, that facts are truths. They are two different things. Truths are about propositions, and what makes a proposition true is that it reflects or mirrors a fact or state of affairs. I see this as a common mistake, viz., mixing up these two concepts. One could say that the language-game of truth is about facts, and whether a proposition say, "The Earth has one moon," is reflecting a fact.

There's also the ill-informed supposition that language games only ever involve language, which even a cursory reading will evict. — Banno

I agree with this.

Did you give me the correct link? That abstract is more about intentionality than bedrock beliefs? Much of what I'm referring to is bedrock beliefs and their relationship to our inherited background.

I don't see how that has much to do with I'm saying.

What I'm saying is that our inherited background (that we live in a world with mountains, lakes, clouds, hands, feet, etc), which is not a system of beliefs, but informs what we believe, both linguistically and non-linguistically. So, there are, for example, prelinguistic beliefs (animal beliefs, bedrock beliefs, or basic beliefs), which are shown in our actions (OC 284, 285) alone, viz., digging a hole, using a hand, or even making a primitive tool. I'm not saying that the inherited background is a system of beliefs, but that the inherited background has a strong relation to what we believe, maybe it’s causal. So, if there were no hands, there would be no beliefs that correspond with the action of using our hands. The confusing part is parsing out the difference between the linguistic belief, “This is a hand,” as a statement, with an action alone that reflects a belief, they are quite different, and in many cases prior to language. This latter category of beliefs is foundational to language, which means bedrock (prelinguistic) beliefs are a prerequisite to language. Just as a chess board and pieces are a prerequisite to playing a game of chess.

The point of course is that the inherited background gives rise to bedrock beliefs, and also gives rise to language itself. This means that without the inherited background the language-games of epistemology (justification and truth) wouldn’t get off the ground. In other words, knowing and doubting are necessarily dependent on prelinguistic beliefs. This is why both Moore and the skeptics are wrong. I believe that Wittgenstein identified something that no other philosopher, that I’m aware of, has identified, viz., the foundation of epistemology. The place where justification ends. It’s something prior to any talk of epistemology, something primitive. It’s the limit of epistemology in many respects.

I want to say two final things. First, there are many kinds of bedrock beliefs, not just prelinguistic bedrock beliefs. There are bedrock beliefs that occur in language. For example, the rules of chess are bedrock beliefs, but they are linguistic.

Second, Wittgenstein never edited OC, so whatever one believes about this or that text is speculation (at least in many cases), because we have no idea what Wittgenstein would’ve removed or added to the text. Although I and other philosophers have arrived at very similar conclusions.

For me it seems misleading to refer to the background, consisting of those things which are necessarily involved in our everyday lives. like hands, feet, legs, arms, ears, eyes, mouths, hills, valleys, mountains, rivers, lakes, oceans, fish, clouds, sun, stars, moon, human technology in all its forms, architecture, music, painting, poetry, philosophy to name but a few in a list of countless numbers, as a system of beliefs. — Janus

You're completely misunderstanding what I'm saying. You're not even close.

These things are not beliefs but intimate and inevitable elements of human experience. — Janus

I'm not sure how you came to that conclusion. If you note the first sentence, it's beliefs about these things, hands, mountains, trees, etc. So we have primitive beliefs (animal beliefs) that are shown in our actions. I'm specifically referring to prelinguistic beliefs or nonlinguistic beliefs.

I think your critique of Moore is a bit over the top.

What are we to do with that proposition? What rests on it? — Fooloso4

(I want to be clear that there are other names associated with these beliefs. The obvious one is hinge-proposition (OC 341), but others come to mind, such as, foundational belief, basic belief, hinge certainties, and animal belief (OC 359).)

I going to answer your question @Fooloso4, but my explanation is also to others who are trying to understand these ideas, so if I say some obvious things keep that in mind.

It's not just the belief about hands, but a whole system of beliefs that falls into the same category. These beliefs make up our inherited background. Moreover, I'm concentrating on those bedrock beliefs that are prelinguistic or animal because of their importance to epistemology and to language itself. Think of these beliefs as ways of acting, i.e., the actions associated with my hands show my belief that I have hands. This is about as primitive or bedrock as you can get because some of our first actions are with our hands. These bedrock beliefs are the ungrounded underpinnings of all the language associated with epistemology. Furthermore, I don't believe they are propositions in the strict sense because they fall outside our language about true and false. This doesn't mean that they can't function as normal propositions in some contexts, it just means that from a bedrock or animal position they are not normal propositions. Loosely speaking, they are states of mind or beliefs reflected primarily in some action. For e.g., like a a dog jumping up and down as it sees its master walking toward the house. These are very primitive beliefs that are prelinguistic or nonlinguistic.

It seems to follow from this that our epistemological language, viz., justification and truth, ends, when butting up against these bedrock beliefs. Included in our epistemological language is the use of the concept doubt. For e.g., "I know X." "How do you know that?" "I don't believe you do know it." - etc. So doubt is closely associated (probably logically associated) with knowing in important ways

The one thing that makes bedrock beliefs stand out is that doubting them makes no sense or is senseless. Why? Because the framework for doubting and knowing is built upon the inherited background of our surroundings. The inherited background is prior to doubting and knowing, i.e., you wouldn't be able to doubt or know without this framework. These concepts grow out of the framework, just as the game of chess grows out of the board and pieces. It's senseless to doubt the very framework that gives rise to the concept doubt. This is why global skepticism is senseless. If you did doubt the framework you would have to doubt the very words you're using.

It seems clear to me that Moore's statement that he knows he has hands is a prime example of a bedrock belief. It's definitely prelinguistic, and it generally cannot be doubted, at least in most contexts without having to doubt the whole of our inherited background.

"What do we do with [these] propositions?" It's a matter of recognizing their special place within language. They are the precursor beliefs to language, and by extension all of the language-games associated with language. So, "What rests on it?" Language rests on it.

I'll stop here for now.

I consider the claim that there are mental states of knowing as a metaphysical claim. Do we have a particular mental state because we know or do we know because we have a particular mental state. Does knowing cause the mental state or does the mental state cause us to know? Is there a different mental state for knowing I have hands that differ from the mental state of knowing I have feet or fingers?

It is not clear to me whether you are accepting or rejecting an appeal to mental states. — Fooloso4

My point about mental states is that Witt believed that Moore's statement, "I know I have hands," is more about his mental conviction or belief than an expression of what he knows. I would reject, and I believe Witt rejects any epistemological view that appeals to some mental state as a way knowing. This seems clear. Using know in this way, as I pointed out, amounts to an expression of a belief without an objective justification. I thought I was clear on this point.

From it seeming to be that there is this queer and extremely important mental state it does not follow that it is so that there is this state. It arises from the misuse of the expression "I know". — Fooloso4

It's seems clear that there are mental states that are generated by beliefs, but there are not mental states that correspond with knowing as opposed to believing. I believe there is a state of belief and that these states come out in our actions (linguistic, tone of voice, the way we gesticulate, etc). The subject of mental states can take us far afield, so I'll leave it at that unless there's a need for clarity.

I don't think Moore's claims that he had hands is a bedrock proposition and do not see how it grounds or plays a role in epistemology. It may have its place in his attempt to refute skepticism but it most contexts it is odd and out of place. It is an example of philosophers being puzzled by the puzzles they create. — Fooloso4

This seems clearly incorrect, viz., that Moore's statement that he knows he has hands is not a bedrock proposition. In fact, probably all the Moorean propositions given in his two papers are paradigm cases of bedrock propositions (or hinge-propositions). I believe this is a fundamental point made by Witt and most philosophers who study OC.

I don't see how you cannot see that these beliefs form the backdrop that allows all epistemological language to take place. It's similar to saying I don't see how the board, pieces, and rules of chess play a role in the game of chess. There would be no language without our inherited background beliefs, animal beliefs. These bedrock beliefs are crucial to language, and especially to the language-games of epistemology. They solve the infinite regress problem and the problem of circularity. Moorean propositions (hinge-propositions) show just where justification ends, and where doubt falls apart or makes no sense.

"For "I know" seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression "I thought I knew (OC 12)."

We often use the phrase "I know" as an expression of our conviction that we know, but this is not an epistemological use of the phrase. This is where there is confusion. An epistemological use of know must have an objective justification, i.e., it must be demonstrated that you indeed do know. Whereas using the phrase "I know" as an expression of one's inner subjective state (feeling or intuition) is not epistemological. The use of "I know" as Moore is using it, is just an expression of a belief, it's not knowledge.

It's in the demonstration of one's knowledge that we often find that what we thought we knew (this is where many are confused about Gettiers e.g.s) is just false. What we believe we know doesn't guarantee anything. Much of what we claim to know is probabilistic, and it can turn out later that some new fact overturns what we believe we know. Hence, I thought I knew. The definition of knowledge as JTB is necessarily the case, but your expression of I know is not necessarily the case. So Wittgenstein's point about the expression "I thought I knew" is an important epistemological point that is also associated with the use of doubt in terms of your claims.

The use of "I know" and "I doubt" is parasitic on the reality in back of our language-games. This is why bedrock beliefs are foundational to knowing and doubting. And it's also why some bedrock beliefs are outside our epistemology. Bedrock beliefs are neither true nor justified, but they are beliefs of a certain kind. Moreover, what's bedrock can change from context to context. For e.g. "I know I have hands" in Moore's context is nonsense or senseless, but in another context it can make perfect sense. Where it does make sense is where it's appropriate to doubt.

"It's not a matter of Moore's knowing that there's a hand there, but rather that we should not understand him if he were to say 'Of course I may be wrong about this". We should ask "What is it like to make such a mistake as that?'--e.g. what's it like to discover that it was a mistake (OC 32)?"

The mistake and the phrase "I thought I knew" are intimately connected.

Moore must think sceptics are idiots. As if they;re going to read his argument and go 'Oh yes, I have hands, I hadn't notice that before'. — FrancisRay

Actually Moore is appealing to what seems to be obvious to all of us, viz, having knowledge of his hands. The skeptic makes the same mistake that Moore makes, viz., not only is there no knowing these Moorean propositions, but there is no doubting them either. The radical skeptic is even further out on the limb than Moore.

I interpret this differently. Wittgenstein is drawing our attention to the fact that philosophers treat claims of knowledge and certainty as if they are metaphysical claims, and this leads them to confusion. Both the skeptic and those like Moore who argue against skepticism suffer from this. They put demands and requirements on these terms that do not exist outside the puzzles they create. — Fooloso4

I would agree that many philosophers do treat knowing as if it's a metaphysical claim (many people do this, not just professional philosophers), at least that's what their use of know amounts to. However, what Moore is appealing to, is a mental state of knowing (he does this without realizing it, or if he does realize it, it's an appeal to what we all take to be a self-evident truth or common sense), which is why Wittgenstein talks about Moore's propositions as an expression of a conviction. We see this from the beginning of OC; "[f]rom it seeming to me-or to everyone-to be so, it doesn't follow that it is so. Moore is appealing to our common sense, i.e., if we don't know this (Here is a hand.), then what do we know? This is why Moore's argument is so appealing. How can anyone doubt that this is a hand, and that we know it's a hand? Moore's proof would be something like the following:

1) Moore knows that he has two hands.
2) Moore makes the inference from the fact that he has two hands, to the conclusion that there exists an external world.
3) Hence, Moore knows that an external world exists.

It follows necessarily. Especially if we do know these Moorean propositions, which is why Wittgenstein says at the very beginning of OC, "If you do know that here is one hand, we'll grant you all the rest (OC 1)." However, does Moore know, and can the skeptic doubt these Moorean propositions. Wittgenstein thought that Moore's papers were some of his best work, but what I think appealed to Wittgenstein was the nature of these Moorean propositions (so-called bedrock propositions) and there role in epistemology. They ground our epistemology in important ways, without them there would be no knowing and no doubting. The language-game of knowing and doubting is necessarily dependent on bedrock beliefs.

We often appeal to our convictions as if they are a form of knowing, especially if they tend to be the convictions of most people. This is one of the reasons why ideology and religious (or any group set of beliefs) beliefs have so much power. The whole group, to one degree or another, is under the spell of their subjective convictions.

[Wittgenstein refers to certainty in two important ways: First, our subjective certainty, which often refers to our convictions, and second, objective certainty, which is just a synonym for "I know."]

This isn't so much about metaphysical claims, unless you are referring to mental states, as it is about the mental state of knowing and the misuse of the concept know. Consider OC 6, "[n]ow, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not.--For otherwise the expression "I know" gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely important mental state seems to be revealed." Two things here are important to note, as already mentioned, misuse of the word know and one's mental state (consider OC 42).

Prior to language there have to be beliefs that ground us. Just as prior to playing a game of chess there are beliefs that are necessary to the game. Beliefs in the chess board, pieces, and the rules ground the game. There would be no chess game without this grounding. There would just be meaningless moves.

While he shows that Moore's use of "know" in "I know this is my hand" is problematic, I suspect Wittgenstein pretty much agreed with the argument Moore presents against idealism. "Here is a hand" shows that there is stuff around us to be dealt with, providing a foundation, a certainty. Again, there have to be slabs in order to engage in the builder's game — Banno

I would say it's more than problematic. One cannot doubt the very thing that gives rise to knowing and doubting. So, I would say in many cases (especially in Moore's case) that his use of know is senseless. Wittgenstein seems to say that Moore's use of "I know..." is more like a conviction (OC 86, 91, 103). Witt is sympathetic to Moore's argument, but he implies throughout OC that Moore's use of know is not epistemological. It's not epistemological because Moore's use goes beyond the language-game of knowing, Bedrock beliefs are what ground our epistemological language-games. Justification comes to an end with certain kinds of bedrock beliefs, i.e., animal beliefs or prelinguistic beliefs. Of course not all bedrock beliefs are prelinguistic, some are intrinsic to many of our language-games.

"The truths which Moore says he knows, are such as, roughly speaking, all of us know, if he knows them (OC 100 - my emphasis)," which he doesn't.