I agree Hanover, as I pointed out earlier, one can observe the objective nature of morality apart from any innate knowledge. Besides how does one separate innate knowledge from any other kind of knowledge? In other words, what is the criteria by which we understand that a piece of knowledge is innate?

So you object to the Golden Rule being the absolute criteria to determine morality, on the grounds that individuals may have different ways of how they want to be treated. I dispute the underlined point. It is inherent to human nature that all humans seek justice and avoid injustice, at least to themselves. I doubt that the victims of the sacrifices to the sun god ever did this willingly, or that the priests picking the victims ever picked themselves; because how can one willingly choose a condition for themselves if they think the condition is unjust? Same for suicidal people; they do not see suicide as a good thing in itself, but as a last resort to minimize the injustice that would otherwise happen to them if they kept on living.

Thus, if everyone inherently seeks justice and avoids injustice to them, then the golden rule is fitting because it results in seeking justice and avoiding injustice for all; and justice is another term for the moral good. — Samuel Lacrampe

"It's inherent to human nature that all humans seek justice and avoid injustice, at least to themselves." Excuse me, but have you been living on planet Earth? People believe all kinds of crazy things, even when it comes to how they treat themselves. Just look at those who believe that blowing themselves up will win them a place in heaven. As for the example I gave, why would you doubt that people would do this willingly, people do all kinds of things willingly in the name of religion. I agree that there were some, maybe even a majority who probably didn't sacrifice willingly, but even a cursory examination of how people have behaved in the past, toward themselves and towards others leads me to conclude you are as wrong about this as you can get. Besides you doubting that something is the case is not reason enough to believe it's true.

"The Golden Rule itself is dependent on a particular view of morality, so it can't be the test of what's moral or immoral."
— Sam26

This statement begs the question: If the Golden Rule is truly the test for what is moral, then it is not itself dependant on any moral views; and if it is dependant on a moral view, then it cannot be the test for what is moral. To escape the circle, you would need to back up the claim that the Golden Rule is dependant on a particular moral view. What view would that be? — Samuel Lacrampe

That's MY point, that's exactly what you're doing? Thus, it's your argument that's circular. You didn't read my point carefully enough.

So for the purposes of my suggested grammar, a fact is not a statement, and we ought reject the idea that a fact has a truth-value. — Banno

So are you saying that statements/propositions reflect facts, describe facts, mirror facts, etc? However, the statement itself is not "the fact?" "The fact" itself exists as a state-of-affairs represented by the arrangement of things in reality (at least generally). Moreover, when we say a statement is true, we are specifically referring to what the grammar itself reflects, that is, when we say a statement is true, we are talking about the statement itself.

It seems to me though that the way we use the word fact can be more expansive than you might suggest. Philosophers try to be more exact, and that might be part of the problem. For example, you might say to me, "Mary put the cat on the mat," and I might respond, "That's a fact," and in this case I'm simply responding to your statement, not the philosophers state-of-affairs definition. So what I'm saying is that there are times when we use the term fact, that it's simply a reflection of the statement itself. We see this in courts of law when we consider the statements people put forth as evidence or as statements of truth. So there are times when we use the word fact and the word true as synonyms. It's very difficult to pull oneself away from the philosophers idea of facts, which I believe, doesn't reflect the many uses of the term.

It's difficult to pull oneself away from the definition, as thought the definition is the be all and end all in terms of answering the question "What is a fact?" or "What is truth?" The tendency, for all of us, is to look for the thing, the object (definition or otherwise) that we can point too. I'm not necessarily disagreeing with you, but merely pointing out something important to add to this confusing topic.

Conventionally, the "Golden Rule: Will (or intend) unto others as you want them to will unto you" is the absolute criteria to determine if an act is moral or not (between humans). As you will try to defend that harm is an essential property of an immoral act, I will defend the test of the Golden Rule. — Samuel Lacrampe

I definitely wouldn't characterize the Golden Rule as an absolute. Some people really don't care what happens to themselves, for whatever reason or cause. This rule also depends on what someone's moral code is, it assumes that we all think alike in terms of what's moral or not. For example, what if I grew up in a culture that believed that one should sacrifice children to the Sun god? One could imagine someone thinking this is a good thing, thus, not only wishing it upon themselves as the ultimate sacrifice for the good of all, but also wishing it upon others. Appeasing the gods for whatever good one thinks might come of it.

The Golden Rule itself is dependent on a particular view of morality, so it can't be the test of what's moral or immoral. Therefore, I would suggest to you that it can be very subjective. I'm not saying that it has no value, because generally it's a good rule to apply, but it can be dependent on cultural or subjective beliefs, making it vulnerable to a kind of relativistic view of what's moral or not.

Given what I've just argued, the argument in favor of your position would seem to be circular. It's as if you're saying the Golden Rule is moral because it's moral. We want to know why it's moral, or what's makes something moral or not moral. What is the essential objective property (if there is one), objective being the operative word, that makes all immoral acts wrong, whatever your intention or motive. I'm making the claim that all immoral acts cause harm, even if we can't always see the harm, which is why it's not always easy to determine if a particular act is wrong or not. However, generally we are able to see the harm, as in my example above. Moreover, my example (cutting the arm off e.g.) shows that morality is objective in most cases, that is, in most cases we are able to ascertain the objective nature of the harm.

I didn't address everything, but I think this is a good place to start.

But you said in your previous post that the three factors you mentioned served to judge if an act was immoral. My point is that if these three factors are present in both cases when the act is moral and immoral, then they cannot serve to judge if the act is moral or not. — Samuel Lacrampe

Sorry I didn't get back to you sooner. The three factors I pointed out are what make an immoral act objective, and not subjective. There is probably no definition that will fit every single case of what constitutes an immoral act. However, one thing that seems to be a property of all immoral acts is the harm done, that is, harm without good reason. Of course here I'm talking about moral agents, as opposed to the harm of natural disasters, or accidental harm which also involves a moral agent.

It's true that the three objective factors are also present in cases of some moral actions. What distinguishes the two is having good reasons for one as opposed to not having good reasons for the other.

So what makes it immoral is the lack of justification, the harm done, and the objective nature of the act. And even in natural disasters or in the case of an accident there is also harm done. So the defining property of all immoral acts or evil (natural or otherwise) is harm. This is not to say that all harm is immoral, it's only to say that wherever you find immorality or an evil of a sort, you'll find harm.

You pointed out, and rightly so, that if a spouse cheats on you and you never find out, then where's the harm. Now as I pointed out, sometimes is very difficult to discover the harm, which is why in courts of law people bring forth evidence to show the harm done. So sometimes we will disagree about whether there was harm done; and if it can be demonstrated that there was no harm, then it would seem to follow that there was no immoral act on the part of the agent.

In your example I do believe that there is harm done to the relationship, even if the one spouse doesn't know about the harm. I also said that in any immoral act there is harm done either to the one committing the immoral act, or to the one on the receiving end, or to both (it's probably both in most if not all cases). It's my belief that anyone who commits an immoral act does harm to himself or herself. Sometimes the harm isn't clear as in the case you cited, but I believe there is psychological harm done to the person who committed the infidelity.

Yes, I know, but that's not the point. The point is that when we say that people arrived simultaneously, we generally are not saying that it's an exact measurement. Like when we say "Stand here," it's generally used in a rough sense. We don't take precise measurements.

There are at least two ways in which we use the word simultaneous. I'll see two events happen and say that it occurred simultaneously, however, we know it's not true given very precise measurements. So in terms of the language-game in which we use the word simultaneous, that is, in everyday usage, it's quite correct for us to say that some event occurred simultaneously. The precision of science is just not that important when saying "John and Mary arrived simultaneously." We have two different language-games, and we should point out that the use of the word has very different functions in each. If you were to argue with someone, and point out that John and Mary didn't arrive simultaneously, they would probably wonder what you were smoking - especially if they came in the door at the same time. And even if you were doing very precise measurements, an event X can seem to occur simultaneously from one point of view, and not from another.

I found an interesting video here http://highexistence.com/this-will-mindfuck-you-simultaneity-is-relative/

Sorry Harry, maybe I didn't make myself clear. My point would be that you can experience change without any kind of measurement of change. For example, I could be sitting on my back porch watching the sunset, completely unaware of how much time has passed (in terms of measurement), yet I do know that change has happened and that time has passed. There is no standard as to how much time has passed, it's completely arbitrary. It's true that you don't know exactly how much time has passed while sitting on the porch, but that's a moot point.

I think where I disagree is with your definition of time. Time can exist without any measurement, that is, we can imagine a universe in which there is no intelligent life; and as such, we know that there would be no measuring of time, and yet time would still exist, and as the primary property of time, change would also exist. Moreover, for us to be able to measure change, change would have to exist prior to the measuring. Change doesn't co-exist with the measurement, that is, you wouldn't say that you have no change until you measure it - of course not, we observe the change, and then we produce an arbitrary form of measurement to account for change within our everyday lives.

Ya, I can agree with you on that, it seems reasonable enough. I wonder though if simultaneity is a necessary feature of time? My guess is that it's not a logically necessary feature of time, as is change. However, I'm not sure.

As in change of thought, viz., moving from one thought to another.

Thanks, but can you have change apart from space?

Experiencing change is experiencing time - that's what it means to experience time. That's why I said earlier that change is analytic to time - you can't separate the two.

I didn't say, you said "...you can't experience change without measurement." I was simply adding to what you said.

There is no doubt that we do measure change, but there is also a sense where we don't measure anything, and yet we experience change. For example, I might say, "Time is moving slowly," that is, my experience of time is affected by my mental perception of it. The same with duration, it could be just an experience without any way to measure anything. I might be waiting for you to show up at a particular place, so I'm experiencing duration without any specific measurement. That's not to say that it couldn't be measured, but measurement is not necessary for the experience of change. I might also know that there are changes occurring without having a precise way of measuring those changes.

You said "...if we did not perceive change in the world then we wouldn't have come up with this notion of a flow of time." My only point would be that there would be no "perceiving" without change. Thus, even the concept of "perceive" is temporal. Not necessarily a disagreement, more of a point of interest.

What I'm saying is that the meaning of the concept of the predicate is included in the concept of the subject. For example, "All bachelors are unmarried," or "All bodies are extended in space," which are instances of the meaning of the predicate being a function of the meaning of the subject. You can't have one without the other.

Although the physics of time includes the idea of space, that is, time is a dimension of space, I don't think space is a necessary feature of time. For example, we experience time or change in dreams, but there is no spacial component. One could also imagine a mind or minds existing quite apart from space, and yet we could still experience a change in thoughts or experiences within the mind.

I said just the opposite, namely, that change isn't isolated from time. Change is analytic to time.

Even if we existed as pure minds without physicality there would have to be change in some sense. For example, moving from one thought to another (past thoughts, present thoughts, etc.).
Change can exist as purely mental events without space it seems to me, that is, it's certainly logically possible.

Yes, we do perceive it, but there would be no perceiving without it.

Ya, it seems that time, at least to me, is logically impossible without change. Even to say that a universe would be empty without change is meaningless, because a universe implies change by definition.

If you're new to philosophy you need to learn how to analyze arguments. If not, how will you know what arguments are any good? Also, you'll need to know some basic epistemology, that is, what it means to have knowledge. After all it's knowledge that we're after, not someone's opinion. Opinions are a dime a dozen, and you'll find lots of them on these forums. It's going to take a lot of work if you want to make any progress. Good Luck.

Well, I mean you can keep repeating yourself, but that doesn't mean you're correct.

I'm not talking about one mind. I'm talking about minds (plural) sharing a reality, as in the thought experiment above. By the way, thinking or thought does not require language. Are you saying that primitive man before the advent of language couldn't think, or didn't have thoughts? Wittgenstein also mentions this in On Certainty. Animals show their beliefs, by what they do, and so do we. You can observe someone's belief through the way they act, so beliefs aren't dependent on language.

The point is to show that your awareness can be completely internal. One could even imagine, without contradiction, everything completely generated by a mind or minds, without external stimulus at all. All reality could be generated by a mind.

There is no meaning without something external to thought. So, if consciousness consists of thought, then there is no consciousness without something external to it. — creativesoul

I'm not sure I agree with this. I guess it depends on what you mean by external to thought. Let's consider a thought experiment. Let's suppose that there are a group of us existing as brains in a vat, and let's further suppose that the reality we are experiencing is fed into us via electrodes. Thus, everything we experience is within the mind/brain, all of us could be linked into a reality that we perceive to be independent of us, but actually all of it is happening within our minds. All of us can communicate via language, thus the meaning we attach to the words would have the same impact as any language, but it would be all internal, even though we believe we are seeing real things, objective things, it wouldn't really be external to what we thought. It would appear to our senses to be external, it would feel like we could move from place to place, but it would be a kind of illusion based on what our brains were fed via the electrodes.

Thus according to this thought experiment meaning wouldn't be external to what we thought, that is, we would derive all meaning based on the illusion of reality, the illusion of an objective reality.

Since questions have become apparent in terms of how meaning emerges within language, I've decided to give a more in depth analysis of this idea in terms of how I believe Wittgenstein handles this question.

In Wittgenstein's Tractatus (his early philosophy) meaning is associated with an object, that is, the object for which the word stands is it's meaning. This was the traditional view of language since Augustine, and to be fair the ostensive definition model (associated with certain words) does account for a large class of words, but not all words. Thus, mastering the use of language consisted in learning the names of objects according to many traditionalists. Wittgenstein points out that one seems to be mainly thinking of specific words like chair, pencil, cup, etc, but not words like soon, five, that, this, time etc.

Wittgenstein uses the example of someone going to the store with a note that reads "five red apples." Now we can imagine the objects associated with apple and red (a color chart for e.g.), but no such object appears for the number five. The word five belongs to a different category of words, and although one can associate the objects in terms of apple and red, no such thing emerges in terms of the word five, only how the shopkeeper uses the word. So in terms of the ostensive definition model, what does the word five refer to? I suppose one could have an ontology of numbers that associates number words with abstract objects. Nevertheless, there is a distinction between objects associated with apple, that is, a thing with spatial extension, but nothing like this emerges with the word five, it has no spatial thing associated with it.

The problem of course is that certain words cause a kind of "mental cramp," we feel that there must be some thing directly associated with these words - something we can point to. For example, "what is truth," "what is beauty," and "what is time," and thus we come up against the source of philosophical bewilderment, as Wittgenstein pointed out.

The tendency is to want to lump all words into the same category, that is, something exterior to the word, as if all words get their life from something external. Of course it's not just that we want to associate words with some objective thing, sometimes we are tempted to associate words or propositions with internal mental events, which is just as incorrect.

Words have a variety of uses in a variety of contexts, thus we understand them by understanding this multiplicity. We should think of language as an activity of uses, like tools in a tool box which have a variety of uses.

It's not that use necessarily drives meaning, because one can always use a word incorrectly. It's use coupled with language-games within and amongst language-users, and the implicit and sometimes explicit use of rules associated with such use.

The other problem of course is our need for precision, which is why philosophers and others are always trying to find definitions that add precision to a word or theory. Again, it's true of some words that there are very precise definitions, triangle for example, but not true of words like perfect, exact, game, etc. There are so many philosophical problems that could be eliminated if one simply understood how language works. Most or many of the philosophical problems in these threads are related to misunderstandings of language.

How we use words tells us something about what we mean. My point is that it's not dependent on a dictionary or objects. It's dependent on the language-games associated with language users.

Consider the following Harry: When we teach a child the use of certain words we sometimes do it by using the ostensive definition model, that is, by pointing to an object and giving it a name. For example, I say cup, and I then point to the object associated with the the word cup. We may do this a number of times before the child starts to associate the word with the object. However, note that the way we are able to tell if the child has used the word correctly, is if they demonstrate the proper association - word/object. So do they use the word correctly in a particular context? For example, you tell them to get a cup, and they bring the cup. If they brought a pencil, then they would not have used the word correctly. One does not teach the meaning of the word cup first, one teaches the child how to use the word first, meaning comes later.

This would also be seen in primitive man, before the advent of writing. Primitive man may have a sound associated with a particular action, a grunt or some such noise. However, if you don't perform the correct action associated with the sound, then you don't understand how the word is used within a community of language users. It's the community who establishes the correct use of the words, that is, they have established implicit rules associated with the noises they make. Note that there are no dictionaries at this point, they don't come along until much later in history. Moreover, when someone decides to write down meanings, these meanings come from how words are used in a variety of ways and contexts.

Thanks Jupiter, I stopped posting in the Wittgenstein threads because I wasn't getting any responses, although that shouldn't really stop me, since most of this is already written.

Ya, the video does get into panpsychism, and I'm skeptical of trying to fit any view of consciousness into some existing view of reality, or some religious view. I think it's going to take thinking outside the box, but that takes courage.

What if your spouse cheats on you and you never know about it? As they say, "what you don't know cannot hurt you". But surely, cheating is immoral. — Samuel Lacrampe

I foresaw this in my argument look closer at the types of harm.

But these three reactions would still occur if you had good reasons to cut someone's arm, like out of self-self-defense. So if the same things are observed for both a moral and immoral case, then they cannot be the criteria to determine if the act is moral or not. — Samuel Lacrampe

If you have good reasons to cut the arm off, then obviously it's not immoral, which is why I differentiate between having good reasons for the harm as opposed to not having good reasons.

We need to differentiate between two types of evil. Moral and physical. You are correct that 'harm' is an essential property of evil, when it comes to physical evil. For moral evil, the essential property is intention; intention of not treat others like we want to be treated. So accidental harm and natural disasters are examples of physical evil. Attempted murder and looking down on others are examples of moral evil. And intentionally cutting someone's arm for not good reason is an example of both. — Samuel Lacrampe

I also covered this, I pointed out the difference between intentional moral evil, and evil that's not intentional, like natural disasters.

Like I said, we're far apart, even your ideas of what Wittgenstein is saying in On Certainty.

What counts as objective morality? — creativesoul

My own view is that there is an essential property to an immoral act, and that property is harm. All immoral acts cause harm to the one committing the act, or to the one who is the object of the act, or to both. If there is no harm, there is no immorality. When I say this I'm not saying that every harmful act is an evil, only that all evil or immoral acts cause harm.

The second component is that immorality is objective, that is, it's not subjective, or a matter of opinion, or a matter of consensus. For example, if I cut someone's arm off without good reason, there are several factors that make this an immoral act, and moreover, make it an objective immoral act. First, it's objectively true that the arm has been cut off, we can see it on the ground. Second, we can objectively observe the screams of the victim. Third, we can also witness the screams and tears of family and friends. These three reactions show the objective nature of the harm done. No opinion or consensus will or can change the objective nature of these observations.

This is not to say that we're always able to detect the harm, which is why in courts of law evidence is brought forward to show the harm done.

Intent can be tricky because while there are clearly immoral acts that involve intent, there are also acts that cause harm without intent, like accidental harm, which we can be held accountable for. Furthermore, there are evils caused by natural disasters that don't involve intent at all, yet they are often referred to as evils because of the great harm done. One might say then that while we can refer to all immoral acts as evil, not all evil involves immoral actions because they are not always the result of an agent.

The absence of god does not entail nihilism. — charleton

I definitely agree with this. Some religious people have bought into the idea that somehow right and wrong, moral and immoral cannot take root unless there is a lawgiver. Nothing could be further from the truth. You might despair at the thought of your life having an absolute end, but that doesn't mean we should retreat into nihilistic thinking.

I was just wondering because we're pretty far apart on some of this stuff, so I thought you may have been reading something other than what I was reading. I too have read most of those books, although I haven't read completely through Remarks on Color, and very little on Culture and Value. Two really good books that I recently read are Ludwig Wittgenstein by Monk, and Wittgenstein, by Schroeder. KT Fann's book is really good if you want to get a good overview. I spent a lot of time reading and re-reading On Certainty, I find it fascinating.

Lately though I've been caught up in the arguments about consciousness.

But your replies don't to seem to fit with my understanding of the later W., and much of the reading I've done on W. Who are you reading? I haven't seen anyone describe sign and symbol the way you do. Maybe you can refer me to someone.

The later Wittgenstein is not a logical atomist. I'll stick with his later philosophy when it comes to language, because, I believe, it clarifies linguistic problems, such as the ones we're talking about.

In the Tractatus what Wittgenstein means by sign are 'perceptible sounds or inscriptions,' and symbols, are signs that have been projected onto the world or reality. And propositions have a sign, because of their projective relation to the world, and a sense because it is associated with a situation. Moreover, a name is a sign that has been associated with an object. Of course Wittgenstein is using name and object as the smallest parts of propositions and facts respectively.

Symbols are signs that have a projection in the world, so, since I'm writing about Wittgenstein, I'm using these terms in the Wittgensteinian sense.

In Wittgenstein's later philosophy he continues to talk about signs, and what gives signs meaning, but what gives signs their life is not some thing associated with them, as he thought in the Tractatus, but their use.

You seem to be confusing signs and symbols, and in places are referring to symbols as signs. Thus the term tree is a sign, and the symbol is the tree. The sign points to the symbol (the thing) associated with the sign. When we type or write, we type or write the sign. Propositions are also signs that have a sense, and in the Tractatus, that sense is associated with some thing, but in the PI, it's use that gives the proposition its sense.

So when referring to reality, there is no thing to associate with the sign, the key is how we use the term in a variety of ways. Some philosophers want to give the word a definite sense, that is, a precise definition, however, that doesn't exist. There are just a multiplicity of uses that have a sense in a particular context.

And to get back to my point with Sime, definitions are just guides, they don't give us, nor could they cover all possible uses, there are just too many possible uses. This can be seen in trying to use dictionary definitions to cover each and every possible use of the term game. The term reality is just like the term game, probably more so.

There is a lot of philosophy written in the name of Wittgenstein that's not really representative of his thoughts on language. I've done a lot of study over the years on Wittgenstein and most of it is done using primary sources. Much of what some philosophers believe about Wittgenstein is based on what others have interpreted, some of it's good, some not. I have a good grasp of his philosophy, but I'm sure that my own interpretations have fallen short too. To neglect his philosophy, or to sell it short, is akin to neglecting Einstein if you're a physicist. He was probably one of the greatest philosophers in the past two to three hundred years. Moreover, to not understand what he said about meaning as use, and to think that a dictionary is something other than a guide, is doing a disservice to oneself and to those who read the posts. I'm mainly referring to what Harry posted above. It's fine to disagree with Wittgenstein, but to misunderstand this very important point is to remain in confusion as far as I'm concerned. I disagree with some of Wittgenstein's metaphysics, and also what he said about ethics, but not with the core of what he wrote in the PI. On Certainty is another important work that has important implications for what it means to have knowledge.

I posted hundreds of pages of Wittgenstein in another philosophy forum, and started to post it here, but most of the philosophers in here have already read most of my posts, so it didn't get much attention. It's mostly an exegesis of Wittgenstein.

I'm sorry but you're way off on this. Read some Wittgenstein.

A new way of thinking about consciousness...
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ApXndYEpQhs