You should start a separate thread on the subject.

How would you explain belief where there is no action? If I take a trek into the Amazon rain forest, where I perform no actions relating to cars (don't speak about cars, don't get into cars, don't see cars, etc) I do not stop believing in cars. — PhilosophyRunner

Where did your beliefs about cars come from? You didn't develop your beliefs in a vacuum. At some point you saw a car, or were told about cars, or interacted with cars.

I find some of this discussion odd for a philosophy forum. — FrancisRay

Why? I'm giving an argument based on inductive reasoning. It's part of the study of metaphysics. You may not agree with my conclusion, but it's still a philosophical inquiry.

Obviously there are questions that can't be answered about an afterlife
— Sam26
Why do you think that is the case? It seems to me that the only question about the afterlife, you are convinced by 'overwhelming evidence,' that you can answer, is that it exists.
99.9% of all species that have existed on Earth, are extinct, but do they all still exist in an afterlife? Or is it just humans that were born after ....... BCE? CE? — universeness

Why do I think that there are many questions that we can't answer? It seems that that is the case with many subjects. Our knowledge is just incomplete, which is why knowledge keeps evolving. For example. in the past people had little knowledge about plant life, but that didn't mean that the flower didn't exist. It just meant what little knowledge they had was incomplete.

If you read my thread, then you would know that the point of my argument was to give testimonial evidence that there is an afterlife. My inductive argument was not meant to go further than that. However, in parts of the thread I do point out that there are other conclusions that one can infer.

I don't know if all species go to an afterlife, probably not. It seems that certain animals do though. This question goes beyond the scope of my conclusion, not that the question isn't interesting. The answer to this question may have a lot to do with how you view this reality. It's my belief that much of this reality isn't real, i.e., it's part of a program, created for us to have human experiences. Of course to defend this would take some explaining, but the seeds of this are in parts of this thread.

Can you offer any conclusions from your musings regarding the nature and structure of the afterlife? It seems to me that becomes your burden, based on your claims. — universeness

Why would you think that there is some burden for me to explain the nature and structure of the afterlife? My argument isn't about the nature and structure of the universe, it's about the existence of an afterlife. That said, I can give some information about the afterlife, and I have done this in different parts of this thread. My belief is that consciousness is at the bottom of reality. It's a brute fact of reality. Also, I believe that time is part of the nature of consciousness. As far as I can determine it seems contradictory for there to be consciousness without time (without change). I think that space is, at least partly, an aspect of what we experience in an afterlife, i.e., as we move from place to place. Whatever consciousness is, in terms of structure, that will tell us much about the structure of the afterlife. However, we are far from understanding the nature and structure of consciousness. Again though, this does nothing to my argument. Saying something exists doesn't mean that we understand everything about that thing. It just means that we don't have access to all the facts. You see this in science all the time.

Well, I personally find E=MC2 very convincing, as it demonstrably works.
Do you think such as NDE's are as robust as E=MC2? — universeness

They're two different investigations. My investigation is a metaphysical one, not a physical investigation. What's considered robust in one context may not work in another context. However, I do think the logic of my argument is very strong. So, it's not about robustness, but about the strength of the argument.

Can you help me understand what I have not so far understood about the term 'cogency' in the context you employ it? Cogency: the quality of being clear, logical, and convincing; lucidity. — universeness

I guess I don't see how I haven't been clear on this point. Whether or not an argument is convincing (cogent) to another person is dependent on what that person knows. And since knowledge varies from person to person, being convinced is partly depended on what we know. So if someone isn't familiar with the concepts of mass and energy, they're not going to understand Einstein's conclusion. So it won't be cogent for them, i.e., it won't necessarily convince them of anything.

An inductive argument is not capable of delivering a binary, true-or-false conclusion. This is because such arguments are often based on circumstantial evidence and a limited number of samples. Because of this limitation, an inductive argument can be disproven by a single negative or weak sample. — universeness

That's right, inductive arguments are supposed to provide some evidence that supports the conclusion, which is why I've said many times in this thread that the argument is either strong or weak. It's suppose to give evidence that the conclusion is probably true, not necessarily true, as in a deductive argument.

So if I argue that unicorns and fairies exist because I communicated with both, during my own NDE then they must both exist as my argument speaks for itself (you know that is a logical fallacy, right?)
I think you are overburdening the law of identity: — universeness

Just because someone claims to see this or that, that doesn't mean the thing exists, obviously. There's much more to my argument than your simplification. Moreover, to reduce my argument to your version of the argument is a strawman.

I was tempted to not respond to your questions because many of the questions I've already answered several times in this thread. But I guess, one more time won't hurt.

Obviously there are questions that can't be answered about an afterlife, just as there are many questions about quantum mechanics or consciousness that can't be answered. However, this doesn't negate what we already know. And yes, I've mused over many of these questions, and will continue to muse over many other questions.

Just because the evidence is overwhelming doesn't mean you can convince anyone or everyone of the conclusions that logically follow. If you had understood what I said about cogency this question wouldn't arise. As for my demonstrations, as you say, I've given them in the inductive argument. I guess you don't understand inductive arguments or you would've asked me this question. You can disagree with the argument, but the argument speaks for itself. If the argument is weak, then the conclusion probably doesn't follow, if it is strong (as I suppose it is), then the conclusion does follow.

There's ill will in some circles towards this sort of analysis. Think of this as setting up a basic structure or grammar for belief. A belief is a relation between an individual and a proposition. — Banno

There's definitely a relation between individuals and beliefs, this seems obvious. However, I would go further, viz., beliefs are relations between individuals and certain types of actions. Individuals show their beliefs by what they do (actions). So I can express that I believe that an object X is a car by using a proposition. I can also show my belief in cars without using language, by getting into the car, working on the car, changing a tire, etc. It's the conscious individual that gives life to a belief in relation to the world.

Many intentional states come in whole propositions, and for that reason those that do are often described by philosophers as "propositional attitudes." This is a bad terminology because it suggests that my intentional state is an attitude to a proposition. In general, beliefs, desires, and so on are not attitudes to propositions. If I believe that Washington was the first president, my attitude is to Washington and not to the proposition. Very few of our intentional states are directed at propositions. Most are directed at objects and states of affairs in the world independent of any proposition. Sometimes an intentional state might be directed at a proposition. If, for example, I believe that Bernoulli's principle is trivial, then the object of my belief is a proposition, namely, Bernoulli's principle. In the sentence "John believes that Washington was the first president," it looks like the proposition that Washington was the first president is the object of the belief. But that is a grammatical illusion. The proposition is the content of the belief, not the object of the belief. In this case, the object of the belief is Washington. It is impossible to exaggerate the damage done to philosophy and cognitive science by the mistaken view that "believe" and other intentional verbs name relations between believers and propositions. — Searle, my bolding

I agree with much of this. I never liked the phrase "propositional attitudes," it never struck me as correct. I also agree with - "Very few of our intentional states are directed at propositions. Most are directed at objects and states of affairs in the world independent of any proposition...The proposition is the content of the belief, not the object of the belief.(Searle)." So the proposition expresses the content of what I believe, but it's definitely not the object of my belief. The object is the world of facts.

It's really about learning, about accumulating knowledge, and not being afraid to think outside the box. If you think this reality is all there is, fine, I'm surely not begrudging you that belief. A lot of brilliant people, smarter than either of us, have concluded that consciousness survives death.

I think the evidence is overwhelming, so for me I know there is an afterlife. It's an epistemological answer. I'm not guessing, surmising, giving an opinion, speculating, or expressing an intuition. Moreover, if after looking at the evidence, you still can't draw the conclusion, then I think you're to wedded to a particular worldview, and not wedded to facts. You're giving to much weight to the materialist view. The materialist view fails on so many fronts it's difficult for me to understand how anyone with an ounce of intellect can seriously believe that what we are observing is the end of the story. We're constantly discovering new things about the universe, so in my mind it doesn't pay to be as dogmatic as you are. What you're espousing sounds more like religious dogma. Could I be wrong in my conclusion, sure, but it's quite unlikely.

You're welcome.

Thanks for the response.

I'm going to make some final comments about the argument presented in this thread. Those of you who have studied propositional logic are familiar with the criteria of a good deductive argument and the criteria of a good inductive argument. The criteria of a good deductive argument are the following:

1) validity
2) soundness
3) cogency

The criteria of a good inductive argument are the following:

1) number
2) variety
3) scope of the conclusion
4) truth of the premises
5) cogency

The argument in this thread was inductive and followed the criteria of a good inductive argument, i.e., except one. The argument isn't going to be cogent for everyone. Cogency simply means the argument is known to be true to the person or persons that hear the argument. In other words, just because an argument follows logically and you know the premises are true, it doesn't follow that everyone who hears the argument is going to know what you know. So, it won't be cogent for them.

A friend of mine gives the following example (Dr. Byron I. Bitar):

Premise 1: The base of a souffle is a roux.
Premise 2: This salmon dish is a souffle.
Conclusion: Hence, the base of this salmon dish is a roux.

Here's the problem in a nutshell. Even though the deductive argument above is sound and the conclusion follows, that doesn't mean that everyone who hears the argument will understand that the conclusion follows. You have to know what a roux and a souffle is in order for the argument to be compelling for you. If you don't know the concepts (or enough about the concepts), then you won't know if the argument is a good argument. The person who hears the argument has to know the premises are true, but how can they know that if they don't understand the premises.

What each of us knows varies from person to person, which is why even arguments that are perfectly sound can fail to convince people. A good argument takes into account what people may or may not know. For e.g., a scientist may know X because they've done the appropriate experiments, but you aren't necessarily going to know what he knows because you haven't studied what he's studied. So even a good argument given by a scientist may not convince you. This happens all the time. Most of us when presenting an argument fail to understand the importance of cogency in the arguments we give. Thus the argument fails.

My point is that even though I know the conclusion of my argument follows from the evidence, others who have not studied the appropriate data aren't necessarily going to know that the conclusion follows or that the premises are true. So the argument won't be cogent for them. There will be people who do understand the premises, and still disagree, but that's a different problem. The point I'm making here is about cogency.

So if my argument is not good or is weak it's because it's not cogent for many people. For e.g., they may not understand that the argument is more than anecdotal evidence, or they may not understand enough about hallucinations to rule them out as a criticism. I've tried to make the argument cogent for everyone by giving as much information as I could, but often this is not enough.

See you in the afterlife. :grin:

I've been skeptical of these sightings for years until recently. The Navy has been tracking these off the east coast and also off the west coast, and Navy pilots have seen these UAPs up close (within 50'). They're definitely not anything we have. The technology is just to advanced. These things fly at enormous speeds and their maneuvering is beyond anything we can do, and they can fly equally well in water. If there is some other country that has these vehicles, then they are way ahead technologically. It's not even close. They could pretty much do what they want. These same vehicles were sighted decades ago, so the technology, if us, would have been around for over 50 years. It doesn't make sense.

There are only a few possible answers to what they could be. First, it's something that we've had for decades and it's remained hidden. Second, they are hallucinations, which doesn't make sense since many of them are tracked on multiple radar systems. Third, it's an intelligence that's been here on Earth but has remained hidden, which would be really weird. Fourth, their from some other place in our galaxy or some other place in another galaxy. This would mean that they've found some way to traverse space beyond anything we could imagine. Maybe they can bend space, but that would take enormous power. Fifth, they're from another dimension. Take your pick. No one really knows. All I know is that there has been some really weird shit happening, and it's not just in America, it's around the world. The Russians have been having many of the same sightings.

That’s all very nice. It’s not philosophy in the sense I mean. I don’t agree with your particular characterization. So my former point stands. — Mikie

What kind of argument is that? You're basically saying, "I don't agree with you so I'm right and you're wrong. That's not an argument, and it's not doing philosophy.

Then we define philosophy very differently. Anyone can argue in favor of their beliefs. That doesn’t mean it’s philosophy … or science. — Mikie

Part of what philosophy does is to examine various beliefs and belief systems in relation to reality (physical or metaphysical). Some of the philosophical tools used to examine these beliefs are logic (correct reasoning), epistemology, and linguistic analysis. To the extent that people use these three tools they are doing philosophy. They may not be trained in the use of these tools, but they're using these tools nonetheless. I think it's a mistake to think that the only people who can do philosophy are those trained in philosophy. If anyone has beliefs about ethics, metaphysics, religious arguments, political beliefs, even beliefs about certain games, they are doing philosophy. If you make an argument about your beliefs in defense of why you believe something is morally wrong, then you are doing moral philosophy, even if you haven't studied moral philosophy. In fact, if you're a thinking person then you do philosophy on some level.

There are other uses of the concept absolute, but it seems pretty clear to me what is meant by absolute certainty. We're referring to an epistemological concept, not some use apart from epistemology. Although, given the many theories of epistemology I'm sure that there are other uses. I'm defining absolute certainty as something that necessarily follows, i.e., we know with 100% certainty as opposed to some probability based piece of knowledge (inductive reasoning).

Who decides what the standard is? Language users decide what the meaning of our concepts are based on how we use the concept in a variety of contexts. There is no committee or person that decides unless there is a new discovery that requires a new concept. It's not just a matter of perspective, i.e., I can't just use words any way I want, although today people think they can.

In logic there are two kinds of arguments (inductive and deductive), an inductive argument means the argument is either strong or weak based on the strength of the evidence. So the conclusion of an inductive argument is more or less likely (probable) based on the strength of the evidence/reasons. The point being, is that the conclusion doesn't follow with absolute certainty. However, the conclusion may follow with a very high degree of certainty. So, again the conclusion isn't absolute but it's still considered knowledge if the evidence is strong enough. Most of what we know falls into this category, including science.

Deductive arguments, on the other hand, follow with absolute certainty if the argument is sound (i.e., it has true premises and it's valid). Deductive arguments are proofs in the strict sense, i.e., they follow with absolute necessity if they are sound. So yes we can know things with absolute certainty.

Finally, it's not a matter of knowing that we exist (Descartes cogito). It's a brute fact that's not in need of justification. What would it mean to even doubt one's existence? Explaining this would take us into Wittgenstein.

You were taught these stories as a child. Anyone who thinks them through, if they’re strong enough, will just let them go as cultural fairytales — on par with Santa Klaus and caring about the National Football League. Others don’t — and that’s fine, but that’s religion and theology, not philosophy. Just as creationism is religion, not science. — Mikie

Any system of beliefs, to the extent that they use reason (logic) or some other epistemological method of justification to support their ideas, is doing philosophy on some level. It overlaps with theology in many instances, but it doesn't have to. It's called philosophy of religion. You may disagree with that philosophy, but it's still philosophy.

Anytime someone gives an argument in support of their beliefs, even if it's in defense of the Earth being flat, their applying reason to defend their belief. The only questions should be, is their argument a good one, or are they doing good philosophy? Hell, many philosophical views are just as bad, and just as dogmatic as many religious beliefs.

It was quite interesting to me, probably as a direct result of my strong methodological naturalist bent! — creativesoul

Ya, and my disagreement is because of my strong metaphysical leanings. :grin:

Ya, I disagree with him. I'm not a fan of Dennett.

I'm doing fine Creative. How about yourself?

A very good question, one that overlaps a conversation I am having with Sam26 in PM. Beliefs are not discrete pieces of mental furniture, despite our tendency to treat them as such. — Banno

I've been referring to beliefs as states of mind reflected in our actions (linguistic and non-linguistic), but the one thing that I should also emphasize is the transient nature of these states. For example, when I open a door, that action is partly a reflection of my belief that a door is there, but it's fleeting.

This state of mind, reflected in our actions, is also a reflection of what it means to be conscious. However, the meaning of belief or the meaning of consciousness is not something contained in the mind, but something reflected in our actions (again linguistic and nonlinguistic actions). Hence, my agreement with you, that the meaning of a concept is not something we can point to in the mind, i.e., there is no mental thing that gives meaning to the concept.

I believe there is a confusion about mind/consciousness in relation to all of this. For e.g., the belief that some philosophers (and others) who deny consciousness or deny our subjective experiences as an illusion. I think this is a grave error.

Bedrock Beliefs and Their Epistemic Importance

(My Philosophic View of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty)

Post 3


Wittgenstein points out that Moorean propositions (hinge-propositions) do not have a clear sense when trying to fit them within an epistemological framework. Consider the following quote:

“’I know that I am a human being.’ In order to see how unclear the sense of this proposition is, consider its negation (OC 4).”

Why does Wittgenstein ask us in OC 4 to consider the negation of the knowledge claim? Because a knowledge claim always stands in contrast to a counterclaim. They are claims or beliefs that have the proper justification for their conclusion. However, if the sense of your claim (your justification) to know is not clear, then it would follow that the claim to not know would be equally unclear. For example, knowing how to play the game of chess is logically connected with what it means to not know how to play the game. Knowing and not knowing necessarily play off each other. This is why Moore’s propositions lack sense. He claims to know “This is a hand,” but exactly what would it mean in his context to not know? This seems to be Wittgenstein’s point in OC 4. If you want to know what a hinge-proposition is, one need only look at the relation between the claim to know and not know (questioning whether one knows brings in the doubt) and whether both lack sense in relation to the belief. This is exactly the problem with Moore’s propositions, which is why the use of these beliefs (hinge-propositions) is not generally epistemological. What makes it difficult to understand Wittgenstein’s point is that hinge-propositions often have a use within our epistemological language-games, which seems to be why he still refers to them as propositions. They have a special role in our language. They are not propositions in the normal sense. They have a dual role, functioning mostly as bedrock beliefs, but sometimes taking on the role of standard propositions.


The epistemological use of “I know…” presumes a justificatory foundation for one’s conclusion. The nature of giving a justification is supposed to nullify a counterclaim, alleviate or remove the skeptic’s doubt, or demonstrate the objective certainty of your claim. A knowledge claim stands in contrast to its negation, and if the negation is not clear, then neither is the justification. This fits Wittgenstein’s point that “I know…” is very specialized (OC 11).

What does it mean that a knowledge claim stands in contrast to its negation? It means that any epistemological claim to knowledge must be demonstrated, and if the claim does not stand up to one of the language-games of justification, then your claim to know is not valid. Hence, the response “You do not know,” or “I thought I knew,” or any other negation of the claim. Again, any claim to know stands in contrast to what it means to not know.

The tendency is to use the phrase “I know…” as a sort of guarantee that you indeed know (a kind of inner state), does not guarantee anything. The epistemological use of “I know…” is not a reflection of one’s inner certainty or conviction. It reflects objective certainty based on a proper justificatory foundation. The correct epistemological use of “I know…” is often met with the questions, “How do you know (the doubt)?” What is your justification?

Confusion often arises when using the phrase “I know…,” and Moore’s use of know reflects this confusion. It is a paradigm case. In Moore’s case, the confusion is more challenging because of our strong convictions about such beliefs. After all, Moore believes he is justified (at the very least, it is a sensory justification), and most would agree with Moore’s argument because it seems so evident that we know we have hands in Moore’s context.

Don't get me wrong, I'm not against prayer, I just don't know what to make of it.

There are all kinds of motives or reasons why people pray, some good, some not. I wonder about the efficacy of prayer. People pray, for e.g., for safety while traveling, and if they arrive safely, then they believe their prayer was answered. What's bizarre is that any answer can fit within their beliefs about prayer. Even if they don't get a desired outcome, it's still an answer. It's like the self-sealing argument, any outcome can fit within their belief. There is no counter-evidence. The truth is there is no way to know if a particular outcome is from God, it could simply be chance or even deterministic.

Wittgenstein does reject that language can reach into the world of metaphysics. It's part of his philosophy from beginning to end. What he doesn't reject is that we can show what's beyond this world, but that's different from saying.

English philosopher Hilary Lawson makes the point that:

... metaphysical frameworks, such as idealism and panpsychism, which were derided as baseless nonsense by the positivists of the past, are back in new forms. But such claims cannot be taken as a true description of an ultimate reality for there is no credible realist theory of language that would make sense of such claims.

I'm not looking for a defence of realism, I'm more interested in the implications of this matter - do we need a theory of language that explains how any realist claim is possible in order to accept those claims?

If we do not employ a realist account of language (as per postmodern thinkers), what is it we can meaningfully say about this notion of 'reality' we are so fond of describing and seems to be a substitute for god? — Tom Storm

There is no theory of language that will answer your question (this question: "...do we need a theory of language that explains how any realist claim is possible in order to accept those claims?") because the theory itself will fall victim to the same questions. Wittgenstein tried answering this question in the Tractatus through the use of names and objects, it's a kind of mapping of reality, viz., the correspondence of names to objects. We know of his rejection of this theory (much of it that is) and we know of what replaced it (language-games). What W. doesn't reject is the notion that language can reach beyond the world, into the world of metaphysics. He still held onto this notion, although it's a bit modified.

If it's true that the meanings of our words come down to how we use the words, then much of what we believe is a matter of what language-game you believe best describes reality. What do we mean by reality? There is no one answer to this question, there are just answers that fit within the context of a particular language-game. If you're an idealist or realist depends on what language-game you believe best describes reality, or best maps reality. If you're religious, then you accept those views of reality as interpreted by a certain view of metaphysics. If you're not religious you'll latch onto views that have another view of metaphysics. If you hold to a third view, as I do, then you'll hold to another view of metaphysics.

I believe there are answers, I'm not saying there aren't answers. However, you were looking for the implications, the implications are that we have a multitude of beliefs that are very difficult to sort through. As I've always said, language is a very confusing tool, but it's the only tool we have to describe reality. Apart from language, all we have is our subjective consciousness that reaches out to reality through sensory experience.

That's what's wrong with a lot of thinking today, everything is subjective. But if they truly believed that meaning is subjective, then your subjective meanings are just as valuable as theirs. The fact that their arguing that their point is correct, is a point against their argument. Again the argument is self-refuting.

Some people are so set in their beliefs there's almost no point to argue with them. You can spot them by how dogmatic they are.

The quote is self-refuting, i.e., it's expressing a particular philosophical point of view that basically says that philosophy is an exercise in futility. However, since the argument itself is philosophical, I guess we should conclude that it to is an exercise in futility. So, it refutes its own conclusion.

Post 2 continues...

OC begins with the following statement:

“If you do know that here is one hand, we’ll grant you all the rest (OC 1).”

Wittgenstein grants that if Moore knows what he claims to know, then Moore’s conclusion follows. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein argues throughout his notes that Moore does not know what he believes he knows. However, I think we are all inclined to agree with Moore. After all, if we do not know this is a hand, then what do we know? This inclination to use the word know as Moore uses it sets in motion Wittgenstein’s response. Is Moore justified in believing his claims are true? The answer to this question directly affects Moore’s proof because he assumes that the propositions he identifies are typical, which they are not.

Wittgenstein asks whether it generally makes sense to doubt that we have hands (OC 2). This question is crucial to Wittgenstein’s argument because it helps identify fundamental, bedrock, or primitive beliefs. Of course, there are situations where doubt about the existence of our hands would make sense, and Wittgenstein points this out (OC 23), but not in the context of Moore exclaiming, “Here is a hand, and here is another hand.” Nor would it make sense as given in a proof.

There are at least two kinds of bedrock beliefs. First, those we observe apart from the use of language. For example, the belief (seen especially in animals and young children) that we have hands and the belief that we are a body separate from other bodies. This is why some philosophers refer to these beliefs as animal beliefs, because of their fundamental or primitive nature. The act of using a hand or moving through space in relation to other objects shows these beliefs. This is not only observed in nonlinguistic children and animals but is apparent in all of us, irrespective of language.

The point of emphasizing the prelinguistic nature of these beliefs is to demonstrate their primitive nature. Bedrock beliefs prescind language. Thus, the ontology of bedrock beliefs gives them a unique standing in relation to our epistemic language. Wittgenstein points out the special status of bedrock beliefs in his opening remarks: does it make sense to doubt them (OC 2)? Again, their status (arational or non-epistemic status) is such that epistemic language would necessarily fail without them.

The second kind of bedrock belief is foundational but not bedrock. If we think of the foundation of a building, it is layered, starting with bedrock. On top of bedrock are other foundational components not as firmly in place as bedrock, but part of the foundation nonetheless. In other words, our prelinguistic beliefs are the bedrock of language. They are the precursor beliefs that allow language and life’s actions to take root. So, although one can refer to certain linguistic beliefs as bedrock (I prefer to separate them from other foundational beliefs), they stand out because they are less susceptible to change. For example, the bedrock belief that I have hands or am a body separate from other bodies will remain fixed for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, the rules of chess are foundational to the game, but they are a different kind of foundational belief; that is, they arise within language. The same is true of the rules of grammar, which are necessarily foundational to language use. However, although the rules in these two examples are foundational, they are not bedrock; that is, they are not as primitive or as fixed as there are objects (other people, trees, mountains, etc.) Many foundational beliefs can more easily change over time. For example, the rules of chess have changed over the years, and grammar rules have also changed.

If we return to the example of a building’s foundation, nothing is more fixed than bedrock; it is the foundation’s most fixed point. And if we look at the construction of a building’s foundation above bedrock, some foundational elements are more fixed than others and less susceptible to change. Wittgenstein’s riverbank analogy suggests much the same thing in the following:

“And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away or deposited (OC 99).”
_____________________

This ends what will be in the first video.

I'm moving the revision of the paper on Bedrock Beliefs and Their Epistemic Importance back to this thread, where it belongs.
Post 1

3rd Revision
06/06/2023 by Samuel Naccarato

Bedrock Beliefs and Their Epistemic Importance

(My Philosophic View of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty)


Biographical Sketch:

Ludwig Wittgenstein was born in Vienna, Austria in 1889. He was the youngest of eight children, five boys and three girls. His father, Karl Wittgenstein, was a remarkable man who became a leading industrialist in the iron and steel industry; consequently, the Wittgensteins were very wealthy. In addition, Ludwig’s mother, Leopoldine, had exceptional musical talents and passed her love of music to the children. As a result, all the Wittgenstein children were exceptionally gifted with artistic talent and superior intelligence.

At a young age, Ludwig demonstrated an interest in machinery, which led to his interest in engineering. He was educated at home until the age of 14, then was sent to Linz in northern Austria to further his studies. After his education in Linz, Wittgenstein went to Berlin to study engineering (1906-1908). In 1908 Ludwig enrolled at the University of Manchester in England to study aeronautics. His research eventually led to the design of a jet reaction propeller, which was a mathematical endeavor. The mathematics of his research eventually led him to the philosophy of mathematics. Specifically to the Principles of Mathematics, published in 1903 and written by Bertrand Russell (not to be confused with the Principia Mathematica, published in 1910 and written by Russell and Whitehead). The main goal of thePrinciples of Mathematics was to establish that the propositions of mathematics rest on a few logical principles. Another mathematician from Germany named Gottlob Frege was also working on the same idea. Wittgenstein eventually meets with Frege to discuss some of his thoughts, and consequently, Frege recommends that he go to Cambridge to meet Russell. Russell sees talent in Wittgenstein, which encourages Wittgenstein to pursue philosophy.

If you want a more in-depth biography of Wittgenstein, there are plenty of books to read (e.g., Ludwig Wittgenstein by Ray Monk and Ludwig Wittgenstein by Norman Malcolm).

I will set out an epistemological theory that enunciates a particular set of propositions derived from Wittgenstein’s final notes called On Certainty, published in 1969. These bedrock beliefs (often called hinge propositions) were identified mainly by Wittgenstein in the final years of his life (1949-1951). I am not claiming anything original in my thesis except to point out that bedrock beliefs have an essential epistemological role that advances the subject of epistemology in ways that few philosophers, if any, before the writing of On Certainty, have considered. I am also not claiming that my thoughts necessarily agree with Wittgenstein’s, nor am I claiming that they disagree. Nevertheless, my thinking on this subject would not have gone in the direction it did without Wittgenstein’s keen intellect expressed in the Philosophical Investigations and in his final notes called On Certainty (hereafter referred to as OC).

Wittgenstein begins OC as a response to G.E. Moore’s papers, A Defense of Common Sense (1925) and Proof of an External World (1939), in which Moore lists several propositions that he claims to know with certainty, such as, “Here is one hand” and “There exists at present a living human body, which is my body.” These propositions supposedly provide Moore with proof of the external world, and as such, they seem to form a buttress against the arguments of the radical skeptic, which is why Moore is making the argument.

Moore says, “I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, ‘Here is one hand’, and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, ‘and here is another’. And if, by doing this, I have proved ipso facto the existence of external things, you will all see that I can also do it now in numbers of other ways: there is no need to multiply examples. But did I prove just now that two human hands were then in existence? I do want to insist that I did; that the proof which I gave was a perfectly rigorous one; and that it is perhaps impossible to give a better or more rigorous proof of anything whatever. …(G.E. Moore, Proof of an External World, 1939).”

It is undoubtedly the case that OC goes beyond Moore’s propositions, so it is not just about Moore; it is about knowing, doubting, making mistakes, reality, empirical statements, certainty, acting out beliefs, rule-following, etc., so it covers a range of topics about what we know, and how it fits into our language. It is important to note that not everything in OC should be seen as a response to Moore. However, Moore provides the impetus for Wittgenstein’s final notes and is mentioned throughout OC.

Wittgenstein criticizes Moore’s use of the word know and the skeptic’s use of the word doubt, and he emphasizes the relationship between the use of these words as an essential part of the language-games of everyday epistemology.

Bedrock beliefs provide the grounding for our language-games, which is analogous to how the rules, the board, and the pieces in chess function as the grounding (reality background) for the game of chess. In fact, without these beliefs it is hard to imagine how language would get off the ground. It would be like trying to imagine a game of chess without the rules, the board, and the pieces. For example, there would be no such thing as a bishop move without the rules, the board, and the pieces. Such a move would be nonsense. The same is true of our concepts, namely, knowing, doubting, making mistakes, rule-following, etc.; these would all be nonsense without the grounding of certain primitive or bedrock beliefs. Such beliefs are at the heart of a correct understanding of knowledge, directly affecting phrases like “I know that such and such is the case” and “I doubt that such and such is the case.”

Although Wittgenstein criticizes Moore’s propositions, he is not entirely unsympathetic to Moore’s argument, which would look something like the following:

1) Moore knows that he has two hands.
2) Moore makes the inference from the fact that he has two hands to conclude that an external world exists.
3) Hence, Moore knows that an external world exists.

The following is what Googles AI chat service, called Bard, said about Wittgenstein's On Certainty. I thought is was pretty good.


"Ludwig Wittgenstein's final notes, On Certainty, are a series of reflections on the nature of knowledge and certainty. In these notes, Wittgenstein argues that there are certain propositions that we cannot doubt, even in the face of skeptical challenges. These propositions, which Wittgenstein calls "hinge propositions," are the foundation of our knowledge and understanding of the world.

"Wittgenstein argues that hinge propositions are not justified by evidence or argument. Rather, they are simply taken for granted as a precondition for any meaningful discourse or action. For example, we cannot doubt that we have bodies, that the world is external to our minds, or that the past is real. These propositions are so basic to our understanding of the world that they cannot be doubted without undermining the very possibility of knowledge itself.

"Wittgenstein's view of certainty has been influential in a number of different fields, including philosophy, psychology, and the philosophy of language. His work has been praised for its insights into the nature of knowledge and the limits of skepticism. However, it has also been criticized for being too vague and unconvincing. Nevertheless, On Certainty remains an important work of philosophy that continues to be studied and debated today.

"Here are some of the key points of Wittgenstein's argument in On Certainty:

"There are certain propositions that we cannot doubt, even in the face of skeptical challenges. These propositions are called "hinge propositions."

"Hinge propositions are not justified by evidence or argument. Rather, they are simply taken for granted as a precondition for any meaningful discourse or action.

"Hinge propositions are the foundation of our knowledge and understanding of the world. Without them, we would be unable to make sense of anything.

"Wittgenstein's view of certainty has been influential in a number of different fields, including philosophy, psychology, and the philosophy of language."

I find it strange to say a basic belief is “I have two hands”. Not only is absurd to say “I doubt I have two hands”, but also “I believe I have two hands” or “I am convince I have two hands”, when, in fact, I have two hands. — Richard B

Of course, but I'm not saying that the statement, "I believe I have hands," is any better. The beliefs Wittgenstein is referring to in many cases, are the beliefs that are shown in our actions. When I sit in a chair, open a door, pick up a pencil, etc., all of these actions reflect beliefs. This is why some philosophers refer to them as animal beliefs, and why I sometimes refer to these bedrock beliefs as pre-linguistic. Not all bedrock beliefs are pre-linguistic, but many are.

I think I will make OC my first video. Making videos going from the Tractatus to OC is something I'd like to do, and I will continue to work on it, but I'm going to concentrate on OC. Besides there are many videos that cover the T. and the PI, but not as many on OC.

But we justify orange juice is sweet by our taste? You seem to be inconsistent here. — Richard B

Yes, it does seem that way, but here it's important to note the relationship between knowing and doubting (very important), which Wittgenstein points out. So, when trying to separate those beliefs (they are arational beliefs) which are bedrock, and not part of any epistemological justification, it's crucial to ask oneself, "Does it make sense to generally doubt this belief?

In the case of Moore's propositions there are very few contexts that we doubt, for e.g., that we have hands. It's something we have, it's part of the inherited background of being human (at least for most), and we sure don't doubt that we are human, unless you're a skeptical idealist. Again, similar to the inherited background of chess, viz., the rules, pieces, and the board. How can we doubt the inherited background our lives?

If we take my e.g., "The orange juice is sweet," we do come to know this in various ways, by tasting it is the most common (sensory experience), but asking someone is another way of knowing (justification through testimony). Does it make sense to doubt that the orange juice is sweet? Yes, we may be asking ourselves or others if it's ripe, or if it's sweet enough and not sour. So, this proposition is not the same as Moore's propositions, viz. called variously, hinge, bedrock, foundational, or basic propositions (I don't believe they are propositions in the normal sense, which is why they have a special name attached to them. It has to do with how they function in our epistemological language-games, viz, as the very building blocks of our epistemological language.).

Moore is demonstrating his knowledge of his hands, and it's this knowledge, demonstrated by proof, that is supposed to rebut the skeptic. Wittgenstein, of course, argues against this. Wittgenstein points out that much of our certainty (I call this certainty subjective certainty, as opposed to objective certainty, the latter is knowledge) is arrived at in the course of our lives, as we act within this reality. I don't in many cases arrive at some of these beliefs through some logical process, which is the point. It's through our interaction with the world that this subjective certainty comes out. Wittgenstein doesn't make this distinction, at least not clearly, but I do. We act in the world with a certain conviction that things are the way they are, and it's not a matter of justification as W. points out in PI 325. And, it's through these actions that these very basic beliefs (other philosophers refer to them animalistic beliefs) are seen.

By the way I added more to my previous response.

No, we don't justify that we have hands through sensory experience. Is that how you came to believe you have hands. Again, it's just part of the inherited background. The statement that "I know I have hands" is just epistemologically wrong, since when do we need to justify that we have hands, unless it's in a very special context, like waking up from an operation. What would it mean to doubt that you have hands in Moore's context?

So what is a “statement of knowledge”? Can you provide an example? — Richard B

A statement of knowledge is a statement that's justified in some way, and there are various kinds of knowledge statement based on different language-games. We justify our knowledge using logic (inductive and deductive arguments). I'm assuming you know many e.g.'s of these. We justify knowledge claims based on sensory experiences. For example, "How do you know the orange juice is sweet?" - because I tasted it. There is knowledge based on testimonial evidence, and this is wide spread, given in books by experts, lectures, testimony in courts of law, etc. So, there are many e.g.s.

The Earth has one moon is a statement of knowledge. The Earth is the third planet from the Sun, on and on. I'm not going to list them, but they're all over the place. Why would you ask this?

A conviction on the other hand is just one's strong belief, which is expressed as a strong subjective feeling, that's not justified or it's based on very little evidence. You here this from many religious people. For e.g., "I know X is true." How do you know? - "I just know it," it's a matter of faith. It's just a expression of one's religious conviction. It's not an epistemological statement.

OK, a distinction is being made here, a “conviction” vs “a statement of knowledge”? — Richard B

Yes, Wittgenstein is pointing out that Moore's propositions seem to be more like statements of conviction, rather than epistemological assertions.

Declaring “I have two hands” falls under the category of “conviction” But Wittgenstein finds this odd to say this in front of a bunch of philosophers rather than saying it after, say, a car crash. — Richard B

Declaring "I have two hands," may or may not fall under the category of conviction, i.e., there are contexts where it might be appropriate. Yes, he does find it odd to say it in front of philosophers, especially as an epistemological statement as Moore does.

Should it even be called a “conviction” when our concepts have been removed from its common use? — Richard B

Well, there is a use of "I know..." that is not an epistemological use, and you hear it all the time. It's used to emphasize one's subjective certainty (their strong conviction) about their belief. It's often confused with objective certainty, which can often be used as a replacement for the epistemological use of "I know..."

Again, what circumstances would this become knowledge? — Richard B

One's conviction, viz., one's subjective certainty can become knowledge when one has the appropriate justification for one's belief or claim. Moore's use of "I know I have hands," would never become a piece of knowledge. It's not a matter of knowing, which means I have the proper grounds. Moore of course beliefs he has a proof, but Wittgenstein is challenging this use of know. Justifying these kinds of Moorean beliefs would be akin to justifying the rules of chess, the board, and the pieces. They are just there as part of the background allowing chess to be played. In the same way, our background, the reality we find ourselves in, is the background that allows for epistemological language-games, and other kinds of language-games. In fact, language arises out of this background, i.e., our conceptual framework is dependent, in many ways, on this background.

I have a job that requires someone to have two hands to operate a piece of machinery; so on the job application I declare “I have two hands.” Is this not providing my knowledge of my biological state to someone who can confirm my assertion? — Richard B

No, and this Wittgenstein's point, i.e., it's not a matter of epistemology, generally speaking.

Post 1 above of Bedrock Beliefs and Their Epistemic Importance has been edited and clarified. Hopefully this paper will clarify my position on OC. My position is not supposed to be some exegetical defense of Wittgenstein notes. It's supposed to be my thoughts on where some of Wittgenstein's thinking seemingly leads.

Any thoughts on where I might need clarification, whether you agree or not, are appreciated.

I recently bought a book called An Essay In Aid of a Grammar Assent by John Henry Newman. If you remember, Wittgenstein references Newman in OC 1. I was interested in finding out what influence this book had on W.'s thinking. I haven't read it yet, but it's calling to me.

I know this thread was mostly supposed to be about the Tractatus, but it seems I've shifted gears a bit.

Although I quote Wittgenstein quite a bit, I'm trying to give an account of where I believe his thoughts lead. There is no way to know where Wittgenstein would have gone with OC, and no way to know which passages would have been left in or out in some final version of OC. All we can do is work out where they might take us, and try to fit his mostly original thinking into our epistemology ideas.
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Bedrock Beliefs and Their Epistemic Importance
(Post 3)

One of the problems with Moore enumerating what he knows, is that it seems to amount to more of a conviction of what he believes, than a statement of what he knows. How does this happen? It happens because the beliefs Moore is claiming to know are not normally part of the language-game of knowing, that is, what he is retailing as part of what we know does not normally fit the role of what we justify. Moore’s use fits the role of someone expressing one’s conviction, and this seems to be the mental state that Wittgenstein is pointing out in OC 6. We often see the use of the word know as an expression of someone’s conviction, but this is not an epistemological use of the word. It expresses more of a subjective certainty, a feeling of being correct, an intuition, or a mere belief. Moore did not intend that his use of know be an expression of a conviction, but that is what his use amounts to. The evidence that this is so is seen in the relationship between the expression of what we claim to know, and the question, “How do you know?” - which is the expression of a doubt or a challenge to justify your claim.

“When Moore says he knows such and such, he is enumerating a lot of empirical propositions which we affirm without special testing; propositions, that is, which have a peculiar role in the system of our empirical propositions.

“Even if the most trustworthy of men assure me that he knows things are thus and so, this by itself cannot satisfy me that he does know. Only that he believes he knows. That is why Moore’s assurance that he knows…does not interest us. The propositions, however, which Moore retails as examples of such known truths are indeed interesting. Not because anyone knows their truth, or believes he knows them, but because they all have a similar role in the system of our empirical judgments.

“We don’t, for example, arrive at any of them as a result of investigation (OC 136-138).”

The main thrust of Wittgenstein's argument is that these Moorean propositions (my claim is that they are not propositions, but expressions of belief shown mostly in our actions) have a "peculiar role," as Wittgenstein says, in our language-games.

This peculiar standing that Moore's beliefs have, is that they function as foundational or bedrock supports (not all foundational supports are bedrock), which is similar to how the rules of chess, the board, and the pieces give life to the game of chess. Moore’s beliefs have a similar role in the language-games of epistemology (although their function is probably much broader). In Moore’s context such beliefs are in no need of justification, that is, there is no need to justify Moore’s claim that he has hands, no more than a rule of chess needs a justification that stipulates bishops move diagonally. It just is the case, as part of the contingent background of reality, that Moore has hands, or that bishops move diagonally. It is not a matter of knowing, namely, justifying a claim, but a matter of contingent bedrock beliefs that support many of our language-games of knowing, justifying, and making truth claims, which is the whole of epistemology. Hence, their peculiar role.

This is not the final edited form of this paper.

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Bedrock Beliefs and Their Epistemic Importance
(Post 2)

Moore’s proof is supposed to show that the conclusion follows necessarily, and if it does, then the skeptic’s doubts are rebutted. The proof would look something like the following:

1) Moore knows that he has two hands.
2) Moore makes the inference from the fact that he has two hands, to the conclusion that there exists an external world.
3) Hence, Moore knows that an external world exists.

Wittgenstein challenges the first premise, namely, that Moore knows that he has two hands. How does Moore know that he has two hands, that is, what is his justification? And do we justify these very basic beliefs? This is at the core of Wittgenstein’s criticism. Do I know that I have hands because I check to see if they are there every morning? Do I make a study of my hands, and thereby conclude that I do indeed have hands? I know chemistry, physics, history, epistemology, and other subjects, and there are ways to confirm my knowledge. However, in our everyday lives do we need to confirm that we have hands? Do we normally doubt these kinds of statements?

Consider the following:

“I know that I am a human being.” In order to see how unclear the sense of this proposition is, consider its negation. At most it might be taken to mean “I know I have the organs of a human”. (E.g. a brain which, after all, no one has ever yet seen.) But what about such a proposition as “I know I have a brain”? Can I doubt it? Grounds for doubt are lacking! Everything speaks in its favour, nothing against it. Nevertheless it is imaginable that my skull should turn out empty when it was operated on (OC 4).”

Even the sense of these kinds of propositions (I do not think they are propositions. I refer to them as very basic foundational beliefs.) is unclear according to Wittgenstein. This is not to say that we cannot imagine a situation in which they have a clear sense, or that there are contexts in which it is reasonable to doubt such statements. It just means that these statements have a unique place in our language of knowing and doubting. The uniqueness of Moorean statements seems to be what Wittgenstein is pointing at in the following quote.

“Now do I, in the course of my life, make sure I know that here is a hand—my own hand, that is (OC 9)?”

The idea here is clear, we do not as a matter of course, make “…sure [we] know that here is a hand—[our] hand…,” and this applies to many, if not all, of the Moorean statements; and although there are exceptions, which Wittgenstein concedes (OC 23), these exceptions are irrelevant in Moore’s context. The point is to answer the skeptic in relation to what can sensibly be doubted.

“Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not.—For otherwise the expression “I know” gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely important mental state seems to be revealed (OC 6).”

The disputes with Moore’s propositions are not only problematic, but they are also very subtle disputes, which means that they are difficult to flesh out. One of the problems is that we sometimes fail to see the connection between the use of the word know, and the use of the word doubt, and the logic behind that use. The connection between knowing and doubting, that is, the logical connection, is a crucial point. It is the kind of logical link that is also seen between rule-following and making a mistake - one is logically dependent on the other, that is, they are necessarily logically intertwined.