Hume's The Problem of Induction means that the so-called laws of nature aren't immutable. They could change at any moment as doing so doesn't entail a contradiction i.e. they're contingent truths, not necessary ones. — Agent Smith

I wouldn't disagree with that.

Inductive reasoning doesn't entail that X follows necessarily.

I was trying to do something that very few have done (if any), viz., bring the argument into the arena of what can be known (in an inductive sense).

I haven't been posting much, but I'm always lurking. :smile:

Probably! I remained unconvinced, but it took decent effort for me to feel like I'd unravelled things. Worth engaging with I feel regardless. At the very worst, you engage with a sophisticated reasoner (@Sam26) who's thought a lot about why what they're saying is good evidence. It would be nice if other supernatural claims were that well fleshed out. — fdrake

I also remain unconvinced. You gave it a good effort compared to the other responses, but the argument's conclusion follows with a high degree of objective certainty. It's probably one of the strongest inductive arguments you could construct based on testimonial evidence.

and concepts are so different, be able to acquire the ability to speak English. Personally, I don't believe a lion's thoughts would be so different to our own. I think human exceptionalism is way overblown. — Janus

I guess it depends how you define human exceptionalism. It seems to me that all you have to do is look at what we accomplish, in areas of science, or in other areas of study, as compared to what other animals accomplish. The way we interact with the world is generally far more complex. This isn't to say that animals aren't more advanced in some areas, but if you look at the overall picture, humans generally will outperform an animal in terms of what we can accomplish.

You sound more like a troll than someone who is interested in good arguments.

The lion is an eater of flesh as many of us are. The lion is active sometimes and rests at others. The lion sleeps and perhaps even dreams. The lion seems to enjoy playing sometimes and cares for the young. The lion copulates. In all its vital features of life the lion does not seem so different to us. — Janus

Ya, I could have worded that better. There are things that are incommensurate, but things that are also commensurate. So, both of these concepts apply.

I never understood that saying of Wittgenstein's, that we would not understand the lion if it could speak, to make any sense. If it did not speak English or a language we are familiar enough with, then of course we would not understand it, just as we don't understand anything spoken in an unfamiliar language. If the lion spoke in a familiar language, then why would we not understand it? — Janus

The assumption is that the world of a lion is different enough, i.e., it's ability to think and use concepts would be so different from our own, that understanding the lion would be a great challenge, if we could understand at all. That's my take.

:up:

I could same about you, but where does that get us? We have different ideas about what's reasonable. I'm not even sure what you believe. I've been analyzing these arguments for about 47 years, so I quite familiar with the arguments. Moreover, I've a good background in logic, so don't talk to me about reasonably backing up my arguments. I find that most Christians, if you are one, aren't good at defending their beliefs.

Can you give an example of a "truth being relative to you personally"? Do you have in mind a preference for vanilla? — Banno

Yes, my preference for vanilla is a truth relative to me.

I'm also bothered by "facts separate from our forms of life". I'm not sure wha they might be. — Banno

Well, the concept fact is relative to our forms of life, but what the facts sometimes refer to are things separate from our forms of life. For example, the Earth having one moon is not dependent on our forms of life.

And "Some forms of life (other than our own) exclude the use of concepts" - is this the observation that some forms of life exclude concepts found in others, or something else? — Banno

It includes the forms of life that exclude certain concepts, but it also includes forms of life that exclude language, at least language that is as complex as our own.

So do we agree that at least some truths are not relative to a from of life? — Banno

I think we agree, but I'm not entirely sure.

This of course raises the question of relativism in Wittgenstein. Some suppose that the truth of any proposition is dependent on the form of life against which the proposition is set. But if, as argued above, in order to recognise a form of life as such we mist recognise some aspects of that form of life, then it follows that there are propositions that are true for both forms of life. To say that forms of life are recognisable as such is to say that they are commensurable, that they share common truths.

Hence, truth cannot be entirely relative to form of life. — Banno

There is a difference between truth being relative to you personally, as opposed to truth being relative to a language. Truth can be relative to a form of life, for e.g. bishops move diagonally, but it can also be dependent on facts separate from our forms of life. Some forms of life (other than our own) exclude the use of concepts, so there would be no common truths, but probably common beliefs.

You seemed to be making it private, that's why I responded the way I did a couple of posts back. Okay, now I think I see what you're getting at.

If one supposes that there are various, discreet forms of life, then one might be tempted to suppose them to be incommensurate. Something like that seems to sit with the lion comment.

But if forms of life were incommensurate, would we recognise them to be forms of life? It seems that in order to recognise certain behaviours as a form of life, we have to recognise the parallels with our own form of life. The language, practices and values of a form of life must be recognised as such in order for us to recognise a form of life.

So it seems that forms of life cannot the totally incommensurate, one to the other.

The interesting question then arrises as to the extent to which forms of life might differ, yet remain recognisable as forms of life. — Banno

With the clarification, I believe I agree with this. It seems that we would recognize the forms of life of animals, right? There has to be something in common?

That's not quite the argument. Rather, one could only recognise another form of life from within ones own, and by seeing that some aspects of the other form of life matched one's own. — Banno

When you say, "...one could only recognize another form of life from within one's own," are you using the phrase "from within one's own," as a private matter, or something broader, to include our forms of life generally as persons?

If one supposes that there are various, discreet forms of life, then one might be tempted to suppose them to be incommensurate. Something like that seems to sit with the lion comment. — Banno

I don't see our "forms of life" as being incommensurate, but as having a family resemblance. Although, with the lion example, I do see it as being incommensurate. We don't share much in common with a lion's form of life, which is why we wouldn't understand a lion if it could talk.

But if forms of life were incommensurate, would we recognise them to be forms of life? It seems that in order to recognise certain behaviours as a form of life, we have to recognise the parallels with our own form of life. The language, practices and values of a form of life must be recognised as such in order for us to recognise a form of life. — Banno

I'm not sure if we would have to recognize our own form of life in order to understand an account of forms of life in general. Wouldn't that be the same as saying, in order to understand a concept, I'd have to understand my own account of concept? We seem to understand what a form of life is, only after understanding forms of life in general, as is what happens with concepts.

So it seems that forms of life cannot [be] totally incommensurate, one to the other. — Banno

I agree. There are some aspects of our forms of life that may not be commensurate, just as there are some aspects of games that aren't commensurate. However, there must be something in common, like the commensurability of the concept game. They share incommensurability and commensurability, both can be true at the same time, but not in the same way.

I don't know, is that as clear as mud?

It seems to me to be like supposing that a form of life could be private. — Banno

I agree. If forms of life could be private, then so could language. To say that language can't be private, is to say that forms of life can't be private.

Oh, no wonder you didn't reply to my question, "What link?" Sorry, I was thinking of a link to a web site. :gasp: It's so easy to misunderstand. You were clear, but my brain had other ideas.

What do you think of the link, if any, to Davidson's rejection of conceptual schema? Davidson's strategy seems to me to be showing that conceptual schema, if they exist, must be private; but that leads to their being incoherent, unintelligible. Hence, he rejects the notion. — Banno

Well, if you believe that Wittgenstein's point about a private language is well-founded, then it would follow that Davidson is correct to reject the notion of a private conceptual schema. It would be incoherent and unintelligible.

Well, we just disagree. I'll leave it at that.

Actually you wrote "IF" He claimed it. Not "IF" He said it. — ThinkOfOne

Obviously if Jesus claimed that he was God, then he said it, or at least implied it.

The point you seemed to miss is that even "probably said" cannot be reasonably determined from the available evidence. — ThinkOfOne

That's my point. We can't reasonably conclude that Jesus said X, Y, or Z based on the testimonial evidence. It's just too weak. Geez, I don't know how I can make it any clearer.

If someone claimed to be God, he may not be a lunatic, he may just be delusional (you could argue that being delusional is a mental illness), or a good liar. — Sam26

Ya, "IF" he said it, but I have no strong evidence/reasons to conclude that he did say it, other than very weak testimonial evidence.

While we don't know that Jesus necessarily said what was attributed to Him, there's no compelling reason to believe that He necessarily did not. I've always found that argument really weak. The argument seems to be, "If we don't know that He necessarily said it, then there's no point in discussing anything that was attributed to Him". If that's an acceptable argument, then that argument could be used for many a historical figure. — ThinkOfOne

Why are you framing the argument in such absolute terms? I sure didn't frame it that way. Even if there was strong testimonial evidence to support that Jesus said X, Y, or Z, that doesn't support the idea that Jesus said it necessarily. The argument is an inductive argument. Inductive arguments don't give us conclusions that follow necessarily, only deductive arguments do that. So, again, it's not about what Jesus said necessarily. It's about what he probably said, or didn't say. If it was true that that is what I was implying, then I would agree, but it's not what I was implying.

Since you responded as if you believe that Jesus claimed to be God, can you address the following which I posted earlier? — ThinkOfOne

How did you come to that conclusion? I said, we don't know what Jesus actually said, because the testimonial evidence is too weak.

I'll refrain from expressing my attitudes or feelings about Christianity, but I don't always succeed. I came from a Christian background, and considered myself a Christian for about 40 years. Moreover, at that time, I considered myself a Christian apologist, so I'm quite familiar with the arguments for God's existence, and C.S. Lewis's arguments.

The problem with setting the trilemma up as the only choices, is that all of the testimonial evidence, as to what Jesus actually said, is second-hand or hearsay, so it's very weak by definition. We actually don't know what Jesus said, because we don't know how reliable the second-hand testimony is. Of course if you believe that the words of the Bible are inspired by God, then your beliefs about the claims of Jesus, as given by the writers of the NT, will be governed by those beliefs. The trilemma only works if you believe the testimonial evidence is accurate.

If someone claimed to be God, he may not be a lunatic, he may just be delusional (you could argue that being delusional is a mental illness), or a good liar. Of course many Christians would respond that these options are not appropriate given that he performed miracles (supposedly), and rose from the dead (supposedly). The problem, again, is that the testimonial evidence is too weak, and the counter-evidence is enormous, i.e., our experiences run counter to people coming back to life after three days in a grave. You would need an enormous amount of testimonial evidence from a variety of sources, including extra-Biblical sources, to support such a belief, and we just don't have that kind of evidence.

What link?

I don't oppose the mental. I just do not suppose it to be confined to the inside of people's heads. — Banno

I agree, if there wasn't some outward manifestation of the mental, then what would a mental life entail? Even if we exclude language, what's mental would have to seep out in some outward act (linguistic or otherwise). The mental, in order for us to call it mental, has to manifest itself in some way. We could say the same thing for what it means for something to be conscious.

If a bowl is existentially dependent upon language(and they are) and the content of the cat's belief includes the bowl(and it does) then that particular belief is existentially dependent upon language, and there's no way around it. — creativesoul

You seem to be suggesting that you can't create a bowl without a language. I'm sure that pre-linguistic man created bowls of some sort, or maybe you're referring to a particular kind of bowl, say plastic bowls. Even if you're right, it seems like a stretch to the conclude that because a thing (maybe stove is more appropriate), is created by language users, that the cat's belief is dependent upon language. When I use the phrase "dependent upon language," I'm referring to the use of concepts as part of a statement of belief. So, the cat is not dependent upon language in this sense. You're adding another sense of "dependent upon language" that doesn't involve the direct use of concepts, which seems to be an indirect dependence. Am I understanding your point, or not? Mostly I'm talking about concepts, in particular the concept truth. The difference maybe in our focus.

Obviously linguistics played a part in the stove's creation, but the fact that stove exists, is just like any other fact of existence for the cat, and the cat's belief. What if we removed all humans from existence, but there still existed stoves, would there still be an overlap between the cat's belief and language? What if someone created a stove, ceased to exist, then cats came into existence later, would you still say that the cat's belief overlapped language? I don't see any reason to think that the cat's belief has a linguistic component simply because some language user created the stove. The stove is just another fact of reality, like a tree or the moon.

I may or may not be one of those philosophers, but I do think common language is capable of being precise enough. Language can be honed. — creativesoul

Ya, I'm not saying language can't be precise, only that some concepts resist precision. So, we agree.

A non-linguistic belief cannot be existentially dependent upon language. If a bowl is existentially dependent upon language(and they are) and the content of the cat's belief includes the bowl(and it does) then that particular belief is existentially dependent upon language, and there's no way around it. — creativesoul

I agree, that a non-linguistic belief is not dependent on language. However, I would probably word the next statement a bit different. The concept bowl is dependent on language, but the fact that there is a bowl (the object referred to as bowl), this fact can be part of the of the cat's belief. In fact, many states-of-affairs can be part of the cat's belief. So, I'm separating the concept from the facts involved in the cat's belief.

Some language less creatures' belief includes content that is itself existentially dependent upon language. Believing that a mouse is under the stove for example includes the stove. This makes perfect sense given that the overlap between their world and ours includes things that we created via language use; some of which are perfectly capable of being directly perceived by language less creatures and thus could be sensibly said to be part of the content of their belief. — creativesoul

Again, here, including the stove is just including a fact about reality, their belief doesn't include the concept stove. The object that the concept refers to is not dependent on language, just as many facts aren't dependent on language. So, the cat's belief, it seems to me, is not dependent on language, at least our language, but maybe dependent upon some fact that has obtained as a result of our interaction with the world. So, I don't see an overlap, i.e., if I'm interpreting you correctly.

I agree with your assessment of your granddaughter's belief. I think your other thoughts may need more refinement. That's my take, for what its worth.

That's painful :gasp:

I'm through for the night. Maybe I'll be back tomorrow, not sure.

It would be absurd to say Witti spurned logic. — Banno

Who would say the W. spurned logic? I surely never said such a thing.

“The criteria which we accept for ‘fitting’, ‘being able to’, ‘understanding’, are much more complicated than might appear at first sight. That is, the game with these words, their employment in the linguistic intercourse that is carried on by their means, is more involved—the role of these words in our language other—than we are tempted to think. (This role is what we need to understand in order to resolve philosophical paradoxes. And hence definitions usually fail to resolve them; and so, a fortiori does the assertion that a word is ‘indefinable’.)” PI 182.

I'm currently reading a paper entitled, A Wittgensteinian Way with Paradoxes by Rupert Read. I'm interested in whether anything he says applies to what we are discussing.

The liar is like someone saying "but look, I can move the king more than one space!" — Banno

I definitely don't see the liar's paradox as the same as saying, "Look I can move the king more than one space." Although I do use this technique in chess when I'm losing.

Facts are the stuff of science. But they are created -- rather than lying there for us to discover, we invent a lot to make them useful for ourselves. Actuality doesn't change with the facts -- facts are generated by our interaction with actuality, though. — Moliere

Your notion of a fact is a bit different from mine. I talked about facts in my summary of truth a few pages back.

What I meant is that seeing a tree, feeling its bark and leaves, carving your initials into it, climbing it and so on are all perceptual. — Janus

Ya, they're all sensory experiences. You're not saying it's all subjective are you?

What's all perception? Are you referring to what we mean by truth? Sorry, I haven't read everything in the last three pages.

We just are never going to get the kind of precision out of language that some philosophers want. It's like an itch that won't go away.

I'm not sure I understand your point. If you're saying there are other ways of gaining knowledge besides science, I definitely agree.

I definitely agree that truth is linguistic, and thus embedded in our forms of life.

You will take my point: logic remains primary in Wittgenstein. — Banno

No, I will not take your point in the way you seem to be making it. It depends on what Wittgenstein is talking about. You do not see the use of logic in the same way it's used in his early philosophy, where logic is primary. He's much more flexible in his later philosophy, not as dug in, in terms of using logic as a primary tool.

But, one of the points in the PI is that language is not always precise. Sometimes being vague is just what we need. So, he's not always trying to be precise, because ordinary usage doesn't always work that way.