According to Piaget, he decentered his thinking, by the same process that a child eventually learns that the moon doesn’t actually follow him when he walks. But the developing process of differentiation and decentration in one’s thinking doesn’t necessarily lead one to a normative perspective shared by others. For instance, new scientific paradigms, philosophical positions, artistic movements often begin with one or a handful of individuals. They break away from normative conventions of thought in order to arrive at their newly decentered theoretical or aesthetic perspective.
So while periods of work of relatively shared values within normative communities , such as the normal
science that Kuhn talks about, is an important contributor to innovation, equally important is the deviation from those norms. — Joshs

Hang on - I’m not talking about a normative perspective, but the possibility of a normative understanding (a developing rationality) that seeks to orient differentiated perspectives in a rational, overarching (and irreducible) structure. It’s a proposed dimensional shift in awareness, a synthesis that would be inaccurate (and remain a theoretical perspective or position) as long as it lacks awareness, connection or collaboration with more limited perspectives within its structure.

We can understand, for example, that the earth appears flat AND that it is spherical, or that the sun appears to move across the sky AND that the earth instead rotates on its axis. We can argue rationally that these limited perspectives are in error, but only from this position of normative understanding that de-centres and integrates our own limited perspective within a rational structure, which we now take for granted. But if you’ve ever tried to argue against a ‘flat earth-er’, you’ll realise that they don’t acknowledge this broader rational structure you’re arguing within. They’re arguing instead from a perspective that assumes a centralised position, and so your rationality is, to them, just a difference in perspective. To have any hope of convincing them, you need to allow for the dimensional shift between this normative understanding and your own limited perspective, as well as the difference between your limited perspective and their perception of your limited perspective. In other words, you need to acknowledge that your position - at the dimensional level they perceive it - is just as ‘wrong’ as theirs. But instead we tend to argue from a perspective assumed as the centralised position or ‘correct’ rationality.

For Kant’s shift to take effect, we must imagine a reality in which appearances are a limited perspective AND in which the perceiving subject is also a participant - not just de-centred but also moveable, like the Earth. But Kant was missing a step: Darwin’s paradigm shift - de-centring our perspective of temporal reality by rejecting the assumption that the existence of humans (and their rationality) was the plan or purpose of eternity - had yet to occur.

I am doing my best here to understand what you are saying (perhaps not well) but also, I'm not sure how you think this needs to negate my contention about the actual OP about "objectivity"--our how aesthetics holds any sense of "rationality" for Kant at all. — Antony Nickles

I appreciate the efforts you are making here - my approach to this is far from conventional, so I’d never expect to be easily understood. Unfortunately my time at the moment is limited, so I will touch on only a couple of points - the first being that I don’t mean to negate your contention regarding objectivity, but to challenge the limitations of your perspective, and work towards a synthesis. It seems natural in moments of disagreement to consolidate perspectives, but I’ve never been very good at debates.

If you misunderstand what I meant, then you ask, "Did you mean the trope, or its analogous nature?" In other words, there are rational ways of clarifiying disagreement: collecting more evidence, clearing up terms, and sure I guess "increasing awareness, connection, and collaboration", but in none of this is a "broader relational structure" necessary (if even possible)--sometimes we are just going to disagree: perhaps I feel you are wrong in your reading of the disowning of love in the opening scene of King Lear. You feel you have tried all you'd like to point to the text, tie it to other occurances in the play that echo it, etc. This is not a "variability in... rational relation"--this a conversation coming to a dead-end. These aren't different "perspectives", they are different rational claims about the art; the "possibility of agreement" is not in "perspectives"; that is not rational, as is a reading connected to the Form, which can be "wrong", say, being simply conjecture, personal opinon (taste), lacking evidence, not accounting for history at all, etc. These things don't have anything to do with one's "perspective". — Antony Nickles

This disagreement you’ve offered as an example is not a rational relation: it is a perception of difference from a centralised position, and a challenge to that position from a dissenting perspective. Each participant believes themselves wholly rational, and yet both judge this as a dead-end based on feeling. They are faced with the limitations of their own rationality, an event horizon beyond which all is deemed irrational, illogical, emotional.

Now, let’s say that one of them recognises this limitation, and humbly entertains the possibility that they might be disconnected from, or even ignorant of, certain qualitative aspects of the text which may be apparent to the other, perhaps owing to their personal experiences of love. Now we’re exploring an aspect of existence beyond what either would consider ‘rational’ from their limited perspective. There’s no rational criteria with which to navigate this relational ‘space’, and yet the difference is undeniable.

As in my discussion with @Joshs, this can lead us to a rational idea that we inaccurately perceive our own viewpoint as central to a normative understanding. There’s certainly precedent in the history of human perception and knowledge (what I think Kant refers to as a ‘Copernican Turn’). In order to return to a rational relation, we need to account for this qualitative relativity. Carlo Rovelli’s ‘The Order of Time’ is an example of how we might approach a decentralising of irreconcilable perspectives. The result for physics is a description of reality as a series of ‘interrelated events’ in a potential ‘block universe’, rather than objects in spacetime. I’m proposing that a similar paradigm shift might be achieved here.

how do we know if the aesthetic meaning we see is objective or based on the projections of our subjectivity. — Jack Cummins

I don’t think we DO know for certain, because it will always be a mixture of both. Our subjectivity is the position from which we perceive meaning. We can construct an intersubjective position based on socio-cultural aspects of our conceptual reality - logic is one such position - but even logic is not central to a normative understanding that is inclusive of non-human interaction. That the majority of existence cannot differentiate between meaning, value, event, object, gradient, direction or energy does not necessitate exclusion of their perspective of meaning from a normative understanding - that’s where our real challenge lies.

Let me help you out here, Mr. Possible: what you are trying to say is that wisdom and the wise man truly exist—as ideals: true wisdom can be conceived of, but its ideal or perfection is never encountered in the “real” world—is that what you are saying? — Todd Martin

Your interpretation doesn’t help me out, Mr Martin - it might, however, convince others to judge the pursuit of wisdom as ‘impossible’, ‘unrealistic’ purposefulness, and dismiss it. I’m not prepared to say that the perfection of wisdom “is never encountered in the ‘real’ world”, because I recognise that the possibility exists, as much as the impossibility also exists. This, for me, is the binary contradiction at the core of existence, the question Shakespeare was alluding to with “To be, or not to be?” You’re free to answer in the negative whenever you choose, but you don’t answer for me.

I'm assuming you want to keep both readings. So let me ask you this: Do you really think that neither my position nor the other's is central to a normative understanding. To be more specific, don't each of us interpret the norm relative to our own pre-understanding? Wouldn't that then mean that , whether i like it or not, my position will be central to a normative understanding? — Joshs

No - what it means is that I inaccurately perceive my position as central to a normative understanding. How do you think Copernicus was able to structure the solar system without leaving Earth’s atmosphere?

I don't think it's the case that in all musical styles we don't appreciate, it's only because of a lack of exposure that we don't understand it. This is sometimes the case, but far from always.

But from saying this, to arguing that, for example, Mozart is better than The Beatles or that Pollock is inferior to Van Gogh, is practically impossible, however strong we may feel about a specific case. — Manuel

Appreciation for music can be viewed similar to ignorance regarding members of a particular ethnic appearance, that they ‘all look alike’ - we haven’t learned to appreciate the subtleties of the genre in relation to different structures of qualitative variability, and we aren’t willing - in the moment - to commit attention and effort to do so. It’s not just about exposure, but a willingness to suspend judgement (based on prior expectations) with regard to what differentiates one sound or visual quality from another, and direct more attention and effort to acquiring broader sensory information and exploring alternative methods of refinement.

There is so much sensory information available in every experience that we develop and refine complex reductionist methodologies for making sense of the ‘noise’, which are tailored to particular experiential conditions.

I can read this in two ways. According to the first, humans perceive events by filling in based on prior expectations. Thus, another person’s viewpoint becomes an additional aspect to our structure of perception.
The second way I can read this is that the structure you’re referring to is interpersonal. The other and my self are poles of a normative social structure of understanding, — Joshs

Yes - in the first reading, we recognise that we perceive another person’s viewpoint from within our own, and so its perceived structure is based on difference. In the second, we recognise that neither my position nor the other’s is central to a normative understanding.

Do you have in mind a kind of hermeneutic process of fusing of horizons? — Joshs

Sort of. We can think of it similar to a system’s capacity to render a three-dimensional image from photographs - the possibility of three-dimensional relational structure must be an aspect of the system first. So it’s not just a fusing of horizons, but awareness, in the qualitative variability of perspective, of an additional aspect to the structure.

Possibility but you didn’t address the other half, Mr. Possible, of my question: is the wise man a fiction? — Todd Martin

The definitive ‘wise man’ is a character of the imagination, in necessary relation to the faculties of understanding and judgement. But I think to dismiss it as ‘a fiction’ (ie. not fact) is an error of exclusion, so I advise caution with this evaluation commonly attributed to the term.

Wisdom exists as a possibility, yes. It’s ‘something’ to strive for.

As TheMadFool suggested, what we’re striving for is wisdom in a practical sense - not necessarily knowing the answers, but capable of finding and applying them for the benefit of all. What I think this amounts to - as a beginning - is a commitment to increasing awareness, connection and collaboration. — Possibility

Let me see if I understand what you are saying about wisdom and the wise man. He is needed when our knowledge fails, when we are uncertain as to what is true and false; for example, when the doctors don’t agree on a diagnosis? Is that the sort of situation you are referring to? or the medical researchers are unsure how to interpret their findings? then they ought to call in the wise man to interpret them for them?

Likewise, when the trainers and dietitians disagree as to how to properly exercise or feed a body, the wise man ought to be called in to set them straight?

Similarly, concerning the things of the soul, when the judges disagree how they ought to judge and punish or reform the citizenry, the wise man is called in, just as he is when the teachers are not certain what or how to teach, and the politicians are not sure what laws to legislate? Is this the idea of the wise man you are promoting, or something else? — Todd Martin

Without trying to answer for @jgill, I don’t think looking for ‘the wise man’ to solve our lack-of-knowledge issues is realistic. Wisdom is demonstrated in collaborative achievement - in the imaginative, understanding and non-judgemental relation between insufficient perspectives - and recognising that no man alone can embody this faculty is as important as seeking it out.

The evolution of art is an appropriate topic and this is well taken; in pushing too hard on the fact of rational judgement at all, I only peripherally addressed the way art changes, and thus changes its rationale. Wittgenstein would, roughly, refer to this as projecting a concept into a wider or new context (perhaps akin to your "space", without an aspect), and with the process of "continuing a series", there, with a student (see PI Index "Series - of numbers). — Antony Nickles

Wittgenstein’s example of ‘continuing a series’ refers to the difference between perceiving the properties of a variation occurring in a particular event (consisting of consolidated ‘objects’), and consolidating the ‘concept’ by which that variation has the potential to occur in other events. But consider an alternative perspective (one that departs markedly from analytical views such as Wittgenstein): perceiving the relational structure in which an ‘event’ (itself consisting of relational structure) is open to variability.

I would first point out that extenuation or expansion presupposes the actuality of the workings of art (reflected in the criteria of its form). The criteria of the form express (Witt's term) the means of art, are the launching point or touchstone; there is no "beyond" or "aspect" they are "pointing" to; the form moves itself ahead without an end. "Purposefulness" is not to a purpose, but only to say that art has (open-ended) ways of being meaningful. This is not capturing, or transcending to, an "aesthetic idea"; it is, as it were, on a path (cubism comes from portraiture) but without destination. Emerson says (roughly) we must live forward fuzzy in front. The context here is the painter, say, with their canvas blank and the means at their disposal; but are we denying history (even in revolutionizing it)? And of course this is acknowledging that, if anywhere, art may break or defy or ignore any of its methods of meaning--ahead of its time; waiting to be explicated--yet to find its words, or voice, or audience. — Antony Nickles

I’m not alluding to a particular end or destination, only to relational structures of possibility. I have explained before that I’m referring not just to the rational judgement of art but to the faculty of judgement, including the state of ‘free play’ with imagination and understanding - the fourth moment of Kant’s aesthetics. To be seen to ‘move itself ahead’ purposefully, a process has a relative momentum and direction, hence the ‘beyond’ and ‘pointing’, but this consolidated ‘touchstone’ is arbitrary - it is the viewer/critic who determines the ‘launching point’, not the art or artist.

My understanding of Kant’s ‘aesthetic idea’ is not a ‘concept’, but unconsolidated (formless) representation of the imagination, from which the artist gives form to possible ways of being meaningful.

I like the idea that ‘we must live forward fuzzy in front’, but I think limiting this to a temporal sense of ‘forward’ might be missing the point. For the artist, this fuzziness is everywhere we look, including history. So cubism does not leave portraiture behind, or deny its history by ‘revolutionising’ it - that would assume a consolidated perspective of history. The painter who consolidates history or even the criteria of form in the face of a blank canvas is limiting their participation in the creative process before they even begin. This is not to say that an artist should ignore either history or the criteria of form, but rather recognise their potential to increase awareness, connection and collaboration with the relational structure in which a perspective of history, or even this criteria of form, is open to variability.

I would, again, argue there is no "other" rationality in the judgement of aesthetics, no "broader systems and structures of rationality"; again, the discussion is not an "approximation", not (as defined by Webster's) "nearly" correct, as if the Sublime (or transcendent) were an eventual or separate correct destination to which we have a different rational relation. — Antony Nickles

Not in the judgement of aesthetics, no. But a discussion is likely to involve two people with slightly or even drastically different understandings of this rationality in the judgement of aesthetics, despite the belief that ‘criteria of form’ is objective and you’re having a ‘logical’ discussion. In most discussions, this doesn’t appear as a ‘different’ rationality so much as misunderstanding, misinterpretation or talking across purposes at the level of meaning. Occasions of disagreement at this level can be interpreted as suggesting a broader relational structure in which increasing awareness, connection and collaboration with the variability in this rational relation might bring possibility of agreement. In that sense, these differing perspectives can be understood as ‘nearly correct’ in relation to this possibility of agreement.

Though I am left with the impression you feel the need to defend that there is something more, greater, that you feel I am taking away, or denying. Maybe it helps to say, the rationality of the judgement of art does not take away from the transcendent experience or creation of art. This fear of denial reminds me of Wittgenstein's consolation to the metaphysical skeptic (my italics):

PI #305. But you surely cannot deny that, for example, in remembering, an inner process takes place." -- What gives the impression that we want to deny anything?... The impression that we wanted to deny something arises from our setting our faces against the picture of the 'inner process'. What we deny is that the picture of the inner process gives us the correct idea of....

and here I want to end this instead with: the extension of the form (instead of "the use of the word remembering"). Witt talks of this picture (there, an inner process; here, an "aesthetic idea") getting in the way of seeing the use of the word remembering as it is (here, the rationality and progression of art's forms with the workings of the art, and their change). All this is to say, the desire to have a special access to aesthetics (or its idea) gets in the way of beginning a conversation. The fear that it might constrain, say, a desire to have some connection with art that is special, ineffable, is not to say discussion is not possible (however threatening). Another way to look at it, again, is the fact we might end without agreement is not proof that we have no way to try (that art is unintelligible), or that there is some better way, or that the attempt is structurally flawed. — Antony Nickles

Again, I agree with all of this, except your impression of what I am trying to achieve. You’ve clarified in this post, a couple of times, that you’re referring specifically to the judgement of art, whereas I have also tried to previously clarify that the OP interest here is with aesthetics - which, in my view (and I think Kant’s) is inclusive of a non-judgemental relation to art, as an aspect of the faculty of judgement (a more accurate translation of his title). You refer to this as the ‘transcendent experience or creation of art’, suggesting that it is somehow separate from this faculty of judgement, which I think is an error of exclusion (albeit a commonly accepted one).

I don’t believe that art is unintelligible, but I do believe an aspect of that intelligibility is possible only in an irreducible relation between perspectives - that, to me, is worth the effort.

I like the idea of a call: the work draws us in, it speaks to us through the criteria of its form, and our critique beckons the Other for their assent. Are these all not "space" enough? A discussion of the form of art does not require or allow for "differing systems and structures of rationality", as in, different rationality than: criteria of a form. But we also don't create the criteria nor change them (arbitrarily; say, without the art form changing). Where is the need for an "end-place"? Modern art expands and re-examines its own rational criteria in the making of the art--it's become its own critic. The criteria are not "incomplete", or unfinished, or, as of yet, only of a lower order (only an approximation?). A discussion of them need not end or be resolved or bettered for the rational conversation of art to begin--the one is the means to the other. We will have no other, better ("objective"?) means, to, say, have a particular, better ("objective"?) end. The frailty of the possibility of agreement in a discussion of art is its triumph, not its lack. — Antony Nickles

Would creative genius be content with inspiring critical assent?

You say that “modern art expands and re-examines its own rational criteria in the making of art” - how do you think it does this, without pointing to an aspect that exists in a relational ‘space’ beyond the criteria of the form? This is how the work draws us in - through transcendence. A discussion which acknowledges this transcendence also acknowledges the nature of its approximation within the criteria of the form. It is in our aesthetic relation to the work beyond this capacity for a ‘rational conversation of art’ that a critical interaction on the form of art in relation to the aesthetic idea begins with the artist themselves.

Most modern art falls short of this, and is content to engage the critic without challenging their perspective. Their passive call to those well-versed in the art form, its criteria and history is to discuss the commercial/cultural value or potential of the work and the artist. For the rest of us, art actively draws us in (through transcendence) to a ‘space’ that challenges our capacity to rationally discuss what we perceive. Those who do not allow for broader systems and structures of rationality (such as aesthetics) limit their ability to engage with the work, in the same way that “a discussion of the form of art does not require or allow for... different rationality than: criteria of a form.”

The frailty of the possibility of agreement in a discussion of art is its triumph, not its lack. — Antony Nickles

Agreed - but why rest on those laurels while modern art continues to shift the sands beneath you?

The problem that I’m having with Metaphysician Undiscovered’s posts in this thread, is that he’s referring to ‘identity conditions’ in terms of ‘what really make some particular what it is’. He’s talking about the metaphysics of identity. Whereas I and others are saying that ‘a = a’ purely on the basis of abstraction, or in terms of the meaning of symbols. I’m leaving aside the metaphysical question of ‘what makes [some particular] what it really is?’ The question I asked was, doesn’t ‘the number seven’ have an identity? Which was a rhetorical question, in that I take the meaning of ‘7’ to be precisely ‘not equal to everything that is not 7’, or, ‘7 = 7’. But somehow, this has given rise to pages and pages of metaphysical speculation. — Wayfarer

This relates to the point that he’s making, though: ‘the number seven’ is not identical to its value, so 7=7 risks equivocation. It reminds me of the children’s trick: ‘one plus one equals window’. It’s all very well to insist on a closed system of thought in which abstraction is all that matters, but it isn’t, and equivocating symbols with their value/potential leads to inaccuracy in terms of the meaning of symbols, and all sorts of interpretation issues when applying logic to both physics and philosophy. We need to be more conscious of methodologies employed in abstraction and interpretation that carelessly assume a closed system of thought.

You’re missing the point of being able to abstract. Abstraction is at the basis of language, and you’re not getting it. Logic and language relies on representation, representing some [x] in symbolic form. You’re mistaking logic for soteriology. — Wayfarer

Logic and language relies not just on representation, but on a potential relation to the possible existence of some [x] as it is. Otherwise what IS the point of being able to abstract?

In many modern schools of logic, the law of identity is simply expressed as A=A. Since it is often not explained exactly what the law of identity really is, it is sometimes simply assumed, that the meaning here is that the symbol A must always symbolize the same thing. But that is not an accurate representation of the law of identity. The law of identity stipulates that symbols cannot give the true identity of an object. The true identity is within the thing itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

:up:

I agree if this is to say not everything about the aesthetic can by captured in critique (or even words), i.e., the Sublime, but I think it's a scapegoat to throw the baby out with the bathwater to say that we are only "approximating" an idea (as it were, that taking the same unknowable place of the "object"--except if you only want to accept a certain type of rationality, logic, or end-place). Also, I'm not sure what "constrain" accomplishes other than to also say it does not meet a particular standard--one which changes nothing about our ability to discuss the aesthetic for everyone to see the public criteria of the form we have pointed out in a universal voice. It is not up to us to assent to the criteria, or an ultimate "idea", only to the critique--only that is subject to agreement. — Antony Nickles

I hear what you’re saying - but I don’t believe I’m throwing anything out. Incidentally, if I reveal that my position in this discussion is as an artist, not a critic, would that change how you perceive my argument?

Well if we have to discuss the hangup with "objectivity"/("subjectivity") we must--I believe Kant starts the death-nell (started by the idea of the metaphysical "object" with Plato) for "objectivity" by shriveling its application to only certain standards (self-contained, impersonal, certain, universal, pre-determined, having moral force, etc.) I get his desire to distinguish out the "subjective", as feeling, inclination, and all the other failings of the particular human; but, in doing so, he entirely removed the human voice and the natural human condition dictated by the limits of knowledge, our separateness from each other (which I discuss in my post about Wittgenstein's lion quote), and the powerlessness of rules/logic/rationality. Modern philosophy (Wittgenstein, Emerson, Heidegger, Nietzsche) puts a nail in the coffin by making the "object", "reality", etc. obsolete, and dialectically filling the object/subject distinction in with our ordinary criteria.

With the judgement of the Beautiful to aesthetics, however, Kant claims the standard of "objectivity" is not even used--we are not discussing the "object" (or the "idea"), we are not applying criteria for its identity or its certainty, universality, its "existence" apart from us. My whole point is that we give up "objectivity" but still have a logical rational discussion--we have everything else except the certainty that we will agree (or force to make us). Who needs the approximation other than to ignore the possibility of the voice of the other to speak for all of us, and to make us responsible for a cogent, rational response--we are answerable to each other; what are we missing? — Antony Nickles

My understanding of objectivity is not in dichotomous relation to subjectivity, so your interpretation of a ‘subject-object distinction’ is quite different to mine. When I argue that a logical, rational discussion of art is not ‘objective’, I’m not arguing that it is instead ‘subjective’, only that its claim to objectivity is limited. This is due in part to Thomas Nagel, and in part to my examining Kant in the ‘wrong’ order. Inter-subjectivity, for me, constructs the dimensional aspects of our reality, so my view of Kant’s aesthetics abandons no ‘standards of objectivity’ to begin with, but rather strives towards the possibility of a more complete objectivity.

This approximation, therefore, is more than just “an exhibition of rational ideas” - it’s a call not to agree so much as to engage in a shared relational ‘space’, in which differing systems and structures of rationality, logic or end-place can be understood and restructured in relation to others without consolidation or conflict based on significance. Without this approximation, which expresses an awareness of its incompleteness through aesthetics (whether intentional or not), how do we acknowledge and respond to the call in the first place?

This is a mistake, and to make this assumption is a problem. Logical statements exist independently, and are valid independently, of the physical structure which they are applied to. That is why we have a distinction between being valid and being sound. The judgement as to the truth or falsity of the premises, which are the grounds by which the logic is actually related to physical structures, is a completely different type of judgement from the judgement as to whether the statement is "logical". That judgement of truth or falsity, is outside the so-called "closed system of thought" (logical system). Nevertheless, it is a crucial part of soundness, though not a part of logical validity. — Metaphysician Undercover

In my book, they don’t exist independently. It’s a claim to independence - a closed system of thought is never really closed, but exists in potential relation to sentient beings, who are ignoring the potentiality of its relation to physical structures in order to examine only its structure of logical possibility. Nevertheless, my use of the term ‘logical statement’ was only to highlight the ambiguity of the original statement, which might make sense in conversation, but would not be useful in logic - it was not a comment on the validity or soundness of the statement itself. Sorry for the confusion - I can quickly get out of my depth in discussions on logic, but I think we are on the same page here.

If we go to the rules at the base of epistemology, upon which logic and mathematics are constructed, we find the three fundamental rules of logic. The soundness, or veracity of these rules must be judged in relation to something outside the epistemological system which they support. These are the premises of the system, which need to be judged for truth or falsity to make sure that the system is sound. So the judgement of these rules which form the foundation of epistemological principles, must be an ontological judgement. Ontology supports epistemology. That's why I represent them as ontological. A premise is always in some sense a conclusion, being a judgement. So the three laws of logic are epistemological premises, but they are ontological conclusions. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with this - my point was that those who consider themselves ‘logical beings’ do not typically ground their system in a larger ontological structure. This is a problem I encounter often. They don’t recognise or acknowledge a necessary relation to the broader structure of reality in which logic, for instance, does not reign supreme. So it seems that what you’re referring to is not so much logic’s Principle of Identity, but Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, as a principle of analytic ontology?

I concede that aesthetic rationality is not "objective" (another post I think to argue that standard is based on Kant's desire to empower some judgment to be, say, irrefutable, but not based on a "real" "universal" object; however, I don't need agreement on either of those contentions to make my point here. — Antony Nickles

I would argue that Kant is referring here not to some judgement, but to the self-conscious faculty of judgement as apodictic. Pure aesthetic judgement seems to me a deliberate refrain.

And I do allow for uncertainty, but only in the sense that it is uncertain that you will see what I see. I do claim that aesthetic rationale has a logic to it, though not a logic that ensures agreement or certainty in conclusions (not the logic you may want). This is an internal logic to the form of the art, the terms and means and structure--what makes a difference in sculpture compared to dance. Wittgenstein and Emerson inherit Kant but make every concept (here every form of art) categorical; each with its own class and criteria. — Antony Nickles

I do agree that aesthetic rationale applies an internal logic to the form, terms, means and structure in talking about art. But this logic serves to constrain the aesthetic in art, as it does in nature - there remains an aspect that transcends and even dissolves these categories of sculpture, dance, visual art, language or music. I think Kant refers to this as ‘the aesthetic idea’ - in relation to which all concepts, all thoughts and indeed all art, is but a rational approximation.

And I allow that we might not agree (on the end of purposiveness--though I'd want to re-read my Kant--or exemplariness of the art form) but the "uncertainty" of agreement here is not corrosive to the possibility of agreement (or even just "approaching" agreement), it does not make the discussion of art irrational or illogical. We do not "agree" on the terms and forms of art (though we may disagree about one criteria's "significance" over another in a certain work). Our "perspective" is not something personal (the art's "significance" to us) so much as seeing the art, for example, thoroughly, within the history of its form, taking in all available evidence, etc. It's not what matters to me, it's what matters in, say, making that art--what is meaningful to the art form. — Antony Nickles

I agree with all of this - but a rational discussion of art is still not objective. However, it is not ‘rational discussion of art’ that this thread refers to, but aesthetics in general - and it’s about this subtle distinction that I’m continuing to quibble with you. I think that aesthetics could be objective - but any discussion of it can only approach this possibility through uncertainty and a self-conscious capacity to transcend the laws of logic.

So if we agree on the first part, how is it "not objective"? I (and Kant) have already granted that it does not have an "object"--which I take in Kantian terms to mean there is no absolute, certain, pre-determined "right"--but does not having a final fixed point obviscate our ability to rationally discuss art? Maybe if we let go of the "objective"/"subjective" dichotomy, we can allow ourselves the grey areas (Witt. post-tractates). In other words, is the possibility of failure make discussion impossible/hopeless? — Antony Nickles

The ability to discuss anything rationally is not necessarily objective. When we render aesthetics in discussion, reduced to a particular language structure, objectivity often defers to certainty.

Still, rational is not always logical. I don’t believe the possibility of failure makes discussion hopeless, only uncertain. When we allow for this uncertainty - acknowledging purposiveness without agreeing on a stated end or purpose, or exemplary beauty/sublimity without agreeing on what is correct about its relation to form - the discussion itself allows for a relation between perspectives to approach objectivity in meaning beyond inter-subjective significance. This aspect of the discussion is irreducible, however.

I don't understand what this means. It takes time to make predictions and they are all happening in your brain, not "outside" the flow of time. At best, you are talking about imagining that you are outside the flow of time, not some ontologically real view somewhere outside of your own head, and "outside of time".

Potential is just another type of imagining, akin to predictions (they may just be the same thing). To say that something that hasn't happened has the potential to happen just means that you predict it could happen, but there would have to be some other pre-existing conditions. A ball on the table has the potential to fall off of it, but only if it's pushed, pulled, or acted on in some way, and until it is acted on in some way, it will stay on the table and the potential remains an imaginary construct. — Harry Hindu

I wouldn’t dismiss imagining so quickly. Potential in physics refers to a relational structure inclusive of the event and its pre-existing conditions, and is as real as a ball on the table. What I’m talking about is similar to how people imagined the structure of our solar system, and then tested, refined and even relied on those predictions, all before they could even leave Earth’s atmosphere. You can’t tell me that wasn’t some ontologically real view somewhere outside of their ‘known’ universe.

So I think potential refers to the relational structure of conditions under which an action/event is determined. It doesn’t require a defined temporal location to exist as such, and can sometimes more accurately determine an event without it. When we say that something that hasn’t happened has the potential to happen, it means that this relational structure of conditions is perceivable in the variability of existing conditions. A ball stationary at the edge of a table has a very real potential to fall off of it - this potential is not an imaginary construct.

But the way I see it, predictions don’t need to be ‘made’ into conscious thoughts happening in the brain. Consciousness is an ongoing interpretation of effort and attention that aligns interoception with conceptual reality. All three of these consist of predictions.

1. You tell the truth. Your friend dies but you've told the truth. You're good (you fulfilled your duty to truth) AND you're bad (you failed your duty to value life)

2. You lie. You save your friend but now you've lied. You're good (duty to value life fulfilled) AND you're bad (you fail your duty to truth) — TheMadFool

3. You tell the murderer that you’re not going to tell him where your friend is because you don’t want him to kill anyone. You’re good - you’ve fulfilled your duty to truth AND to value life.

It’s not that hard.

Sure, but my point was that aesthetics extend beyond this universally valid ‘judgement of the beautiful’ that rests on an indeterminate concept, towards a purposive relation to or apodictic delight in the beautiful/sublime, regardless of judgement.

Universal validity/communicability is not objectivity.

The law of identity is an ontological issue concerning the nature of all things. Did you not read the Wikipedia, or Stanford quote I provided? Here's Wikipedia:

"In logic, the law of identity states that each thing is identical with itself."

See, the law of identity makes a statement about the nature of things. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think what Wayfarer keeps trying to point out is what I’ve highlighted in bold: the law of identity makes a statement about the nature of things within a closed system of thought. I don’t agree that the law of identity is meant to be ontological.

Does it even make sense to ponder the existence of an observer outside the "flow of time"? Observing itself is a "flow" (change). It's "flow" all the way down. — Harry Hindu

Every time we predict or anticipate events, we posit a perspective outside the ‘flow of time’. And every time we test those predictions, we edit and refine a relational structure that perceives the block universe in potentiality. Time isn’t an illusion - it’s just structured differently in the block universe.

Kant refers to aesthetics to explore the faculty of judgement because the aesthetic experience transcends what we judge as ‘beauty’, as well as the concept of ‘beauty’ itself. More than personal preference, more than a universal claim, purposive without purpose and regardless of necessity, pure aesthetics refers to an inter-subjective aspect of experience beyond both morality and logic, where we can delight in ‘free play’ between imagination and understanding before this faculty of judgement.

The aesthetic experience is ‘objective’ only when we refrain from judgement.

I think that the law of identity is actually an attempt to produce a closed system of thought. It is a prescriptive rule as to how we ought to use terms. Of course, as soon as a rule is imposed, there will be violations, that's the point of producing the rule, to distinguish violation from non-violation, and attempt to clear things up. But without the law of identity being enforced, there is freedom of ambiguity, and equivocation, as you describe. — Metaphysician Undercover

All three laws of logic aim to produce a closed system of thought - that’s what logic is. Quantum physics demonstrates the process of accurately aligning the significance of physical event structures within the same logical system, and the qualitative uncertainty that necessarily exists at this level.

If we go back to your simple example of “I reserved a table for 4 at 4”, the symbol 4 is the same, but the physical event structures they represent as a value are not. For this to be a logical statement, the symbols need to be expanded out to include a qualitative relation to their represented physical event structures: “I reserved a table for 4 people at 4pm AEST.” What results is akin to a wavefunction: describing the significance of a four-dimensional relational structure between the significance of two measurement events within the same logical system. The more effort and attention required to potentially align the senses and meanings of sender and receiver, the more accurately the significance of the relational structure must be described in the information to reduce uncertainty (eg. What date? What restaurant? What town?). Because the receiver of the message needs the most accurate information to align the potential of their own physical event structure to that of the sender, in order to produce a genuinely closed system of thought.

Why is omniscience recognising only what humans value, only logical rationality? Kantian ethics is constructed within a limited human perspective of value, based on the primacy of human life, logical statements of truth, human and commercial property, human dignity, etc. But Kant was still bound by pre-Darwinian limitations of perspective - we are not. Kantian aesthetics points to the possibilities of increasing awareness, connection and collaboration beyond this perspective of ‘logical’ or ‘moral’ through the faculty of judgement. The faculty of imagination extends beyond what is ‘logical’, the faculty of understanding extends beyond what is ‘moral’, and the faculty of judgement extends beyond what is ‘pleasing’. This is how we gain wisdom.

If my question is about objective morality and the answer is yes, it’s true, it exists, then what reason could we as ethical creatures chose to ignore it. And if there was an objective morality then the behaviour of people, all people, would be according to those morals, the rewards would be apparent. Would people go against it? I don’t know. If the universe was moral then I would assume we are moral. But as a beginning the knowledge that an objective morality existed is a beginning to a better future. Governments would operate on those morals, justice would operate on those morals, treatment of others, treatment of animals or the environment.

You may have other ideas about how this state could be reached. I’m assuming that we on this forum all have some aspect of philosophy we believe that if applied would make for a better future. — Brett

There are a lot of IFs being thrown around. We don’t have enough knowledge, and no way of knowing, if an objective morality exists, let alone how such knowledge might be expressed in the affirmative. It’s all very well positing a question that, if the correct answer is known, would lead us to a ‘better’ future, but I’m not quite sure what you’re trying achieve with it.

If an objective morality exists, then we don’t have sufficient access to information in order to know this. If a Higher Power exists, then again, we don’t have sufficient access to information to be sure of the correct answer. As TheMadFool suggested, what we’re striving for is wisdom in a practical sense - not necessarily knowing the answers, but capable of finding and applying them for the benefit of all. What I thunk this amounts to - as a beginning - is a commitment to increasing awareness, connection and collaboration. I think this would suffice in place of a resounding ‘yes’ to any question you might pose here.

But I will reiterate my concern that you won’t entertain a ‘no’ answer to the question, which defeats the purpose of positing a question in the first place. You’re assuming that ‘yes’ being the correct answer would render it the only answer, but I think you’re being naive here. We need to recognise that existence is fragmented, and that much of it is a result of insufficient awareness, connection and collaboration - a ‘no’ answer that increases ignorance, isolation and exclusion. There is no wisdom in exclusion, for instance.

What's your opinion on my reply to jgill above, Possibility? Do you agree that what the mathematical symbols represent are operations? So when we have an equation, we say that the operation on the right side has the same value as the operation on the left side. And when we say that 4=4, the symbol 4 refers to a grouping of individuals, and we say that one grouping of four has the same mathematical value as another grouping of four. Therefore relative to mathematical value, a grouping of four is "the same" as any other grouping of four, but relative to identity, the two groups are clearly not the same. Notice how I refer to the "grouping" of four, because this is an activity, an operation, carried out by the sentient being which apprehends the four individuals as a group of four. Likewise, to apprehend one thing as an object, an individual unity, is an operation (individuation) carried out by the sentient being which perceives it that way. This fundamental act of individuation is the basic premise for mathematics. Therefore the axioms of mathematics need to be well grounded in the law of identity which stipulates the criteria for being an individual. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’ve found that the term ‘object’ - denoting a consolidated focus of thought or feeling - is often freely applied to physical objects, events or concepts. I find this ambiguity leads to much confusion, and I’ve had numerous discussions with other contributors to this forum regarding the dimensional distinctions between the relation of self-consciousness to, say, an actual object, an operation/event (eg. grouping), a symbol for the concept that represents the value/significance of an event, and meaning prescribed to that symbol.

But mathematics and logic, like computer information systems, are often treated as closed conceptual systems, with any qualitative relations (necessary for the system to be understood) assumed and consolidated: ignored, isolated and excluded. So a ‘mathematical object’ refers to the ‘individual’ symbol for a concept that represents consolidated value/significance of an event - any instance of which is a subjective, temporally-located relation between an observer/measuring device and qualitative relational structures of measurement/observation. But within the isolated conceptual system of mathematics (which effectively assumes and then ignores an alignment of underlying relational structure by abstraction), a ‘mathematical object’ would abide by the law of identity. This from the Wikipedia entry on Law of Identity, referring to violation:

“we cannot use the same term in the same discourse while having it signify different senses or meanings without introducing ambiguity into the discourse – even though the different meanings are conventionally prescribed to that term.”

The Law of Identity applies only in a logical, abstract (closed) system of thought or language. Any ‘mathematical object’ is interpretable in reality only by a self-conscious observer in a qualitative potential relation to both the symbol (to prescribe qualities of meaning) and the event (to attribute qualities of sense or affect). The moment you relate the Law of Identity to anything outside of logic - ie. once you cannot assume an alignment of sense or meaning in discussion - you risk violation.

There is a deliberate ambiguity to my question that gives freedom to the faculties of imagination, understanding and judgement.
— Possibility

Which is no help at all. — Brett

You insisted on a question within the grounds of the OP. Are you looking for truth in the form of a question, or a reductionist methodology from which to orient your own perspective?

FWIW, I agree with both questions you posited - I think they are different ways of approaching the same contradiction. I don’t think the answer to either is necessarily affirmative, but in answering ‘yes’ we are at least relating to faculties that could improve existing methodologies for determining action.

It is the possibility of the answer being ‘no’ that you haven’t addressed.

Maybe we could turn the whole idea around and find the perfect answer, then work out what question must have been asked in order to elicit this answer, sort of like the quiz show Jeopardy. — Garth

The perfect answer is apparently ‘yes’.

Just out of interest what would your question be? It has to be one that is answered by a simple yes. — Brett

Edit: sorry was that your question: could anything be possible? — Brett

Yes.

To clarify, this is not the same as ‘is anything possible?’ or ‘is there anything at all?’. There is a deliberate ambiguity to my question that gives freedom to the faculties of imagination, understanding and judgement.

Could anything be possible?

Whether you refer to it as a Higher Power, objective truth/morality, unconditional love, the Absolute, pure possibility or existence itself, you manifest both the question and the answer in every relation. To state the question is to limit it to concepts in a grammatical structure which, according to Rovelli, “developed from our limited experience, before we became aware of its imprecision when it came to grasping the rich structure of the world.”

You may notice that posters here have offered questions that appear more open-ended, but are really more confining: how do we gain wisdom? What is hateful? To which any answer consolidates further into particular value systems.

I get that this is hypothetical - for me, the question ‘is there a Higher Power?’ is simply one iteration of the contradiction at the core of existence. As Trinity says: ‘It is the question that drives us’, but ‘what is the Matrix?’ is not the question - it’s just an attempt to consolidate the question, for which existence is the answer.

This brings us right back to where we struggle to reach a mutual understanding. I disagree that thoughts come to us fully formed - they are constructed from interrelating potentiality. There is nothing to suggest that a perfect world does not exist as a Higher Power idea that we’re struggling to consolidate into a thought.

FWIW, I am in agreement with you in this discussion, but I’ve been reluctant to muddy the waters with my own interpretation. It seems confusing enough for those arguing as it is.

I will say that logic, like mathematics, like Shannon information, is not about meaning - meaningfulness is assumed upon use. It’s about the relation between signs (not things) within a specific value system. The equation is ‘possibly meaningful’ only within that system, in which both sides represent the exact same value, regardless of any particular instance, and regardless of its possible meaning. So long as you assume a perfect alignment in instances of value structure and possible meaning, then both sides of the equation 4=4 are ‘the same’. In reality, it’s more like a six-dimensional ratio (0, 0, 0, 0, 4x, 0) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 4x, 0), with only some of the redundancy removed - this equation 4=4 is entirely redundant in logic, mathematics and Shannon information theory. It has meaning only when the sides are NOT identical.

The suffering of the world could only be addressed fully by a Higher Power, one, because a Higher Power is perfect and two, the universe was created by the Higher Power. Our perception of a Higher Power as we see it, through religious dogma, is limited in understanding. A true Higher Power would have no reason to create a world that included suffering. What would be the purpose of that, to teach us endurance? For what purpose would you need endurance in a world created by a perfect High Power? — Brett

Who’s to say this ‘High Power’ is done creating perfection? There is an assumption here that the creative process is already complete, and that what we refer to as ‘suffering’ is to be endured by ‘created beings’, rather than as a consequence of conscious or willing participation in the creative process.

The fact that we cannot arrange the universe like a single orderly sequence of times does not mean that nothing changes. It means that changes are not arranged in a single orderly succession: the temporal structure of the world is more complex than a simple single linear succession of instants. This does not mean that it is non-existent or illusory.
The distinction between past, present and future is not an illusion. It is the temporal structure of the world. But the temporal structure of the world is not that of presentism. The temporal relations between events are more complex than we previously thought, but they do not cease to exist on account of this. The relations of filiation do not establish a global order, but this does not make them illusory. If we are not all in single file, it does not follow that there are no relations between us. Change, what happens - this is not an illusion. What we have discovered is that it does not follow a global order...
What confuses us when we seek to make sense of the discovery that no objective universal present exists is only the fact that our grammar is organised around an absolute distinction - ‘past/present/future’ - that is only partially apt, here in our immediate vicinity. The structure of reality is not the one that this grammar presupposes. We say that an event ‘is, or ‘has been’, or ‘will be’. We do not have a grammar adapted to say that an event ‘has been’ in relation to me but ‘is’ in relation to you...
In the world, there is change, there is a temporal structure of relations between events that is anything but illusory. It is not a global happening. It is a local and complex one which is not amenable to being described in terms of a single global order. — Carlo Rovelli, ‘The Order of Time’

@Luke @Banno - enjoying your discussion, by the way.

So much of what you write resonates with my younger self, so I’m glad my responses are helpful to you.

By collaboration, I don’t just mean with self-conscious, willing human beings. Collaborate with existing structures, with the current situation, with what’s going to happen anyway, with the flow of water, with gravity, with chi...this is creativity. When we understand the relational structures of the universe, or at least focus on increasing awareness, connection and collaboration, we don’t have to try to control or even ‘change’ anything - we can create our own opportunities. The world isn’t working against us - for the most part, it has no clue what we’re capable of, let alone what our intentions are...

I hope that 2021 is amazing for you - just don’t wait for life after the pandemic before you start.

I’ve been reading along quietly with great interest - I wonder how familiar you are with the work of Lisa Feldman Barrett in developing a ‘constructed theory of emotion’ in neuroscience/psychology? I haven’t read Kelly, but from your descriptions here, there seem to be a great many parallels - particularly where he says “Validation is the relationship one senses between anticipation and realisation”, and especially in this:

So each new event is both familiar to us in some
respect, else it would be invisible to us, and different from our previous experience. But some
events we make sense of better than others. That is to say, we can align some new events in a rich manner along multiple dimensions of similarity with respect to our construct system. Other events lie mostly outside the range of convenience of our system. That is, our system is impermeable to these events. This is where affect comes in. Affect is simply the organizational state of the system with the respect to its effectiveness at assimilating a new event. Put differently, affect is how much sense new event makes to me. If my construct system is struggling to assimilate an event, to make sense of it in terms of likeness to what I already understand, if I only experience the event in terms of incoherences, then my experiencing will be one of chaos and confusion. This is what anxiety is for Kelly. If I anticipate that an event may lie outside the range of convenience of my system , this is threat. So basically all affective terms for Kelly describe my relative success or failure to make sense of my world. It is important to understand that feeling is not a RESPONSE. to such success or failure, not a mechanism that detects such organizational changes after the fact and then relays them to one’s consciousness in the guise of kinesthetic or proprioceptive receptors. Feeling simply IS the organizational dynamics as they are directly experienced. — Joshs

To some extent, I feel, especially while I am not working that I am not really part of any structures and do not have any influence of any significance. Many other people also feel marginalised. So , I would say that personally, I hold onto the value of creativity and awareness, my ideas or so called creative quest barely counts within the framework of structures which exist. Of course, I think that the structures should change but no one cares what I think at all. But, saying that I am wondering if there is a danger of thinking that one's own influence does not matter because perhaps it does count, because there are many dimensions of existence. — Jack Cummins

It is creativity - in terms of awareness, connection and collaboration beyond ‘existing structures’ - that enables the perception of structure to change. There is a danger in thinking that your influence does not matter, or that no one cares what you think - these are limited perceptions that stifle your creativity, as I was describing to Brett earlier in reference to understanding. You seem to have plenty of skills and experience that are sorely needed in these unusual times by people who are marginalised - it would be a shame to let that go to waste by limiting yourself ‘within the framework of structures which exist’. Sometimes acting as if the structures are different can be enough to change them - ‘be the change you wish to see in the world’ is about creativity - recognising that the way you perceive the world matters, it’s just that no one else can see how it matters until you find a way to manifest it in the world. Awareness and connection are just the beginning: it is collaboration that engages the world in change. We need to stop thinking that change happens all at once when the ‘right person’ decides - often 99% of it is already in place by then. Like with the question of originality, is it more important to be recognised as the change-maker, or that change occurs?