What I describe is a general formula which accounts for all instances of consciousness derived from external sensory information. The choice of words, I admit, could be better. Quantitative information might be better then reason, but it depends on what is being integrated. There are no assumptions here however, that information is integrated is evidenced by the Euclidian space you see. The rate at which this is sampled is an interesting question. Given there exists a plank length of time, we know consciousness is not a smooth process, as you have conceived it. That information is sampled at the plank length is highly unlikely, given that we are unable to distinguish between 30 Fps and smooth continuous time. So it is unlikely to be more then 30 to 40 a second. Energy efficiency being the pertinent consideration. — Pop
Consciousness is derived from an ongoing relation between external
and internal sensory information, among other relations. I am not disputing that information is integrated prior to consciousness, but I do dispute that any external sensory information is integrated quantitatively (ie. consolidated) prior to
experience. You’re assuming this evidence of Euclidean space can be ‘seen’ by all life. But I would argue that the capacity to ‘see’ Euclidean space is contingent upon a self-conscious, reasoning system, and assumes that a consolidated, bio-molecular structure exists at zero. This is the rational framework of human conception. Incidentally, an application of Euclidean n-space to a monist reality that is inclusive of both particle physics and consciousness requires a challenging paradigm shift: that no assumption of consolidation exists at zero-point energy. This changes the way we look at reality.
We commonly refer to sampling in terms of ‘rate’ - a relative temporal quantity - only because Shannon information assumes the existence of a consolidated 3D structure at 0. But life is an
integrated four, five or six-dimensional system, so qualitative sampling can re-organise information, even in a single-celled organism, across sub-atomic particles, atoms and molecular systems according to its relational structure, and all at once. Every level of relational structure in an integrated system recognises affect (effort and attention) in one form or another - this is why life differs markedly from computer systems - where effort (hardware) and attention (software) are isolated system structures.
I also provide some proof of the construction through an articulation of qualia.
The qualia of life is consciousness
The qualia of consciousness are experiences.
The qualia of experiences are emotions.
The qualia of emotions are feelings.
The qualia of feelings are points on the PPS
The qualia of points on the PPS are death - pain / pleasure - life.
The qualia of life is consciousness – this completes the consciousness loop.
You see there is a loop that binds my construction together - all these elements are related by qualia and so no individual element can exist on it's own. When you consider one element you can not do so without all the others. Your understanding dose not recognize this at all. You would have to disprove this conception in order to logically dismiss it. — Pop
This is not proof of the construction - you apply the term ‘qualia’ as a placeholder concept, a metaphor for any type of relational aspect: kind of like ‘God’. Quale is commonly defined as: a quality or property perceived or experienced by a person. The problem with defining any qualitative property with a concept such as ‘qualia’ is that a self-conscious system can then apply the term to refer to
objects as if they were consolidated information in themselves. But the only consolidated information in the concept ‘qualia’ is the ‘person’, as a conscious system. Everything else is relative. It makes more sense to state:
Experience is a qualitative property of consciousness.
It’s important to note that ‘experience’ as a qualitative property is not the same as quantified or consolidated information. The process of integrating properties of consciousness into relational structure is not necessarily causal or temporal. This gradually developed, tested and refined structure enables self-consciousness and reason, in which ‘experiences’ - as potentially quantifiable patterns of relation - can be probabilistically conceptualised and re-structured into
potentially consolidating information, leaving only ‘feeling’ in relation to these experiences, as an unconsolidated/qualitative property of what is a potentially consolidating (conceptual) ‘reality’.
Feeling is a qualitative property of self-consciousness.
Once again, not the same as quantified or even
potentially consolidating information. The process of integrating properties of self-consciousness into relational structure is not necessarily conscious or rational. To understand it, we construct ‘emotion concepts’: predictive patterns of relational structure between a potentially consolidating ‘self’ and a potentially consolidating ‘reality’. What needs to be recognised here is that nothing in this relational structure is ever
actually consolidated. It all consists of conceptualised relational structure, effectively in a ‘superpositioned state’, so to speak.
But let’s go back a couple of steps and ask: is consciousness a qualitative property of life? It can be assumed - given that there IS a qualitative property to life - but there is no proof that all life is conscious. I would argue, however, that consciousness is enabled at the most basic level by integrating qualitative properties of life into relational structure, in a process that is not necessarily observable or measurable. I would also argue that Barrett demonstrates that:
Affect is a qualitative property of life.
I’ll admit that definitions of words commonly available to us are not helping our discussion. There is a dimensional distinction between the qualitative properties of living (affect), of conscious (qualia), and of self-conscious/reasoning systems (emotions). You seem to assume that these qualitative properties are the same (qualia), but it seems evident to me that they are structurally different, each perceptibly and apperceptively contingent upon a certain structural complexity in the system. What’s more, looping your metaphorical conception back onto itself excludes any relation to the physical or chemical structures of reality - once again suggesting a dualism that appears to contradict your position.
So, I would argue instead that:
Affect is a qualitative property of life.
Integrating affect in relation to life develops consciousness.
Experience is a qualitative property of consciousness.
Integrating experience in relation to consciousness develops self-consciousness and enables reason.
Feeling is a qualitative property of self-consciousness.
Integrating feeling in relation to self-consciousness develops the possibility of meaning and purpose.
Emotion is a predictive relational structure between a potential self and a potential reality.
Your conception has a gaping hole, In my opinion, in that you do not describe an experience at all. You skip from information integration to Affect arbitrarily. In so doing you do not account for what it feels like to be conscious. You skip the pertinent aspect of consciousness - how experience is emotional, how feelings are painful or pleasurable. And so you create a conception of consciousness befitting a P.Zombie. — Pop
I don’t think I’ve skipped this aspect of consciousness at all. Experience is not emotional - a self-conscious system I can be described as emotional in relating a potential self to a potential reality. Feelings are not EITHER painful or pleasurable - feeling has a dual aspect of valence (pleasant/unpleasant) and arousal (low/high) as the qualitative property of a self-conscious system.
We both understand what it feels like to be conscious - I don’t need to explain that to you. How I understand it is always going to be different from how you understand it, and any attempt I make to
describe an experience will necessarily be positioned
within consciousness, and so cannot create a complete explanation of consciousness - only a subjective expression of it.
To explain consciousness, you need to propose and refine a perspective of consciousness
beyond ‘feeling’. This is not a p.zombie conception, but rather re-examines Kant’s proposal of a ‘Copernican Turn’: to reject the assumption that human reason is motionless, and that our perspective of reality is central.
The way I see it:
1. The conceptual system predicts an interoception of affect from existing conceptual structures;
2. Affect determines attention and effort across the organism to align with this prediction;
3. This alignment adjusts interaction, directing the organism’s experience of sensory information;
4. Sensory information informs the interoceptive network of errors in the prediction-alignment process;
5. The interoceptive network translates these errors into a dialogue determining the attention/valence and effort/arousal required to most efficiently and effectively re-align with the conceptual system, given the organism’s other anticipated energy requirements. — Possibility
Every one of your 5 points contains an unprovable assumption. It is a typical and reasonable proposition of how information might be integrated, but that is all. There is no hint as to why this should be happening. — Pop
I have never assumed that this
should be happening. That it is a reasonable proposition of how information might be integrated at this level is a start. But I’ve specifically described it to align it with current neuroscience on emotion-related information. So that, as research improves our understanding of interoception, the theory becomes scientifically provable.
My theory contains:
1. A provable definition of consciousness - every instance of consciousness is self organization - for everything - always. It is a dynamic system even for rocks.
2. How experiences are emotional, ( contain carrot and stick ), as an explanation of what animates the biological system
3. How inanimate matter becomes conscious - through self organization, that has almost universal acceptance in abiogenesis theory.
You may not agree with it, but I don't believe you can reasonably disprove it. So far you have made some dints in certain aspects ( and I thank you for your help ), but it still floats. You offer up an alternative theory, which contains no explanation for the three points I mention, and so from a philosophical point of view I wonder why you even bother with it. Your theory is like dozens of reasonable theories that do not address the hard problem, but wait to be rescued by more information down the track. Unless they address the points I mention, they are just not in the race as an explanation of consciousness, in my opinion. — Pop
As I have said from the start, you do not have an explanation of consciousness - all you have is an expression of consciousness, from a position within consciousness.
1. This is not a definition of consciousness. But let me see if I can position your thinking here.
A. Examples of self-organisation occur at every level of dimensional structure.
B. Human consciousness can be described as a form of self-organisation.
C. In human consciousness, organisation occurs at every level of dimensional structure.
D. “Every instance of consciousness is self-organisation - for everything - always.”
E. Conversely, every instance of self-organisation is consciousness - “It is a dynamic system even for rocks”.
F. Therefore, panpsychism.
I wanted to point out, first of all, that I agree with statements A, B and C. Self-organisation in human consciousness is a highly integrated system, effective all the way down to the sub-atomic level. This is not the same type of self-organisation that occurs in crystallisation or other rock formations, though. Crystallisation is a form of self-organisation that occurs only on one level of dimensional structure - specifically at the level of molecular relations - there is no organisation occurring at any other level. Just because it seems (from our limited perspective of consciousness) that every instance of consciousness can be described as a form of self-organisation, it does not follow that every instance of self-organisation is equal to consciousness. This distinction between self-organisation and
integrated self-organisation is explained more clearly in Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness.
2. Experiences are not emotional - a self-conscious system is emotional in relating a potential self to a potential reality. What motivates a biological system is affect: relational/qualitative information as a four-dimensional structure of effort and attention. Any ‘emotion’ in relation to that structure is attributed from
your consciousness.
3. Inanimate matter is attributed consciousness from your relation to it, particularly from your perception of its potential in relation to yours. But inanimate matter is really only vaguely aware of a certain variability in its organisational structure at each moment of interaction, and only in relation to that particular interaction. All other information regarding its capacity for self-organisation is attributed in your conception by your own relation to it.
From my perspective, all of your vertical down conceptions are P.Zombies without emotion providing impetus. Unemotional Information, energy and matter cannot create consciousness - we know this from an understanding of ourselves. Add emotion, and you have consciousness! It is consciousness that requires emotion, not the other way around. Relational information on it's own cannot create an enduring consciousness until a self is created. Once a self is created then self organization can take place around this nucleus. That a self is created suggests a bias to be, or at least we know that the self that is biased to be will prevail. Selves that are random, or indifferent to be, will disintegrate. Relational information is already consolidated to a higher system, so it is elements of a higher system that are relating and consolidating, and disintegrating, but then a certain type of relational information contains a bias to be, and consolidates and breaks away from the higher system, in the formation of a self. Then enduring self organization can take place ( consciousness ). — Pop
Consciousness isn’t just a matter of adding emotion to information. Unemotional information exists only in our misconception of reality. Information cannot exist without relational structure - that we isolate ‘information’ from ‘emotion’ is a fundamental misconception in human reasoning. Relational information is primal, so yes, it CAN ‘create’ an enduring consciousness simply by interacting with other relational information - because it is relational information (and nothing else) that constitutes a potential self.
It seems you’re assuming that a consolidated higher system precedes self-organisation, but I would dispute this. What precedes self-organisation is a vague perception of potential, of variability in organisational structure. But as a self-conscious, reasoning observer, who may be more informed of this potential (from previous experience) than the structure itself, YOU attribute consolidation to this higher system - because the ‘higher system’ is
your consciousness. And any interaction you then have with the structure necessarily
informs it of this potential you perceive. So what you’re describing is your conception of the relational process between your consciousness (the ‘consolidated higher system’) and the relational information in question, at this point in time. Once you recognise this, you can work on a clearer understanding of the relational information in question, in terms of how conception of it might vary in relation to a differently consolidated consciousness.
Consolidation is a perception, a form of self-organisation that isolates relational structures within an integrated system, in order to specifically attribute attention/effort as required. Only a self-conscious system has the capacity to conceptualise ‘emotion’, and attribute it as a property to any isolated relational structure within its conception.
Emotion is information, but it is a private information only you can experience. Why do we have these internal carrot and stick communications? Who or what is communicating internally? — Pop
Only you can experience your emotion as such because of the unique way that you structure relational information, according to the relational structure of your past experience. But if you consider that ‘emotion’ is just a predictive pattern of relational structure between a potentially consolidating self and a potentially consolidating reality - then theoretically it may be possible to map all relational information as affect in a superposition state. The challenge is for physicists to recognise that this is essentially what quantum mechanics does: reduces relational information to a dimensionally-structured prediction of attention and effort when aligned with an observer’s defined position. But that’s another discussion.
The communication occurs between conceptually isolated relational structures within an integrated system, in order to maximise the efficiency of awareness, connection and collaboration. The system communicates with itself through complex organisational systems of ongoing consolidation, relation and integration. It is the integration capacity that is often overlooked in seeking to explain consciousness: we are motivated not just to exist or survive as we are, but to increase awareness, to connect and collaborate with all of existence, regardless of our perceived limitations.
Kant refers to three categories of quantity: existence as if one (unity), as one of (plurality), and as the only one (totality). The extent to which a system achieves a dynamic balance between all three is the ultimate success of relational structure - not human consciousness or reason.