In many cases, the things as they appear are very much the things as they are. If I am beholding an apple, I can be sure that I am holding an apple and not a frog. In this case the noumenal and the phenomenal are the same thing; and senses very much are a valid guide to reality. — Ilya B Shambat

The question you should ask is this: how do you know whether all the sensations of an apple (color, shape, smell, taste etc.) are caused by an apple in and of itself and not by a frog that causes you to perceive an apple?

fdrake pointed that out back on page one. — SophistiCat

I also pointed out that I think there is a problem with the doomsday argument on page one. I then spent the remaining pages trying to come up with a convincing argument, but unfortunately this seems to have driven off the remaining participants.

Of course, the matter is not so cut and dried as to be dismissed out of hand, as evidenced by decades of arguments over The Sleeping Beauty, Doomsday, Simulation, etc. And the issue is not confined to abstract philosophical puzzles either: it lies at the heart of some conundrums in modern cosmology as well (typicality, fine-tuning).

For more on the general form of the issue look into self-locating beliefs. — SophistiCat

I agree it's a very thorny problem. Likely one for which there will never be a convincing purely mathematical solution (or one including formal logic). I was kind of reminded of the "Monty-Hall Problem". That one is considered solved, but it continues to baffle people.

I think my initial response, one page one, is still sound insofar as the problem of all these "self-locating" problems is that they apparently create new information ex-nihilo. The difficulty lies in properly explaining how a valid application of statistical principles leads to an invalid result. I earlier suspected that it has something to do with considering all future humans to have already lived when assuming one is a random observer. This would not directly apply to, say, the Sleeping Beauty problem. Both do, however, share the issue of whether or not the observer is privileged and can therefore not be considered to be randomly selected.

True. It still makes me wonder whether we can say anything at all about the graphs though. From a mathematical point of view, yes. But I wonder if there is more to it.

Found this video about the subject btw. Nick Bostrom explains the doomsday argument very clearly: — Mind Dough

Seems well put. There seems to be some problem with the doomsday argument, but it's not a simple mathematical problem but one that has to do with more basic considerations. You can probably say that the problem is not that the math is wrong, is that the math doesn't provide a good model for reality in this case. So if we were just talking about the graphs as graphs, it might be fine to conclude that graph 2 is more likely.

Sure, the mathematical operation itself isn't circular. If it were that obvious people would have realized long ago. It's actually quite difficult to find an argument against it, and my argument is probably pretty muddled at this point.

I think there is a hidden assumption in treating the entire future human population as an already existing and closed sequence of persons that you can then find you place in via statistical analysis. Perhaps applying the Copernican principle is actually wrong here. Your viewpoint is privileged, as you are already born. You can no longer be considered a random element.

Anyways, I was hoping my examples would make it easier to understand what I meant, but you don't seem interested.

I think we are asking something like: Is there a smaller chance of you being you when there are more people in existence. — Mind Dough

Well if that's the question, the answer pretty clearly has to be no. The chance that you will be born is not related to how many people exist afert you were born.

The Doomsday argument only works because we have information about the past (the number of people who have already lived) whereas in your analogy we don't, so they're not comparable. — Michael

I don't think it's that easy. The actual claim that the doomsday argument makes is the following:

In other words, we could assume that we could be 95% certain that we would be within the last 95% of all the humans ever to be born. If we know our absolute position n, this implies an upper bound for N obtained by rearranging n/N > 0.05 to give N < 20n. — Michael

That is to say humanity will likely end before more than 20 times the number of humans that have lived so far will have lived. That statement remains the same for any point in time you do this calculation, so for the ancient Egyptians it would have been the same formula as for us. This is the part that purports to generate information, and it does so without reference to the past.

Putting in the numbers is merely reformulating the result.

This seems backwards. These arguments are being used to suggest how probable the above scenarios are; e.g. the Doomsday reasoning is used to assign a low probability to humans surviving until the heat death of the universe. — Michael

Well, yes. My point is that the doomsday argument is essentially circular reasoning. If you already know the probability you don't need the doomsday argument.

In fact I didn’t even say that. I said the thought experiment involves abstracting yourself from history then putting yourself back in. I didn’t mean that is literally something that happens. — AJJ

If that's not literally what happens, how can we use the thought experiment as evidence that a particular scenario is more or less likely?

We can't "put ourselves back into history" since we don't know the extent of history. So what we end up doing is assuming that our lives represent a random spot in a bounded distribution. This, however, is also not accurate since our position in time is not a random point on humanity's timeline. Since we already exist we occupy a fixed position on that timeline, and the timeline is not finished so we can't run statistical analysis on it.

It's true that we can only calculate the probabilities if we know the distribution, but the questions being posed in this discussion are in the form "if the human population over time is distributed like this then what is the probability that we will live during this time period" in which case we have a known distribution from which to calculate a probability.

Obviously in real life we don't know how the human population will be distributed. We don't know the rate at which the population will grow or decline or stabilise over time, which is why I answered that we can't know when humanity will end. The only thing I've been trying to argue is that if the human population grows at a steady rate until an immediate end such that the last generation is the largest it doesn't follow that we are probably the last generation – that's only true if the last generation contains more than half of all humans who will ever live. — Michael

My argument is that, for the purposes of statistical analysis, we cannot treat an unbounded future distribution like a bounded past one. For example, you have to consider the possibility that humanity survives until the heat death of the universe. A priori, that scenario is as likely as humanity disappearing tomorrow. Since the scenario is possible, it must have an effect on your calculation. So you'd have to first assign a probability to that scenario and every other possible end point until you could make a meaningful calculation.

Consider this example: There is a machine that, when you press a button, produces a random ball from it's inventory. Balls are either red or blue. The machine starts with 10 red balls. Every hour, a blue ball is added. You find this machine an unspecified amount of time after it has begun operating. Are you more likely to receive a red or a blue ball?

The way I see it, the logic of the doomsday argument would have you pick blue. After all, there are potentially many more blue balls than red ones. I say that the question has no answer. You cannot calculate any meaningful probability without further information. That is despite the fact that you know the exact distribution of balls for every hour of operation.

In order to make the problem solvable, you have to introduce an upper limit and then calculate from there.

The argument doesn’t posit this. That’s just a useful way of visualising — AJJ

Didn't you tell me earlier that this was, in fact, your argument?

In memory of the discussion we had a while back on the Sleeping Beauty problem, say you're going to be put to sleep. A scientist will select one of the coloured balls at random. If it's red then you'll be woken on Monday; if it's orange you'll be woken on Tuesday; and so on.

Before you're put to sleep you're asked about the probability that you will be woken on Monday. That probability is 1/15. You're put to sleep and then woken up on your randomly selected day. What's the probability that it's Monday? It's still the same 1/15 it was before you were put to sleep. — Michael

I think I know where we are talking past each other. You are looking at this from the perspective of the experimenter, who decides in advance what ball to give to the player, knowing the sequence of colours. So from you perspective, all balls are always in the pool.

I am looking at this from the perspective from the player who just receives a ball. The ball can be drawn from a machine. The machine draws from a pool of balls that changes over time in the manner outlined above. In that case, we have to account for the fact that the machine will more likely than not have drawn from a limited pool.

What I want to illustrate is that, if the pool of balls is not fixed in advance, the probabilities can change quite drastically. In such a case, merely assuming to have drawn from the largest group is mistaken. This is the case for the argument made in this thread. There is no "experimenter" that knows the sequence in advance and has assigned you a slot in the history of humankind. You simply know you "drew" a slot, but not whether or not the pool is limited. In that situation, you need further information.

It's described in the argument:

"If Leslie's figure is used, then 60 billion humans have been born so far, so it can be estimated that there is a 95% chance that the total number of humans N will be less than 20 × 60 billion = 1.2 trillion. Assuming that the world population stabilizes at 10 billion and a life expectancy of 80 years, it can be estimated that the remaining 1140 billion humans will be born in 9120 years" — Michael

Sure, that's what happens mathematically. But since we're on a philosophy forum, let's look at it from an epistemological perspective. It's not actually possible to compute the (likely) end of humanity based on the input information here, would you agree? If so, then what does that probability actually mean?

Well it’s how the argument I’ve been making goes. — AJJ

In that case your conclusions on the first page:

This shows how unlikely it is that we’ll ever expand out into the galaxy, since it would mean we’re all part of a tiny fraction of all humans, rather than the other huge group. Instead it stands to reason that we’re at the top of graph 2’s curve. — AJJ

Don't follow from your argument.

That's wrong. When the experimenter is deciding who to give the red ball to at T1 there's only a 1/15 chance that he picks me. Therefore there's a 1/15 chance that when he gives me a ball it's red, and so a 1/15 chance that when he gives me a ball it's T1. — Michael

Uh, what do you mean "who to give the ball"? It was never mentioned that the balls are distributed among 15 people. This is all based on the assumption that you get one ball out of a pool of 15 balls.

Given that whether or not the other 14 balls are lying in a box somewhere or in the hands of 14 other people is irrelevant from the perspective of the "player", I also don't see how you arrive at different probabilities here. If it's T1 and you have a ball, the ball must be red. It's not possible for it to be T1 and the red ball being in some other person's hands, because you have a ball.

The Doomsday argument is an interesting one to consider: — Michael

While the argument is mathematically different, it's the same kind of statistical analysis. So the same criticism would apply: how could we generate information (in the form of a probability) about the end of humanity based on the input information?

I don’t think either is OK, since we can’t be anyone else. The thought experiment involves abstracting yourself from history then putting yourself back in randomly. We find that the last generation is the most likely one for us to wind up in, so that’s what makes sense for us to think, even though it’s not unlikely we’re somewhere else. — AJJ

That's not quite how the argument goes. If we exited history and then randomly re-entered it, we might indeed be justified in reasoning we'd enter somewhere nearer the end of humanity. But the argument had been whether or not probability theory tells us there is an increased probability we are close to the end right now.

No. — Michael

Which begs the question how we are supposed to calculate such a probability in the first place if we lack information on it.

I agree with that if there are more people in rooms 1 - 4 than there are in 5. — Michael

Ok, so this is how I think the probabilities look when we don't know what "stage" we are in. Since we don't have information on the length of the stages, we should assume we are equally likely to be in each one.

T1: 1/5
R: 1/1 -> 1/5

T2: 1/5
R: 1/3 -> 1/15
O: 2/3 -> 2/15

T3: 1/5
R: 1/6 -> 1/30
O: 2/6 -> 2/30
Y: 1/2 -> 1/10

T4: 1/5
R: 1/10 -> 1/50
O: 1/5 -> 1/25
Y: 3/10 -> 3/50
G: 2/5 ->2/25

T5: 1/6
R: 1/15 -> 1/75
O: 2/15 -> 2/75
Y: 1/5 -> 1/30
G. 4/15 -> 4/75
B: 1/3 -> 1/15

This neatly reverses the probabilities. Because red is always in the game, it has a total probability of 1/3, and we should now always bet red.

Have I made some grave error here?

P(T1) = 1/15
P(T2) = 2/15
P(T3) = 1/5
P(T4) = 4/15
P(T5) = 1/3

So, if we have to bet on a time then betting on T5 gives us the best odds. This is where I agree with AJJ. However, given that P(T1-T4) = 2/3, it's most likely not T5. This is where I disagree with AJJ.

And, as I said before, there's no circular reasoning here, and it's the same reasoning as used in the case of which time period we're living in (it's just "people being born at time" rather than "balls being given out at time"). — Michael

But it seems to me that it should make a difference that it's possible that not all balls are in the game. The chance that there is one red ball is 100% (as we have been given a ball, so it must be at least T1). The chance that orange balls are in the game must be less than 100%, since it could still be T1. Similarly, the chance that there are yellow balls in the game must be less than 100%. Doesn't the probability that each "stage" of the game has already happened decrease linearly? It's more likely that at least 2 stages have elapsed than it is that all 5 stages have elapsed. Isn't it like the room problem? I don't know which room I am in, but I am more likely to be in room 1-4 than in room 5.

If you agree with AJJ's take on the basic probabilities, then do you also agree that we can somehow deduce the timing of humanity's demise based on just the information outlined in the thought experiment?

Sorry if I wasn't clear. I'm just told the rules and then given a hidden ball. I don't know if my ball is blue and I don't know if the time I was given the ball (say 12:00pm) is T5. — Michael

So what are the probabilities P(it is at most T4) and P(it is T5 or later)? If they aren't equal, this changes the probability to have a blue ball.

That’s not right. Take my example with the coloured balls. 1 red is given out at T1, then 2 orange at T2, then 3 yellow at T3, then 4 green at T4, and then 5 blue at T5. There’s nothing circular in saying that if I have to bet on which Tn my ball was given to me then T5 gives me the best odds (1/3). It doesn’t make sense to say that if I was given my ball at T4 then T5 doesn’t give me the best odds. That’s like saying that if my ball is red then betting on blue doesn’t give me the best odds. That’s not how probabilities are calculated. — Michael

That's true, but in your example, you know you're already after T5. That is to say all balls are in the game. With the doomsday argument, this is not the case. In your example, you'd have to account for the probability that there are no blue balls at all yet.

I don’t think it is. The only presumption is population growth until an abrupt demise. It then follows that the final X years will have a greater population than any earlier X-year range, and so therefore that betting on the final X years will give us the best odds of winning. — Michael

That is if we are in fact living in the final years. If we're not, then betting on the last rooms gives you no better chance of winning. Your position in the rooms is determined by time, not population number, so you can only be in the largest group (given continuous population growth) by being in the last group. So, the question ends up circular.

Assuming population growth (and an abrupt rather than gradual end), you're more likely to win if you select the last 5 rooms (assuming the rooms are numbered according to the time period). — Michael

Whatever the last five are, because that will be the range with the most people in it. That’s assuming we go extinct quickly, but whatever the choice you’d choose a range towards the end of all the rooms. — AJJ

So, the argument here is the last five presumably have the most people, and presumably we're in the largest group.

But we're assuming population growth as well. So if humanity stays around after us, the chance that we are in the last 5 rooms drops dramatically. So to answer the last 5 rooms is presuming - and not proving - that humanity's demise will come relatively soon. If the demise isn't soon - and we have no prior information on that - the chances might be completely different.

Our ignorance here is such that even betting on being in the largest (and therefore last) group doesn't work, because the way we've set the thought experiment (assuming population growth and a rapid decline) the question we are asking is actually "are we in the largest group". The argument thus ends up circular.

Yes. — AJJ

That seems to me an utterly fantastical claim. It would imply that the laws of physics somehow base humanity's demise on the first person who is formulating this doomsday argument in their heads.

Well sure, I guess reasoning doesn’t generate information, but it does discover it. — AJJ

So are you claiming that information concerning the timing of the end of humanity is encoded in a) the fact that humans exist right now and b) the assumption that the living human population will be highest shortly before it's demise?

The groups we’re using in the thought experiment are real though: Generations, with the assumption that each is larger than the last, which so far has actually been the case. — AJJ

Generations aren't real. they are more or less arbitrary groupings of people who were born in the same time period. But regardless, the generations are the rooms in the hotel. You want to know which room you're in.

So let's set up a proper thought experiment: The entire human population that will ever have lived is grouped into 100 hotel rooms. Every room represents the same amount of time between humanity's evolution and it's demise, but you don't know how long that is. Every room is an incredibly vast extradimensional space, and it is completely dark, so you don't know how many other people are in your room and you have no way of communicating with them.

Now a voice tells you that you will go to heaven if you can guess which room you're in. You can choose any range of 5 rooms as your guess, as long as you're in any one of them, you win. Which range do you choose?

I would say a reasonable assumption is information. It’s certainly something we can reason from.

No it doesn’t contain information about humanity’s demise. It’s the mathematical reasoning that shows we’re most likely close to that demise. — AJJ

Mathematical reasoning, being a deductive process, cannot generate information though.

The probability does change if you divide the rooms into groups. If I say you’re either in rooms 1 or 2 or in any of the rest, then it’s most likely you’re in the second “any of the rest” group. — AJJ

If those are the groups you are given by some outside source. But if no outside source provides you with any groupings, and you're just standing alone in a room, you cannot reason yourself into rooms 3 to 100 by arbitrarily deciding on these groups. Given arbitrary groups, one can make any sequence of rooms the most likely one. No such thought experiment tells you where you actually are though.

It's even worse when, as is the case with future generations, you don't even know how many rooms there are. If you simply know there are n rooms and you are in one of them, there is no way to tell what number your room is. Yet the logic of the "doomsday argument" would have you believe that you can.

You’ve blundered here and now you’re trying too hard to disagree with me. — AJJ

Or perhaps this isn't about you and I'm just interested in the topic.

The information we use is the assumption that the final generation will be the largest one. — AJJ

But as you state, this isn't information, but an assumption. But even if we grant the assumption as essentially correct, it does still not contain any information about humanities demise, so the question of where that information comes from remains.

The mathematical reasoning we use is that it’s most likely for a random person to be part of the largest group, assuming we don’t already know where they are. — AJJ

As an analogy, take the hotel room example. You're in a hotel with 100 rooms, but you don't know which room you're in. If someone asks you whether you are in the first ten rooms, your answer should be no. But if someone asks you whether you are in room 2 or in room 50 your answer should not be fifty just because you are more likely not to be in the first 10 rooms. Because for that specific question, the probability of either is 1/100. This probability doesn't change if you arbitrarily divide the hotel rooms into groups.

So in order to make a meaningful statement, the groups need to be given in advance. Otherwise, just knowing you're "in the largest group" tells you nothing because groups don't actually exist as physical objects.

No we aren’t, and yes we can. — AJJ

So, which is it? Do we have further information that allows us to make a determination or are we creating information ex nihilo using math?

Just saying "it's mathematical reasoning" is the same as saying "it's magic".

If we know that someone is not at the top of Graph 2’s curve then obviously they’re not at the top of Graph 2’s curve. But we don’t know where we are, and in that ignorance the probability that we’re at the top of Grapxh 2’s curve comes into play. — AJJ

But we're turning that ignorance into a probability without further information. That is impossible. If we're ignorant about what graph we are on and where we are on that graph, we can't magically turn said ignorance into new information using math

My feeling says this is not an argument for having a larger chance that graph two is true, but I am wondering about the argumentation on that. I suspect something in the line of survivorship bias, but I am still curious whether this is an existing thought experiment (I think I saw this somewhere before) and what the arguments/criticisms are. — Mind Dough

It's not a named bias as far as I am aware. It amounts to magical thinking though. It's very similar in that regard to the "fine tuning" arguments. Math (in this case statistics) is used to mask the fact that the argument has no substance. You'll notice that this "doomsday argument" has only a single piece of information as input: that right now, humans exist. It puports to derive from that information a piece of entirely new information - the likelihood of humanities imminent demise.

But how does it get from one bit of information to the other? It does not account for current trends in global politics, the economy or the environment. It simply transforms one piece of information into another. That is, it creates information ex-nihilo, which is impossible.

The interesting question is: How does an application of mathematics that, on it's face, seems valid, lead to an absurd result?

This shows how unlikely it is that we’ll ever expand out into the galaxy, since it would mean we’re all part of a tiny fraction of all humans, rather than the other huge group. Instead it stands to reason that we’re at the top of graph 2’s curve. — AJJ

But according to that logic, it stands to reason that everyone who has ever lived was at the top of graph 2s curve, but they weren't. How is that possible?

Few it seems, if at all beyond yourself, wish to affirm that sentiment. — Vessuvius

It's easier to get an audience to engage if you don't make an effort to make yourself harder to understand (well, some audiences might find it mysterious, but being mysterious is only interesting if you intend to con people). For anyone who is not a native speaker, your text also contains too many specialized terms to be easiliy readable.

Okay, so this is my point. Morality is then not really to do with the CI but something else beyond it, or prior to it. — schopenhauer1

Well the CI is based on reason, so reason is prior to it.

You seem to be positing either some sort of moral sense, or socially-constructed agreement, or list of values that we all share and THIS becomes the source of the moral framework, not the CI itself. In fact, the CI presupposes that we already have a sense that hypocrisy is wrong. The CI does not therefore provide any of the actual morality, it's the values that we already have when we are applying the CI. — schopenhauer1

I can kinda see where you are coming from here. Yes the CI is not like a moral code, e.g. the ten commandments. It's purely a method to arrive at such rules. The "source" of the moral rules is human reasoning about the (hypothetical or actual) situation under consideration. This is not a flaw in my opinion though. Rather, this is what sets the CI apart from codes of rules which always have trouble finding solid ground to stand on.

This is where then we should focus it would seem to me. He can then admit that really it is more of a hypothetical imperative- "If we want to maintain a certain type of society, and we do not want to be hypocrites about maintaining that society, then the standard of CI would apply". But again, the type of society, and not being hypocritical would have to be addressed and examined first as to why that counts as moral in the first place. — schopenhauer1

But the CI, being a fully general method, does not rely on us first establishing a certain type of society. It works on any possible society. So long as the members of that society have shared interests, it will end up providing a framework to further those interests. That's the idea, anyways. All that you need to do is the ability to put your self in other people's shoes, as the saying goes. If everyone does that, and everyone's minds work roughly the same way, the result is that everyone ends up with roughly the same rules.

So the thief who revels in a society of treachery, and the oathbreaker who wants a world of untrustworthiness... — schopenhauer1

Yes, as I have already mentioned above there are maxims that concern anti- social behaviour yet do not lead to a self-contradiction. The most famous one is actually killing for personal gain.

These maxims result in societies no sane person would want to live in though, hence they still fail the CI. Of course there are persons who'd genuinely want such circumstances, but they would not be accessible to morality, no matter how convincing.

But...

1. This is very different from
whether you can add as many conditions as you like to a “maxim.”
— Theologian
which is what I was actually arguing against — Theologian

How is it "very different"? Could you provide a clear rule as to what conditions are and are not allowed?

The first is not expressed in the form "if X then Y," but I acknowledge it can be. "By any safe means" may be transformed to the X value as "if it is safe to do so." But this seems such a general condition as to be a virtually absent "X" to me.

Similarly so an X value that is "being in want of money," when the Y value is to go get some money. — Theologian

Perhaps Kant simply did not want to choose overtly complex examples. What makes you think there is a restriction to the kind of conditions that a maxim can have?

IF it is safe to do so, THEN I will absolve myself of all responsibility for the actions of all other rational beings.

There you go. Now it's a maxim. :smile: — Theologian

The reason it's not a maxim is not because you did not put it in the proper form. The reason is that it can not determine a will. You cannot will yourself to be absolved of responsibility. You can perhaps wish it to be so, or argue that it is so, but it's not something you can act on.

Otherwise... I think we may perhaps have reached the point where we may each agree that the other's posts speak for themselves, and require no further comment. — Theologian

So, you spend considerable effort to write these posts, yet you do not want to engage with my main criticism? I have repeated it in three different posts now, you have neither acknowledged it, nor even claimed I am wrong. What gives?

It's more about good or bad about what a society should do and the relations of people in that society. That is an assumption inherent in the ideas of property, trustworthiness, etc. — schopenhauer1

But these are assumptions that the acting people have. They are not inbuilt into the CI. The thief assumes something about property, the oathbreaker something about oaths. People have assumptions, and so their maxims will include them.

This really is very murky.. "human society".. "common ability to reason".. Not everyone has, does, or will come up with a same common reasoning about society and its interests. — schopenhauer1

Murky? What's murky about it? Is it unclear what I mean by "common ability to reason" or "human society"?

But sure, not everyone agrees on the details. But how much of that is due to personal interests or pre-existing beliefs? I don't think anyone can truly say.

There is already an assumption of what is good behind the "practical reasoning" for which the categorical imperative is supposed to focus on. — schopenhauer1

What is assumed about good and bad by starting from the fact that we are human beings that live together in a society?

Thus, "property is a concept that is good for society" is really more what Kant is saying morally, and not the categorical imperative. — schopenhauer1

Kant doesn't say this when he talks about the CI, though he did write about property and I don't think he ever questioned the idea of property. Whether or not Kant was correct in assuming that individual property is moral is a different question from the question of whether the CI is the correct standard to assess morality.

But this already means that the CI itself is just a heuristic and not morality itself- there is something beyond it whether that be a good, a value, or an emotional weight or moral sense of something, depending on your theory. — schopenhauer1

So, what is behind it? How does it get in?

I can't speak for Wittgenstein, but I would suggest that it means that a rule can't be contingently universal. There's a contradiction in terms there. — Theologian

That would be a contradiction in terms, but it's not what I said. Maxims aren't rules (though their structure is very similar) and they aren't universal (or else there'd be nothing to universalise).

Notice how in all of the above, Kant never once, not once, considers that there may be some alternative maxim that could also apply, and which you could at the same time will to be universal, and that this may, perhaps, make the act permissible. — Theologian

Of course he doesn't. Because, if you read the examples, you notice that they all just deal with the one maxim that actually describes the persons actual intentions. Other hypothetical maxims are not relevant.

Finally, currently there is a debate going on on this thread as to whether you can add as many conditions as you like to a “maxim.” Frankly, I don’t think that expanding out your maxims in this way is consistent with the term as used in Kant’s writings. — Theologian

If you look at the portion of Kant's writings you quoted, the maxims listed all have conditions. They have "when X is the case" segments.

The more freedom you give me to design maxims as I see fit, the easier it becomes for me to come up with at least one maxim that seems to apply that no-one could at the same time will to be universal. The freedom to add additional clauses and contingencies as I see fit makes it easier, not harder, for me to dream up some perverse maxim that an act is in accordance which, yet which you could not, at the same time, will to be universal. You’re strengthening, not weakening my hand. — Theologian

The problem is that you still misunderstand how the CI applies. I have pointed this out twice already. The CI evaluates a particular maxim. One which you either actually want to adopt or merely want to consider for the future. The maxim comes first, the act second. Of you take an act and then "dream up" arbitrary maxims it might fit you're simply doing it wrong. That exercise is entirely unrelated to Kant's system.

What I said above is fine just so long as all our maxims are "Thou shalt nots." But what if we also have a maxim that's a "thou shalt," and the two conflict? — Theologian

Maxims are neither "thou shalt" nor "thou shalt not". They're always "I will". The CI is not a canon of rules like the ten commandments. It's a self-test to run on your own behaviour. Expressing the results of a CI test as a law is a second step that you can use to determine behaviour in advance.

All (or at least most) ethical theorists have sought to establish an objective basis to their favored theory. Kant’s is that morals are implied a priori by reason. To be immoral is to be irrational, and to be perfectly rational is to be perfectly moral. That is what Kant actually said. — Theologian

Yes, but "rational" is not the same as "objective".

My own “naïve” response to this is that when you act according to a maxim, you are not making it universal. That is simply not the decision you are making. So superficially at least, it seems profoundly irrational to insist on acting as if it was. — Theologian

It's a good thing, then, that Kant does not insists that this is the case. When you apply the CI, you imagine your maxim as if it were a universal law. It stays a maxim in your head, however.

So what masquerades as Kant’s conclusion – that there is an objective basis to morality – is in fact his unstated premise: That there is an objective basis to morality. So reduced to its naïve form, with its real fundamental premise laid bare, Kant’s true argument form devolves to A therefore A. — Theologian

Now this is turning into pure nonsense. Kant doesn't claim his morals are based on an object somewhere, he claims they are based on reason. The CI doesn't come out of thin air. There is an actual derivation you can read.

Kant's solution only works if we absolve ourselves of all responsibility for the actions of others - or at least, of all others we recognize as rational beings. But suppose the maxim "absolve yourself of all responsibility for the actions of all other rational beings" became universal. — Theologian

That's not a maxim though.

There's several problems here. First, again is that it reduces to a hypothetical: "If you want to live in a world where property is honored for daily living, then you would not steal". There is an element of common interest there. We can choose to not value property and be okay living in a society that property doesn't matter. Perhaps it is a treacherous "all man for yourself" society that we desire. Then stealing would be fine. Sure, this is probably not something most people would value or desire, but in some possible world, person can indeed value this type of society. — schopenhauer1

There's a lot to unpack here. The "categorical" in the CI refers to the way you form your maxims, not to their content. You're supposed to be "motivated" by duty alone, and reason determines what that duty is. This ties back into Kant's conception of freedom.

The reason you apply though, is practical reason. As such, it does not operate in "some possible world" but always in the context of human society. And humans, by and large, have common interests. Sociopaths and mental illnesses exist, but those are exceptions. Kant assumes that humans have a common ability to reason, and I think it's difficult to disagree with that.

Thus, the contradiction itself like "property being useless as a concept", or some such, is really based on social norms, emotional feelings about the value that may or may not be contradicted, and more generally things that are more qualitative, probabilistic (being socially constructed and contingent), and not universal in application. — schopenhauer1

I think this is taking things a bit too far. There are no "emotional feelings" involved in determining whether or not a maxim is self-contradictory. You just look at what concepts the maxim presupposes. Those concepts may be themselves the result of social processes, but that doesn't turn the operation into a "qualitative, probabilistic" process. The process is subjective, yes, because morality isn't written down as some object somewhere. The universal application only ever happens in a mind.

Right, so the theory itself rests on the value/emotional weight put on property itself. There is something beyond the contradiction that is added. The thief has to actually value property in the first place. Thus, it does turn hypothetical: "If you value property, then you would not steal, as property itself would be usefuless for you". Hence why I claimed that the supposed "categorical" imperative becomes "hypothetical". — schopenhauer1

Well but the thief does value "property", in the sense that he values having secure access to material goods, or else what would the point of stealing be? It's important to look at the act from the perspective of the maxim. A thief's maxim might involve profiting from selling the stolen goods. In that case, it's obvious that the thief relies on the notion of property to benefit from the act (as without the notion, noone would buy). There are maxims where this kind of contradiction doesn't exist. For example, one might simply steal because one has no other way to acquire food, or simply to deprive the owner of the item in order to spite them. In those cases, no self-contradiction occurs, and it's then a matter of asking whether or not one can will the maxim to be universal.This second step is similar to the well known "golden rule", or perhaps in a more modern form Rawl's veil of ignorance.

I watched the first episode of the acclaimed new Chernobyl. THe opening lines were something along the lines of becoming so surrounded by lies that the concept of truth looses all meaning. — Wayfarer

Yes, in a way that is how Trump (and by now his entire administration) operates. To his followers though, truth is still important, they just feel that their deeply held truths and their protection is more important than anything else Trump lies about.

The constant lies have two purposes: to reassure his supporters that Trump will never ever admit to being wrong, thereby offering unwavering protection against reality, and to keep his opposition distracted from the last scandal with a new one every week.

Trump is strange in that he lies about dumb things where other politicians would tell the truth, but he’ll also occasionally tell the truth where others would lie, e.g., cheating on his taxes (“it makes me smart”) & accepting oppo research from a foreign government. — Erik

I don't think it's all that strange. Trump is just narcissistic and not very smart. He will tell the most outrageous lies to protect his ego, but he often isn't smart enough to realize what he should and shouldn't say.

Pity that people fall for it. — Wayfarer

I don't think people really "fall for it". Rather, people who have existing views that are in some way not acceptable to current society (be it not scientifically supported or not socially accepted in many circles) use Trump to shield their existing views from criticism. Trump becomes one more way to compartmentalize the world into the people that are right because they agree with me and the people who are just haters/shills or work for the evil agenda of government/banks/mass media/the Jews.

This is also why Trump seems immune to scandals and fact-checking. He isn't really relevant as a person.

I don't see why there couldn't be something that shakes out in some universal violation.. "If everyone didn't allow for exceptions for emotional grieving, out of reasons of civility, that would itself endanger civility".. I don't know.. I'm sure I can think of a better one, but you get my gist. — schopenhauer1

Not everything that seems impractical is a contradiction in terms of the CI. It's not like being rude to customers, for example, is the only way to process grief. What Kant means by self-contradicting behavior is not maxims that "endanger" a positive value, but maxims that, if universalized, would defeat their own purpose. The thief aims to enrich himself, but if stealing were universalized, all the thief's wealth would be itself subject to stealing, and hence mostly worthless.

I kind of find it funny that he is pitting "reason" with "emotion". That's kind of a false dichotomy. Property, life, civility, trustworthiness would be things we would have to value in the first place. Presumably value has some sort of emotional preference attached to it. Actual, now that I think about it, another criticism is that these contradictions might reduce down to preference theory or a hypothetical imperative.. because it presumes that we must value property, getting along, etc. — schopenhauer1

That Kant unnecessarily pits reason against emotion is a common criticism, and one that later followers of his ideas have tried to rectify. But the CI does not rely on an emotional value attached to property, getting along etc. In fact that's the major reason why it has been so influential. Kant bases the CI purely on the form of a general law. It has no content. All content comes from examining maxims in a social setting and seeing which maxims, if universalized lead to outcomes that are both non-contradictory and can be willed regardless of your position in that society.

Once the maxim is made on the foundation Categorical imperative, it cannot give a maxim which we cannot rationally follow.Every moral act will be carried in some event which is logically related, but the circumstances need not to be mentioned.We will have a hierarchy of maxims that way, where we will end up selecting one maxim over another in a certain circumstance. — Wittgenstein

Why would this result in a hierarchy of maxims? If the maxims are conditional, they don't conflict in the first place. Kant considers the CI to be like your own personal law-giver. You should follow the law unconditionally, but the laws themselves, just like external laws, can have conditions.

I think most people would like to have statements like
" Do not kill except in self defense " , the problem with such maxims is that it can't be universalized.
Consider the CI
"Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law."
If we try to universalized the first statement, we will end up disputing what "self defense".The maxim " Do not kill" can be easily universalized, the right to live is well preserved. — Wittgenstein

But I just pointed out that "Do not kill" cannot be universalized, since there are circumstances where one would will to be killed, such as in defense of innocents. That what "self defense" entails precisely requires further examination is not grounds for claiming that it cannot be universalized. Even simple maxims like "respect the porperty of others" require further details on what exactly constitutes property.

We can apply the CI in logically related situations without specifying the particulars.
For example " Do not kill a murderer" or "Do not kill a soilder that has surrendered" are essentially saying "Do not kill".They can be applied to all particular situations if we take their general form. — Wittgenstein

But you just specified the particulars. Are you claiming that by reformulating the abstract maxim into a couple of more specific maxims, the specific maxims now somehow violate the CI?

In most of the countries, any lawyer would tell you, using " self defense" is arbitrary/difficult to apply in most of the cases. — Wittgenstein

Yeah no. Self defense is one of the simpler legal concepts.

Consider how killing someone who has trespassed into your property can be killed if you are also within the realm of your property but if you are outside of the property, you cannot kill the intruder. — Wittgenstein

Because when you are outside the property, it's not exactly defense, is it?

If we try to universalize it, everyone will act differently even with the same maxim. — Wittgenstein

But the basis of Kant's system is that everyone has access to the same rationality. So, if everyone rationaly thinks through what should and should not consider self-defense, they would not come up with different behaviors. If what you were saying here was true, then the CI itself could not work, since it presumes that every actor applies the CI internally and comes up with the same maxims.

Let's suppose they act in the same way as you would, l think it will undermine the right to life and hence be unreasonable. — Wittgenstein

Well you're going to have to supply an argument why you think self defense is incompatible with the CI. Kant himself did not think so.

A good will is good under any circumstances and conditions but the categorical imperative can only be carried out by a good will. Changing the maxim based on circumstances undermines the role of will and makes it subservient to ends/goals. — Wittgenstein

So a couple of points:
First, this isn't a contradiction in terms, just a contradiction.
Secondly, not all maxims "pass" the CI. "I will lie when it suits my purposes" is a maxim, and it's clearly conditional. It just fails the CI "test".

Lastly, I think you are confusing the motivation for following a maxim with the content of the maxim itself. The reason for adopting a maxim in accordance with the CI should be unconditional duty. But that doesn't mean that the maxim must apply to all circumstances.

Further more the maxim being based on a universal categorical imperative should not be extended into particulars as we cannot practically decide a universal when the conditions exceed the bare minimum but the bare minimum can always be reduced a condition less maxim such as "Do not Kill" a true maxim which can be reasoned and followed by all reasonable man. — Wittgenstein

Isn't that just saying that the CI cannot be practically applied? After all real situations are always particular. Besides, "Do not kill" without any conditions cannot be universalised, since it rules out self defense.

Again, the point is we do not know what maxim is correct, hierarchically. — schopenhauer1

If the CI works, there should not be a hierarchy of maxims, since a maxim that can be universalized cannot conflict with another maxim that can be universalized, or else they cannot be universalized.

So let's say that the clerk is rude because his wife died a couple weeks earlier and that puts him in a bad mood. So then in that case the maxim might be, "A clerk should not be rude, unless a tragedy befalls him close to the time of rudeness to a customer, as then no one would be allowed time to process their grief appropriately". This then trumps the maxim, "Clerks should never be rude to customers as this is violating civility and denying their humanity". Which rule wins out? — schopenhauer1

There wouldn't be emotional exception to a maxim, since that defeats the point. The idea behind the CI is to have reason guide your actions, not emotion. Kant would uphold the duty of civility (assuming it applies for the moment) even if an emotional reaction would be understandable.

A conditional maxim is a contradiction in terms. — Wittgenstein

Could you elaborate on that?

We can throw away certain maxims or make them part of others but that will leaves us confused and destroy any ethical theory. — Wittgenstein

How so? There are maxims which can also be described by a more general, abstract maxim, but in less detail.

And the answer, in the context of the comments I am posting, is that She doesn't allow it; it is necessary if good is also to exist. — Pattern-chaser

But that raises another issue: If evil is necessary for good to exist, and God created evil, then she cannot have been good. So, the God that created the universe was not, after all, good.

So omnipotence and omniscience have nothing to do with responsibility or duty: that comes from benevolence, from God being 'good'. Hmm, OK. So if God eliminates the tuberculosis bacteria, has She done good to humans, evil to bacteria, or both? Or neither, as would be my view. Good and evil are relative. No, I don't mean that as an open-ended assertion, I mean that good to one species (humans) can be evil to another (bacteria), so it's relative in that sense. It's all down to context. Is God, omnipotent as She is (apparently), expected to act so that Her actions are 'good' for all living things, or She is branded 'evil'? That makes no sense to me. — Pattern-chaser

Why would God need to either eliminate the tuberculosis bacteria or allow humans to suffer? An omnipotent being could just create a world were all beings can exist in harmony.

And there's another way they're relative, equally specific. Good requires the existence of evil for its very meaning. You can't have yin alone; it is only meaningful in contrast and comparison to yang. So it is with good and evil too.

Therefore a 'good' God would necessarily have to create evil, if only to give that goodness some meaning. That rather puts paid to the idea of a 'good' God, doesn't it? And remember, you're considering God as a creator-God (as I do not, but that's OK), so it's God who creates evil, if it is created, as there is no other creator to do it, is there? This seems to lead to the conclusion that a 'good' God would have to create evil in order to be a 'good' God. :chin:

So there is no Problem of Evil. It's just a mistake; a misunderstanding. — Pattern-chaser

There may not be good without evil, but there would still be an absence of evil. There can be an absence of pain and suffering, and that absence would be meaningful even though the beings inhabiting that world would have no terms for that absence. Is a God that creates pain and suffering for the sake of distinguishing it from joy and happyness good?

I don't ignore metaphysics. I deny it. — Stephen Cook

Denial is neither rational nor healthy though.

How does knowing everything (omniscience) and having unlimited power (omnipotence) make God responsible for Everything? — Pattern-chaser

Responsibility flows from the ability to act and the duty to do so. An omniscient and omnipotent God has an unlimited ability to act. The duty is self-imposed by the third attribute - benevolence. The combination of all three is incompatible with suffering in a universe created by that God, hence the theodicy problem.

Is it God we're discussing, or just a scapegoat? — Pattern-chaser

Omnipotence is a defining characteristic of God in the context of this problem.

So, unlike a classical universe, although still fully deterministic, prediction become impossible in principle as well as in practice in such a universe. Even for God. — Stephen Cook

Which means that God isn't really a god after all, since she's neither omniscient nor omnipotent.

Since we are a part of this material universe, we too are made of billiard balls. Therefore, the only way for Free Will to exist is for it to exist outside the time and space constraints of a material universe. — Stephen Cook

Or perhaps the material universe is the illusion and the free will we experience is actually the deeper truth. Your approach ignores metaphysics and directly jumps to physicalism.