Causality, Determination and such stuff. Reading notes: So it seems like there's a few things going on in the Anscombe essay. Here are some that stood out:
(1) Disentanglement of causality from necessity. Positive claim: there can be causes which do not follow of necessity.
(2) Disentanglement of determination from causality. Positive claim: Something can be determined without being caused. It strikes me that Anscombe is ultimately unconcerned with causality. It all but drops out of consideration in the second half of the paper. It was used as a 'way in' to talk about 'determination' and its obverse, 'indetermination'.
(2.1) 'Determination' cannot be thought outside of some given range of possibilities: "to give content to the idea of something’s being determined, we have to have a set of possibilities, which something narrows down to one – before the event". By distinction, causality is post-hoc: "But there is at any rate one important difference – a thing hasn’t been caused until it has happened".
(3) Conclusion: 'Indeterminism' must be admitted, at the very least, as a possibility. Interderminism meaning: given a set of outcomes, it cannot be specified, in advance, which will obtain.
(4) I have a huge question about the level of granularity - mereological and temporal - at which all these considerations are meant to apply. Are these conclusions meant to be the same for the Galton board, taken as a whole, and a single ball travelling along a Glaton board path? Why is each of these two cases individuated as such? What motivates this individuation? Why not consider some balls, and not others? Maybe two balls, rather than one; or why not the Galton board, and the path of one or two or three or all balls? How does taking into account these analytic 'cuts' - seemingly arbitrary, affect the analysis?
The question of 'givenness' ("given a range of possibilites...") has big implications on the status of in/determinism (epistemological? ontological? Something other?). Anscombe is ambigious about this, but intuits it when she discusses the temporality of determination (determined when?) and distinguishes - without coming back to it - between determination and what she at one point calls 'predetermination'. Want to say more about this later. Will just open the question for now, if anyone else can see the issue.