The book is dedicated to Deleuze. There was some sort of friendship. Continuing: Klossowski's mom was the last lover of Rilke. Rilke had many lovers. One of them is Lou Salome. Lou Salome, of course, is most famous for her role as a non-lover to someone who would have preferred that things were different. — csalisbury
This is really cool. Salome was, herself, an incredible thinker and a first-rate psychoanalyst. I know of her work only second-hand - Kaja Silverman wrote an absolutely gorgeous book (
Flesh of my Flesh) that deals with the notion of 'analogy', and she spends alot of time detailing the intellectual relationship between Rilke, Salome and Freud, and devotes quite a few pages to examining Salome's work on it's own terms. It made me sad and a bit ashamed that I only ever knew her as Nietzsche's and Rilke's love interest.
I read that Klossowski book a really long time ago. I remember finding it a bit hard to digest, and it's one I've been meaning to come back to. I think what I got out of it was an appreciation for just how heavily Nietzsche's psychological state left it's mark on his philosophy. What is it that keeps drawing you back?
How would you relate Deleuze's co-opting of the Nietzschean 'throw-of-the-dice' (with the sky/earth-table distinction) to this? It seems to map broadly to it, but the 'throw of the dice' itself could potentially add a few new elements, I say tentatively. Curious to hear your take — csalisbury
I'll try and relate this to Deleuze's third stipulation about the virtual: that it is not to be confused with the possible (the first two stipulations, to recall, were: (1) The virtual is an ontological problem; and (2) The virtual does not resemble the actual). This third stipulation, that the virtual is not the possible, follows from these first two. The actual (this actual horse, say) is not the
realization of a 'possible horse' (note the terminological distinction: actualization =/= realization). There is no possible horse that exists somewhere and is then subsequently given the stamp of reality. So if that's the case, what is possibility? What kind of ontological standing, if any, does possibility have? How does one explain the very idea of possibility, and the idea that it comes 'before' the reality of some thing?
For Deleuze - following Bergson again - the very category of possibility is an illusion that is retroactively posited as accounting for the genesis of the actual. Possibility comes
after, and not before the actual. The idea of possibility as a genuine ontological category arises when one 'forgets' that virtual problematics (grasslands, movement, light, etc) are what in fact gives rise to actual things, and when instead of difference, identity is given primacy. The possible, after all, exactly resembles the actual. It is the actual 'minus' the property or attribute of existence, but which resembles it in every other respect. This is actually alot more straightforward than it sounds - if you calculate the odds of something happening, you're almost certainly extrapolating from past events: you're using the actual to define the possible. This is how any normal betting shop will probably calculate the odds of your wager. There's nothing wrong with this
per se. It just doesn't make for good grounds for ontology.
Now if this all makes sense, then it follows that there are two ways in which 'chance' can be grasped. The first way - the usual way - is that chance is the realization of one or another possibility. You have a set of possibilities, and it is by chance (a roll of the die, say) that
this possibility rather than
that possibility is realized. On this account, chance is subordinate to the reproduction of a situation that is identical across all throws of the die. Deleuze in the
Logic of Sense puts it best: "these games... retain chance
only at certain points, leaving the remainder to the mechanical development of consequences or to skill". This is just another way of saying that chance, when grasped under the aspect of possibility (and hence identity), simply 'realizes' this or that possibility, as given in advance.
However, if possibility is in fact a derivative formation that is parasitic upon an actualization that moves from virtual to actual, then there ought to be a second way to understand chance, this time as grasped under the aspect of the virtual. Rather than chance as subordinate to a given set of possibilities, this is chance as that which reorganizes or introduces
new possibilities into the equation to begin with. This is why Deleuze relates the dice throw to the temporality of the future, and the introduction of genuine novelty into the world. A throw of the dice that "affirms the whole of chance each time", is one in which chance is not distributed according to a prior structure of possibility, which would instead "fragment it according to the laws of probability over several throws". Hence why the 'ideal game' is one in which "each move invents its own rules".
The stuff about the sky and earth relate to Deleuze's whole tripartite theory of time, which is a bit much to go into, but I think the above should hopefully articulate virtuality and the dice throw in a decent way. I'll say, in closing, that I reckon the discussion of the dice throw in
The Logic of Sense is somewhat easier than the one in D&R. The chapter which discusses it ("The Tenth Series of the Ideal Game") is only 8 pages long, if you can read it.