In the minds of the people in question, it does. It's so difficult because people expect (and sometimes demand) knowledge empirical. Just as John has done, they will demand to know what the infinite is, in the world, as if it depended on being some observed states of the world. People find it difficult to be aware of the infinite because they are already using metaphysic that holds the finite is all there is to know. If it's not empirical, they think it is unintelligible.

So how is what the acosmist saying different than what, for example, Kant says about the 'in itself'. The noumenal signifies what things are in themselves, which might be paraphrased (although Kant would not use this kind of language) as what is real in itself.

If you want to say that substance has a Real (ontological) status that is more than merely its use for our understanding, then why would that not be the same as to say that the conditions of our understanding and experience are transcendent (or transcendental in Kant's sense of 'beyond the empirical) to our experience and understanding? — John

The acosmist doesn't confuse self for the empirical. It doesn't need to be empirical to be "determinable." As an infinite, it's is intelligible, rather than being some mystery we can never access because we don't have observation of it.

Under Kant's reasoning, the self is still understood as empirical. We (supposedly) can't say anything about it because it doesn't appear in our experiences of the world. For the acosmist, the point is the thing-in-itself not transcendent to our understanding at all. It's intelligible and Real. There's genuinely more to knowledge and understanding than the empirical. The infinite is not drawn in conflict to the finite world--i.e. unintelligible, beyond reason, a "mystery"-- but rather given with it, with meaning and significance.

Infinites are of the world. They are necessarily and so true at any point of the world, despite the infinite never being any state of the world. Logic means and matters in the world. To place the infinite in utter disconnection to the world, as the transcendent does, is to ignore what is significant about logic. It is to put unintelligibility (e.g. "mystery," "knowledge is impossible." "you can't know anything unless you observe it in the world" ) in place of intelligibility (logic).

It's a contradiction in terms. That which is present in the world is, by definition, not transcendent. Unknown processes can't even allow this because that is just some action of the world we don't know. When is logic applied, any "transcendent" force or being merely becomes another worldly actor-- the "supernatural" is shown to be incoherent. The beings of another realm are just part of nature we don't know about. They are worldly with worldly consequences, rather than metaphysical.

Well, that's the point about Spinoza's metaphysics: it tells you about metaphysics, rather than the world (for that use physics, observation, etc.,etc.).

In this respect, it's the opposite of most other metaphysics. Most metaphysics claim (or at least are understood to) to tell you about the world-- follow/believe/understand this god or force, and you will finally grasp how the world really works.

By breaking with this tradition, Spinoza takes out the transcendent because it is, more or less, the position that metaphysics describe or account for the world. The transcendent God is the metaphysical (outside the world) which nevertheless defines the world. Spinoza is pointing out this is a contradiction. Since metaphysics are never the world, they cannot give the world.

Its quite simple, given Spinoza's definition not only can we not conclude that there is only one substance. I don't see how we have any knowledge of a substance in itself and self sustaining. There is no such thing in our world to observe and test, so it can only be conjecture. — Punshhh

The absence of anything to observe and test is exactly how we can conclude there is one substance. Since it is not an empirical state, the question of showing its presence through observation and measurement is incoherent. Substance is purely logical, an aspect of reality "beyond" the empirical, which cannot be identified or measured by observing the empirical world.

What you are attempting to argue here is reductionism. You take substance and insist that it is a state of the world we observe and measure-- much like the reductionist who claims the meaning of experiences are "just brains"-- as if knowledge and understanding were only about giving empirical measurements.

We can be sure about substance because we know substance is not subject to change. Since we know it's not an empirical state, not even one we don't know about, we know it is beyond the question of being an actualised possibility in the contingent world. For substance, there is no "might be" or "might not be," based upon what states of the world do. One cannot coherently "conjecture" about substance.

The acomist's point is the ontological/ontic (finite) is illusionary. Only the infinite is Real, so any existing state is outside the Real. I'm not equating the ontic or ontological with the Real. I'm saying the opposite: existing states are never Real. The enquiry excludes ontic and emprical entities (and their realness under ontology)-- hence that which is not finite and existing (substance) is Real.

People have pointed out it's philosophical significance several times: self-definition. The unchanging logical expression of self. A predicatless and unchanging substance is exactly the topic of the discusion. The whole point of substace is that it doesn't exist. If it were to exist, it would be finite and subject to change. Substance cannot be "ontological" and no-one here claimed it is.

This is why I say you are giving a correlationist account that equivocates substance with states of the world. You expect substance to have "ontological" (i.e. existing) consequences.

This question is loaded with correlationist expectations. Substance is thought to be a matter of properties found in the world-- something defined how might speak about a "large rock" or "tall tree"-- or else not qualify as a concept with any substance.

Spinoza's point is this correlationist account is incohrent. Substance doesn't rely on something else for its defintion. The act of a transcendent being, the presence of experience, etc., etc., are NOT required to define substance. Substance is substantial all on its own-- the logic of self, the it-in-itself, the logical truth of self-defintion.

Kant was wrong. The thing-in-itself is intelligible and we may know it perfectly. Useless to emprical description for sure, but such description was never at stake in understanding the thing-in-itself. The mistake Kant (or at least many of his followers)made was to think that the thing-in-itself was some empirical state we might to know. Since it's not (as Kant himself pointed out, that we can't know the it-in-itself in emprical description), there's no emprical description to discover about it. The appeal that we can't know the it-in-itself because it has no emprical form falls.

Idealism's point is the world is not an illusion. It claims experiences, states of existence, are the extent of things.

Experience is treated as infinite and objects of existence (experiences) are the extent of everything.Idealism (and it close cousin Substance Dualism) are reductionst: there's nothing but present experiences.

The acosmist can only cohrently be a realist. For them, the world (finite states) can only be illusionary. Experiences (states of the world) cannot be Real.

Only Substance is Real for the acosmist-- the infinite, the logical necessity, which is not subject to finite change-- that which is outside the finite but never seperate from it.

You reading that like a reductionist scientist. As if being an object in the would amounts to being immanent. If that were so, we wouldn't need anything more than empirical description.

To dwell in the world has a far deeper meaning than to be an object of causality. Any state of the world also has a logical expression, an infinite, which cannot be altered by changes in the finite world.

I am Willow, for example, a logical truth and expression immune to change, no matter what the finite world does. Not even my death alters it-- a necessary truth, inherent and indewelling to any world. To think the inherence and indewelling of immanence amounts to just being an object in the world is miss what it's about.

Indeed, it is to claim immanence (infinite) is only state in the world (finite), which is precisely what immanence is not.

When Spinoza makes the distinction between objects of causality (finite) and the principle of self (infinite), your response is to claim the are the same (that it's only about objects in the world). You are missing the entire point Spinoza is making and haven't even addressed the concept he is talking about.

Spinoza's point is exactly that the self-causing principle is NOT in the world. Immanence is not being in the world, but rather being EXPRESSESED by the world. The self-causing principle is infinte (not fintite, not a state of the world, necessary), rather than finite(a state of the world, a moment of causality, contingent).

I don't think you're being specific enough. There are plenty of instances of resentment in "underdog morality," but it is also frequently an expression of justice. In some instances, it's both at the same time.

Resentment tends to manifest as hatred or cruelity towards a powerful group. The powerful "deserve it," whatever thatight be, for being dominant. It's not really a measure of whether someone is seeking a just outcome or defending an ethical concern. They are sort of two different axes which are defined independently.

God is not transcendent. Such a God is a worldy actor. Indeed, any vision can only be wordly because the caused state (the vision) is someone's experience. Without worldly mechanism (the experience which is the vision), there are no visions.

It's the nature of God which discounts the transcendent. If God does something to the world, God is worldly. On the other hand if God eshews the finite, then God is nothing, an infinite that does not exist or act-- an immanent substance only.

The twin nature of being both worldy and beyond the world is a contradiction and incohrent. God's needs as a finite or infinite preculde the transcendent. To suggest a transcendent God is to tell falsehoods about God.

The point is about how someone is loved, a distinction between being understood as an object which delivers or a person with significance.

It's not a point about material gain, but whether you are recognised as a person. The difference between, for example, corporation that loves its workers that make it profit and a small businesses where an individual is understood as a person with a life.

In terms of possessions and status, they may be equal. A person of either is paid, given a respect by peers and valued by thier employer, but only one is understood as an individual person. It's a question of whether one is understood as an object which produces value or a person who matters. Are you only understood to be an image which produces value? Or do people grasp you as an individual, a logical and ethical subject that matters in-themselves?

On the contary, the OP is arguing becoming is necessarily a relation. The point is how we think about relation is frequently flawed. Rather than a secondary feature, formed out specific judgement, relations are actually primary. For anything, from the moment it is, it is of becoming and in relation. Becoming is necessary a relation and also primary.

Becoming seems more like that which changes, lives or is present, than a movement from here to there.

Indeed, becoming is sort absent in reflective discourse; it only picks out two states which have no more change to undergo. If we point out X had changed to Y, we aren't referring to something which becomes, but two moments captured in suspension. The X we talk about goes nowhere else. The same is true of the Y.

Becoming is necessarily a relation because it involves a distinction. To become means something is in realationship to other things-- a boundary of object, change and presence-- even when it's not made explicit or sorted into specific catergory. The moment anything is, becoming is so. It's not a thing of existence, but an expression given by anything that exists.

I think the primacy of relation is exactly what becoming gets at. Awareness pre-dates sorting into strict discursive catergoies. One senses so much before using the catergoies and classifications used around them. I think we notice a lot before we "establish existence."

The act of establishnent is sort of a second order act. We do it force or create the world in a particular direction. Awareness pre-dates this action. People realise something before the start directing themsleves to change the world.

Rather being unintelligible, the world before (or without) the act of establishnent is perfectly intelligible. People genuinely realise something without setting a stuffy and exact discourse. Becoming doesn't need the loss of intelligibly, but rather that comprehension goes beyond merely setting out defintions of forms. Intelligibly has more depth than many philosophers give it credit for.

My point is counterparts are incohrent: it makes no sense to speak of them. Modal logic shouldn't entertain them at all. The sign (e.g. Algol) is not a universal "constraint" which creates the particular of Algol in any world. Each Algol is entirely their own state, belonging to its own possible world.

Any world is, in fact, a collection of specific objects, only they are logical (or semotic) objects too. The reductionist's mistake is not claiming the world is only a collection objects, it's suggesting that their presence is the only significance. The colour red doesn't just exist, it has a logical meaning expessed nowhere else. As does any state or object we might encounter or imagine.

It's a question of recognising that "the beyond" is only the world, meaning expressed by the world, which is what makes relevant to us-- our own well-being, life, joy, etc., is at stake when dealing in "the beyond." One does not escape the world, even in the most audacious literal notions of life that continues after death.

The "beyond" is always a better world-- one in which we live in virtue, without suffering, with loved ones,, with something that matters to us and is just. We are "saved " not by leaving the world, but rather by living a world which was better than before. Ordinary existence is what delivers the "beyond, " be it a elimination of despair (a new understanding the world matters) or a victory over death (a God exists who acts to give a on going transfinite life).

In the historical fork, there is only the Algol of one possible world. The Algol which follows after the present in particular causal links (e.g. this particular body, with its history of location and interactions).

I'm not arguing the concretism view. There is no need for a possible world to be actual. I can coherently speak of a possible world where I am the king of England (two possible worlds, but the Willow of one possible world) or a possible world where another Willow is king of England, without it ever being actual. Indeed, what defines a possible world is it's an abstraction of logic, a necessary truth of what might have happened, so actuality is exactly what a possible world does't need.

Individuation is not only present in actuality, but also in logic. We might say all states are, themselves, their own logical object, expressing their own respective possible world.

So the argument is that what constraints don't care about can be treated modally as accidental rather than universal properties. If a difference doesn't make a difference, then what it "actually is" becomes logically a matter of indifference.

If you are applying this to individuation - the prime target of predicate logic - then it says we know Algol well enough not to mistake her for any other dog even if we were to encounter her in some entirely different world. There is something essential about her that defines her.

Or at least - reductionism being desperate to cash out nominalism - there is so little different about her (our "mental" idea of her, heh, heh) that we are content to take this counterpart Algol as a token of a type. I mean, a sign of a thing. — apokrisis

It always makes a difference. Algol of another possible world is in fact an entirely different dog. In discussion of modal logic, many people fail to understand individuation. They errounosuly take semiotic similarity to mean two entirely different states are the same. It's particularly common in the context of counterfactuals and time-travel. People are imagined as a universal, a semiotic rule which individuates in same in all circumstances, supposedly making Willow in any possible world the same person. It's a failure to understand time and possible world make a difference to individuation. The Willow who not make this post is not me, no matter how similar or different we might be.

Indeed, there is something "essential" that defines each state, but it's a worldly feature. The Algol of one possible world is, by definition, not the Algol of another possible world. Each is a particular state of a world with its own semiotic expression. Semiotics doesn't create any state. Such expression is embedded in within it from the moment of its emergence. The Algol of each possible world is never anything other than the Algol of that world.

"Contraints" cannot do anything because there is never any state on which they might act. Since any state of the world has its semiotic expression for the moment it emerge, there is no "formless foam" to be "constrained." Semotic expression is given with every state and means that it is individuated: there are only discrete states with express various "universals." Signs are not what makes the world, but rather what any existing state expresses.

Any "universal" is not a constraint on the world, but an expression of freedom. The law of gravity, for example, is only expressed in particular possible world where existing states of interest behave in a particular way. Outside that possible world (i.e. one where states don't or cease working to the law of gravity), there is no such law.

So the informal picture is that worlds are constructed by going from the particular to the general - recognising the increasingly generic constraints that can still bind a set of parts as a whole. — apokrisis

So this picture is a contradiction. It argues a a whole is formed out of the particular, but it actually claims that the whole (generic) constraint forms the particular (the parts expressing the whole), such that particulars are defined by the generic constraint rather than themselves (e.g. "Algol" supposedly the sign which defines the existence of the particular dog Algol in any world).

Terripin is pretty much right here.

The possible world is not an manifestation of constraint, but rather freedom or radical contingency-- the possible world defies the constraint of actuality, to remain true no matter what's happening in the world. Logic does not constrain the world (that would be what exists, not the logical rule or semantic sign), but rather is expressed in the constraint of existing states.

Sometimes states of existence express on logical rule, at other times it's another; one possible world expressed here, a different possible world expressed there.

The problem with the appeal us not really knowing anything is its intent. What are we aiming for in making such an argument? Some sort of perfect knowledge which gives us all the answers. The limited scope of any instance of knowledge is considered a problem we must get past if we want to understand existence-- it's still aiming for an account of everything, the impossible one, given the uncertainty of the world.

Knowledge is still understood to be some exhaustive account we are meant to obtain, rather than being realised as necessarily limited and incapable of giving a full account. If we are making the demand of an exaustive account, we have failed to understand stand the limit of knowledge and what that means.

Apo's argument doesn't specifically point out a metaphysicsl point, but there is plenty going on. The understanding that knowledge is necessarily limited is a metaphysical point.

To set aside the question of an exaustive account, as it's realised as impossible, and point out that knowledge is only ever limited, is a metaphysical culling-- any postion which appeals to an exaustive account is revealed to be incohrent. Logically, we can only have limited knowledge. Not only is our knowledge limited, but there's no exaustive account to aim for.

The "useful fiction" argument doesn't make sense in the way it's often termed. For physics, the important question is its descriptive power. What makes it "real" is that it accounts for the world, not a particular emprical form-- I mean where is the state of "energy?" Yet, we don't go around saying energy somehow isn't real.

Let's imagine for a moment that atoms weren't a particular state of the world (which is sort of true of the Borh model), would it mean that atomic theory wasn't how the world worked? Not at all. If our objects still behaved in that way, atomic theory would still be expressed by the world; it would be description of how the world really worked, despite the absence of particular atoms which someone could pick-up and hold with atom tweezers.

But that's the problem. The only way to account for the measurement ( including the device) is through describing it. This preculdes certain prediction because the measurement is not defined prior to itself-- we can't tell what happens for certain until the event is present. Binny's speculation leaves us in the same place as other accounts of QM: unable to predict with certainity because we can't derive a measurement from outside itself. Rather than solve the "measurement problem," he's just pointing out uncertainy collapses with measurement, much like many other accounts of QM, from CI to MWI.

The problem is it doesn't work. Take out the measuring device and one is talking about a different interaction in the world. It is no longer a state we are measuring with a device. A measurement without a measuring device is nothing more than an incohrent fantasy.

Practicing a measurement is inseperable from the measuring device. It makes no sense to speak as if our measurement (or description) is spoiling our knowledge. There is no measurement or description without it.

Binny is therefore stuck (or rather simply irrelevant in the first instance). The hidden effect of the measuring device cannot be used to predict with certainity. Even if we knew it all it would do is describe the interactions of a measuring device as they occured. All those interactions not involving the measuring device, or those which behaved otherwise to what we expected, would not be covered--uncertainty remains.

Is the cat in the box alive or dead? It won't be defined with certainity until it is measured(effect of the measuring device inclusive).

The point it's equivalent in the context of observation and description. We can't get past uncertainty to give a description of the (pre)determined future. With respect to our capacity to describe what's going on, the exact and unknown quantum state we can't measure is of no more use to us than a non-local state.

In terms of descriptive power, the exact state we don't know might as well be in some other galaxy. We don't have description of it which allows us to tell the future which must necessarily occur.

The issue is that basically claims non-locality. If our problem is an inability to locate particles, then our local space is defined by something else, by things which cannot be pinpointed in our immediate vicinity.

It also effectively claims a hidden variable: if only we knew this hidden state we can never know about, then we could recognise how an electron was pre-determined to hit the screen.

To me that reads more like a question of ignoring the behaviour or not raising it, rather than it being beyond discovery. Something like a society which pretends nothing is going on for social decorum, where manners are more important than recognising or stopping abuse.

I'm not surprised. I am defending the identity of the celibate and sexually restrained. Alas, you do not extend the same curtesy when I point out your naturalistic fallacies about human sexual behaviour.

In logical terms, I fear your agreement is a bit of a marriage of convenience: a pragmatic assertion because it opposes a discourse claims prominent sexually is a necessary human trait, rather than respect for avoiding the equivocation of human behaviour and ethics with status.

But then pretty much par of the course when discussing human sexually. In discussion and debates about human sexuality, most of it is directed towards "justifying" behaviour and status, rather than understanding sex itself and its relationship to ethics. The liberals come our with nonsense like "it's only physical pleasure" or "people should do whatever why want" or "prostitution is always a wonderful service for everyone." On the other side, people like yourself ignore the interests and actions of some people, to entrench an image and status to a particular way of life (e.g. life-long relationships, sexual exclusivity, etc.,etc.) disconnected from people's sexual behaviour and relationships.

"Need" tends to be understood in a sense of human destiny, as if all human are programmed to perform sex by merely existing. It forms sort of an image of humanity under which there is no question of whether an individual desires sex or if it's an ethical action to take.

Within the context of debates about celibacy and sexual behaviour, it forms a significant prejudice against those who are interested in sex or refrain form having. They are effectively aren't considered human becasue the do not manifest interested and behaviour all humans supposedly "need."

Though "desire" isn't a good term here either because it ignores the issue at stake: empathy for those for whom sex is a good thing.

It seems you have given up what is noble because the mind is not eternal. That seems absurd. — Agustino

On the contrary, it demonstrates an understanding of the eternal, as far as the human body and mind goes. Spinoza's point is the eternal is an expression of the world. To say: "The soul is only the name of something in the body" is apt. When we serve the eternal, we act for our body and the world around us. The eternal significance of the body (including the mind) is what makes our action important. And why we cannot separate bodies of states out into neat boxes which have nothing to do with our-well-being or other people.

The "material" is not contrary or separate to ethics, but rather what makes them so important. There's a "spiritual/psychological" component all the way down, expressed by every material state and action. Ethical divides are not made on the eternal vs finite, but rather in the context of the eternal-- actions are immoral because those states have an entering expression of immorality, not because they are material.

Indeed-- they are not crisp enough in their thoughts. The doubter doesn't stick to the particular thoughts, feelings and actions they are meant to under faith. In the face of possibility (e.g. God might of might not be) the become unsettled. They start thinking: "Well maybe my faith isn't right, perhaps my way of life needs to be something else," becoming lost in a sea of vagueness.

Contrast with the Knight of Faith who, in the face of possibility (e.g. God might or might not be), affirms their way of life in no uncertain terms. Despite, the possibility of their way of life being wrong (e.g. God might not be), they affirm their faith. Indeed, the way of life is thought to be necessary, despite the truth of possibility otherwise. Crispness is the point. Not even a necessary truth of possibility can challenge the necessity which is the crispness of faith.

You are not entirely sure what you mean by "God exists" because it doesn't, in terms of existence, mean anything at all. It's a confusion created by mistaking an affirmation of faith or reason for faith ( "God exists" ) for empirical commentary. You use "God exists" to defend and understand a way of life you practice-- the point is to be crisp in that way.

That's a contradiction. The spiritual reality is defined by how it is not vague at all.

"Faith" is in knowing exactly what to practice and think-- a belief, a ritual, an understanding, a feeling. It's actually crisp all the way down. So much so that it is a beacon that holds or someone returns to even in when assaulted by vagueness. The person beginning to doubt their way of life is called to "have faith," to turn away from the uncertain and the vague, to the particular crisp practice of faith.

It's not a contradiction.

People don't come to act morally by being outside the world. They act within it. Any instance of changing from immoral to moral behaviour is a change of the world. We don't get there by presenting to be outside the world. We do it be being in the world and respecting it's eternal ethical expression.

Spot God in today's news, then. 25 dead in head-on smash in Thailand. US Republicans decide to scrap the Ethics Office, then change their minds. Somewhere, no doubt, numbers of women and children slaughtered by jihadis. Hey, it's all God, right? 'Nothing to transcend here, folks, move right along — Wayfarer

Indeed. Those are unethical acts and outcomes of the world. Horror, tragedy and immorality, an eternal expressed by the world. Not something to transcend, but loss which ought have been avoided, states of the world which ought not have been enacted or happened. An eternal expression of the world which cannot be avoided (even if all the dead were resurrected, the Republicans decided not to scrap the Ethics office, it would not undo what was done ).

Certainly, there is a world to avoid in the future. We ought to act so these sort events don't happen again. This is not a question of "transcending" the world. It's being a part of it.
Pretending there is a force which undoes the eternal expression of loss isn't the worldly act of avoiding head-on smashes, terrible political policy or massacring women and children.

It's just a hedonistic story that suffering and loss can become something else if we believe it. A philosophy not dedicated to understanding and respecting the eternal, but rather one which disrespects and ignores it, to create the image that the horrible and/or immoral outcomes don't really occur. It serves not understanding the eternal, but the desire for life without pain.

And what, according to Spinoza, was the acme, the highest point, of the philosopher's life? — Wayfarer

God is immanent for Spinoza. Not a transcendent force that makes the world meaningful or produces an escape from the meaningless world, but an expression of the world-- the eternal, the value, meaning and significance produced by each state.

Love of God is not belief in the transcendent which saves us form the ignominy of the world, it's understanding of the eternal expressed by the world (ethics, meaning). Meaning is always found of the world itself. Meaning is eternal-- it is never born and it never dies. Death does not remove the love of a family. Birth does not found it.

One cannot have a "problem of meaning" because the world is never without value, meaning and significance. No-one needs to create meaning in the world, be it a transcendent force (e.g. mystics, theism, etc.,etc.) or man (e.g. Nietzsche, existentialism, the science and technology of Modernist utopia, etc.,etc.), for the world always comes with an expression of meaning, value and significance. There is never "just the existence" of a rock, mountain or person. The presence of any state also means the eternal expression of its value, meaning and significance.

Our highest point is to recognise this. To understanding the world, its eternal expression, rather than just in terms of the empirical state we must possess next or to insist that it's meaningless. An understanding of the eternal itself (ethics, virtue, meaning, logic), rather than floundering over possession and loss of the transient (death, possessions, money, desires).

I think the question is, what can possibly rationalise or provide the motivation for that? — Wayfarer

They don't need to be rationalised. The "higher" is already expressed (always too, given they are eternal truth of ethics) in the world. "Transcendent force" does not need to enter the game to make it so. This is Spinoza's point.

You say that, if pumping myself full of recreational drugs is to be unethical and a failed attempt to find satisfaction, it must be rationalised through the transcendent. Supposedly, my life itself (and the world) can't have that significance. The story goes that, somehow, if there is no transcendent rationalisation, it somehow ethical or amoral to engage in substance abuse and think it amounts to solving any problem of dissatisfaction.

This is nonsense. All the failures of drug abuse are an expression of the world-- the damages it causes me, relationships it destroys, an obsession which takes my attention away from more important things, including "higher" aspects such respecting and loving my friends, family and other people. All the reason and motivation not to abuse drugs is found in the expression of the world.

The world (or "material" ) isn't value neutral. It express value and ethical significance all the time.

Realism requires it. Without it, objects wouldn't be anything without us thinking about them.

Though, this doesn't mean there isn't a way we think about objects. Our thoughts about objects are always that, which is how we can be wrong about them-- the way we think about an object is mistaken because we don't grasp its logical expression.

Nietzsche would have preferred that God wasn't dead. His whole secret ambition was always to revive God. The fact that God was dead was a problem for him - a problem to be solved, to be overcome. — Agustino

Which is why he has an expectation of unity. Rather than treat and accept the world as separated, he tries to pull it back together into unity, as is separation was a problem. Instead of realising separation and the value those states express (an infinite of value), he thinks it's a problem, that unity must be returned if their is to be meaning-- the absence of God isn't realised as how meaning is expressed (i.e. each separated state expresses meaning, which is why some things are important and other not) but thought to be the absence of meaning (the world must have unity to be meaningful).

But you don't understand my point. My point is precisely this, that the world isn't immune to destruction and change, and can't be immune to them, and the more we seek to actualise those things in history, the farther we get from them. And Nietzsche understood this too. — Agustino

You've missed mine. I'm saying that's an illusion born from the belief and expectation of unity-- the breaking of our philosophy from that tradition. History is full of people achieving changes they sought to make. It's also full of unintended outcomes and failures to meet expectations.

Things seem further away because we expect what we are seeking, even though it hasn't happen yet. We make the mistake of taking our eye off the world and only focusing our imagined outcome (which is frequently some notion of a unified world).

The reason "the more the more we seek to actualise" seems to result in goal further away is because it's an action in response to the world response the world pushing back against attempts to change it. As the number of rejections build, so do things like violence. A campaign for economic equality turns into a violent totalitarian action, with plenty of scapegoats, when the rich an powerful refuse to make any change, for example. The expectation of the unified world is so strong, that all manner of Sin becomes acceptable under the promise of achieving it. That's the cost of believing in God-- one's imagined world (unity, metaphysics) overpowers awareness of the world (separation, empirical), to a point where can no longer see what's being done in the name of progress or justice.

When the general says that, it's not his hubris that has defeated him. — Agustino

Wasn't my point. His hubris has him shocked at the outcome-- he thought it was impossible for him to loss-- and defines that he thinks that its a "miracle (the impossible)" rather than just the world doing what it might. The point is not about why he lost, but how he makes a logical error in reasoning about his loss-- the thought he was beyond the possibility losing. Rather than an issue with the world, it's a problem with his metaphysics.