Correct. More than one substance is incoherent. :clap:

I don't care where you draw the line or not. Any fundamental particle is named just as much as a mountain. If we cannot speak of mountains before we name them, we cannot speak of fundamental particles before we name them.

Ordinary objects and fundamental particles are on the same level, each is a thing we may describe. Fundamental particles are really just another ordinary object. They never "explained " other objects themsleves-- to speak of atoms is not to speak of a house, for example.

Nope, that's also special pleading: fundamental particles and patterns are just as much things we name as mountains.

You realise this is special pleading: the objects matter, rocks, snow and dirt are equally things we have named. If there is a problem with the things we call mountains existing before we name them, the same would be true of matter, rocks, snow and dirt.

There is no object independent of the meaning of your subjectivity. All objects, whether you know about them or not, are in a conceptual relation to you, even before you exist-- one could speak, for example, of what Josh would experience once you came to exist. A dinousar could have told of you posting on this forum, if it had the concepts.

No difference exists between arguing an object is more than the form you give it and it existing in itself. If your concept is NOT making it so, something else is. What might this be? The only cohrent answer is itself, else we are saying it is something else entirely.

Exactly, which is why any given thought we might have cannot define an object.

Any object is more than our thought about it. There are relations between it and everyth i ng else which are no spoken at any point which we know about it. Even if our awareness of it is perfect, there is more to be spoken about it than the form we've identified.

With respect to our concepts, the answer is yes and no. Any object has more to it than just our concept of it. If we speak about it's form, we don't talks about it's self--defintion. If we speak about its self-defintion ( "there is an object here, disticnt form other things)" , we fail.to identify what form the object takes. Any object is more than a concept we have or it.

But it is also true anything about an object is explicable in a concept, one which we might come to have. There are no "inexplicable" objects of which no-one could know about. We can learn any concept.

It does indeed. Examples are incredibly abundant: every single object subsists itself.

In being a distinct thing, each object cannot be granted by any particualr concept of form. No matter which form an object might take, the form cannot be exhaustive of it. There might always be more to the object. It is more than the concept of form in question.

Objects need more than an idea to make them so. I cannot just think of a concpet of an object and make the object so. If I am to speak about am existing or logical object, I need that being to be so, else I won't be speaking about am object which is there. I'll just have an idea of something I imagined. All object are given on themselves because they are not the existence of my experience. My thoughts cannot make them there, no matter how hard I try.

I'm saying it doesn't lead to that, at least under this account of Kant.

Kant isn't rejecting existence of things before humans here, just the existence of things which are beyond human concepts. All Kant is saying is the world before our existence must reflect our concepts, since it is in conceptual relationship with us. In this Kant agrees with what is thought of as a realist in this thread, out in the world, before humans exist, there is a dinosaur or mountain which we may be known, one reflected in our concepts when we are aware of it.

Meillassoux is right, but has placed the problem in the wrong spot. The correlationist problem is really in Kent's metaphysical account of how objects are themselves.

Kamt doesn't make the suggestion nothing exists before our experiences, but forms a correlate supposition it is concepts which make something so. Kant is missing the metaphysical account of self-identity. He tries to deny noumena, rather than recognise there is something independent of any phenomenal form which constitutes the being of objects. Kant is missing understanding of how there is a thing (noumena), the existence is not phenomenal concepts we experience, which defines the forms and object takes. His problem is not denying emprical objects exist before humans, but rather failing to understanding how things exist and take the form they do. (i.e. not by conceptual form, but by the independent being of an object, which we may be aware of).

It's one a major interpration of Kant, though significantly different than might Wayfarer suggest.

Under this account of Kant, noumena is just an empty notion of our critical metaphysical thought. We posit it to demonstrate the shortcomings accounts of things independent of how they appear and conceptually relate to us.

Kant was responding to accounts speaking of forces of our world, yet which would never appear to us, but would somehow affect us. In Kant's sights are the theists, the mystics, etc., who would try to suppose a transcendent force which explained us, but was inexplicable in our concepts.

In this respect, Kant has no problem with objects existing before or without us, he's only making the point things must be explicable in our concepts. Kant, as an emprical realist, has no problem with My Everest existing at a particular height before any humans measure it.

I'm not quite sure what you think was going on. My point was she recognised she existed with penis, but understood it doesn't belong or ought not be there.

All along my point has been these are both true. Transformation is sought because she recognises how she exists but understands this ought to be different.

My point is a falsehood to say she is delusional about what body she has. If she already believed she existed with the body she ought it have, she would understand there is nothing which needs to change. One has to realise something is part of them to be have the goal of removing it from themsleves. My point is someone has to recognise how they exist, if they are to think something about their existence doesn't belong.

Ergo, it is impossible for this person to be delusional about how their body exists. They need to know how they exist (with a penis) for them to want to change it.

It's not really question of binary either because it's about the body. If the issue is you exist with a penis, then whether one is male, female or anything else doesn't define the problem.

If one ought not have a penis, then there is motivation to remove it whether you are male,.female or something else entirely. Whether having a penis is binary or non-binary does nothing eliminate the issue. Either might be true, the person question would still want it removed, it's the state of body which they hold to be a problem.

There is no isomorphism within the Platonic realm either, each concept is unique.

The formalisation of 2+2=4 as just symbols is different to the concept of two plus equals four, which is turn different from another concept using the symbols 2+2=4, which is in turn different to a translation of two equals two equals four form one language to another.

I'm not speaking about a correspondence to the physical realm, but rather the distinction and identity of different concepts or meanings within the Platonic realm. One concept is never another, is not doing the same thing as another. I'm talking about the necessary distinctions of the platonic realm, which render isomorphism incoherent.

To assign isomorphism in Platonic realm is to tell a falsehood about the distinctions of the Platonic realm. A ToE is impossible because it cannot cross distinction. Whether in the physical or Platonic realm, any proposed ToE is but one distinction of reality. In being the ToE, as opposed to everything else, it necessarily leaves something out. It always fails to cover of something the distinction which are not it.

Put simply, it does not matter how complex or not a string might be, for in being itself, it is distinct from everything else. The problem isn't given in the particular length or cycles a representation might have or not, it is that the representation is never thing it describes. Full detail is the only description to give, whether we speak of a physical state or something in the Platonic realm. There can be no "shorter strings" of description, derivation form outside concept or formalisms. Any thing, physical or Platonic, can only be given by itself. Our descriptions only give an account of this thing when it describes it.

This does no imply randomness. It is not, for example, make 2+2=4 random. Since it is given by the concept itself, it is the nature of that instance of 2+2=4 to have this particular meaning. The same is true of every instance of two plus two equals four. The same is true of every concept of translation between two symbolic languages.

Whether the definitions of the Platonic realm or instances of measurement of the physical universe, there is a reason are present as such: that what each of them are/do. One was never gong to have a world in which an instance of 2+2=4 meant something else than it does. Same for 2x2m pavers one is using in their backyard. If you've got a 2x2 meter paver, it's was never going to be anything else.

If one is not his body, what is he? Who or what is this little being that possesses this body? I worry this little being might be parasitic. Perhaps the body should rid itself of this little being before it does anything it can never undo. — NOS4A2

You're missing the point. She is her body. She (the woman in question) recognises it.

She moves to alter her body (a penis, we'll be reductive for simplicity) because she recognises it is a part of her.

If she was delusional about her body, she would have no motivation to alter her body. She would believe she had a vagina and no penis (again, I'll be reductive for simplicity's sake), so she would not hold her body (with a penis) needs changing.

Mathematical objects do not have isomorphism either, for each is it own particular concept. 2+2=4 is not the same as another, different concept of 2+2=4. One mathematical rule is not another.

There is no such thing as a ToE because it violates what an account or theory of something does. Each description we give of something, whether it a state which exists or an eternal concept, is singular are and unique. A ToE if formed on the false premise we can give an account of something be an entirely different thing. The very point of a description, theory or definition is it accounts for one specific thing. None of these things are everything, so a ToE will always fail.

Completeness, if there is anything approaching it, is only defined in a given a specific account. We can have always have a "complete" account in we may fully describe something as we are aware of it, but this will not be exhaustive of everything because there is always another thing; a different rule, another state, a different concept, not given in this description of a thing we know.

I imagine if the reflection on the retina was right way up, we might see the world inverted, assuming reflection is working like mirrors.

Yes, and the dream exists, so that fact happened in the world.

It means the given definition is lie.

Supposedly, the body is meant to make the identity, but this is not the case. We find the presence of the body is not granting the identity at all. The body is silent upon identity. The body is not making or stopping anyone being male, female or anything else.

This is a huge point: it means having a sperm or eggs does not make one male, female or anything else. If one has an identity, it must be given by a truth of identity.

Yes, real, but not existent on Earth. When you encounter something in a dream you are experiencing something which is there. It's a fact of the world someone can be wrong about.

I'm asserting that existing things are many different ways. A simple example is colour: any given thing is not just one colour, but ALL then colours which are there to be perceived. The banner of our forum is not only purple, but also, for example, grey (as seen by those who cannot see any hues)..

These issues are resolved.

Dreams are also directly perceived. They are just different things we are encountering. To see dream dragon is to encounter a different thing to my house.

Differing abilities aren't a problem either. Each object itself is multiple. It is what anyone perceives of it.

Both of those definitions comment on identity. They don't describe bodies at all.

The account is of which people can belong an idenity (male or female), supposedly, by which body they have. It's all about idenity.

If we look at the bodies, we find they don't care about these identities. A body which produces sperm does so whether it has an identity of male, female or something else. A body which has eggs does so whether it has an idenity of male, female or something else. The body does not define only those with sperm are male or only those with eggs are female.

Sartre is posed deliberately against nothingness as a nihilism. The point is an examination of our accounts of ourselves as given by concepts finds nothingness.

I am, in conceptual terms, nothing. All these philosophies and doctrines which have insisted what I am on account of some essence, some conceptual rule, I find empty. My existence or consciousness exists, extending beyond them all. For all their promises of who I am, all these doctrines have only recognised me as nothing, substituting me for whatever essence they wanted to ascribe me.

For Sartre, nothingness is the lie being told in every account insisting an are in an essence, rather than ourselves. It is the nihilism which disappears when we recognise ourselves as self-defined and responsible.

But that's just it: no-one does it. The often discussed "wrong body" trans person, for example, does not misidentify biological facts. They know what body they have, which is the problem for them.

If they did misidentify biology, thought they had a vagina when they had a penis, they would have nothing to worry about/desire to change their body. They would already understand themselves to have the body right for them.

Biological sex is a lie about sex and it's relation to people, as sex is an identity not a biological fact.

Sex says nothing about the states of affairs of the body (which is why we always find ourselves falling back on bodily description when trying to explain sex. If sex really was a bodily description, we wouldn't have to say " well male/female means... xyz body" ).

For sure, my point I'm the notion of biological sex is exactly like gender is this respect. It is not a description of bodies, what bodies can do or what bodies might do, but rather a concept of (supposedly) when and where certain identity and traits(e.g. male, female) can occur or not.

Sex is not biology at all. In this sense, it is nothing more than expectation of who can belong as male, female or something else, much like any gender role.

Sex, in this sense, is not accurate at all. At best, it's a description of a sex identity, at worst it is a lie about sex and biology.

Either way, it is not any sort of description of what biology is present. It does not describe biological relations at all.

So you last paragraph there is true except for the very last part. Identity isn't a biologcal fact at all. But this doesn't mean identity is false itself, just that it is a different sort of fact, not a biological fact but an identity fact.

More along the lines the understand it to legitimately identify certain people, such there is a group talked about, thought about, understood to be treated certain ways or not, is there.

All without thinking race is biological or ascribing it defines some essential quality or predjudical value to a group.

Sex is equally a construction put over the biology of plants too. As with people, it is the biological state of the plant which is doing sexual reproduction, not a sex.

To describe reproduction, we need to describe the states of body which do it. It does not matter what "kind" they are. Bodies aren't changed by whether the are understood to be female, male or any thing else.

A male with the appropriate biology can give birth, his body has determined it so. Sex is not a biological fact.

You're almost there: it also the case female vaginas and male penises constructed in the mind, for the biological fact does not care whether it is female, male or something else.

Sex was never the descriptor of bodies. It always a supposition of identity we've added on top of the biological fact.

Whether describing biological states refers to sex or not does not entail a certain biological state is not of a certain sex.

This part is correct. Why? Just because sex is not a biologcal fact, that doesn't mean those with certain biological facts don't have a sex. Many people with a body (i.e. biologcal facts) have an idenity which is sex. People have sex on it's own terms: it is true some people with biological states also have an idenity of sex.

But the point is sex must be given on it's own terms. To exist with a one type if body does not give a fact of.sex identity. People aren't a sex because they have a penis or vagina, they are a sex if that's the truth of their sex idenity. People of bodies have sex identity, rather than one's body determining which sex is identity one has.

So that wasn't quite my point. My point was that race wasn't biologcal, not that a category of race itself was a false belief. Categories of race may be (and are) entirely true, just as a social relation and construct.

In many ways it is a none question because they moment a group has been identified as a race, there is a person related to socially. If I set out a social category of these people, it gets used across society, the question of whether I might want to use it beccomes sort of moot. The people who exist, have been classifed by race and are treated in certain ways, are still there.

To be colourblind doesn't work becuase these people how exist and are affected are still there. It just doesn't get rid of significance of racial groups and how people have been affected.

I just showed that is not the case: describing the present biological states involves no reference to gender or sex.

My point is precisely that bodies don't change. Whether a body is male, female or something else, it will be its bodily self. If we have a male vagina, it works just the same as a female one. Same for a female penis. The body is always unaffected by which sex or gender category a person belongs to.

People alter their bodies when they want a change to their body.

It's not even that, creativesoul. They are confusing race with biology. Race was never a biological fact, even though some people might have thought it so and wanted it to be.

All along race has been a certain social distinction, a category not of biology, but a social category about people who exist (who often have a skin colour, culture or ethnicity).

I'm pointing out this is not true at all.

If I describe the body parts any person has which are involved in reproduction, I make no mention of sex or gender. To say, "This person has a penis and testes, etc. and they do..." or " This person has a womb, ovaries, etc., and they do..." involves no distinction of male or female. The description of bodies remains the same if they are female or male or something else entirely.

Sex is not describing biological facts. It's our, in this case, prejudicial account of what someone of certain biological facts can mean or be. We are saying: "Well, this person cannot be a man/woman because it just not what those genitals do", just as we do in accounts of gender roles, where we insist people can only be certain things because they have certain genitals.

It's not reiterating biological facts, it just insisting where a body can only be certain things because it exists with some genitals or chromosomes or organs.

This is an example of the sort of underlying prejudice fdrake was talking about.

What ever made the bodies in question "male" or "female?" People have different bodies no doubt, but this is no more informative then the fact people have different colour hair.

Sex is.exactly like a gender role here: it supposedly sets an idenity which a given body can be. It is drawing out who.someone is on the notion having certain genitals just cannot be that. In having this account, we are prejudiced in the same way as any other gender role. We are not describing who they are in terms of how they exist, but just applying an our insistence the world is not supposed to work that way.

My point is we were never talking about an all encompassing system in the first place. Rather, we were describing particular thing, in this case, the mathematical relationships of 2+2=4.

Nothing about this claims there to be a singular model or thing, but merely says we are talking about a particular one. Non-standrad models or relationships are perfectly fine, we just aren't talking about them or knowing them in this identification of this 2+2=4.

Other non-standard uses are fine, even a different concept of 2+2=4, and just constitute a different relationship we might know about.

There is no essentially unique. The relationship is the reverse: no matter how similar things might be (natural numbers, different instances of atoms, different instances of human, etc.), they are each a unique difference. Even those who are the same in a representation are entirely different.

There is no isomorphism between any of them, even as the might take on similar forms, symbols or meanings.

I think a good response there was never any base in the first place, the arbitrary is nothing more than a ghost of imagination.

There are no "arbitrary" things because each thing we are describing is necessarily unique to itself. If we take a mathematical relationship, like 2+2=4, the question of the arbitrariness makes no sense because there would never be 2+2=4 (what is known here) which would be anything other than a 2+2=4.

You got zombied. The Great Whatever got banned a couple of years ago.

You appear to have said quite a lot about nothing.

The OP seems to be answering the title question in speaking the title too, a rhetorical aphorism for the ages, I think.

It should be beyond doubt, the contention is God is found everywhere. Metaphorically (since such a God, being everywhere, cannot have a specfic empircal manifestation to watch), would see such a God wherever we looked.

But if we understand that, there is no question of faith. We know God is present for sure. We no longer have an uncertainty or nihilism for belief to make safe.

I feel like I've been here before, but this is a pernicious myth. It is not feelings which are determining truth at any point. One's feelings are just one sense of what's happening.

We might say they are the means by which one knows their sex or gender. Any time we understand something we have a similar sort of feeling, that specfic meanings are of certain things or events.

Like these many other situations, what makes a gender or sex true is not a fact someone feels it, but a truth of sex or gender itself about the particualr person in question. We are bound to recognise trans people not because they feel a certain way, but instead because it is true they have a particualr idenity.

When we misgender a person, we are telling a falsehood about their idenity. We are claiming their idenity is something which it is not.

But that's just the issue: if the speech is not completely, then coercion is in play.

At the very least, there is the reason/shame of being mistaken, the ethical question of speaking how one should. Even if we take a postion, for example, that some offensive comments can be uttered, we are still in a space of cocerion because the identification of them as offensive marks the utter as shameful. It's still the case one ought not be speaking that way, even if they are allowed to. Pressure of cocerion is being applied in the mere recognition of a vilification, falsehood or lie.

It could, my point was it would have to be entirely imagined. They wouldn't have the distinction of colours or non-colours we do in our emprical observation. Since everything is green to them, the whole EM spectrum would appear as the colour green.