My point wasn't that all men do this, but that some do. Objectification isn't limited to women who act "provocatively." These men will do it to any woman. Choosing not to be a stripper isn't a solution to the problem.

Nor was I talking about marrying for a piece of ass. Being attracted to someone ass and then forming a relationship with them, marrying them, etc. is perfectly fine. A great ass is a fine reason to be attracted to someone. As is being a sexual relationship. There is nothing wrong with wanting to be in a relationship because you like how a person looks or the sex you have with them. Neither of those are objectification.

I wasn't talking about freedom either. My point was about how the men objectifying understand women and how this constitutes a material social relation. One might suppose people are free to speak however they want. Objectification would still be objectification. The men in question would still be responsible for doing it. I'm not talking about some fantasy land in which no men objectify or even proposing this is likely to happen. It's only that men are responsible for these actions. Women don't get objectified because they exist and are attractive. Some men choose to understand they are their property for one sexual exploit or another. (obviously, I think these ought not happen too, but this is a seperate question to how the objectification occurs).

But it doesn't. Women get this shit all the time, not just when their stripping. This doesn't happen because women so one particular thing or another, it happens because then men in question don't respect women as people. The door is always open because men take a woman's mere existence to be a sexual object.

Neither, he should recognise those other players have violated their ethical obligations, if the comments in question are specifically harmful for one reason or another. And that the others should be admonished and possibly sanctioned for failing un their reposiblities to others (this is why sports have code of conduct regarding sledging, racial vilification, etc.).

Just because jerks will be jerks so and monsters will be monsters does not make thise actions just "The way the world works."

For wearing the clothes, yes.

This is not the objectification.

The objectification is in the actions of others, the leers, the a lot whistles, th3 comments, etc. any of which were chosen by the objectfier.

If they were implying some scatological sexual interest, sure.

Smell? Unlikely, restrooms are supposed to be shitted in and be stinky. It's not harmful in the same way. Someone pointing out you shits are stinking and annoying isn't turning you into a sexual object. Nor is having stinky shits turning anyone else into are sexual object.

The stripper is not responsible for the monstrous reactions of objectfiction from anyone watching. Watchers have a responsibility to understand her as person and respect her sexual boundaries (yes, even as she is stripping for them). They must respect she is not just an object for them to use and absue however they want.

Nothing from a contract, but the ethical obligation not to treat people like they are one's possessions. You don't do that shit becuase it's harmful to others. You aren't respecting their sexual boundries.

Even (Or maybe even especially, given their proximity to sexual interest) strippers.

Yes, you are not getting something.

When a stripper chooses to give you a sexy dance, chooses to make you feel attraction and sexual pleasure, it is not permission for anything else. It does not mean it is okay to talk about how nice the stripper would be to fuck with your friends. It does not mean it is okay to grope. It may not even mean it is okay to leer (after all, there are different tones of looking). Permission to see and enjoy the sexy dance is not an okay to anything else.

And to think otherwise is objectification (entirely from you!) , for it is to take the stripper in question beyond the bounds of what they chosen to do, give you a sexy dance, and insist they must also be or do all these other sexual things to you(despite the stripper having not chosen to partake in those at all).

What exactly is the point meant to be here? My comment about strippers was about what it true when there are strippers. I was using it as an example to describe how even actions or intentions we might consider most provocative do not amount to objectification.

I'm not sure why you are speaking of contracts here. Contracts aren't invoved in relations of objectification or not. Indeed, they are utterly irrelevant to sexual behaviour or relations of any kind. One cannot contract their ability to refuse sexual activity or object to lewd comments away.

No where did I mention other women being wrong.

Indeed, when I was talking about a woman's intention or purpose being irrelevant to instances of objectification, I was talking about ANY woman, not just the one I talked about I the example.

My postion here is exactly the opposite of what you seem to think it is: I'm saying it is fine and good for any woman to appear as they wish. That, it in this behaviour, there is no objectification. Strippers are not objectifying themselves.The objectification is in how others are responding to this behaviour or not.

Her purpose and intention don't matter.

The objectification is coming from the actions of others. In, for example, men who are thinking she is their sexual toy becuase she has some purpose or intention.

Let's say she does a striptease. This does not mean men can leer at her. It does not mean they can wolf whistle. It does not mean it's cool for the men discuss talk about how "she has such a wonderful pussy I'd love to fuck".

No, it is not. Not in the sense that women are appearing looking beautiful.

Yes, in the sense that beauty pagents are cultural/political organisation which assert a women has a specific social value upon her looks.

Appearing as an object does not equal objectification. Everything appears as an object. If this were equal to objectification, then simply existing and being seen would entail people correctly harassing, leering, touching, grouping, speaking of others as sexual slaves, etc. This is not true.

That the thing though: there is no such hypocrisy.

Every woman could walk around naked, want to be looked at sexually, want to cause sexual attraction in any make a present. It would make no difference to what men ought to do. The men would still be wrong to touch, harrasss proposition, leer, etc., the women in question.

Wanting to be looked at or appear attractive does not equal being sexually objectified. The objectification is a separate action, taken by other, in response to the presence of a person.

That's being concerned about his desire that a woman must attracted or interested in him. It has nothing to do with a woman's needs. Her concerns, desires and needs do not feature anywhere in this sort of thought.

You recognise that someone being attractive, wearing suggestive clothing or acting provocatively does not mean someone is there to fulfil your sexual desires. When you are relating to people, you understand that sexual relations and appearance are not defined by whether someone feels attraction, but by whether the other person wants to be invoved.

People do not objectify themsleves. Not even when they're writhing around naked in front of a crowd. The supposition they must be a sexual object come from the watching crowds. Watchers are the ones who suppose whatever an attractive person does makes them available for sex. They are the ones who decide to treat attractive people like they don't have their own wishes or personhood. Objectification is not in feeling someone is attractive or a person wearing little, it's in supposing someone to be there for one's sexual desire just because they exist.

We might well talk about it, if we speak the same language about it. All we need are our words, which have specific references to our feeling of pain, such that when one of us hears the words, we experience awareness of the pain in question. "What pain feel like to me," whatever that entails (which varies and may be a host of different thing, depending on the pain we are talking about), just needs to be communicated.

It's not there is nothing to say about it, but that we cannot get at it from outside itself. There isn't one certain concept which we can derive what someone else is feeling.

reactions to pain, or pain behaviours, tend to appear similar across genuine cases — Luke

So these aren't really telling us anything. Yes, they might be evidence someone is in pain... but that only functions if those behaviours are (and are known to be, in these instances) correlated with pain. In effect, to recognise a "pain behaviour," we have to already be aware the person is in pain. We have to know an instance of pain occurring before sorting a person's behaviour into "pain behaviour."

Therefore we have to turn to the internal thing, the thing which is called pain, to establish principles to differentiate real pain behaviour from mock pain behaviour. This is where Wittgenstein fails as you describe. "The private sensation is real, but nothing can be said about it; nothing further about it can be described or discussed in our public language." By claiming nothing can be said about this internal, private thing, he leaves us completely vulnerable, without any principles to address deception. — Metaphysician Undercover

Lots can be said about it. In fact, it is what we are doing here: distinguishing real pain behaviour from mock pain behaviour. Our words are doing it. When we encounter someone doing one or the other, these words describe that difference. We can in fact describe it to others, "That is mock behaviour" or "That person is genuinely in pain" perfectly.

In either case, we have spoken about it in words. Wittgenstein is giving us what address the the deception in speech: there is no private language, the so called "private" thing was never private in the first place.

"Feels like" has similar publicity. I can know what other people feel. My experience may take on similar sensation. Here the topic has moved on from words. In this situation, we are not asking about what words are used, but whether someone feels the same as another. It's not a move from words to knowledge, but a sensation experience all along.

The lesson here is not to get fooled into thinking a specific language used (or not used) here makes a difference. When we are dealing with publicity, we are dealing with whether some people feel or understand as others do, whether it be a language, what happened yesterday or what someone is feeling. Such communication is defined by the existence of certain experiences in the people in question. It is something our experience does.

Properly stated, as a realist, it would be a claim one's imagination was in one's mind. In other words, just a recognition one's imagining are states of their experience.

The realist postion is things which do appear in our minds are not our minds. If we cannot imagine anything outside our minds, there is no consequence of rendering everything mental.

It's not that there is high standard of falsification, but that falsification is impossible. People aren't squabbling over what appears in phenomena or not. Experience always appears consistent with both. Kicking a rock does not show idealism false because one is clearly experiencing it. Just another construction of experience.

Realism and idealism is a metaphysical distinction of things. When the realist says there is a rock I'm kicking, they are not saying a pheneonma is manifest in my experience. Instead, they are identifying the rock is not me. The rock is not me or my experience (of the rock).

Kantian analysis of the transcendental illusion only redoubles the idealist illusion. He traps our account only in the context of phenomenal experience. Our experiences are just of things which are in our experiences. Or So the story goes. Perfectly compatible with the idealist, for whom there are only the things in experience.

Kant didn't push through to recognise the transcendental illusion has a different genesis. Not a failure to recognise phenomenal reality or a worship of empty noumena phenonemal cause, but rather the error of failing to recognise transcendental reality. The mistake was just confusing on transcendental feature with another, such as the thing/causality/phenomena with God.

Frequently, we know about things which have no appearance in experience. In fact, this is everything, including all pheneonma. Each pheneonma is something outside experience, an existing thing which is not any experience if it. This is the metaphysical distintion of realism: the things I experience are not my experience.

As a distinction of difference/identity/defintion, there is no empirical observation or analysis which addresses the question.

So you say... but how can we trust this if "Reason evolves" is not true?

If "reason evolves" does not carry across times, then there will be instances in which lightening is still being generated by Zeus.

It's not really God of Gaps. The list a metaphysical postion things do not depend upon our mind. Questions of whether things have been explained in our mind hasn't been touched. God of gaps would need the supposition that when things appeared to us, they are inexplicable or unexplained.

All we have in the list is the fact our minds are not equivalent to what is true. We might reason about many things, but it is not that we are reasoning about them which makes that reason true.

There is a mistake in the list, an equivocation between the defintion of reason and the mind of a God. Thinking of a God is in a no different postion than us: reason cannot be instances of the existence of a God either, for reasons is always true, not just when a God might happen to think about it.

I don't think there is any difference between the two.

In the stories in which we harm others with our flaws, we are the villains of the piece. We were the one who, in one sense or another, did something were not supposed to or a part of something doing the harm. We never get a pass because "We are not as bad as Hitler, Biff or Thanos" because the harm of another does not take away our own. There are no comparisons to be made, no excuses that we didn't cause as much damage as someone else. I do mean the villain. That's what it is to be flawed in a way which harms others.

You are, for course, right. People don't want to think of themselves as the villain... but they must to recognise the harms committed, otherwise we are just pretending they don't exist.

In race issues, for example, trying to insist racism is just those intentionally racist villains, rather than any of the structural "whiteness" which is no-one's direct action or intention in particular.

No. The context of the harm is also those structural impacts. Sometimes they might even do more damage than someone who is intentionally racist (consider someone born into a structure of poverty vs someone shouting a racist slur). Those structural impacts, with threads interlaced with white identity, are also a villain. If we cannot recognise this, the harm and it ethical significance, that something is there which ought not be or have been done, something not redeemable, not undoable, we are only engaging in a pretence about a problem.

"Whiteness" isn't referencing the existence of a person with white skin, but the existence within the social context of white idenity and its relation to opression. The equivalent in disability context is the able-bodied identity and bias.

I also don't think the it's physcholgically toxic to recognise oneself as the villain. All that's being spoken about here is regonising the harm the presence of the oppressive social context has done, and perhaps a specific role they might have played in that. To recognise harm which has been done to someone is not toxic, it just honest.

Toxicity lies in in thinking one cannot have engaged in such harms, the place in which on takes an implict assumption these said harms are something they could not be involved or related to, for they couldn't possibly be commiting or have relation to such terrible harm. This is why, as others have pointed out, approaching this in terms of "ending" all oppression is a bad idea.

Aside from issues of oppession being vast and complex, certainly not endable by a group of people coming to understand the harms which occur, it attracts the oppressor side to notion of being those who never, ever engage or relate to those harms. The result is likely a lot of white people who cannot recognise harms because they are desperate to be people without any connection to such harms.

My point was any biological trait is on equivalent terms as hair length. DNA, chromosomes, genitals , etc., are just as much finite instances of the body which might be subject to change. In terms of defining sex, all of them are on the same level and have the same problem: the equivocate sex simply wth how someone appears, as if belonging to a sex was just a matter of looking a certain way.

By deeper, I mean an account of sex which grasp the unity itself, which doesn't just just equate having a sex with possessing a particular appearance, an account in which a sex remains defined even in the face of finite changes (e.g. hair length, chromosomes, genitals, DNA, etc.). One which does not equate sex having medical produces to look a certain way, going to the gene store, etc.

If that works for you, fine. To me it sounds non-sensical. In my experience, men who look like men (general physical characteristics, specifics of penis, testicles, beard, body hair, manner-of-being-in-the-world) also act and identify as men. The same (different features) goes for women. Not 100% of the time, but more than 99%. Maybe I hang around with an unusually conventional group of people, but I don't think that is the case.

It IS the case that men and women can perform many roles traditionally assigned to the opposite. Men can be effective nurses, women can be effective soldiers (so reports have it, anyway). Some men are homebodies, and some women are out carousing all night. But female soldiers and all-night carousers generally think of themselves as women. Male nurses and homebodies continue to them of themselves as men.

Were society organized differently (in other cultures it has been) men and women occupy roles which in the US are oppositely assigned. For instance, women in many countries do heavy outdoor work, not exclusively, but consistently.

It is my impression that you are NOT talking about gender-linked occupational roles -- like only men get to be bricklayers and only women get to be nurses.

I’m not saying it works for me. It’s an objective truth. All instances of sex are defined by sex itself.

Many of the male and female sexed people have certain characteristics. Nothing about my position says there cannot be many men with certain physical characteristics, specifics of penis, testicles, beard, body hair, manner-of-being-in-the-world.

Indeed, it claims exactly the opposite: if there are men with those traits, they will exist and appear in our observations of society. Men existing with those traits was never problem nor denied. Those men aren’t men because they have those traits, they are men with those traits. 100% or 0.00001%, the amount of men we see with those traits doesn’t affect it, the male sex of each man defined by his sex itself.

The male nurse is correct to think of himself as still a man. Being a nurse, being just an appearance, has no impact upon his sex. Just because there is a notion amongst some that only women take those roles, the unity of his male sex remains unaffected.

I am talking about sex/gender linked occupational roles, not specifically, but they are a member of the same family of defining a person and role by their appearance. Biologically defined sex is another example of these. Just as someone might be saying those who are men, are not nurses because that’s a woman’s role, the notion of biological defined sex claims one cannot fall into a role (ample/female) on account of how they appear (one body of another).

Sex, in these biologically defined terms, is no different than a gender role. The woman with a penis is the same sort of situation as the male nurse. Some people might believe the role cannot go with an appearance, but that doesn’t change what is true of the person. If we have a woman whose existence is doing (i.e. she exists with one) a penis, she is still just as much a woman, just as the male nurse is still a male. Saying otherwise ("But only MALES have penises", "Only WOMEN are nurses") is only someone ignoring the given truth a person and their sex itself. Like nursing, having a penis is just something the someone might be doing, whether other think it impossible for them or not.

Chromosomes are just another appearance. Like hair, body parts,genitals, etc., they are a biological trait reported to entail sex. One which might be subject to change. We and cut or grow our hair, cut off or remodel genitals, potentially some effect might change or remove a chromosomes too. They are no better as ground to sex.

If someone’s Y chromosomes suddenly dropped off tomorrow, would they cease to be a man? Hardly the stable quality of an identity. The trouble with supposing one is made into an identity by possessing particular traits, if the identity is then equivalent to those traits. If the trait goes, so does they identity, at least by the story being told. Sex by chromosome is another one of those shallow appearance stories, like the hair and genitals before it.

Have or alter your body this way, change your traits, and you will finally belong to your identity. The supposition identity is not grounded in itself. We must consume thing to be part of the team. Just buy the right drug, alter yourself the right way, you will finally be your meaningful self. When you finally take on the appearance of a man or women, you will be one.

The great irony in the consternation over “fluid” sex is it is the essentialist who believes, above all, it is fluid. Since they cite a trait external to identity defines it, the spectre of fluidity is always haunting. If the trait changes, if the appearance changes, so must their identity. Essential relation between identity and appearance doesn’t allow for a man without a penis to be a man, a person with long hair to be a man, a person without XY chromosomes, etc., the essentialist is always in fear of finite whim destroying sex because sex does not extend past appearance for them. It’s only ever about having the right kind of hair, genitals, chromosomes, iPhone, Apple Watch, car or house. The essentialist is the one who goes shopping for a sex or gender, taking one to be buying the right product in the social space. For them, sex is only looking a part, possessing the right sort of things. Lose the look, you lose the sex.


When I say sex lies deeper, I mean it is defined separately to one's appearance (e.g. hair length, genitals, a particular chromosome or not), in terms of one’s sex itself. It is not a status obtained by having one sort of appearance or another, but a substantial feature itself. Changing one’s appearance has no impact on their sex. Grow a man’s hair, he is still a man. Cut off a man’s genitals, he is still a man. Eliminate man’s Y chromosome, he is still a man. Sex, being identity of whole, holds across changes to other aspects of that whole. Similarly, give a woman short hair, she is still a woman. Change a woman’s genitals, she is still a woman. Give a woman a Y chromosome, she is still a woman.

The unity of identity applies just as much to the (trans) woman. If the woman appears with a penis, no breasts, etc., she is still a woman. If she appears with breasts and a penis, she is still a woman. If she appears with breasts and a vaginoplasty, she is still a woman. If she appears wth XY chromosomes, she is still a woman. Sex is not a game of obtaining or changing by buying appearances. To have a sex (or change a sex) depends on an attribute of sex itself.

In this respect, trans identity is an illusion. It only makes sense in reference to shallow appearance identifications of sex— that someone who looked like they should be a man is a woman or vice verse. When we understand the deeper truth of sex itself, the idea of trans no longer makes any sense. Appearance doesn’t give any definition of sex. Any sex might be given with any appearance. There is no longer “woman who looks like a man” or a “man who looks like a woman.” Just men, women, and anyone else, with the unity of their sex itself, however they appear.

Properly stated, a trans woman is just a woman, many of whom never actually changed sex at all (they were a woman all along, just misread by those who thought women only appeared a certain way), with a different appearance (e.g. hair length, genitals, chromosomes) to some other women.

Theories about perpetual motion machines amuse me. If it's always moving, how is there a counterfactual situation of it not moving to theorise against?

It seems the theorist has forgotten the machine is always in motion.

Everything we experience is equally a self-generation. Our body doesn't produce just the appearance of colours, but anything we encounter with our senses, including the shape, mass, etc. of.objects . If this self generation was a problem for the reality of colours, it is equally a problem for the reality of anything we experience.

Not true, the claims at stake are of objective truth, a specific social relation and power. The philosphies grouped as post modernism have never claimed there is no objective truth.

The argument isn't "social constructs" are some instance of a casual force which institutes one specific event over another (such as pressing a button causing a door to open), but referencing the fact our social organisation is formed in a certain way (we have built our society this way, in how we have socially organised), constructed out of the behaviours we do, rather than being an afterthought of some initial state.

The sort of example you are talking about there is easily refuted because it ignores the self-definition of a discipline. Math, for example, cannot be used to prove the superiority of straight white men because it’s an entirely different topic. It’s not like an empirical proof, where there is a self relation between what has appeared in experience and the empirical manifestation of the proposed state. Nor is it like a mathematical proof, in which there is some initial mathematical proposal which is then shown to be contained within a certain set of mathematical operators.

In the example you give, all you have is someone making associations between different concepts and what we must think. It’s a version of Divine Command, if God says X (the mathematical relationship performed), then Y (the superiority of straight white men) must obtain. This is just an association or correlation between two different concepts (the math and the notion straight white men are superior).

In Sartre’s terms, it’s a bad faith position. Like when someone says, “Well X told me to do it, so I had no choice” or “I can only do Y because I’m a human” or “I can only be polite to the customer, for I am a waiter."

Or similar to certain accounts of sex and gender, which claim the presence of a bodily trait entails someone must only ever belong to one category or another.

Or to use a mathematical example, an instance in which someone equivocates two distinct sets as a single set. I draw these comparison to show how cross discipline “evidence” or “proof” look like, by picking out some kind of similarity in the meanings of the two disciplines to describe something.

Deductive proofs, as such, are not really a thing in this context. They only ever repeat the initial rule (including whatever prejudices and errors they entail), an exercise in just affirming what you have already claimed or, in many cases, demanded. In terms of accounting for what and when something is known, they don’t really have a place. When we are at the place of reflecting on how we know what know, we are dealing with what we understand in any case. Any sort of deductive relation only comes after this, when we know a deductive rule and the things it applies between.

I don't know about ideological position (that springs to mind certain political nations which aren't relevant to my point here), but certainly a logical one.

To oppose the point I've made here, you would have to equivocate the existence of the body with word, such that a body with a penis was identical to the word "male," such that one would never have a body with a penis without it being the word male. An obvious incoherence since, as you yourself have pointed out, the body is distinct from the words which talk about it.

Indeed. A body with a penis will be a body with a penis, whether it is "male" or "female." The sex identity doesn't determine the bodily state at all.


Same with chromosomes (which is to say, even to change chromosomes would still only be altering an "appearance". Sex lies even deeper than that.)

The point was your account is clearly mistaken: one can give a body with a penis the sex category of woman without denying she has a penis. No doubt there is a denial or rejection of something in this position, but it is not the bodies which have been formed by nature.

Sex is nothing but another name, a categorisation of identity.

Nature stuff, the bodies, are unaffected by this categorisation. If we have, for example, a woman with a penis, there is no denial of nature. Nature, the body with a penis, just has an identity of woman.

I'd say that's how can appear, but it's a little bit more complicated than that.

People are not infrequently, at least for a time, trans when their mind is insisting the opposite or lacks conception of what's going on. There seems to be something more going on too, at least more than is implied by calling it a truth of mind. Sex or gender is a particularly identity truth itself. We aren't just talking about a thought or feeling someone has when we consider it.

I fear your reaction here is exactly that they were describing.

Usually, a very literal account is in play with these sort of statements. What does it mean for a white person to harm other racial minorities? How does the particular social construction of “whiteness” manifest? In the existence of white people, that’s to say, their particular existence in a social context of white supremacy is how these particular harms are occurring to non-white minorities. Who are actors of harm in these situations? Existing white people (amongst many other too, but here we are speaking of harms formed by a presence of white people and the social context of their supremacy).

White people have difficult recognising what their own existence involves, which I suspect the diversity training is talking about here. Can one recognise the harms committed by the existence (or rather presence if you prefer) of white people under a white supremacy? Even if it might be no particular fault of their own.

Economic inequality, for example, is a harm towards a racial minority. It is present in the existence of white people in the given white supremacy. Yet, it was never the fault of the white baby born into wealth. It’s not really even the fault of a given white man, certain conditions excepting. But it is nevertheless a harm formed in the existence of the social order and its people. It does not have to be intentional. In some cases, it doesn’t have to any specific action you took. We are born into a social context, our existence has a significance beyond what intend or even do ourselves. A person might not be morally blame worthy in these situations (e.g. a white person born into a rich white family), but it is still an existence with significance .

The more personal level of harm, in which a white person might be morally blameworthy, also tends to run concurrently. In our society it is highly likely an individual has engaged in some instance of racial harm on an individual level, some feeling of disgust or disrupt there, a dismissal there, an off colour joke there, some sort of assumed expectation of “whiteness” at some point. To insist one couldn’t have been anything of those things, that their existence they did not ever engage in any of those harms seems extremely unlikely to say the least. The idea seems to be to put one (the existence of a white person), beyond any possibility of engaging in those harms.

It’s ever unsettling truth in the context of these race issues: “whiteness” is the villain. On some level recognising issues of white supremacy means taking issue with many aspects of how white people exist, including some base assumptions they make about their own identity. It means understanding one’s group, oneself, to be villainous on one level or another. Particularly difficult because it's running headfirst into some of the most basic assumptions about individuals we make in our culture. We tell ourselves everyone is a free blank slate, without relations or impacts upon others unless we choose it.

The trouble is a univocity thesis is first and foremost a nominalist one, at least with respect to how the term is being used in this thread.

Univocity always begins In the grasping of a distinction between the human individual and unity. God is recognised not be human at all, no matter how much they are together or connected. It is the ghost which haunts univocity. Everyone trying to collapse everything into unity is always going to get caught be the initial nominalist distintion they made in the first place.

It's obvious their claim to only unity is only trying to paper over, to hide a distinction implict in their reasoning in the first place, an exercise in pretending we are not distinct from God.

Seems to me like we do not subject accounts we know to be perception to a supposition of it being an illusion... so I suspect we might be closer to the naive realists than you might think.

Explanation is always complete because it details some thing-- "It has been explained"-- but never exhaustive because there are things of which a given account does not speak.

So yes, the tree has been accounted for, insofar as it has been truthfully spoken about. Speak the shape.of it's leaves, you give a full account, insofar as you describe, the shape of the trees leaves. Do not be fooled by the fact there is much more to the tree, you have genuinely accounted for the tree. You just aren't accounting for the many other ways and relations this tree exists in.

I'm not sure why anyone would need omniscience to simply know X. It seems strange to think they would need it to be certain about X either. In either case, one has knowledge of one particular thing. One does not need omniscience to know one thing.

Covered by what I said, both of those are, in the same sense, an explanation. (or in Leibnizian terms, both are true by PSR).

The problem has never been having multiple instances of explanation, just supposing there is a difference in what it means for something to be explained. (i.e. dualism, transcendent things, supernatural realms, etc.).

My Spinozisic intentions must not have been clear enough...

Pluarity is impossible because we are dealing with explanation. One cannot have two forms of explanation. If something is explained, true, etc., it is so in the same sense: the thing in question has been accounted for.