Theists, atheists, and agnostics are trapped in a ill conceived language game. They long for the comfort of language about every day objects that their debates just don’t provide.

It may be more helpful to understand the fruitfulness of an idea, to acknowledge a spectrum of senses of “there is”, and to have the freedom to choose based on what has been presented.

Yep, a metaphysics need not have any relevancy to the world we experience, or it can make us see the world in only one way

Would Kripke say a proper name refers to the same person in all possible worlds or a proper name is stipulated in all possible worlds? I think the latter.

In each scenario, the same object walks into the room.

1. An object walks in a room and I name this object “Gell Mann.” “Gell Mann” could not have been the famous American physicist. When I think truly that “Gell Mann” could have been a lawyer, I am referring to Gell Mann, the object I named “Gell Mann”.

2. An object walks in a room. Tattooed on the object is the letters “Gell Mann”. The object with the tattooed letters “Gell Mann” could not have been the famous American physicist.” When I think truly that object with the tattooed letter “Gell Mann” could have been a lawyer, I am referring to the object with the tattooed letters “Gell Mann”.

3. An object walks in a room. I observed this object and come up with a complete description of this object based on what I can observe. The object I completely described could not have been the famous American physicist.” When I think truly that this object I completely described could have been a lawyer, I am referring to that object I had completely described.

Analysis:

Does it matter whether we call this naming or describing, the function it serves is the same, to communicate to avoid misunderstanding. For example, in scenario #3, if someone ask me who could not have been the famous American physicist, I reply with the complete description of the object. This keeps re-occurring with different people, I decide I need to provide an abbreviated description, and call it “Gell Mann” Is this a description or a name, does it matter as long as I avoid misunderstanding?

Though not know as “Common Sense” philosophers I believe these two quotes show a particular compatibility between two lines of their thought:

1. “Don’t ask: how can I identify this table in another possible world, except by its properties? I have the table in my hands, I can point to it, and when I ask whether it might have been in another room, I am talking, by definition, about it.” N&N SK

2 “Does it matter which we say so long as we avoid misunderstanding in any particular case” PI LW

A language user may intend to use a name in a particular way but with conversation they may learn if there is a common understanding of that name.