• Is Kripke's theory of reference consistent with Wittgenstein's?
    Would Kripke say a proper name refers to the same person in all possible worlds or a proper name is stipulated in all possible worlds? I think the latter.
  • Is Kripke's theory of reference consistent with Wittgenstein's?
    In each scenario, the same object walks into the room.

    1. An object walks in a room and I name this object “Gell Mann.” “Gell Mann” could not have been the famous American physicist. When I think truly that “Gell Mann” could have been a lawyer, I am referring to Gell Mann, the object I named “Gell Mann”.

    2. An object walks in a room. Tattooed on the object is the letters “Gell Mann”. The object with the tattooed letters “Gell Mann” could not have been the famous American physicist.” When I think truly that object with the tattooed letter “Gell Mann” could have been a lawyer, I am referring to the object with the tattooed letters “Gell Mann”.

    3. An object walks in a room. I observed this object and come up with a complete description of this object based on what I can observe. The object I completely described could not have been the famous American physicist.” When I think truly that this object I completely described could have been a lawyer, I am referring to that object I had completely described.

    Analysis:

    Does it matter whether we call this naming or describing, the function it serves is the same, to communicate to avoid misunderstanding. For example, in scenario #3, if someone ask me who could not have been the famous American physicist, I reply with the complete description of the object. This keeps re-occurring with different people, I decide I need to provide an abbreviated description, and call it “Gell Mann” Is this a description or a name, does it matter as long as I avoid misunderstanding?
  • Is Kripke's theory of reference consistent with Wittgenstein's?
    Though not know as “Common Sense” philosophers I believe these two quotes show a particular compatibility between two lines of their thought:

    1. “Don’t ask: how can I identify this table in another possible world, except by its properties? I have the table in my hands, I can point to it, and when I ask whether it might have been in another room, I am talking, by definition, about it.” N&N SK

    2 “Does it matter which we say so long as we avoid misunderstanding in any particular case” PI LW

    A language user may intend to use a name in a particular way but with conversation they may learn if there is a common understanding of that name.