• On the Relationship between Concepts, Subjects, and Objects

    See my Wittgenstein footnote.
    I repeat...all concepts/words take their meaning from specific contexts. Nebulous (philosophical) contexts result in 'language on holiday'.
  • On the Relationship between Concepts, Subjects, and Objects

    I suggest you examine the concept of 'existence' itself ! You may come to the conclusion that 'existence' (like all concepts denoted by a word), simply implies 'human contextual functionality', and that ' expected physicality' is merely one aspect of that functionality.
  • Objections to metaphysical arguments for the existence of God are otiose
    As an atheist the concept of 'God' has no function for me but I acknowledge its functionality for others. The lay concept of 'existence' is based on the naive realism of 'an observer independent world' rather than a Pragmatist view of 'existence' implying 'contextual functionality'.
    (Your 'no God without humans point' touches on that but doesn't nail it to naive realism). From this pov, all rejection of ''existence of God' based on 'lack of evidence' or social history is futile, because 'God' remains psychologically and socially functional, and therefore 'exists' for many.

    IMO, the only worthwhile debate in this matter is to discuss the view that religion in general, and theism in particular tends to be historically socially pernicious, and hence 'dysfunctional'. It bears some similarity with a 'drugs'debate'..
  • We Don't Want To Believe - Because, If We Believe, Then...
    Frank
    What point are you trying to make quoting Jabberwocky ?

    Lewis Carroll (Charles Dodgson) was a logician interested in semantics. Are you claiming expertise in this area ?
  • We Don't Want To Believe - Because, If We Believe, Then...
    You are correct Terrapin. What matters is agreement as to 'evidence' and that's a social phenomenon. Indeed, from the pov that 'reality' is never directly accessible, pragmatists reject 'absooute(non contextual) reality' as meaningless which in turn renders 'guess' to be about whatworks, not what is.
    [NB The Eprime movement in philosophy attempted to ban using the word 'is' ]
  • We Don't Want To Believe - Because, If We Believe, Then...
    Once more, had you read the epistemological literature, you would be aware that all words, including 'guess' take their meaning from the social context in which they occur. They are no longer considered representational of a 'state of reality' independent of that context. That position renders much verbiage called 'debate' as mere jockeying for social dominance, or even a form of social dancing.

    "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less." "The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things." "The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master—that's all."

    Lewis Carroll.
  • We Don't Want To Believe - Because, If We Believe, Then...
    To Leo
    Frank is here on a self validatory mission regarding his agnosticism. This involves ignoring all usual epistemological objections because his personal sacrosanct word magic of 'guessing' has replaced the word magic of 'holy writ' he rejected. He of course dismisses this contextual observation as 'crap', but
    but that's is actually all there is to it.
  • Is Existence a Property of Objects, or are Objects Properties of Existence?
    Comment to Relativist
    (Apologies for summary post...the edit function seemed to have deleted the post above but it then reappeared !.)
  • Is Existence a Property of Objects, or are Objects Properties of Existence?
    Comment to Terrapin.
    All 'things' do have 'existence' if you move away from naive realism. What matters is 'functionality for the thinger'. The functionality of 'Santa Claus' for me as an adult differs from that for my child. Physicality is merely one aspect of expectancies triggered by the words we use to do thinging.
    This of course renders debates about 'the existence of God' futile. The functionality of the word 'God' fof me as an atheist is very different to that for a believer. But I cannot deny the 'existence of God' for him since 'evidence' for disputed 'things' lies in the eye of the beholder.
  • Is Existence a Property of Objects, or are Objects Properties of Existence?
    No It is generally accepted that ontology and epistemology are inextricable. What you call 'properties' boil down to 'expectancies of the nature of interaction' triggered by socially acquired 'names'.

    There are multiple arguments supporting this rejection of 'naive realism' ranging from Buddhism (Tat Tvam Asi), via Phenomenolgy through to philosophical pragmatism.
  • Is Existence a Property of Objects, or are Objects Properties of Existence?
    No. It is generally accepted that ontology and epistemology are inextricable. What you call 'properties' boil down to 'expectancies of nature of interaction' triggered by a socially acquired label.

    I assert that 'existence' is relative to observers, never absolute. It is a word used in contexts where 'evidence' is being disputed. Other usage implying 'naive realism' is an example of Wittgenstein's 'language on holiday'.

    This assertion is supported from a number of sources:

    1 Comparative physiology of perceptual syetems.
    2 The QM position stated by Niels Bohr, thwt tere are no 'things' only 'interaction events'.
    3 Kant's point that 'noumena' (Dingen-an Sich) are inacessible.
    4.Heidegger's point that Existenz is only applicable to Dasein
    5 Nietsche's point that, no 'description' is closer to 'reality' than any other. Descriptions are more more or less functional according to context..
    6. The subsequent rejection by philosophical pragmatist's like Rorty, of the 'Reality-Non Reality' debate as futile.
    7 Autopoietic views of the life process which bypass the concept of 'sense data' (Maturana)
    8 State transitional views of cognition (Genetic Epistemology) In which 'observer' and 'world' states are co -extensive and co-existent.
    9...and finally the Budrhist concept of Tat Tvam Asi (Thou art That) in which 'self' and 'observed' are a holistic single 'reality'.
    i
  • We Don't Want To Believe - Because, If We Believe, Then...
    Now why would your attempts at self rationalisation of your choice of to leave the Church get under my skin ?

    And as long as others are prepared to play games with you about your ridiculous belief that 'you don't do believing' that's their problem.

    Have fun !
  • We Don't Want To Believe - Because, If We Believe, Then...
    :smile:
    I see Frank is still trying to rationalise his escape from the Church ministry by brandishing his simplistic shield emblazoned with the word 'Guess' at all antagonists,. It is indeed a pity that, after all these years,he does not seem familiar with the plethora of epistemological literature available.

    fresco.
  • Is Existence a Property of Objects, or are Objects Properties of Existence?
    I suggest classical set theory is irrelevant for dealing with 'existence' because 'thinghood' being an aspect of observer\observed interaction is transient and cultural. i.e Things do not 'exist' in their own right , they are functional focal experiences (or potential experiences) which have been labelled. The closest 'logic' gets to this is perhaps 'fuzzy logic' in which the 'thinghood' (functionality) shifts according to observer receptive state and lexicon.
    Reference ...Comparative Physiology...what humans call 'dead insects' dont 'exist' for frogs. And are we not merely bigger frogs who have selectively augmented our physiology with transducers ?

    Acoording to this 'functionality view of existence', alll labelled 'things' have 'existence' but their functionality differs according to observers. Thus 'god exists' for 'believers' or 'electrons exist' at some levels of scientific theory but not others. Physicality is merely one aspect of 'thinghood'.
  • Is Existence a Property of Objects, or are Objects Properties of Existence?
    My view is that 'thinghood' is what humans ascribed to some focal aspects of Their perceptual interaction. In other words 'existence' is a word we use for those recurrent interactions we consider to persist in our interaction history. The naming of such functional interactions reinforces such persistence by the abstract persistence of a word or object name. And since words are socially acquired there tends to be agreement i.e. understanding about the expectancies. encasulated by 'object names'.
    Simple Reference...quantum theory...'there are no 'things'....only interactions..