On an event-specific use, it would be impossible to demonstrate that without the 'correct' mindset (or "X") self-efficacy could not be achieved as it doesn't account for chance

I chose my words poorly and too hastily. I meant to express that, on a one-off event, a person's behavior may have outward appearances of a maximal self-efficacy, but there would be no way to differentiate between a methodical mindset that led to a maximal behavioral response, rather than just stumbling onto an event-specific behavioral response that gave the appearance of maximal self-efficacy.

However, if self-efficacy became a consistent goal of the individual and mindset "X" were both a logical and habituated method for increasing self-efficacy, then I believe clear causality could be established with minimal data, at least correlation of sufficient measure to warrant adequate interest and funding for research.

I understand this is a bit unorthodox, but I am certainly in territory that is not neatly addressed by the usual methods of analysis in psychology and reasoning in philosophy, of which I am aware.

In this instance, a sound and valid argument seems the most logical method for suggesting the application and the reliability of mindset "X" to increase self-efficacy. However, empirical data could certainly support the argument and lessen the chance of Type 1 errors.

My biggest concern was the construction of the argument as deductive, but it looks like that may not be possible given the complexity of the terms.

You have been a great help @TheMadFool, (and you @sime) I know time is valuable and it is appreciated.

If anyone else out there would like to jump in or may have a referral for a follow up, please, let me know.

Thanks!

An individual's mindset is a mental construct, though. There would be no real way to collect data for this except through self-reporting measures. Accuracy, validity, and reliability of reported mindsets would be too problematic even with a carefully thought out scale. If statistical analysis were possible, I'd likely not need a deductive argument, I could just point to the data.

I truly do appreciate your input on this. Are you aware of any options I may have to submit the actual argument for a review? There are some websites, but the ones I found then claim intellectual rights of the argument and comments and I am not affiliated with a university, so my access to academic departments is limited.

Thanks, again!

ah, you found the missing thread I could not locate...

Thanks for the reply,

You'll have to prove that without the ''correct'' mindset, self-efficacy can't be achieved. In other words you'll have to show that self-efficacy achieved AND incorrect mindset is impossible.

On an event-specific use, it would be impossible to demonstrate that without the 'correct' mindset (or "X") self-efficacy could not be achieved as it doesn't account for chance. I'm thinking of the cliche that even a broken clock is right twice a day.

However, on an prolonged scale, the argument should already demonstrate the "best path to consistent self-efficacy" is by "X".

Does that make a difference at all in your view?

I thought I had responded last night, but I can't seem to find the thread.

At any rate, I had looked at hypothetical syllogisms, but didn't feel that the actual argument fit neatly in that category, although I really do not know.

I had doubts of the "if-then" nature of the hypothetical, and I think I was getting hung up on the "degree" of which one may choose or choose not to engage in the conditional. In this regard, the conditional does not necessarily depend on a chain of events as much as it does the conscious decision of the person involved to engage in the event (which I guess is not that different from a hypothetical).

The crux of the argument is that to maximize self-efficacy, one should "X", but it doesn't necessarily follow that one should want to maximize self-efficacy, and it doesn't prevent one from randomly stumbling upon the most self-efficacious outcome despite a lack of "X". However, to consistently maximize self-efficacy, then the conditionals of the argument, and the argument itself fits very nicely
(or so it seems).

@sime modal logic is another one of those areas I reviewed but still seem to be giving the square peg, round hole type of issue for me. Indeed, each proposition may have specified truth-values associated with the possible worlds, but I am getting hung up again on the "potentiality" of an event on a spectrum along with the outcome of "intent" on a spectrum.

I am certain I am making this harder than it is, but human behavior is a very complicated thing and self-efficacy, by definition, must be considered on a spectrum.

Ex: I am trapped in a very difficult and strange puzzle room with multiple locked exits. One exit represents the maximal solution and leads to the best prize. Other exits represent less than the maximal solution, yet are still solutions. There are clues available that will require accurate interpretation to be of maximal use. Each clue outlines a very specific 'behavior'. When performed properly, the 'behavior' unlocks part of the puzzle. If all clues are interpreted to complete accuracy and the 'behaviors' are performed properly, the best exit, i.e., the one representing maximal efficacy, will become available.

This example should be taken to represent:
a) a given environment
b) interpretations of and behavioral responses to the environment
c) the existence of a maximal response to that environment given said conditions

P1: The more accurate my interpretation of the clues, the greater potential of performing the maximal behavior.

P2: The greater potential of performing the maximal behavior, the greater the relevance of the behavior to the maximal solution.

Therefore: The more accurate my interpretation of the clues, the greater the relevance of the behavior to the maximal solution.

Again, this is a hastily constructed argument, but it comes much closer to the actual argument. It may not be right on target, but the language (more accurate, greater relevance, maximal solutions) may shed more light on what I am getting confused with as far as conditions place on the propositions.

I really appreciate the responses, they have been helpful, so far.

Thanks @TheMadFool, I have actually spent some time looking into hypothetical syllogisms, but I felt the actual argument didn't fit nicely into that category, but I am obviously not the one to judge.

I think what I was shying away from was the "if-then" nature of the conditionals in the hypothetical, whereas what I was getting caught up on was the "degree" to which one may choose or choose not to apply "math knowledge" or "affection". In other words, I may know math better than anyone, but that does not prevent me from making the conscious decision (or momentary lapse of reason) to answer incorrectly. Likewise, my math-loving partner may find knowledge of mathematics appealing and worthy of affection, but if at an inopportune time, jealousy could just as easily arise.

I am quite confident I am making this more complicated than it should be, and I feel I am trying to shove a square peg into a round hole...

The crux of my argument is to demonstrate that to maximize self-efficacy, one should pursue "X" type of mindset, but that does not mean that one must pursue self-efficacy, or that one may not just occasionally stumble into a state of maximized self-efficacy with a random mindset. However, for the pursuit of self-efficacy as a prolonged and consistent goal, the argument seems to shine quite nicely.

I'm aware that without presenting the argument, I am not giving anyone much to go on. I am just not sure if I am comfortable posting it here, being this is my brand-newbie first day to this site...