I discuss analogy at some length in considering the rules of evidence in my book. — Dfpolis

Just out of curiosity, what book?

Link?

I have been contemplating your post. I think we all agree it's an interesting one. I hesitate to say anything definite, as it deals with some quite technical matters with which I have at best a nodding acquaintance. Nevertheless, I would hate it to be said that I failed to rush in where angels fear to tread, so I am going to tentatively pitch a few thoughts to you - and to the forum at large.

Depending on your response, the first of these may turn out to represent a significant issue, or alternatively, a trivial and pedantic one. I don't know.

You say:

In each instance, something is “necessary” if it is logically entailed by some set of premises, which I’ll call its “basis.” — Dfpolis

I think your point here works better if we eliminate the word "logically" from that sentence. It is often said that logic provides our paradigm for necessity, but this does not mean that all necessity is logical necessity. For example, it is also often said that causation is physical necessity. So (setting aside Hume) the impact of one billiard ball upon a second billiard ball renders the movement of the second ball necessary. But this is physical necessity, not logical necessity.

I think you might further tighten the meaning of this sentence up by not only removing the word "logical" but replacing it with "certainly." Thus necessity becomes certain entailment.

What do you think?

Now we get to the part that I am most tentative about. Once you have this concept of necessity, I'm not entirely sure that the analogy of proportionality actually helps us. I don't disagree that certain entailment can be applied to different bases, but... so what? Especially if we take this concept of entailment to what seems to me to be its logical conclusion; namely that:

1. Modal logic need not be a separate branch of logic. Rather modality reflects ordinary deduction — Dfpolis

Incidentally, you may notice that by editing your quote carefully I have significantly changed its meaning: I cut off the end of the sentence above, which was "restricted by the relevant basis."

But my point - or perhaps my question - here is precisely that there may be only one meaning of necessity: certain entailment. And the fact that we may apply this concept to different things does [Edit: Oops! I meant DOES NOT] suggest multiple meanings. Any more than the fact that we may use the natural numbers to count different things - applies, oranges, rubber nipples, and so on - implies that the numbers take on different meanings depending on what is counted. 2 is 2 regardless of what is being counted. We just have the one concept being applied to different domains.

But... given that I've never actually studied modal logic, it's possible that there are horrible, horrible problems with what I just said that would be glaringly, idiotically obvious to a modal logician.

Yes, that's nice.

A technology capable of somehow interacting with The Force™ (or a science capable of explaining it) would be the obvious answer. But then, look how awesome midichlorians turned out to be!

Sooo... maybe AI powerful and creative enough to run military droids that were at least the equal of human soldiers, pilots, etc in strategic ability?

Of course, that would lead to a truly fundamental change in the SWU. Which may or may not be what you want in fanfic.

Still not seeing what any of this has to do with countable vs uncountable infinities.

Yes, I am familiar with the concept of countable vs uncountabile infinities. How exactly does it affect this argument?

Cool :smile:

All physically real objects have locations defined by at least three dimensions. So we are all volumes, not points. On that basis, I like @Terrapin Station & @Coben’s answer:

It has a location--a lot of them, actually because that's what space is. — Terrapin Station


Yes, it's a bit like asking where in the elephant is the elephant.

Answer: everywhere. — Coben

But suppose our universe exists inside a larger universe, for example, as imagined in string theory. So long as we aren’t sticklers for the word “where” applying only to the spatial dimensions of our own universe, but accept that it may apply to other dimensions as well, our universe then has a location inside that larger universe. Which leads us to christian2017’s answer:

if this universe is all that there is then i would agree with you that it has no position. If there are higher and lower dimensions then it does have some sort of position. — christian2017

“But,” some might say, “that’s just being pedantic. If the box is inside a larger box, the real question being asked here is clearly about the location of the larger box! Indeed, what we are really asking is where is the location the largest box of all. Whatever it may be.”

“Fair enough,” I say. “But what if there is no largest box? What if there is an infinite series of boxes? In that case there is no largest box, and every box has a location inside another box.”

Does that defeat Terrapin Station’s original answer?

I don’t think so. So long as we have some description or conception of the whole shebang, the infinite series [Edit: perhaps network rather than series?], even if our concept is just the word “cosmos,” then the location it has is clearly the set of all ordinates inside that cosmos.

Still... it was a fun ride while it lasted.

And I can’t help but add:

“Wherever you go, there you are.”

Who says philosophy has nothing to do with wisdom?

I simply ask you to stop with the nonsense, or prove the sense. — tim wood

On which note I ask you: How exactly does countability even become an issue here?

There is a difference between not dumbing a subject down, and explaining it in such a way that your explanation can only be understood by someone who has a sophisticated understanding of that subject already.

The following is a direct copy and paste from the article:

The following theses are all paradigmatically metaphysical:

“Being is; not-being is not” [Parmenides];
“Essence precedes existence” [Avicenna, paraphrased];
“Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone” [St Anselm, paraphrased];
“Existence is a perfection” [Descartes, paraphrased];
“Being is a logical, not a real predicate” [Kant, paraphrased];
“Being is the most barren and abstract of all categories” [Hegel, paraphrased];
“Affirmation of existence is in fact nothing but denial of the number zero” [Frege];
“Universals do not exist but rather subsist or have being” [Russell, paraphrased];
“To be is to be the value of a bound variable” [Quine]. — van Inwagen, Peter and Sullivan, Meghan

Hmm... Okay. Cool.

My personal favorites are the final three. Although "Existence is a perfection" has its charms too.

Incidentally, you misrepresent me.

why do you have this expectation that learning it should be effortless for everyone, no matter their background? — SophistiCat

What I actually said was:

an encyclopaedia article should be comprehensible to an intelligent lay person willing to put in a little effort. — Theologian

I still don't think they're reaching that bar.

Try reading the article in its entirety and then get back to me. Of course, you do realize that I suggest this only because you have now earned sufficient enmity that I want to make you suffer...

Somehow I find myself reminded of this...

I have no idea what you are talking about. Technical terms? What technical terms? — SophistiCat

Read again. I never mentioned "technical terms." I said:

You either have the highly technical background knowledge [emphasis added] required to make sense of this or you don't. — Theologian

The question is, can an intelligent lay person who consults an encyclopaedia article hoping to gain a basic understanding of what metaphysics is be expected to know about Aquinas's Five Ways?

Of course not.

So is using Aquinas's Five Ways as an illustrative example a good way to explain metaphysics to a lay readership?

Of course not.

The author is writing for himself, and perhaps for other philosophers. To return again to the fact that this needs to be judged as an encyclopaedia article, it's lazy, self indulgent writing.

As for your point, which I anticipated, that the reader could always go look it up, yes, of course they could. But to repeat again what I said before, they shouldn't have to. The writer of this article is the one who's there to explain things. And he's doing a really bad job of it.

You say:

you would still be able to infer from the context that some famous historical philosophical text is a paradigmatic example of metaphysical writing — SophistiCat

Well, obviously. But that tells us literally nothing about what metaphysics is.

Finally, yes, ten seconds is about all it takes to lean that Aquinas's Five Ways are:

five logical arguments regarding the existence of God summarized by the 13th-century Catholic philosopher and theologian St. Thomas Aquinas in his book Summa Theologica. — SophistiCat

But even if this does not tell us literally nothing, it still tells us very little. Perhaps... that metaphysics might have something to do with the existence of God? That's about it. It certainly doesn't tell us enough to extract much sense out of the article we started with. Why, for example, did the author zero in on only the first three of the five ways? We don't know. We can only find out by investing a significant level of effort into a task we shouldn't have had to undertake in the first place.

I repeat: it's lazy, self-indulgent writing. And it's a bad encyclopaedia article.

Perhaps we've been reading different articles, because my impression of the SEP is the exact opposite. — SophistiCat

Yes, they do vary considerably. But not to worry: if you keep using it you'll come across one of the abominations soon enough. The link I already provided is a good place to start.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/ — Theologian

Incidentally, when I said:

Quite near the beginning of this atrociously dense and technical piece of writing, the author throws in the line: "The first three of Aquinas's Five Ways are metaphysical arguments on any conception of metaphysics." — Theologian

You inquired:

I don't understand why you find this sentence problematic. English is not my first language, so tell me, I am curious: is it the style? Or do you really not understand what it is saying? — SophistiCat

It's problematic for exactly the reason I specified. If you read on, I continued:

What is the intelligent lay person supposed to make of that? What, I could not help but wonder, even the first time I read it, was the genius lay person supposed to make of it? You either have the highly technical background knowledge required to make sense of this or you don't. Of course in this day and age you can always go look it up elsewhere, but to demand that kind of thing from your reader is just bad writing. To explain the technical in terms of the even more technical is appalling pedagogical practice. And this is far from the only instance in the article where the author does this. Indeed, the practice almost seems to be his standard operating procedure. — Theologian

I realize I'm practicing thread necromancy here, but for whatever reason the side-bar suggested this thread to me under "More Discussions," and I wanted to say I completely agree with Thorongil.

A lot of the SEP articles are terrible encyclopaedia articles. Very often I think it would be better described as the "Stanford Technical Manual of Philosophy": the key difference being that an encyclopaedia article should be comprehensible to an intelligent lay person willing to put in a little effort. Very often the SEP seems to give that quaint notion a giant middle finger.

Not that long ago, this was assigned to me as one of my first year philosophy readings:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/

Quite near the beginning of this atrociously dense and technical piece of writing, the author throws in the line: "The first three of Aquinas's Five Ways are metaphysical arguments on any conception of metaphysics."

What is the intelligent lay person supposed to make of that? What, I could not help but wonder, even the first time I read it, was the genius lay person supposed to make of it? You either have the highly technical background knowledge required to make sense of this or you don't. Of course in this day and age you can always go look it up elsewhere, but to demand that kind of thing from your reader is just bad writing. To explain the technical in terms of the even more technical is appalling pedagogical practice. And this is far from the only instance in the article where the author does this. Indeed, the practice almost seems to be his standard operating procedure.

I'm not denying that this article has its uses; or that it cannot be helpful to certain audiences. But judged as an encyclopaedia article (dare I say qua an encyclopaedia article) it is one of the most execrable pieces of writing I have ever encountered.

You know, I've always said that the reason I decided to study metaphysics in the first place was because I wanted to make telepathic contact with the saucer people...

When one takes into account the amount of intelligence that has been invested in attempts to prove the existence of God, it is hard to answer entirely in the negative.

But of course, that is a completely different thing from believing that their arguments are valid, or their conclusions true. Extremely intelligent people can be quite delusional. Or simply wrong.

Belief may be a sucker's game. But intelligence on its own does not grant immunity to it.

I might as well come clean as to the limits of my own understanding. While I did a couple of philosophy units in my undergraduate degree way back when, I've only been seriously studying philosophy for a bit over a year. I said what I said in the OP because it seemed to me, rightly or wrongly, that the implication I drew was fairly self evident in the first formulation of the CI itself. But the deeper we go into the details of Kant (or any other philosopher) the more likely I am to say something that is purely and simply wrong.

But hey, I can live with that if everyone else can! :wink:

At this stage in my philosophical development, I think I would call myself a monist. But I am far from convinced that distinguishing between idealism and materialism actually gets us anywhere, or even has any meaning.

As I think you grasp, what I was getting at with the questions I put to you was that every human activity, inquiry included (scientific, philosophical, or otherwise) presupposes something. And you gotta start somewhere! Call that practical reasoning, if you will. But to treat what is presupposed by your starting point as a fundamental part of what is may be like committing to stay in kindergarten your whole life. I fear treating Kant's distinction between transcendental and natural causes as absolutely hard and fast may be falling into this trap. I prefer a more recursive approach in which which our presuppositions are continually open to reexamination in the light of our most recent round of discoveries.

I have often been struck by the thought that the activity of writing letters to Santa Clause presupposes the existence of Santa Clause...

Your list, however, has a more transcendental appeal that mine can never compete with! :smile:

Sorry, I'm not quite sure what you mean by "the Nussbaum thread."

EDIT: Oh, found it.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6046/nussbaum

Damn. I meant to make
Post one hundred a haiku.
The chance lost, I weep.

I think we would be getting closer if we mentioned the actual things that people value- relationships, physical pleasure, aesthetic pleasure, etc. The heuristic to see if one is violating a principle by which people obtain these things can be useful, but only if we understand what it is that people value, if that can even be ascertained. But then it is really a theory of value that comes first before talk of how a value may be contradicted. — schopenhauer1

But then, dear schopenhauer1, you're plunging directly into the unseemly waters of... utilitarianism!

:gasp: :gasp: :gasp:

...or at least paddling at their edges!!!

It may indeed be the case, that the categorical imperative only has any meaning for those rational agents that think themselves in possession of a transcendental causality. — Mww

I can't deny that we have the kind of experience we do because, at least in part, our minds are constructed a certain way. But I also don't think that accepting this much leads to a literal acceptance of transcendental causality as understood by Kant. One may, perhaps, see Kant as paving the way for something like modern "cognitive" science; which itself seems to offer a more recursive rather than strictly "top down" way of understanding the relationship between mind and experience.

You can't "do science" without taking positions that are inherently philosophical, and which certainly don't seem to be subject to immediate empirical verification. That realization was what got me interested in philosophy to start with. But at the same time, having taken the necessary positions and "done some science," I also can't deny that that seems to lead to a far more sophisticated and and better justified understanding of the mind than we could ever have arrived at a priori. As I said, a recursive relationship.

And while I'm not going to attempt to prove it in this post, I am far from convinced that where this understanding ultimately leads includes a distinction between transcendental and natural causes.

Though not completely dismissive of the idea either...

Oh, PS:

Here are a couple of questions you might like to consider:

Does what starts off as epistemologically fundamental necessarily have to wind up as ontologically fundamental?

Does it necessarily have to wind up in your final ontology at all?

Okay, I'm about to nod off, so this will be my last post for a bit.

And somehow, I feel I'm playing Euthyphro to your Socrates, and my answer to this question is going to set me up for something! But hey, I'll play on...

Beyond the commonality I previously noted for the purposes of the argument I was making at the time, I think the one of which you speak is that all four:

1. Point to what we might call some "natural" inclination towards immediate personal satisfaction (relieving pain or want, avarice, or self indulgent idleness);

2. Asks the question "what if acting in said way became a universal law?" (This of course being the connection to the first formulation of the categorical imperative);

3. Then comes to the conclusion that a world in which everyone gave in to this inclination became a universal law is simply not possible.

I could leave it there, but the quote with which you lead in makes me wonder if you aren't also looking for a "1(b)" where one could also see the commonality that empirical observation (or at least, short term observation, or observation only within the scope of our individual lives) might lead us to the conclusion that acting on what I previously called "some 'natural' inclination" would actually make the world, or at least our own lives better.

Now, your second question:

By "it" I take it you mean the "it" in "will that it become a universal law."

I take that "it" to refer to the maxim on which you would be acting.

(I was tempted to say "would hypothetically be acting," but in this context that could be construed as confusing!)

I'm wondering if where you're headed with this is a view of maxims as referring to, or at least more concerned with motives (those "'natural' inclinations" I spoke of earlier).

Given that all revolve around reducing pain or want; or increasing pleasure and prosperity, one could also see in these examples Kant setting up ethical problems where he can show (or attempt to show) that a utilitarian response ultimately breaks down.

Anyway, bedtime for me. Over to you, Socrates!

Interesting. — Mww

You know, a former lecturer of mine, who was himself a former student of Noam Chomsky's, once told me that Chomsky "Played academic hardball, in which it was more important to be interesting than right."

I may yet have a great career ahead of me! :wink:

Yay! Chaotic Evil! :grin:

Cheers! :smile:

Now this is turning into pure nonsense. — Echarmion

Hmm... Okay.

Allow me to speak with equal candor. Deep in your own nonsense (I shan't speculate on whether it's willful or not), you do actually have me on one point. Kant's maxims are indeed expressed - or at least can be expressed - in the form of "if X then Y." You got me.

But...

1. This is very different from

whether you can add as many conditions as you like to a “maxim.” — Theologian

which is what I was actually arguing against; and

2. At times Kant's "X" value is so general that it's virtually absent. For example, take two maxims that Kant does consider (for the purposes of rejecting):

"to increase my wealth by any safe means" (Critique of Practical Reason, Mary Gregor trans.)

"When I think myself in want of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know that I never can do so." (from the same link Mww gave that I referenced before).

The first is not expressed in the form "if X then Y," but I acknowledge it can be. "By any safe means" may be transformed to the X value as "if it is safe to do so." But this seems such a general condition as to be a virtually absent "X" to me.

Similarly so an X value that is "being in want of money," when the Y value is to go get some money.

So if you want to pull me up on

absolve yourself of all responsibility for the actions of all other rational beings — Theologian

...not being a maxim because it is not of the form "if X then Y," then fine.

IF it is safe to do so, THEN I will absolve myself of all responsibility for the actions of all other rational beings.

There you go. Now it's a maxim. :smile:

You are right about this, I acknowledge the fact, but I don't think this has any real effect on anything I actually said.

Otherwise... I think we may perhaps have reached the point where we may each agree that the other's posts speak for themselves, and require no further comment.

Thus, "property is a concept that is good for society" is really more what Kant is saying morally, and not the categorical imperative. — schopenhauer1

Kinda makes me want to merge this with the socialism thread. Kant is so bourgeois.

While I'm going off on tangents, I think there's another serious problem with Kant's solution to the murderer at the door scenario that hasn't been pointed out thus far.

Kant's solution only works if we absolve ourselves of all responsibility for the actions of others - or at least, of all others we recognize as rational beings. But suppose the maxim "absolve yourself of all responsibility for the actions of all other rational beings" became universal.

There could certainly be no police, no judiciary, no penal system. Civilized society would collapse overnight.

Okay, that's enough from me for now. Over to the rest of you.

You know, having poured out all the above, I can now see another problem. And it's a problem both for me and for Kant.

What I said above is fine just so long as all our maxims are "Thou shalt nots." But what if we also have a maxim that's a "thou shalt," and the two conflict?

Whatever you do then, you'll have broken a maxim!

Kant, of course, takes the coward's way out, claiming (as I previously observed) that such a conflict is inconceivable.

Of course, even if he's wrong, it's only a problem if we assume all situations have a moral way out. Perhaps the universe, by its very nature, just compels us to be sinful? I'm back to the teachings of Saint Bartholomew: "You're damned if we do and you're damned if you don't." There's nothing incoherent about that. It's just a nasty universe.

But the idea of an inherently moral universe does bring me to what I've long thought of as the real fundamental problem with Kantian ethics.

All (or at least most) ethical theorists have sought to establish an objective basis to their favored theory. Kant’s is that morals are implied a priori by reason. To be immoral is to be irrational, and to be perfectly rational is to be perfectly moral. That is what Kant actually said. And his basis for that claim is that if you act according to a maxim that you could not at the same time will to be universal, you are being irrational. Kant’s claim is that if you don’t want to live in a world where everyone welshes on their debits all the time; or you can see that a world where everyone welshes on their debts all the time is simply not logically possible, because no-one would ever lend in the first place, then it is irrational for you to welsh on your debts. You are, in effect, saying that you disapprove of this action, while at the same time engaging in it yourself. Which is, so he claims, irrational, and we can know this a priori.

My own “naïve” response to this is that when you act according to a maxim, you are not making it universal. That is simply not the decision you are making. So superficially at least, it seems profoundly irrational to insist on acting as if it was.

Kant’s claim – that it is irrational to act according to a maxim that you would not will to be universal – only makes sense if you introduce an additional assumption: that there are in fact maxims that prescribe moral and immoral actions. Either that, or that there are moral and immoral actions, and that these can be prescribed by maxims.

So what masquerades as Kant’s conclusion – that there is an objective basis to morality – is in fact his unstated premise: That there is an objective basis to morality. So reduced to its naïve form, with its real fundamental premise laid bare, Kant’s true argument form devolves to A therefore A.

Impressive, ain’t it?

Great... I just spent the last three hours putting the finishing touches on a 1,300 word attack on Kantian deontology. To say nothing of the time spent on it over the last few days.

This, apparently, is what I do for fun...

I gotta get a better forum-life balance! :gasp:

@Wittgenstein@Mww
Anyone who’s ever tried to “do” philosophy, to examine, take apart, or, dare I suggest, contribute to philosophical arguments, inevitably notices that the exact formulation of a position matters. It matters a lot. A subtle re-wording of a premise can open up or rule out entire lines of reasoning. A minor tweak to a conclusion can make the difference between a valid and an invalid argument. Anyone who attempts to do philosophy, even for just five minutes, quickly notices this.

To give an example from relatively philosophical recent history, logical positivism holds that all metaphysical statements are meaningless. But, it has been countered, “metaphysical statements are meaningless” is itself a metaphysical statement.

Whatever you may think of that argument, the logical positivists do not get to say “Oh, but you know perfectly well that we didn’t intend to imply that, so you’re just being willfully ignorant of the details of our philosophy.” That’s not how implication works. It’s not how philosophy works either. If the position of logical positivism, as formulated and advanced by logical positivists, turns out to have self-contradictory implications, that is a problem – for the logical positivists. It is not evidence that the person who points out this self-contradiction is just being willfully ignorant because they failed to focus exclusively on what the logical positivists intended to imply.

My own argument form, as @Kippo correctly identified right from the outset, was reductio ad absurdum. It is a valid argument form. And it pretty well always works by identifying some implication that everyone knows perfectly well your opponent never intended to imply.

So. Does, as I suggested, Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative imply that literally everything is forbidden?

To me, it all comes down to whether or not we take Kant at his word when he says “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.” I think “only” is the crucial word here, because if there is even one maxim you are acting in accordance with that you cannot at the same time will that it become a universal law, you are no longer “acting only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.”

QED.

Furthermore, a great deal that Kant says only makes sense if we interpret the first formulation of the categorical imperative in this way. In every instance I have found where Kant argues that some specific act is wrong, all he does (or even tries to do) is show that it forms an instance of acting in accordance with a maxim we could not at the same time will to be universal.

For example, following the reference Mww gave

My reference can be found here: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5682/5682-h/5682-h.htm#link2H_4_0005 . Scroll to SECOND SECTION—TRANSITION FROM POPULAR MORAL PHILOSOPHY TO THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, then scroll some more to the 7th indented footnote on what a maxim is — Mww

and scrolling down a bit lower, we find:

***

1. A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied of life, but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of nature. His maxim is: "From self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction." It is asked then simply whether this principle founded on self-love can become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life would contradict itself and, therefore, could not exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law of nature and, consequently, would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty.
2. Another finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money. He knows that he will not be able to repay it, but sees also that nothing will be lent to him unless he promises stoutly to repay it in a definite time. He desires to make this promise, but he has still so much conscience as to ask himself: "Is it not unlawful and inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this way?" Suppose however that he resolves to do so: then the maxim of his action would be expressed thus: "When I think myself in want of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know that I never can do so." Now this principle of self-love or of one's own advantage may perhaps be consistent with my whole future welfare; but the question now is, "Is it right?" I change then the suggestion of self-love into a universal law, and state the question thus: "How would it be if my maxim were a universal law?" Then I see at once that it could never hold as a universal law of nature, but would necessarily contradict itself. For supposing it to be a universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be able to promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping his promise, the promise itself would become impossible, as well as the end that one might have in view in it, since no one would consider that anything was promised to him, but would ridicule all such statements as vain pretences.
3. A third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some culture might make him a useful man in many respects. But he finds himself in comfortable circumstances and prefers to indulge in pleasure rather than to take pains in enlarging and improving his happy natural capacities. He asks, however, whether his maxim of neglect of his natural gifts, besides agreeing with his inclination to indulgence, agrees also with what is called duty. He sees then that a system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal law although men (like the South Sea islanders) should let their talents rest and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement, and propagation of their species- in a word, to enjoyment; but he cannot possibly will that this should be a universal law of nature, or be implanted in us as such by a natural instinct. For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his faculties be developed, since they serve him and have been given him, for all sorts of possible purposes.
4. A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to contend with great wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks: "What concern is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as Heaven pleases, or as he can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor even envy him, only I do not wish to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in distress!" Now no doubt if such a mode of thinking were a universal law, the human race might very well subsist and doubtless even better than in a state in which everyone talks of sympathy and good-will, or even takes care occasionally to put it into practice, but, on the other side, also cheats when he can, betrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates them. But although it is possible that a universal law of nature might exist in accordance with that maxim, it is impossible to will that such a principle should have the universal validity of a law of nature. For a will which resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law of nature, sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires.

***

Notice how in all of the above, Kant never once, not once, considers that there may be some alternative maxim that could also apply, and which you could at the same time will to be universal, and that this may, perhaps, make the act permissible. Of course, he doesn’t need to consider this possibility if we take his use of the word “only” in the first formulation of the categorical imperative seriously. He has shown that an act is in accordance with a maxim that you cannot at the same time will to be universal. Therefore, by his own standards, he has made his case and he can stop there.

By contrast, if we don’t take him at his word, and assume that somehow he is not serious when he uses the word “only,” literally all the arguments that he advances above now have a hole in them that you could drive a truck through. Or perhaps an infinite series of trucks, since one can always dream up new maxims to test.

Everything I said applies equally well to Kant's argument that stealing is wrong. If we all stole all the time, private property could no longer exist, so there could be no such thing as stealing. Therefore we cannot steal and at the same time will that stealing be universal. Therefore stealing is wrong. And that, once again, is that.

Are you noticing a pattern here?

If you read the secondary literature on Kant, it seems generally accepted among ethicists that one of the great weaknesses in Kantian ethics is that Kant rarely provides much in the way of guidance for choosing between competing moral imperatives. I refer interested parties to a reference I gave before in a previous post:

https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/30317932.pdf

The only well known example of Kant considering any kind of moral quandary [and the only example at all that I'm aware of in which can actually provides the solution to the quandary] is the famous “killer at the door” example that has already been discussed. But even that seems to exist only to demonstrate that all other rational beings are independent moral agents, and so that you are not responsible for the maxims that they act on. If you lie, you yourself are acting in accordance with a maxim that you cannot at the same will to be universal. Therefore it's wrong, and all discussion ends.

Again, are you noticing that same pattern in his argument form? One broken maxim, QED.

Other than that... if you follow the link I gave immediately above (and scroll down to the first paragraph beginning on page 3), you'll see that Kant's theoretical response to the possibility of moral quandaries was that it was conceptually impossible for them to even exist, but that there could, perhaps, be conflicts between "the so-called 'grounds' of the obligations," and that in such cases the strongest grounds prevail. For myself I am far from convinced that this is even coherent, and that even if it is, that it does not wind up flatly contradict the first formulation of the categorical imperative. Nevertheless, I believe that this is the only even possible ground for refuting the claim I made in my OP, so I present it to you. It's possible that only someone completely committed to a really excruciating exegesis of Kant would be able to nut all this out. Or perhaps even that gives Kant too much credit. Maybe he's just fudging it at this point. He realizes he's in trouble, and so has resorted to such vague wording that no strong conclusions either way are possible. Or maybe I'm being too harsh. Maybe he, like the rest of us, just gets stuck and unsure sometimes.

"What if Kant were one of us?"

He is, you know. I think we forget that sometimes. And now I'll have that playing in my head all day...

Finally, currently there is a debate going on on this thread as to whether you can add as many conditions as you like to a “maxim.” Frankly, I don’t think that expanding out your maxims in this way is consistent with the term as used in Kant’s writings. But for the purposes of my own underlying thesis, even if you can, so what? The only real issue here is whether I'm right about the "only" part. If I am, then expanding on the range of possible maxims that could potentially apply only has to effect of expanding on the range of possible maxims that could potentially forbid the action.

The more freedom you give me to design maxims as I see fit, the easier it becomes for me to come up with at least one maxim that seems to apply that no-one could at the same time will to be universal. The freedom to add additional clauses and contingencies as I see fit makes it easier, not harder, for me to dream up some perverse maxim that an act is in accordance which, yet which you could not, at the same time, will to be universal. You’re strengthening, not weakening my hand.

@Wittgenstein

A conditional maxim is a contradiction in terms. — Wittgenstein


Could you elaborate on that? — Echarmion

I can't speak for Wittgenstein, but I would suggest that it means that a rule can't be contingently universal. There's a contradiction in terms there.

I'd gone away for a bit because I wanted to consult the primary and secondary literature carefully and see if I still thought what I thought when I OP-ed. Only now, coming back, I can see I have even more to catch up with! :razz:

On a matter of - dare I say - practical reason, there are posts I can write in pretty much the time it takes to type them, and there are posts that require actual research. I probably can't afford too many of the latter because there are actually other things I need to get done besides participate in this forum!

Nevertheless, you should hear more from me shortly...

Yes, yes. I know...

Ahh, yeah. Okay. Makes sense. Thank you for the comprehensive reply. :smile:

you cherry pick some misleading facts and must deliberately dance around facts that would demolish the notion you try to put forward. — ritikew

On a completely different note, I am afraid I don't know what the facts are that would demolish what Maw said here. Could you expand on this point a bit?

I have mixed feelings about Chomsky. But I was very unimpressed by the description he gave of Skinner as a "Nazi." Which he bravely did after Skinner was dead and so could no longer sue for libel.

Maybe one day I will start a thread on methodological behaviorism...

haha don't take it personally son — ritikew

As for the "son" part, I may be a little older than...

I've only been seriously studying philosophy for a little over a year. — Theologian

...may have lead you to believe! :wink:

What I said is, true, but I never said I hadn't done anything else. Though I am definitely not up there with Bitter Crank!

As for the

so far from what I have seen here, pretty much correct on Marx's work. — ritikew

...part, feel free to make the case. I'm certainly not here claiming to be any kind of expert on Marxist theory myself.

I just don't find it persuasive when someone's entire argument is "Hey, I've read the book, so I know." Especially when it's a long and complex book, and it seems that there are plenty of other folks who've also read the book and "know" differently.

I confess: Back when I was an English major (shortly after Adam and Eve moved out of Eden) I too had to decide which long boring books I would skip. Sometimes the skipped books were important. But... there are only so many hours in a day, and one's brain can absorb and process only so much. I admit it: The thought of reading all of Shakespeare is still horrifying. Or any of Thackeray and Trollope. It's not going to happen, and I still call myself an English major.

I believe in evolution, but I didn't read Darwin. Instead I've read lots of bits and pieces about evolution. — Bitter Crank

Thank you, Bitter Crank. That's pretty much where I'm coming from. The practical reality, I think, for all of us, is that if we limit ourselves only to those thinkers whose work we have the wherewithal to read directly, our intellectual horizons would shrink drastically. There's just too much out there. As our American friends might say, sometimes we need the CliffsNotes version.

Now, @Maw:

What I find "dismissive" is someone who has not read an iota of Marx and yet has already passed judgement on Marxism because of secondary sources, de-contextualized readings from a political pamphlet, and a citation-less online encyclopedia, which while useful is not a substitute for doing the actual readings. — Maw

But how dismissive have I been really? Yes, I start out with the view that Marx says that the fall of capitalism is inevitable. Based on the secondary sources I've seen to date, I had no reason to believe that to be controversial. But once that view was challenged, I acknowledged the limits of my own knowledge, and I think have been pretty open to the possibility that I what I thought I knew may have been wrong.

If you want to talk lack of citations, frankly, look to the beam in your own eye. But speaking of, my own list of secondary sources now include this:

"Ultimately, according to Das Kapital, the 'capitalist class becomes unfit to rule, because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery.' Consequently, the capitalist system collapses, and the working class inherits economic and political power."

https://www.britannica.com/topic/Das-Kapital

I still make room for the possibility that Das Kapital says no such thing. It's not like I consider Britannica to be infallible. But I do consider it a little more authoritative than a random person I just met on the internet. I want to stress that I don't mean that to be a slight or an attack on anyone present. I acknowledge that any of you could with equal validity describe me in exactly the same terms. Absent some pretty compelling argument or evidence, if I said one thing and Britannica said the opposite, can anyone here honestly say that they'd believe me?

Absent some previously earned credibility, pointing at a very thick book and saying "Oh, it agrees with me" doesn't count for very much. Because, as we all know, no-one can read all the thick books. Including you, Maw.

Whether you care enough to put in the effort to unpack it a bit more is up to you.

Just wanted to thank everyone who's contributed suggestions thus far. Hopefully this thread will grow even more over time! :smile: