Agreed.

I don't count Reason as a Passion (emotion) because I subscribe to the biological account of brain activity. Reason is situated in the pre-frontal cortex, emotion is seated in the limbic system. Hume, of course, didn't have any fMRI's to help him out, so his conclusions are impressive. That he agrees with me is even more amazing! >:) — Bitter Crank

But reason can certainly re-train the reactions of the limbic system, that is why it is possible to overcome fears, such that when exposed to the object of fear, one no longer feels the anxiety. It is part of the brain's neuroplasticity.

If M. A. thought "the passions only occur if reason demands that they do in that particular context" then he was an idiot. Like as not he knew perfectly well that he could not FEEL ravenous hatred just because in context that emotion would be a good idea. He wouldn't be able to feel even moderately bored on command--and no one else would either. You can choose what to order for lunch, but you can not choose how you will feel about the food you get. — Bitter Crank

Well, it seems to me that you are willing to call quite a few people idiots: Epictetus, Seneca, Spinoza, Epicurus, etc. And yes you can choose how you will feel about it (or rather how you will not feel about it). For example, you can do a stoic exercise, wherein you imagine that the food that will be served to you will be served rotten on purpose so that others laugh at you. Prior to getting the food, you can train your mind so that it doesn't react with anger when it receives the food in such a condition. Hopefully, this will be just an exercise, and your food will be alright tho :p

Reason can not summon emotions. Reason can make you behave AS IF you felt something, but you will know that it is fake. If Marcus did not love Annia Galeria Faustina Minor, he would not feel it. He could act as if he did, but he could not FEEL LOVE on reason's command. — Bitter Crank

I'm not sure. I think this isn't entirely true. You can make yourself fall in love with someone for example. All you have to do is repeatedly idealise them in your mind, bring them into your mind's eye, fantasize over them, create your own stories about them, imagine great adventures with them, imagine having sex with them, etc. If you do this repeatedly, you will start feeling in love with them. This is undeniable, I mean the whole of cognitive behavioral therapy, rational emotive behavioral therapy (REBT), mindfulness-based-cognitive-therapy etc. are based precisely on this point: we can decide how to feel about things.

That Reason can order our Passions about is a conceit that pro-reason partisans like to entertain. It's nonsense. The conceit works OK when you like what you are thinking, and doing what you like to do, and nothing is getting in your way. Then somebody comes along and trips you, kicks you in the balls, and shits on your head. You will rage and burn (at least for awhile) regardless of what your reason thinks you should feel. — Bitter Crank

Yes, I will probably rage about it, if I haven't prepared myself in advance. Having your reason dominate your passions is as difficult as it is rare as Spinoza put it.

The passions are of the body, the body is of nature, and nature always bats last. — Bitter Crank

I think Reason is of nature too; I mean I don't see why not!

Just got the 6 months subscription! :) Do I get to turn green or something now? >:)

The best example of anti-art, Groys writes, is Marcel Duchamp’s 1917 “Readymade Fountain.” Duchamp signed (under the name R. Mutt) and dated a store-bought, mass-made, porcelain urinal and then exhibited it. Is the urinal art? Does it do what art is supposed to do? Once it’s been moved into a gallery space, Duchamp suggests, the answer is decisively yes. And what is art supposed to do, anyway? If a viewer gives the urinal—or fountain, rather—the same kind of concentrated attention one gives a work by Monet, is it any less of an aesthetic experience? Duchamp seems to be saying that the creativity and craftsmanship one sees in excellent works of fine art can be found lining the walls of public restrooms, if only one is able to look at those urinals in a certain way. Beauty is not just in the eye of the beholder, anti-art points out, but is invented in the eye of the beholder.

Anti-art’s aim is not to rob art of its purpose but to democratize it, to make it clear that the bathroom has as much aesthetic interest as the gallery if only one is able to change one’s mindset.

From: http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-arts-and-culture/books/101723/a-philosopher-of-small-things

That's just some interesting stuff I came upon these last few days that I just got reminded of when I saw the picture of the "Readymade Fountain" here. Not that I agree with it; personally I don't like the urinal, and I do agree with Thorongil that it does not give me an aesthetic experience which makes my mind come to a halt and become fully present, with no will, passions, or desires left.

Except that I would disagree about the "facing up to great challenges" bit. Heathcliff does not look at it as a "great challenge" to get back Catherine and destroy Linton. In fact, for him, it is no challenge at all -> even thinking about it gives him great joy. That is why he states "while I'm thinking of that, I don't feel any pain". Thinking of it as a challenge suggests to me that somehow there is a doubt about one's capacity to overcome it; one looks at it as a mountain of suffering one must bypass to get to what he desires. We're still thinking in terms of "can I do this or can I not?", and we're not very far from the question "should I do this, or should I not?". Notice that for Heathcliff, these questions never come up... he does not care whether he can do it or he can't; he will die trying if he must. For him it isn't a challenge - it's his life. He is not trying to surpass himself, or become better or anything like that. He is merely trying to become who he already is.

How very Humean of you BC! It will remain mere wordplay unless we clarify what are the practical differences between Reason also being a passion and Reason being something different. When I say that Reason can also be a passion, I simply mean that Reason can restrain and overcome any other passion in individuals where it is the strongest passion. In my opinion, reason and the passions share the same essence. It is only a question of which is stronger in a given individual, since they all compete in governing them. There have been very few individuals in history in whom Reason became the strongest passion. Take an individual like Marcus Aurelius; in such a man, Reason dominates the passions; it means that the passions only occur if reason demands that they do in that particular context. Then take an individual like Hamlet, where a group of passions (love, hatred, anger) dominate and enslave his reason. In the former case, Marcus feels love towards his wife because Reason demands that he does (since they are married). In the latter case, Hamlet hates Claudius despite the fact that, rationally, whatever happened is already done with, and it is not affecting him anymore in any way -> thus his hatred has overpowered his reason, instead of the other way around.

Thanks for your warm welcome @Mayor of Simpleton @Baden @jamalrob ! :)

Hey guys! This new forum seems great! I might stop posting on the original PF for now, and keep all new things posted here, unless I find something interesting from time to time there! :) Thanks for this new opportunity guys, and looking forward to keep talking with you!

I guess my "ethical" question goes deeper - should reason be dominated by the passions, or should reason itself become a passion dominating all the others a la Epicurus, Spinoza, et al.?

I don't know @Thorongil... you seem to be worried about being deceived by believing that which is false. But as Kierkegaard states: "One may be deceived in many ways: one may be deceived by believing the false, but one may also be deceived by not believing the true [...] Whose recovery is more doubtful? [...] To awaken one who is sleeping or to awaken one who, awaking, dreams that he is awake?" This is further supplanted by the observation of William James that some things become possibly true by means of our belief in them:

Now, let us consider what the logical elements of this situation are in case the religious hypothesis in both its branches be really true. (Of course, we must admit that possibility at the outset. If we are to discuss the question at all, it must involve a living option. If for any of you religion be a hypothesis that cannot, by any living possibility be true, then you need go no farther. I speak to the 'saving remnant' alone.) So proceeding, we see, first that religion offers itself as a momentous option. We are supposed to gain, even now, by our belief, and to lose by our nonbelief, a certain vital good. Secondly, religion is a forced option, so far as that good goes. We cannot escape the issue by remaining sceptical and waiting for more light, because, although we do avoid error in that way if religion be untrue, we lose the good, if it be true, just as certainly as if we positively chose to disbelieve. It is as if a man should hesitate indefinitely to ask a certain woman to marry him because he was not perfectly sure that she would prove an angel after he brought her home. Would he not cut himself off from that particular angel-possibility as decisively as if he went and married some one else? Scepticism, then, is not avoidance of option; it is option of a certain particular kind of risk. Better risk loss of truth than chance of error,-that is your faith-vetoer's exact position. He is actively playing his stake as much as the believer is; he is backing the field against the religious hypothesis, just as the believer is backing the religious hypothesis against the field. To preach scepticism to us as a duty until 'sufficient evidence' for religion be found, is tantamount therefore to telling us, when in presence of the religious hypothesis, that to yield to our fear of its being error is wiser and better than to yield to our hope that it may be true. It is not intellect against all passions, then; it is only intellect with one passion laying down its law. And by what, forsooth, is the supreme wisdom of this passion warranted? Dupery for dupery, what proof is there that dupery through hope is so much worse than dupery through fear ? I, for one, can see no proof; and I simply refuse obedience to the scientist's command to imitate his kind of option, in a case where my own stake is important enough to give me the right to choose my own form of risk. If religion be true and the evidence for it be still insufficient, I do not wish, by putting your extinguisher upon my nature (which feels to me as if it had after all some business in this matter), to forfeit my sole chance in life of getting upon the winning side,--that chance depending, of course, on my willingness to run the risk of acting as if my passional need of taking the world religiously might be prophetic and right.

[...]

I began by a reference to Fitz James Stephen; let me end by a quotation from him. " What do you think of yourself? What do you think of the world? . . . These are questions with which all must deal as it seems good to them. They are riddles of the Sphinx, and in some way or other we must deal with them. . . . In all important transactions of life we have to take a leap in the dark.... If wc decide to leave the riddles unanswered, that is a choice; if we waver in our answer, that, too, is a choice: but whatever choice we make, we make it at our peril. If a man chooses to turn his back altogether on God and the future, no one can prevent him; no one can show beyond reasonable doubt that he is mistaken. If a man thinks otherwise and acts as he thinks, I do not see that any one can prove that he is mistaken. Each must act as he thinks best; and if he is wrong, so much the worse for him. We stand on a mountain pass in the midst of whirling snow and blinding mist through which we get glimpses now and then of paths which may be deceptive. If we stand still we shall be frozen to death. If we take the wrong road we shall be dashed to pieces. We do not certainly know whether there is any right one. What must we do? ' Be strong and of a good courage.' Act for the best, hope for the best, and take what comes. . . . If death ends all, we cannot meet death better." — William James

The quotations are from Kierkegaard and William James, two sources I recommend you should read if you haven't already:

1. Works of Love by Kierkegaard (https://www.scribd.com/doc/239527503/Soren-Kierkegaard-Works-of-Love)
2. The Will to Believe (essay) by William James (http://educ.jmu.edu//~omearawm/ph101willtobelieve.html)

It seems pretty similar to what Pierre Hadot states - theoretical discourse is useful only in-so-far as it can lead to the practice of a good life. Of course, one can never cover in theoretical discourse all the possible occurrences in life, but theoretical discourse gives one sufficient guidance to help them develop an instinct/habit of reacting spontaneously to whatever happens; or as you say it offers a structure to field value notions. And I don't disagree lol.

You are mis-reading me and projecting your own thoughts onto what I have said. To wit:
"We only evaluate that which we think MAY not be good" + "if someone ends up evaluating, this shows that whatever activity they are engaging in does not have a clear, INDUBITABLE value". Both these sentences mean that the decision to evaluate underlies an uncertainty about the value of something. To which your reply that "it does not show that the activity has no clear value" just misses the point. It's not supposed to show that, it's only supposed to show that "we can't be sure [...] about its value" as you state.

And to answer your new question. Take Heathcliff for example:

"He leant his two elbows on his knees, and his chin on his hands and remained rapt in dumb meditation. On my inquiring the subject of his thoughts, he answered gravely 'I'm trying to settle how I shall pay Hindley back. I don't care how long I wait, if I can only do it at last. I hope he will not die before I do!'

'For shame, Heathcliff!' said I. 'It is for God to punish wicked people; we should learn to forgive.'

'No, God won’t have the satisfaction that I shall,' he returned. 'I only wish I knew the best way! Let me alone, and I'll plan it out: while I'm thinking of that I don't feel pain.'"

Notice that he never bothers to evaluate whether his action is valuable. He is only concerned with how he can carry it out. Why? Because its value is indubitable to him - it doesn't require to be evaluated. In other words - we only evaluate when we have doubts about value. When we are certain - no need for evaluation.

But the entire decision to evaluate it betrays a doubt - a doubt about its value. After all, we only evaluate that which we think may not be good. So if someone ends up evaluating, this shows that whatever activity they are engaging in does not have a clear, indubitable value.

No, but reason does not play a role in it being captured - it is supra-rational. Certain experiences in life are extremely valuable to those who have them - amongst those mystical experiences, experiences of strong attachement/love/passion, etc.

Yes, obviously my post is using reason as well, that's not the point though. The point is that there is more than that to life - something valuable that reason cannot capture.